Trial Court Rules Appeal Not Permissible From a Denial of a Motion to Recuse

In the case V.M., a minor v. Sattar, No. 2025-CV-01838 (C.P. Montg. Co. April 14, 2026 Saltz, J.), the trial court issued a Rule 1925 Opinion requesting the Superior Court to find that an interlocutory appeal from an Order denying a Motion for Recusal was not permissible given that the Order at issue was neither final nor otherwise immediately appealable.

In this matter, the Defendant’s Motion for Recusal was, according to the Court, based upon the judge’s prior rulings that were adverse to the party filing the motion for recusal. The Defendant was asserting that the judge had allegedly demonstrated bias against the Defendant in that regard.

In denying the Motion for Recusal, the court further ruled that a hearing on the recusal motion was not necessary because the motion did not present any facts that, if proven, would raise questions regarding the judge’s impartiality. Rather, in this matter, the Defendant’s Motion for Recusal was primarily based on the judge’s prior adverse rulings.

In this Rule 1925 Opinion, the trial court requested the Superior Court to quash the Defendant’s appeal as improper.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer Common Pleas Case Alert, www.Law.com (July 2, 2026).

Source of image:  Photo by Katrin Bolovtsova on www.pexels.com.

  

Judge Nealon of Lackawanna County Reviews the Standard of Review Applicable to a Motion for Recusal

In the case of Correctional Care, Inc. v. Lackawanna County, PA, No. 2021-CV-3079 (C.P. Lacka. Co. Oct. 10, 2025 Nealon, J.), the trial court set out the standard of review relative to a Petition to the court requesting a recusal of a trial judge or the entire trial bench.

In this case, the provider of healthcare services to correctional facilities filed a lawsuit against the County seeking compensation for monies allegedly owed to the Plaintiff under the parties’ contract.

During summary judgment proceedings, the healthcare provider produced a testimonial affidavit from one of the County judges who served as a prison board member during the relevant time period under the contract. In that affidavit, the County judge made references to facts pertinent to the issues presented under the contract.

Following its production of that affidavit, the healthcare provider filed a Petition requesting a “full bench recusal” based upon the other judge’s status as a potential trial witness. The healthcare provider also sought a change of venue.

Judge Terrence R. Nealon of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas, who addressed the recusal request, set out the standard of review.  Judge Nealon was not the judge who had provided the above-referenced affidavit.

Judge Nealon noted that a judge faced with a recusal request must first make a conscientious determination of the judge’s ability to assess the case in an impartial manner.

If the judge is satisfied with that subjective self-examination of objectivity, the judge must then consider whether the judge’s continued involvement in the case could reasonably create an appearance of impropriety.

The court referred to other cases in which judges of this particular court had recused themselves from matters in which a colleague was likely to testify.

The court noted that the presiding judge at the trial of this matter would have to determine whether the judge’s proffered testimony is admissible, and if that testimony is admissible, the acceptable scope of the cross-examination of the judge.

In this case, Judge Nealon noted that, although the court believed that it would decide those evidentiary issues impartially and objectively based upon the applicable law, the court’s consideration of the other factors led him to conclude that his proceeding in the matter as the judge when a colleague of his was a witness in the case could create an appearance of impropriety in reasonable minds.

Accordingly, Judge Nealon granted the request to recuse the bench from this case and directed the court administrator to reassign the pending summary judgment motions filed by parties, along with the Motion for a Venue Transfer, to another judge.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Source of image:  Photo by Tingey Law Office on www.unsplash.com.

Motion for Recusal Denied As Untimely

In the case of Philadelphia Cmty. Dev. Cole. v. Isabella, May Term, 2016, No. 04133 (C.P. Phila. Co. March 27, 2019 Powell, J.), the court addressed the current status of the Pennsylvania law surrounding a motion for recusal of a trial court judge.  

In denying the motion, the court noted that the parties seeking their recusal at a pattern of filing recusal motions at the trial level and on appeal, all of which had been previously denied. The court also observed that all of the party’s recusal motions had been filed after the court issued decisions adverse to that party.  

The court generally noted that judges are presumed under Pennsylvania law to be fair and competent.  

It was also noted that a party seeking recusal was required to raise the objection at the earliest possible moment or the issue would be considered time-barred.  

The court otherwise noted that, once a trial in a matter was completed, a party was deemed to have waived the right to have a judge disqualified.  

In cases where after-discovered evidence was involved, the moving party was required to show that the evidence could not have been brought to the attention of the court in the exercise of due diligence and that the existence of the evidence would have compelled a different result.  

In this matter, the party did not submit its Motion for Recusal until more than four (4) months after the trial court had finally decided the matter.   The court concluded that the Motion for Recusal was therefore untimely such that the issues raised were waived.   

The court additionally found that the party failed to meet the requirements regarding after-discovered evidence given that that evidence could have been easily discovered through a simple internet search and presented to the court far sooner.  

Please click this LINK if you wish to read this Opinion.

