I was recently made aware of the below older Facebook Discovery/Admissibility cases
These cases have been added to the Facebook Discovery Scorecard on the Tort Talk Blog and which can always be freely accessed by going to www.TortTalk.com, scrolling down the right hand column and clicking on the date below the title "Facebook Discovery Scorecard."
One of the benefits of the Facebook Discovery Scorecard is that you can click on the case names on the Scorecard to be linked to the actual Opinions or Orders. I have set up the below cases in the same regard, i.e., you can click on the case name to go to the decision online.
The cases are, as follows:
Hanna v. Giant Eagle, Inc., 2016 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 107253 (W.D. Pa. 2016 Mitchell, J.)(Court precludes unfettered access to
Plaintiff's social medial account).
Bryant v. Wilkes-Barre Hosp. Co., LLC, 2016 LEXIS 87103 (M.D. Pa. 2016 Mannion, J)(Court
allows admission of Facebook posts to challenge Plaintiff's credibility at
trial). I send thanks to Attorney Brian J. Murren of the Camp Hill, PA office of Marshall, Dennehey, Warner, Coleman & Goggin for bringing these cases to my attention.
The below article of mine was recently published in the Pennsylvania Law Weekly and is republished here with permission. This article was also previously published in Counterpoint, the newsletter of the Pennsylvania Defense Institute.
The Latest on the Discoverability and Admissibility of Social Media Evidence
By Daniel E. Cummins | February 07, 2019 Pennsylvania Law Weekly
Daniel E. Cummins
Foley, Comerford & Cummins
Scranton, PA
Over the past year, the Pennsylvania state trial and
appellate courts have continued to grapple with issues pertaining to social
media discovery as well as the admissibility of social media evidence at trial.
Discoverability of Social Media Content
In Kelter v. Flanagan, No. 286-Civil-2017 (C.P.
Monroe Co. Feb. 19, 2018 Williamson, J.), Monroe County Judge David J.
Williamson followed the developing common law that permits a party access to
another party’s private social media pages only when it has been first
established that information relevant to the litigation can be seen on the
public pages of that profile. In Kelter, Williamson granted a
defendant’s motion to compel a plaintiff to provide the defendant’s counsel
with her Instagram account log-in information in order to allow for further
discovery of the information on that profile.
This case arose out of a motor vehicle accident. According
to the opinion, the plaintiff initially testified at her deposition that she
did not maintain any social media accounts. When confronted with proof to the
contrary, the plaintiff then admitted that she maintained an Instagram account
and asserted that she had allegedly misunderstood the question presented.
Defense counsel then reviewed posts from the plaintiff’s
Instagram account from the time period shortly after the accident that were
available for public access on the plaintiff’s Instagram account. According to
the opinion, those posts seem to indicate that, despite the plaintiff’s claims
of limitations following the accident, the plaintiff had engaged in vigorous
physical activity both before and after the accident, such as references to
shoveling snow and going to the gym.
When the plaintiff declined to provide any additional
Instagram account information, the defense filed this motion to compel, which,
as noted, was granted by the court.
The court ruled in this fashion given that the defense had
made the required threshold showing that the public pages on the plaintiff’s
profile suggested that more information may be found on the private pages of
the same profile.
In granting the defense limited access to the private pages
of the site for discovery purposes the court ordered that the defense not share
that information with anyone not related to the case. The court’s order further
mandated that the plaintiff would not remove or delete any content from that
account.
Confirming that there is a split of authority on this issue
among the trial courts of Pennsylvania, a contrary result was handed down in
the recent Northampton County Court of Common Pleas ruling in Allen
v. Sands Bethworks Gaming, No. C-0048-CV-2017-2279 (C.P. North. Co. Aug.
6, 2018 Dally, J.).
The Allen case arose out of a plaintiff’s alleged
slip-and-fall in a bathroom at the Sands Casino in Bethlehem, Pennsylvania.
During the course of discovery, the plaintiff provided
limited information in response to social media interrogatories seeking
information regarding her online activity. The plaintiff confirmed in her
responses that she used Facebook and Twitter but declined to provide any more
detailed information other than to confirm that nothing had been deleted from
her accounts since the date of the incident.
The defense responded with a motion to compel for more
information, including information from the private portions of the plaintiff’s
social media profiles.
