Court Rules That Expert Testimony Not Required To Establish Defendant's Duty to Provide a Safe Workplace

In the case of Chirdon v. 3M Company, Inc., No. G.D. 22-16244 (C.P. Allegh. Co. March 24, 2025 Kline, J.), the trial court denied the Defendant’s post-trial motions in an alleged unsafe workplace trial involving allegations of asbestos exposure to a boilermaker.

According to the Opinion, the jury awarded $2.3 million dollars in compensatory damages and $1.5 million dollars in punitive damages against the Defendant employer.

In this Rule 1925 Opinion, by the trial court, the court addressed defenses raised with regard to statute of repose, the method in which the concept of outrageous conduct may be admitted into evidence at trial, issues regarding the bifurcation of the liability and punitive damages phases of the trial and challenges by the defense to the Plaintiff’s failure to utilize an expert to explain OSHA violations.

Notably the trial court rule that expert testimony was not required to establish the Defendant's duty to provide a safe workplace.  Rather, the court ruled that the duty to provide a safe workplace, as well as the applicable OSHA regulations were within the understanding of ordinary jurors.

Overall, the trial court ruled that the Defendant failed to meet the standard of review for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial.  As such, the Defendant's post-trial motions were denied.

Anyone wishing to review this decision may click this LINK.

I send thanks to Attorney Ken Behrend of the Behrend Law Group, LLC located in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania for bringing this case to my attention.

Source of image:  Photo by Sylvia Brazzoduro from www.unsplash.com.

Justice Wecht Rips Pennsylvania Supreme Majority in His Dissent on Majority's Ruling Not To Reconsider Its Flawed MCARE Decision

In its recent decision in the case of Yanakos v. UPMC, No. 10 WAP 2018 (Pa. Jan. 31, 2020), a majority of Justices on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court declined to reconsider its original decision in this case from late last year in which the Court struck down the statute of repose under MCARE thereby allowing a wider avenue of recovery for Plaintiffs. The decision struck down a seven year statute of limitations for a certain class of medical malpractice cases.

In his Dissent, Justice Wecht expressed his ardent disagreement with the majority's refusal to reconsider its decision and wrote that “[t]he filing before us illustrates that the decision in Yanakos was not just incorrect, but was confused as well. Confused about the law. Confused about procedure. Confused about insurance. Confused about the questions presented.”

Justice Wecht noted that not only did the appeal take on a life of its own after it reached the Pennsylvania Supreme Court but "this [Pennsylvania Supreme] breathed new life into it" by expanding the issue before the Court. 

This expansion of the issue by the Justices in the majority enabled those Justices to address more expansive issues and issue a decision of a wider scope on matters that, in the words of Justice Wecht's Dissent, the Plaintiff "had never argued and that the lower courts had never considered."

Justice Wecht also indicated that he wanted a reconsideration because the decision by the majority “ignored precedent, misinterpreted the remedies clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution, and incorrectly adopted (and then misapplied) the intermediate scrutiny test.” 

Justice Wecht noted that that the American Medical Association, the National Federation of Independent Business, the Pennsylvania Medical Society and even the majority caucuses in both the Pennsylvania House and Senate had joined the petition for reconsideration to no avail.

Justice Wecht went on to write, “Reargument is a fail-safe. It gives an appellate court the opportunity to admit that it made a mistake. This court should have taken advantage of that opportunity today.” For these reasons, Justice Wecht dissented from the decision by the majority to preserve their previous decision by denying any reconsideration of the issue.

The majority's refusal to allow for a reconsideration to be heard means that MCARE's statute of repose is no longer valid.

You can read Justice Wecht's compelling Dissenting Opinion on the majority's decision in Yanakos to refuse to allow for a reconsideration of its previous decision HERE. 

The Tort Talk post on the original Opinion previously issued by the Supreme Court in Yanakos, along with Justice Wecht's Dissenting Opinion to that original decision can be viewed HERE.

Source: "Pa. Justices Refuse to Reconsider Statute of Repose Ruling, Sparking Stinging Dissent From Wecht" by Max Mitchell of the Pennsylvania Law Weekly (Feb. 6, 2020).

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Rules that Medical Malpractice Statute of Repose is Unconstitutional

In the case of Yanakos v. UPMC, No. 10 WAP 2018 (Pa. Oct. 31, 2019) (Op. by Mundy, J.), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in a 4-3 decision, ruled that MCARE's statute of repose was unconstitutional.

Typically, a medical malpractice action is governed by a two (2) year statute of limitation.  However, there may be some cases where a Plaintiff does not discover an injury that is allegedly the result of medical negligence within that two year period.  Under MCARE's statute of repose, medical malpractice actions must be brought within seven (7) years of alleged medical malpractice.

The rationale of the majority Opinion in Yanakos striking down the statute of repose under the MCARE Act was that the statute of repose was not substantially related to a governmental interest as was necessary to uphold the statute.  The Court also found that the statute of repose in the MCARE Act violated the Pennsylvania Constitution's guarantee of open access to the Courts.

The majority Opinion in Yanakos can be viewed HERE.

The Opinion of Justice Donohue, concurring in and dissenting from the result, can be viewed at this LINK.

The dissenting Opinion written by Justice Wecht can be viewed HERE.

Source:  Article - "MCARE Statute of Repose is Unconstitutional, Pa. Supreme Court Rules."  Pennsylvania Law Weekly.  By Max Mitchell (October, 31, 2019).

Statute of Limitations As Compared to Statute of Repose

In its recent decision in the case of Dubose v. Quinlan, No. 22 EAP 2016 (Pa. Nov. 22, 2017) (Op. by Mundy, J.)(Baer, J., Concurring and Dissenting)(Saylor, C.J., Dissenting), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reviewed the differences between the statute of limitations and a statute of repose in the context of a medical malpractice case.  

Concisely, the court found that statute of limitations create a time limit for bringing suit, based upon the date the claim accrued.  In contrast, statutes of repose may limit when suits may be brought, not on the basis of an accrual of a claim, but from some other cut-off date.  

The court noted that only statutes of limitation are subject to equitable tolling under Pennsylvania law.  

This decision is also notable in its holding that the statute of limitations for both wrongful death and survival claims in a medical malpractice case is two (2) years from the date of death.  

The court also noted that the MCARE Act modified the applicable statue of limitations in medical malpractice cases such that, in wrongful death actions arising out of a medical malpractice claim, the claim only accrues at death, not from earlier injuries.   The court found that, as the more specific statute on the issue presented, the MCARE provisions prevailed over the general tort statute of limitations.  

Anyone wishing to review the Majority Opinion may click this LINK.

Justice Baer's Concurring and Dissenting Opinion can be viewed HERE.

Chief Justice Saylor's Dissenting Opinion can be viewed HERE.

I send thanks to Attorney James M. Beck, of the Philadelphia office of Reed Smith for bringing this case to my attention.  

Judge Nealon of Lackawanna County Tackles Numerous Asbestos Litigation Issues

In his recent 71 page Opinion in the case of Horst v. Union Carbide Corp. et al., No. 15 CV 1903 (C.P. Lacka. Co. April 27, 2016 Nealon, J.), Judge Terrence R. Nealon tackled a variety of issues raised in motions for summary judgments filed by twelve different defendants.

The Opinion contains useful nuggets of analysis addressing unique case law establishing special standards for medical causation, lay opinion testimony, the statute of repose, and punitive damages in asbestos litigation.

Anyone wishing to review this Horst decision may click this LINK.