Preliminary Objections to Claims of Recklessness and Punitive Damages Overruled

In the case of Appleman v. Byrne, No. 2026-CV-498 (C.P. Lacka. Co. Sept. 24, 2026 Gibbons, P.J.), the court issued an Opinion denying a Defendant’s Preliminary Objections attacking claims of recklessness and claims of punitive damages in a motor vehicle accident case. 

President Judge James A. Gibbons reviewed the current status of the law which allows for the pleading of allegations regarding a defendant’s general state of mind, such as an allegation of recklessness, as being permitted without any supporting facts at the pleading stage.  

President Judge James A. Gibbons
Lackawanna County

The court noted that a plaintiff is not required to produce any evidence of recklessness on the part of a defendant “until after the completion of discovery.”  See Op. at 5.

The trial court additionally noted that, with respect to claims of punitive damages, the appellate courts have held that claims of wanton and reckless conduct can be alleged generally.  

In this matter, the court found that the Plaintiff was not only allowed to generally plead claims of recklessness and/or punitive damages, but also found that the Plaintiff did assert facts in the Complaint to support the same. 

More specifically, the court noted that the Plaintiff alleged that the Defendant driver was recklessness because he allegedly took his eyes off the road for an extended period of time when he allegedly dropped his coffee on his lap and looked down to grab it, during which the rear-end accident occurred. 

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Allegations of Recklessness Allowed to Proceed in MVA Case

In the case of Bolus v. Lake, No. 2025-CV-4637 (C.P. Lacka. Co. Sept. 16, 2026 Nealon, J.), the court addressed Preliminary Objections asserted against allegations of recklessness and a corresponding demand for punitive damages.

This matter arose out of a motor vehicle incident.

Relative to the allegations of recklessness and punitive damages, the court followed the trend of cases allowing for the pleading of such claims in the absence of any supporting facts so long as a claim of negligence is asserted.

The court noted that recklessness can be generally alleged under the terms of Pa. R.C.P. 1019(b). 

The court additionally noted that a demand for punitive damages is not governed the “material facts” pleading requirement in Pa. R.C.P. 1019(a) due to the fact that a claim for punitive damages is merely an element of damages incidental to an underlying cause of action, rather than a cause of action itself.

The court otherwise overruled the Preliminary Objections asserting the inclusion of “scandalous or impertinent matter” relative to the allegations regarding the “No Kings Day” rally that was going on at the time and place of the incident. The court found that some of the “No Kings Day” protest allegations in the pro se Plaintiff’s pleading were relevant to the Defendant motorist’s state of mind and the accompanying claim for punitive damages.  The Plaintiff had alleged that the Defendant allegedly obstructed the Plaintiff’s path of travel in a reckless fashion at the time of the accident.

The court did otherwise sustain certain other Preliminary Objections to certain other language contained in the Complaint.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Lessons in Complaint Drafting From Judge Mark Powell of Lackawanna County

In the case of Hoagland v. PPL Electric Utilities Corp., No. 2024-CV-5799 (C.P. Lacka. Co. Sept. 1, 2026 Powell, J.), the court addressed several Preliminary Objections filed by the Defendant in a motor vehicle accident in which the Plaintiff was a passenger in a freightliner that crashed and struck a PPL utility pole.

The Plaintiff contended, in part, that the pole was placed dangerously close to the roadway and that PPL’s negligent and reckless conduct related to the placement of the pole allegedly caused or contributed to the Plaintiff’s fatal injuries.

The court sustained PPL’s objection to the Plaintiffs’ inclusion of a “John Doe maintenance company” as a Defendant. The court noted that, although the Plaintiffs alleged that they utilized reasonable diligence in attempting to identify the unidentified company, Pa.R.C.P. 2005 expressly provides that the Doe-Defendant procedure is not available in an action commenced by way of a Writ of Summons as was the case in this matter. The court additionally noted that the subsequent filing of a Complaint did not alter the result. As such, the claims asserted against the Joe Doe Defendant in this matter were dismissed.

Judge Powell otherwise rejected PPL’s contention that the Plaintiffs’ allegations describing the pole as “too close,” “dangerous,” and “unsafe” lacked sufficient specificity. The court noted that, when the Complaint was considered as a whole, the allegations were specific enough to allow the claims to proceed.