In his detailed opinion, Judge Craig Dally of Northampton
County provided an excellent overview of the general rules of discovery
pertinent to this issue as well as a review of the previous social media
discovery decisions that have been handed down around the commonwealth by
various county Courts of Common Pleas as well as by courts from other
jurisdictions.
No Pennsylvania appellate court decision was referenced
by the Allen court as there are apparently still no such
decisions to date on this emerging issue.
In his opinion, Dally noted that the defense had pointed out
discrepancies between the plaintiff’s deposition testimony regarding her
alleged limitations from her alleged accident-related injuries and the photos
available for review on the public pages of the plaintiff’s Facebook profile
depicting the plaintiff engaging in certain activities.
Nevertheless, after reviewing the record before the court,
Dally still ruled that the defense had failed to establish the factual
predicate of showing sufficient information on the plaintiff’s public pages to
allow for discovery of information on the plaintiff’s private pages.
In a footnote, the court emphasized that such a factual
predicate must be established with respect to each separate social media site
the defendant wishes to access further.
The court additionally noted that, in any event, “it would
be disinclined to follow the line of Common Pleas cases that have granted
partiescarte blanche access to another party’s social media
account by requiring the responding party to turn over their username and
password, as requested by the defendant in this case.” The court found that
this type of access would be overly intrusive, would cause unreasonable
embarrassment and burden, and represented a request for discovery that was not
properly tailored with reasonable particularity as required by the Rules of
Civil Procedure pertaining to discovery efforts. In light of the above
reasoning, the defendant’s motion to compel was denied.
As such, it appears that Dally was generally opposed to the
notion that discovery should be allowed into the private areas of parties’
social media sites and, as such, he tailored his opinion to secure this desired
result.
The above recent trial court cases on the discoverability of
social media information continues to confirm that, in the absence of appellate
guidance on the issue, there will be uncertainty as to whether a particular
Court of Common Pleas in a given county will allow for further access of a
social media site in response to a motion to compel.
Admissibility of Social Media
Content
Over the past year a notable appellate social media
evidentiary decision on the separate topic of admissibility of such information
at trial was also handed down in a criminal court setting.
In the case of Commonwealth v. Mangel, 181 A.3d 1154
(Pa. Super. 2018), the Pennsylvania Superior Court ruled that social media
posts are inadmissible in criminal cases unless prosecutors can present
evidence of who actually authored the commentary. It is expected that this
ruling in the criminal court context will be the same when it eventually arises
in a civil litigation matter.
The court in Mangel affirmed an Erie County trial
court decision denying a prosecutor’s motion in limine seeking to introduce
into evidence Facebook posts and messages allegedly authored by the defendant.
The Mangel court ruled in this fashion after noting that social
media accounts can be easily hacked or faked. Both the trial court and the
appellate court in Mangel found that merely presenting evidence that the
posts and messages came from a social media account bearing the defendant’s
name was not enough to admit the evidence at trial.
The court noted that Facebook posts and messages must
instead be authenticated under Pa.R.E. 901 in a manner similar to how text messages
and email messages are authenticated. The Superior Court in Mangel
relied on its own 2011 decision in Commonwealth v. Koch, 39 A.3d
996, 1005 (Pa. Super. 2011), affirmed by an equally divided court, 106 A.3d 705
(Pa. 2014), which dealt with the separate but similar issue of the
admissibility and authentication of cellphone text messages.
In the 2018 Commonwealth v. Mangel decision,
the court noted that the Koch court had previously held that
“authentication of electronic communications, like documents, requires more
than mere confirmation that the number or address belonged to a particular
person. Circumstantial evidence, which tends to corroborate the identity of the
sender, is required.”
The Mangel court ruled, in a case of first
impression, that the same analysis should also apply to social media
posts in the criminal court context. As stated, it can be expected that a
similar ruling would be handed down in the context of a civil litigation matter
should this issue resurface in the future.
Publication of New Social Media
Decisions
To review a comprehensive compilation of social media
discovery decisions handed down to date in Pennsylvania, one can freely access
the Facebook
Discovery Scorecard on the Tort Talk blog at www.TortTalk.com. Copies of the decisions
found on the scorecard can be downloaded by clicking on the case names.
While the Facebook Discovery Scorecard is comprehensive, it
is not represented to be complete. There may be other decisions out there that
have not been publicized.