Appeal of Denial of Motion to Disqualify a Court Appointed Neutral Quashed

In the case of Haviland v. Kline & Specter, No. 1791 EDA 2017 (Pa. Super. March 22, 2018 Murray, J., McLaughlin, J., and Stevens, J.) (Op. by Murray, J.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court addressed the rules of pertaining to permissible appeals from the trial court. In this particular case, the question was whether a trial court’s denial of a motion to disqualify a court appointed neutral arbitrator was appealable.   The court ruled that it was not and, therefore, he appeal was quashed.  

This matter arose out of a dispute between law firms over fees.   In the trial court proceedings, the court appointed a neutral arbitrator to hear the matter.   One of the parties involved filed a motion to disqualify that arbitrator.   After the trial court denied the motion to disqualify the neutral arbitrator, the case was appealed.  

A main portion of this court’s Opinion dealt with whether the trial court’s denial of the motion to disqualify the arbitrator was appealable as a non-final order.   In this regard, the Superior Court stated that it was unable to locate any case directly on point. However, the court concluded that the case law addressing the interlocutory nature of pre-trial recusals of trial court judges to be persuasive and instructive.  

The court held that “an order denying a motion seeking the recusal or disqualification of an arbitrator, as with an order denying the recusal of a trial judge, is not a final order or an interlocutory order appealable as of right or as a collateral order.  

Given that the Superior Court found that the trial court’s Order denying a party’s motion to disqualify an arbitrator is not a final order or an interlocutory order appealable as of right or as a collateral order, the Superior Court quashed this appeal as it, therefore, did not have jurisdiction to the merits of the issue presented. 

Anyone wishing to read this case may click this LINK.

Timeliness of Recusal Motion Reviewed by Pennsylvania Supreme Court

In the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision in the case of Lomas v. Kravitz, No. 87 MAP 2016 (Pa. Sept. 28, 2017)(Maj. Op. by Baer, J.)(Dissenting Op. by Saylor, C.J.), the Court affirmed the Superior Court's decision that a recusal motion was untimely where it was filed six weeks after the moving party admittedly learned of the facts supporting a request for recusal.

In this matter, which arose out of a contractual dispute in a construction matter, the Plaintiff asserted that the entire trial court bench should recuse itself from the matter when one of the litigating attorneys involved in the matter was elected to serve as a County Judge on the same Bench.

As noted, the Supreme Court affirmed the finding that the moving Party waived their recusal claim after waiting too long to file the same.

Anyone wishing to review the Majority Opinion may click this LINK.

The Dissenting Opinion may be viewed at this LINK.

Judge Minora Addresses Motion for Trial Judge, And Entire County Bench, to Recuse

Judge Carmen D. Minora of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas has issued another decision in which he outlines the trial court's standard of review when faced with a motion for recusal of the trial judge. 

This time the decision was handed down in the case of Friends of Lackawanna v. Dunmore Borough Zoning Hearing Board, No. 2015-CV-6337 (C.P. Lacka. Co. Nov. 28, 2016 Minora, J.), which involved a Land Use Appeal.

In this decision, Judge Minora not only addressed a motion for the trial court judge to recuse himself, but also a request that the entire Lackawanna County Bench be recused.  Judge Minora recused himself but denied the motion to recuse the entire court.

The Friends of Lackawanna decision can be viewed at this LINK.

Judge Minora's other decision on the standard of review for a motion to recuse was the case of Schoenburg v. State Farm.  Here is a LINK to that Tort Talk post, which contains a Link to that decision.

Senior Judge Minora Grants Motion for Recusal

In the case of Schoenberg v. State Farm Insurance Company, No. 2012-CV-5005 (C.P. Lacka. Co. Aug. 10, 2016 Minora, S.J.), Senior Judge Carmen D. Minora of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas granted a Defendant’s Motion for Recusal. 

In his Opinion in the matter, Judge Minora noted that his noted that “[r]ecent United States Supreme Court cases regarding judicial disqualification and recusal dedicate a review of the new law in this area.” 

In analyzing Pennsylvania and Federal law on the issue, Judge Minora generally noted that a court proceeding begins with a presumption in favor of the court that a tribunal is fair, unbiased, and disinterested.   The trial court then has a duty to reveal any facts that would tend to show bias or interests making the tribunal arguably partial.   

At that point, the party concerns must motion to the court alleging facts as to why they believe the court is disqualified and thus seeking the court to recuse itself. 

Once the matter reaches that stage, a court must perform a subjective review of its appropriateness to handle the pending case.   Also, an objective test, a procedural test, and a code of judicial conduct review also ought to be taken.  

In the end, Judge Minora granted the Defendant’s requested recusal in part and denied it in part, resulting ultimately in the court’s decision to recuse itself.    


Anyone wishing to review a copy of Judge Minora's detailed analysis in Schoenberg for the deciding of a motion for recusal, may click this LINK.