The court did otherwise, however, strike the Plaintiffs’ generalized references in the Complaint to unspecified statutes, ordinances, regulations, and industry standards. In this regard, the court granted the Plaintiffs twenty (20) days to identify, more specifically, any statute, ordinances, regulations, or industry standards that they are relying upon.

Judge Mark Powell
Lackawanna County

Judge Powell additionally followed the trend of allowing the Plaintiffs’ allegations of recklessness to remain in the case given that claims of negligence were asserted.

Also allowed to continue were the claims for punitive damages. The court noted that the Plaintiff had alleged that PPL knew the pole was dangerously close to the roadway, appreciated the risk it presented to motorists, and consciously disregarded that risk.

Judge Powell otherwise struck the Plaintiffs’ generalized allegations of negligent maintenance and repair because the Plaintiffs failed to identify any physical defect with the pole.

A separate negligent inspection theory was found to be viable because an inspection arguably could have disclosed that the pole’s proximity to the roadway allegedly presented an unsafe condition.

The court otherwise also concluded that the Plaintiffs plead a viable negligence claim under Tolerico v. Bonham, 650 A.2d 1192 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994), which recognizes a utility company’s duty to locate and maintain utility poles so as to avoid unreasonable and unnecessary dangers to motorists on roadways.

The court emphasized that the Tolerico case also established that a driver’s departure from the roadway does not necessarily constitute the sole or superseding cause of an ensuing collision with a utility pole.

Here, the court concluded that it could not determine from the pleading that the driver’s loss of control was so extraordinary or unforeseeable so as to relieve PPL of liability as a matter of law.

Accordingly, the question of whether the pole was dangerously located and whether its placement was a substantial factor in causing the death of the decedent remained a factual question for discovery and, if appropriate, trial.


Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Source of image:  Photo by Mitchell Luo on www.unsplash.com.

Judge Best of Monroe County Allows Claims of Recklessness and Punitive Damages To Proceed in Commercial Vehicle Case

In the case of Maro v. Snook, No. 1805-CV-2025 (C.P. Monroe Co. June 15, 2026 Best, J.), Judge Patrick J. Best of the Monroe County Court of Common Pleas overruled a Defendant’s Preliminary Objections challenging a Plaintiff’s claims for punitive damages and challenging allegations of gross, wanton, willful, reckless, indifferent and outrageous behavior in a motor vehicle accident matter.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff was stopped in his vehicle in a line of traffic in a construction zone when the Defendant rear-ended the Plaintiff’s vehicle. At the time of the accident, the Defendant was operating a commercial vehicle which was a van that was owned by the company Defendants.

In his Opinion, Judge Best began his discussion by confirming that Pennsylvania is a fact-pleading state. 

The court noted that its review of the Plaintiff’s Complaint revealed at least twenty-five (25) separate acts and/or incidences of failure to act on the part of the Defendant, all of which allegedly constituted breaches of his duty of care owed to the Plaintiff relative to the rear-end accident. 

The court also noted that the Plaintiff had pled facts in support of allegations that the Defendant had violated various sections of the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Code including with regards to following too closely, exceeding the speed limit and driving in careless disregard for the safety of others.

Notably, the Plaintiff also alleged in this case that the Defendant was driving and operating a motor vehicle while using an interactive wireless communication device to send, read, or write a text-based communication while the vehicle was in motion in violation of provisions of the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Code.

The court additionally emphasized the fact that the Plaintiff had alleged that the Defendant was driving a vehicle at an excessive speed within a construction zone. 

The court noted that other courts have ruled that such conduct can be wanton and reckless where a rear-end collision results. Moreover, in this case, the allegation was that the Defendant was traveling at an excessive speed, within a construction zone, while simultaneously texting. 

The court found that such factual allegations supported the claims of recklessness and the claims for punitive damages. 

Judge Patrick J. Best
Monroe County

Judge Best stated that the “conscious action of propelling a vehicle forward, foot on case pedal with eyes down and not on the road, is particularly egregious and extends beyond mere negligence” such that facts alleged in this regard support claims of punitive damages and recklessness.