Continuing publication and widespread dissemination of the
trial court decisions on these still novel social media issues is important and
beneficial to the bench and the bar as a whole. Should you happen to have or
come across a social media decision, please send a copy to dancummins@comcast.net in order that the
Facebook Discovery Scorecard can be continually updated as this new common law
develops at the trial court level and without any appellate guidance to date.
Daniel E. Cumminsis a partner in the Scranton, Pennsylvania insurance defense firm of Foley,
Comerford & Cummins where he focuses his practice on the defense of car and
trucking accident matters, UM/UIM matters, premises liability cases and
products liability litigation. He is the sole creator and writer of the Tort
Talk blog (www.TortTalk.com) and also
offers mediation services through Cummins Mediation Services. Contact him at
dancummins@comcast.net.
This article of mine appeared in the April 10, 2018 edition of the Pennsylvania Law Weekly and is republished here with permission.
Authentication in the Digital Age:
In Recent Cases, Old and New Collide
By Daniel E. Cummins|April 05, 2018
Daniel E. Cummins
As they say, “The more things change, the more they remain the same.” And so it is with the changing forms of evidence in the digital age including various types of electronic messages and a wide variety of social media platforms designed for the exchange of information, photos and videos. But what has not changed are the long-standing and staid Rules of Evidence applicable to all forms of evidence.
The old and the new are colliding in recent cases in which the state and federal courts of Pennsylvania have addressed the novel issues of how different forms of digital evidence are to be authenticated before such evidence may be ruled admissible in a court of law.
While the seminal decisions laying down the requirement and parameters of the authentication of digital evidence have all come out of the criminal court context, it can be anticipated that identical rulings will be handed down in the civil litigation context as well in the future.
Rule of Evidence 901
Under Pa.R.E. 901(a), which is consistent with its counterpart Federal Rule of Evidence, it is provided that “to satisfy the requirement of authenticating or identifying an item of evidence, the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is.”
The rule goes on to give specific examples of how different types of evidence may potentially be authenticated. Currently, there is no specific example provided with respect to the new situation of social media or digital evidence. Perhaps there is a need for an amendment of Rule 901 in this regard in light of the recent case law on the issue.
According to the commentary under Pa.R.E. 901, “the authentication or identification requirement may be expressed as follows: When a party offers evidence contending either expressly or impliedly that the evidence is connected with a person, place, thing, or event, the party must provide evidence sufficient to support a finding of the contended connection,” see Pa.R.E. 901, Commentary, citing Commonwealth v. Hudson, 414 A.2d 1381 (1980); Commonwealth v. Pollock, 606 A.2d 500 (1992).
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Recent decisions handed down in Pennsylvania have begun to confirm that the mandates of Rule 901 apply to all forms of electronic and social media messages.
A Case of First Impression
In a 2005 decision issued during the dawn of the digital age, the Pennsylvania Superior Court addressed, for the first time, the issue of authentication of evidence of instant messages in a criminal court matter in the case of In the Interest of F.P., a minor, 878 A.2d 91 (Pa.Super. 2005).
In the case of F.P., the Superior Court rejected the argument that instant messages, which were the precursor to emails and text messages, are inherently unreliable because of their relative anonymity and the occasional difficulty connecting a message with its author given that any person could be using the computer from which the message originated (assuming that person had the appropriate password).
The court in F.P. noted that these issues were no different from letters or other paper documentary evidence that could be forged or denied by the alleged writer. While the court in F.P. acknowledged that, “unless the purported author is actually witnessed sending the email, there is always the possibility it is not from whom it claims, … the same uncertainties exist with traditional written documents.” For example, a “signature can be forged; a letter can be typed on another’s typewriter; distinct letterhead stationary can be copied or stolen.”
The court reiterated its belief that that email messages and similar forms of electronic communication could be properly authenticated within the existing framework of Pa.R.E. 901 and Pennsylvania case law and without the need for the creation of new rules or law for this new form of evidence.
As such, the court in the F.P. case held that, like documentary evidence, electronic messages could be properly authenticated within the framework set forth under Pa.R.E. 901.
The F.P. case laid out the framework for authenticating digital evidence by first reaffirming the basic principle that the admission of evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will be reversed only upon a showing that the trial court clearly abused its discretion.