Link to Interesting Drug and Device Law Blog Post on Judicial Recusal Due to Campaign Contributions

Below is a link to an interesting recent post on the Drug and Device Law Blog regarding the recent amendments to the Judicial Code of Conduct as it relates to judicial recusal due to campaign contributions received.  I thank Attorney James Beck, a writer for that blog and an attorney with Reed Smith in Philadelphia for bringing this to my attention:

http://druganddevicelaw.blogspot.com/2014/01/campaign-contributions-and-judicial.html

Two Recent Notable Decisions From Lackawanna County Judge Carmen D. Minora

Standard for Motion for Recusal

In his October 1, 2012 Opinion in the case of Minor v. Erie Insurance Company, No. 2009 - CV - 1579 (C.P. Lacka. Co. Oct. 1, 2012 Minora, J.), Judge Carmen D. Minora of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas rejected the carrier’s Motion for the judge to recuse himself from further involvement in this matter involving an insurance coverage dispute.

This matter arose out of a first party medical benefits dispute involving approximately $20,000.00 in medical bills and attorney’s fees. The case initially went through a court system arbitration at which the Plaintiff prevailed, followed by an appeal up to the jury trial level.

The parties came before Judge Minora at a Settlement Conference. At the conference, the Court recommended that the parties settle, given the time commitment, the costs associated with a jury trial, and given the relatively small amount of money at issue.

The Defendant moved for the Court to recuse itself under an argument that the Court had shown bias towards the Plaintiff at the conference. The Court denied the motion and the Defendant moved for a reconsideration of that decision.

In this Opinion, Judge Minora denied the Defendant’s Motion for Reconsideration. Judge Minora's detailed Opinion provides a thorough recitation of the standard of review by a trial court judge for a motion for recusal.

In its ruling the Court in this matter noted that, generally speaking, a party seeking to recuse a judge must show evidence of bias, interest, unfairness, or other disqualifying factors. The Court must then make an independent self-analysis of its ability to be impartial, followed by an analysis of whether the Court’s continued involvement in the case would create an appearance of impropriety.

The Court in this matter concluded that it made an impartial decision that the Defendant had not made a good faith effort to resolve the case during the Settlement Conference as required by the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court also determined that its continued involvement in the case would not create an appearance of impropriety. The Court noted that it would be the jury, not the Court, that would render the ultimate decisions on the issues presented at trial.  As such, the motion for recusal was denied.

Anyone desiring a copy of this decision may contact me at dancummins@comcast.net.

Judge Carmen D. Minora
Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas

Negligent Entrustment

Judge Carmen D. Minora of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas recently had another opportunity to address the issues surrounding a cause of action for negligent entrustment in the case of Guffey v. Kyriazis, No. 2009 - CV - 2308 (C.P. Lacka. Co. Sept. 21, 2010 Minora, J.).

In this matter, Plaintiff’s vehicle was rear-ended by the Defendant driver, who was allegedly under the influence of alcohol at the time of the accident. After the accident, the Defendant driver fled the scene and hid in his basement. When the police arrived at his home, the Defendant allegedly fled through the back door. The Plaintiff claims that the Defendant driver fled because he was intoxicated.

The Plaintiff filed a Complaint against the Defendant driver and the owner of the Defendant’s vehicle. According to the Opinion, both Defendants co-owned the vehicle.

The Defendants moved for partial summary judgment under an argument that one co-owner of a vehicle cannot “entrust” the vehicle to the other co-owner under the context of a negligent entrustment claim.

Judge Minora noted that §308 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts defines the tort of negligent entrustment as when an actor permits another person to use a thing or engage in an activity when the actor knows or should know that the individual is likely to create a risk of harm to others. The Court also noted that Pennsylvania law has further established that the tort of negligent entrustment applies in a motor vehicle accident case when the owner of a vehicle entrusts that vehicle to an intoxicated person.

However, Judge Minora noted that, under the facts of the Guffey case, each of the co-owners of the vehicle had unfettered access to the vehicle and there was no legal right of one co-owner to withhold access to the vehicle from the other co-owner. As such, given that the Defendants were co-owners of the vehicle, “the act of entrustment never actually occurred.”

Accordingly, the Court dismissed the non-driver co-owner Defendant from this matter.

Judge Minora further ruled that the Plaintiffs did not have sufficient evidence of the Defendant driver’s alleged intoxication to support a claim of reckless indifference against that Defendant. The Court noted that proof of intoxication is relevant to a recklessness claim and that some Courts have held that a Plaintiff must present corroborating evidence on the issue of intoxication in order to pursue such a claim.

In this matter, the Plaintiff was unable to present any evidence of intoxication on the part of the Defendant driver because he had fled on the night of the accident. Judge Minora held that the mere act of fleeing was not enough to establish that the Defendant driver was intoxicated as there may have been numerous possible reasons for that Defendant’s actions.  As such, the Plaintiff’s claim of reckless indifference was dismissed as well.

Anyone desiring a copy of this decision in Guffey v. Kyriazis may contact me at dancummins@comcast.net.