Plaintiff's Claim of Two Impacts Helps To Defeat Summary Judgment Motion in Chain Reaction Accident Case

In the case of Akbar v. Glover, No. 10572-CV-2023 (C.P. Erie Co. May 22, 2024 Ridge, J.), the court denied a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by a Defendant driver that was the last car at the end of a chain reaction accident.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff was rear-ended by Defendant in the car behind the Plaintiff. 

The second Defendant then came along and rear-ended the first Defendant. 

The Plaintiff alleged a chain reaction and asserted that the first Defendant was caused to hit the rear of the Plaintiff’s vehicle a second time after that first Defendant was rear-ended by the second Defendant. Both Defendants were named in the lawsuit.

The second Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment asserting that the Plaintiff did not show a prima facie case of that Defendant’s negligence. 

The second Defendant asserted that the Plaintiff admitted that he did not see the second Defendant's vehicle before the impact and that, therefore, the Plaintiff could not establish that there was a second collision with her vehicle caused by the second Defendant. That Defendant asserted that the fact that the Plaintiff allegedly “experienced” an alleged second impact was not enough.

The court denied the second Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. 

In doing so, the court pointed to the Plaintiff’s statement that she felt two (2) impacts. 

Moreover, the court noted that the first Defendant testified that there was definitely no second impact caused solely by that first Defendant.

The record before the Court also showed that the second Defendant admitted that they did not know whether the collision with the first Defendant had caused the second impact with the Plaintiff's vehicle.

Finding that there were issues of fact to be decided by a jury, the judge denied the Motion for Summary Judgment.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

I send thanks to Attorney Brandon R. Keller of the Pittsburgh law firm of Ainsman Levine, LLC for bringing this case to my attention.

Source of image:  Photo by Burak the Weekender on www.pexels.com.

Court Rejects Trucking Defendant's Argument That All Claimants Have to Be Joined As Indispensable Parties Due To Limited Funds To Pay All Awards

In the case of Krakowiecki v. Walker, No. 2:22-CV-00518 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 1, 2023 Cercone, S.J.), the Western Federal District Court case addressed a tractor trailer Defendant company’s Motion to Dismiss a Plaintiff’s motor vehicle accident litigation arising out of a multi-vehicle accident on a highway. The Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(7) and Rule 19 due to the Plaintiff’s alleged failure to join an indispensable party.

In support of its argument, the Defendant argued that, in addition to this litigation, other drivers and/or insurance companies have brought multiple claims against the same tractor trailer Defendant in other lawsuits such that the available funds possessed by the Defendant to satisfy all of the Claimants’ were limited. 

The tractor trailer Defendant argued that adjudicating this particular matter without all such Claimants joined in the same case would impair or impede or otherwise prejudice the ability of the absent parties to protect their interests. The Defendants also asserted that proceeding without the other Claimants being joined into this case would risk multiple, inconsistent duties to pay by the Defendant.

In denying the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, the federal court reviewed Rule 19 which covers whether an absent party should be joined to existing litigation.

The court ruled that the Defendant’s claim of potential multiple exposures generated by the different claims and/or the Defendant’s potential inability to satisfy all of the resulting liabilities through the available insurance fails to raise concerns that fall within the scope of Rule 19.

The court also noted that, under the analysis required by Rule 19, there is nothing about the claims of the other alleged Claimants that impairs or impedes the ability to adjudicate the claims or defenses of the Plaintiff and the Defendant identified in this particular lawsuit.

The court went on to the note that the holding that a joinder is compulsory under Rule 19(a) is a necessary predicate to a district court’s discretionary determination under Rule 19(b) that the case must be dismissed because the joinder of the party is not feasible and the party is indispensable to the just resolution of the case.

Here, the court found that the tractor trailer Defendants had not established that any of the other Claimants is a required or necessary party to this particular lawsuit. As a result, none of the other Claimants were found to be an indispensable party. 

Accordingly, the court found no reason to grant the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. As such, the motion was denied.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

I send thanks to Attorney Dale G. Larrimore of the Philadelphia law firm of Larrimore & Farnish, LLP for bringing this case to my attention.

A Chain Reaction Accident: Was It One Accident or Two Accidents For Purposes of UIM Coverage?

In the case of Busby v. Steadfast Ins. Co., No. 2:19-CV-02225-HB (E.D. Pa. Oct. 31, 2019 Bartle, J.), the court addressed cross-motions for summary judgment in a post-Koken case involving claims for breach of contract and bad faith.

 One issue the Court faced was whether the Plaintiff was involved in one “accident” or two “accidents” when she was involved in two separate impacts in quick succession. The answer to this question would determine whether the Plaintiff was permitted to seek out additional UIM coverages under an argument that she was involved in two separate car accidents.

In its Opinion, the court noted that one of the policies at issue provided a definition of an “accident,” and the other did not. The court generally noted that, in the insurance context, the term “accident” is generally defined an unexpected and undesirable event occurring unintentionally.

Judge Bartle reviewed two different competing approaches used by the courts to determine the number of accidents for purposes of insurance coverage: the “cause” approach and the “effects” approach. The court noted that, in Pennsylvania, as in a majority of jurisdiction, the “cause” approach has been adopted.

Under the cause approach, the general rule is that an occurrence is determined by the cause or causes of the resulting injury. Under this analysis, the court determines if there was but one proximate, uninterrupted, and continuing cause which resulted in all of the injuries and damages alleged by the Plaintiff.