It was additionally noted that, like paper evidence, evidence of paperless electronic messages could also be authenticated by either direct proof or by circumstantial evidence. The court noted that, under Pa.R.E. 901, such direct evidence in support of authentication could be in the form of testimony of a witness with personal knowledge that the evidence is what the proponent claims it to be.
The court also held that proof of any circumstances which will support a finding that the writing is genuine can also suffice in court to authenticate the writing.
In the F.P. case, the court pointed to circumstantial evidence relating the content of the messages to prior statements and actions by the alleged sender. The court also was influenced to allow the evidence of the text message as it appeared that the alleged sender sent the message given that he used his own first name in the message sent.
Accordingly, the court in F.P. found that the evidence of the instant messages had been properly authenticated and were, therefore, properly admitted into evidence.
Another Case of First Impression
Six years later, another case of first impression, this time pertaining to text messages, was handed down in the matter of Commonwealth v. Koch, 39 A.3d 996, 1005 (Pa. Super. 2011), affirmed by an equally divided court, 106 A.3d 705 (Pa. 2014). The split affirmance by the Supreme Court leaves the Superior Court decision in Koch as good law.
Koch involved an appeal by a criminal defendant from a Cumberland County conviction for drug offenses based, in part, on evidence from text messages allegedly sent by the defendant. On appeal, the defendant challenged the admissibility of the evidence of text messages on the basis of lack of authentication.
The Pennsylvania Superior Court in Koch ruled that text messages were not admissible unless they were properly authenticated, i.e., unless there was evidence presented that the messages did indeed come from the alleged sender.
The defendant in the criminal case asserted that there was no evidence to establish that she had sent any of the drug transaction-related text messages. She also asserted that it had not been established that the drug transaction-related texts received on the phone were specifically directed to her. Moreover, the defendant offered evidence that her cellphone was also allegedly being used by someone else at the time the messages were sent.
On appeal, the Superior Court found that the text messages were not properly authenticated and, therefore, should not have been admitted into evidence during the course of the trial. The criminal conviction was overturned.
As support for its ruling, the Superior Court in Koch pointed to the above-noted Pennsylvania Superior Court decision in In the Interest of F.P., a minor, 878 A.2d 91 (Pa.Super. 2005) pertaining to instant messages.
The Superior Court in Koch agreed with the analysis of the F.P. case that electronic messages could be authenticated in the same manner that paper evidence was authenticated. The court in Koch noted that “electronic writings typically show their source, so they can be authenticated by contents in the same way a communication by postal mail can be authenticated.” However, the Koch court cautioned that, while text messages and emails can almost always be electronically traced back to their source cellphone or computer, the sender of such messages is not always thereby automatically identified. In other words, particular cellphones and computers can arguably be utilized by anyone at anytime to send the messages.
The Superior Court in Koch reviewed similar decisions from around the United States and noted that, “in the majority of courts to have considered the question, the mere fact that an email bears a particular e-mail address is inadequate to authenticate the identity of the author; typically, courts demand additional evidence.”
As such, the Superior Court held that there must also be “circumstantial evidence, which tends to corroborate the identity of the sender,” before an electronic message may be authenticated and admitted.
Ultimately, the court found that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the text messages where the cellphone’s physical proximity to the defendant at the time of her arrest had no probative value with regard to whether she authored the messages.
The Koch requirements for authentication of a criminal defendant’s text messages were followed in the more recent case of Commonwealth v. Mosley, 114 A.3d 1072, 1082 (Pa. Super, 2015). In Mosely, the court found that there was no evidence, direct or circumstantial, clearly proving that the defendant was the author of the drug-related text messages, or any corroborating witness testimony regarding authenticity of the messages. Consequently, the court in Mosely held that the trial court erred in determining that the drug-related texts were properly authenticated.
In Commonwealth v. Murray, 174 A.3d 1147 (Pa.Super., 2017), the Superior Court affirmed a trial court finding that text messages had been properly authenticated. The Murray court noted that ‘the trial court determined that the text messages in question were properly authenticated based on the contextual clues in the messages and the fact that [the officer] retrieved the phone from Murray’s person.”
A similar ruling pertaining to the authenticity of a text message was also handed down in the case of Commonwealth v. Woods, No. 1324 MDA 2013 (Pa. Super.,2014)(unpublished, nonprecedential).
A Third Case of First Impression
In a very recent March 15 decision in Commonwealth v. Mangel, No. 2018 Pa. Super. 57, the Pennsylvania Superior Court ruled, for the first time in state court, that social media posts are inadmissible in criminal cases unless prosecutors can present evidence of who actually authored the posts. That is, the evidence was inadmissible unless it was properly authenticated.
The court in Mangel supported its requirement of authentication by noting that, in this day and age, social media accounts can be easily hacked or even entirely faked.
The Mangel court affirmed an Erie County trial court decision denying a prosecutor’s motion in limine seeking to introduce into evidence Facebook posts and messages allegedly authored by the defendant.
Judge John L. Musmanno wrote in Mangel that “authenticating social media evidence is to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis to determine whether or not there has been an adequate foundational showing of its relevance and authenticity.”
Consistent with the rulings in the Koch and F.P. decisions, both the trial court and the appellate court in Mangel found that merely presenting evidence that the posts and messages came from a particular social media account bearing the defendant’s name was not enough to rule the evidence admissible. Citing to the F.P. and Koch decisions, the Mangel court noted that these types of Facebook posts and messages must instead be authenticated under Pa.R.E. 901 in a manner similar to the authentication of text messages and instant messages.
The Superior Court also relied upon a prior U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit decision requiring authentication of Facebook posts in the case of United States v. Browne, 834 F.3d 403 (3d Cir. 2016).
The Third Circuit rejected the government’s argument that pursuant to F.R.E. 902(11) the contents of the “chats” exchanged over Facebook were “self-authenticating” as business records when accompanied by a certificate from Facebook’s records custodian. The court more specifically ruled that the “chats” on Facebook were not business records under FRE 803(6) and thus could not be self-authenticated under FRE 902(11).
The Browne court nonetheless affirmed the appellant’s conviction after finding that the trial record reflected more than sufficient extrinsic evidence to link the defendant to the chats and thereby satisfied the government’s authentication burden under a F.R.E. 901 analysis.
Anticipated impact in civil matters
While all of the above cases pertaining to the authentication of various types of electronic messages arose in the criminal law context, it is safe to predict that identical rulings will be handed down when these issues are raised in a state court or federal court civil litigation matter. The Rules of Evidence pertaining to authentication of evidence are the same regardless of in which type court and which type of litigation the issue arises.
It can be anticipated that this issue of authentication will continue to reoccur not only with respect to authenticating emails and text messages but also tweets, along with commentary, photos, and videos on social media sites such as Facebook, Youtube, Linkedin, Snapchat, Instagram and any other social media platforms that may come into existence.
When planning to rely upon these forms of digital evidence, litigators, prosecutors, and criminal defense attorneys should be prepared to produce the related direct or circumstantial evidence necessary to authenticate the electronic evidence at issue, or risk not being able to utilize the evidence at all.
Daniel E. Cumminsis a partner with the Scranton law firm of Foley, Comerford & Cummins. He focuses his practice on the defense of auto accident, premises liability and products liability matters. His Tort Talk Blog can be viewed at www.TortTalk.com.
Every once in a while a criminal court decision comes along that may have an impact in civil litigation matters.
In the case of Commonwealth v. Mangel, No. 2018 Pa. Super. 57 (Pa. Super. March 15, 2018 Musmanno, S.J. Ott, J., Shogan, J.)(Op. by Musmanno, J.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court ruled that social media posts are inadmissible in criminal cases unless prosecutors can present evidence of who actually authored the commentary.
The court ruled in this fashion after noting that social media accounts can be easily hacked or faked. In so ruling, the court affirmed an Erie County trial court decision denying a prosecutor's motion in limine seeking to introduce into evidence Facebook posts and messages allegedly authored by the Defendant.
Both the trial court and the appellate court found that merely presenting evidence that the posts and messages came from a social media account bearing the Defendant's name was not enough to allow the evidence in.
The court noted that Facebook posts and messages must instead be authenticated under Pa.R.E. 901 in a manner similar to how text messages and instant messages are authenticated.
Judge Musmanno wrote that "authenticating social media
evidence is to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis to determine whether or not
there has been an adequate foundational showing of its relevance and
authenticity.”