The court noted that, if the cause and the result are so simultaneous or so closely linked in time and space as to be considered by the average person as one event, the courts adopting the “cause” analysis have uniformly held that such an accident involves a single occurrence or accident.

In this matter, the Plaintiff was a passenger in a back seat of an automobile driven by another person that the Plaintiff had hired as a Lyft driver. As that vehicle was traveling eastbound on the Schuylkill Expressway in the left hand lane, the traffic came to a stop. The driver of the Lyft vehicle rear-ended the vehicle that was stopped in front of him in traffic.

Moments after the Lyft driver hit the car in front of him, another vehicle collided with the rear of the vehicle in which the Plaintiff was located as a passenger.

The court noted that the vehicle that the Lyft operator was driving was equipped with an event data recorder, which recorded “two separate events.” That data also established that approximately only one second had passed between the two crashes.

The court also stated that evidence was presented as to the delta forces of impact applied to the Plaintiff with respect to each of the accidents. The delta force numbers were different with regards to both accidents.

Judge Bartle also noted that the Plaintiff’s treating doctors had attributed her injuries to “the incident” or “the accident.” It was additionally noted that the Plaintiff’s medical providers did not offer any opinions as to which injuries were caused by which accident.

Applying the “cause” approach under Pennsylvania law, the court in this Busby case found that there were two independent actors who caused two separate collisions. The court also noted that, while the time between the two crashes was only one second, that was enough time for the Plaintiff to be thrown forward as a result of the Lyft crash and then again a second time as a result of the subsequent rear-end accident.

The court also noted that, even if the Lyft driver had not rear-ended the vehicle ahead, the evidence confirmed that the Lyft vehicle still would have been rear-ended by the other vehicle. Accordingly, the court noted that the crash caused by the Lyft driver rear-ending the vehicle ahead was not the proximate cause of the rear-end crash to the back of the Lyft vehicle.

Therefore, the court in Busby found that the two crashes did not involve one continuing and uninterrupted cause.

Judge Bartle distinguished the facts of this case from a typical chain reaction motor vehicle accident crash where the last car hits the car in front of it which then hits the car in front of it as a result of the first impact. In such a different scenario of a “domino” type of chain reaction accident, the court noted that that separate situation could be viewed as one accident under the policy language at issue in this case.

Based upon its analysis, the Eastern District Federal Court predicted that, if faced with the issue, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would rule that, under the facts presented in this case, two accidents took place.

 As such, the court granted the Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment in this matter and found that she was involved in two accidents for purposes of the potential insurance coverages. The motions of the insurance company Defendants seeking a finding that only one accident took place were denied.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK. The compantion order can be viewed HERE.

Plaintiff's Vehicle Need Not Have Been Actually Impacted by Defendant's Vehicle To State A Valid Claim of Negligence in Chain Reaction Accident

In the case of Sutcliffe v. Bernese, No. 4:19-cv-00317 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 12, 2019 Brann, J.), Judge Matthew W. Brann, denied a defendant’s Motion to Dismiss in a multi-vehicle accident case.  The court ruled that liability in a multi-vehicle accident situation does not require that the plaintiff’s vehicle have actually been impacted by the Defendant’s vehicle. 

In this matter, it was asserted by the defendant tractor trailer driver that his actions did not factually cause the plaintiff’s alleged injuries in this multi-vehicle accident during which numerous vehicles hit the plaintiff’s vehicle.   This particular defendant asserted that, because his tractor-trailer never came into contact with the plaintiff’s vehicle, that defendant could not be found to be a factual cause of the plaintiff’s injuries or damages.  

Judge Matthew W. Brann
M.D. Pa.

However, Judge Brann found that the Complaint alleged sufficient facts to state a claim that, but for this tractor-trailer’s alleged negligent collision with another tractor-trailer, the plaintiff would not have traveled into the left lane to avoid that collision, resulting in the subsequent collision with her vehicle by the other defendants.  

Given that the court felt that the plaintiff had pled sufficient facts both on factual and proximate causation issues, this Motion to Dismiss was denied. 

The Memorandum Opinion issued by Judge Brann can be viewed at this LINK.  The Court's companion Order can be viewed HERE.

Law Applicable to Chain Reaction Car Accidents Reviewed

In the motor vehicle accident case of Jaurez v. Friess, No. 13-145 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 3, 2016 Conti, J.), the West District Federal Court denied summary judgment in a chain reaction motor vehicle accident case. 

In so ruling, the court reviewed the law pertaining to joint tortfeasors as well as the law of causation. 

Applying the law to the case before it, the court in Jaurez stated that, in a multi-vehicle collision, liability can still potentially be found on all involved, including with respect to vehicles that did not collide with each other under their own power, but rather, were pushed into one another.   Stated otherwise, the court ruled that it cannot be said, as a matter of law, that just because two vehicles did not collide with one another under their own power, that those operators were not liable.  The court noted that the causal negligence of those operators may be inferred from those motorists bringing their vehicles too close to one after which a third party to smash them together.  

Based upon these issues presented by the facts before the court, summary judgment in favor of certain defendants was denied.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK


I send thanks to Attorney James M. Beck of the Philadelphia office of Reed Smith Law Firm.   Please be sure to check out Attorney Beck’s excellent blog, the Drug and Device Law Blog (Click HERE to check out Attorney Beck's blog).