The Superior Court in Mangel relied on its own 2011 decision in Commonwealth v. Koch which dealt with the admissibility and authentication of cell phone text messages. Commonwealth v. Koch, 39 A.3d 996, 1005 (Pa. Super. 2011), affirmed by an equally divided court,
106 A.3d 705 (Pa. 2014) (cell phone text messages); See also In the Interest of F.P., a Minor, 878 A.2d 91, 96
(Pa. Super. 2005) (computerized instant messages).
Click this LINK to view my Pennsylvania Lawyer magazine article on the Commonwealth v. Koch case.
Click this LINK to view the Tort Talk post on the split Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision in Commonwealth v. Koch.
In the recent Commonweath v. Mangel case, the court noted that the Koch court held that
“authentication of electronic communications, like documents, requires more than
mere confirmation that the number or address belonged to a particular person.
Circumstantial evidence, which tends to corroborate the identity of the sender,
is required.”
The Mangel court ruled, in a case of first impression, that the same standard should apply to social media posts in the criminal court context.
Anyone wishing to read the Commonwealth v. Mangel decision may click this LINK
Commentary: It is safe to predict that the same standards would be applied in a civil litigation matter as well with respect to the admissibility of social media posts, emails, or text messages.
Source: Article by Zack Needles entitled "Superior Court Adopts Standard for Authenticating Social Media Post." The Legal Intelligencer (March 21, 2018).
In a recent decision in the case United States v. Browne, 834 F.3d 403 (3d
Cir. 2016 Fisher, Krause, Roth, J.J.)(Op. by Krause, J.), addressed the proper authentication and admissibility of social
media posts.The case involved an appeal
of a criminal case from the U.S. Virgin Islands. Although this decision arises out of a criminal case, the rationale regarding the authentication and admissibility of Facebook chats may prove useful in the context of a civil litigation matter.
The Third Circuit rejected the government's argument
that pursuant to F.R.E. 902(11) the contents of "chats" exchanged
over Facebook were "self-authenticating" as business records when accompanied
by a certificate from Facebook's records custodian.The
court more specifically ruled that the “chats” on Facebook were not business
records under FRE 803(6) and thus could not be self-authenticated under FRE
902(11). The court nonetheless affirmed the appellant's
conviction finding the trial record reflected more than sufficient extrinsic
evidence to link the Appellant to the chats and thereby satisfy the
government's authentication burden under a FRE 901 analysis.
Anyone wishing to review this decision, may click
this LINK.
I send a thanks to Brian J. Murren, a law clerk with
the Camp Hill, PA office of Marshall, Dennehey, Warner, Coleman &
Goggin for bringing this case to my attention.
A Facebook decision from a while back has been brought to my attention--this one is not on the discoverability of Facebook info; rather, this decision pertains to the admissibility of such information at trial over the objection of the Plaintiff, in part, that the information is embarrassing. In the Federal Western District
Court of Pennsylvania decision of Newill
v. Campbell Transp. Co., No. 2: 2012-CV-1344, 2015 U.S. Dist Lexis 4350 (W.D. Pa. 2015 McVerry, J.) from
over a year ago, the court reviewed a Plaintiff's motion in limine to preclude
the Defendant from introducing several of the Plaintiff's Facebook posts into
evidence in a personal injury matter on the basis they were irrelevant,
unfairly prejudicial, and potentially embarrassing. According to the opinion the
Plaintiff's Facebook posts referenced going to the gym, landscaping, flooring,
and undercoating a truck. The Plaintiff
also apparently advertised his services as a handyman, indicating that no job
was too big or too small.The Court found that the posts from
Plaintiff's Facebook account that reflected physical capabilities inconsistent
with Plaintiff's claims of injury and limitations were relevant and
embarrassment alone was found not to be a sufficient basis for excluding the
posts pursuant to F.R.E. 403. The Court did leave the door open
for the issue to be revisited during the actual trial by noting that if, at the
time of trial, the Defendant attempted to introduce posts the Plaintiff felt
were particularly embarrassing, the issue of admissibility could be re-raised
pursuant to F.R.E. 611. Anyone wishing to review this case,
may click this LINK.
I send thanks to Brian Murren, a law
clerk in the Camp Hill office of Marshall, Dennehey, Warner, Coleman & Goggin for bringing this decision to my attention.