The court in this case also found the Superior Court decision in the case of Monroe v. CBH2O LP, 286 A.3d 785, 800 (Pa. Super. 2022) (en banc), in which that appellate court ruled that recklessness can be pled with reckless abandon in any case so long as the Complaint alleges a claim of negligence, as supporting the allowance of claims of recklessness in this case. Judge Best followed the trend of finding that, where negligence is alleged, recklessness may also be generally pled as a “condition of mind” under Pa. R.C.P. 1019(b).

In the end, the court overruled the Defendant’s Preliminary Objections and allowed the claims for punitive damages to proceed against the Defendant driver as well as his Defendant employers.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer Common Pleas Case Alert, www.Law.com (July 23, 2026).

Post-Trial Rulings By Trial Court in MVA Case Affirmed on Appeal

In their non-precedential decision in the case of Major v. Five Star Equipment, Inc., No. 735 MDA 2025 (Pa. Super. June 30, 2026 Panella, P.J.E., King, J., and Lane, J.) (Mem. Op. by King, J.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the post-trial rulings issued by Judge Terrence R. Nealon of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas related to a motor vehicle versus pedestrian accident case.

According to the Opinion, at a bifurcated trial, the jury attributed 75% of the responsibility for the happening of the accident to the Plaintiff and 25% to the Defendant.

On appeal, the Plaintiff challenged portions of the verdict slip and related jury instructions. The Plaintiff also asserted that the trial court had erred prior to trial in granting partial summary judgment on behalf of the Defendant and dismissing the Plaintiff’s claim for recklessness and in excluding post-accident evidence regarding the Defendant driver’s competence. The Plaintiff also argued that the trial court abused its discretion in bifurcating the trial.

Here, the court had bifurcated the trial based upon the fact that, after the parties were given a trial date with a certain number of trial days based on what the parties had advised the Court as to how much trial time was needed, the parties listed additional witnesses which led the court to conclude that it was highly unlikely that the parties would finish the trial within the allocated time period requested. As such, the court bifurcated the trial to avoid unnecessary cost and to facilitate the interests of judicial economy. The trial was bifurcated into liability and damages phases.

The appellate court rejected the Plaintiff’s argument that they were entitled to a new trial on the basis that the trial court had incorrectly bifurcated the case. The appellate court emphasized that the decision whether or not to bifurcate a case is entrusted to the broad discretion of the trial court, which is considered to be in the best position to evaluate the necessity for bifurcation.

Here, after consultation with the parties, the trial court had scheduled five (5) days for trial based upon the parties estimation as to the amount of time they believed the trial would take. Later, at a pre-trial conference, the parties then indicated that they intended to call eleven (11) lay witnesses and nine (9) expert witnesses to testify. The parties further estimated that one of the four days scheduled for trial would be taken up by the jury selection process, the court’s introductory instructions, and counsel’s opening statements.

The trial court had determined that it was highly unlikely that the remaining four (4) days of trial would be sufficient time for all of their testimony, closing arguments, jury instructions and deliberations. The trial court had expressed a concern that it would be forced to declare a mistrial if the trial is not completed within the allotted time. The appellate court agreed with the trial court’s conclusion that the interest of judicial economy and conveniens supported the bifurcation of the case. The appellate court was not swayed by the Plaintiff’s argument that the trial actually ended up only taking three (3) days to complete.

On appeal, the appellate court otherwise agreed with the trial court that the Plaintiff had waived her claim of error with regards to the Verdict slip.  The appellate court otherwise agreed with the trial court that separate questions as to each theory of negligence asserted against the Defendant company were unnecessary given that the trial court’s jury instructions specified and explained all of the theories of negligence involved in the case. The appellate court found that the trial court had repeatedly instructed the jury that, if they found negligence on any of the grounds described during the jury instructions, the jury must find that the Defendant company was negligent.

With regards to the trial court having issued a partial summary judgment against the Plaintiff’s claims of recklessness, the appellate court reviewed the law of punitive damages and, after a review of the trial record, found that the Plaintiff failed to produce any evidence to support the claims of recklessness. As such, the appellate court stated that the trial court did not err in dismissing the Plaintiff’s punitive damages claims whether in terms of the direct actions of the Defendant company or on the basis of vicarious liability.

Based upon the above reasons, the appellate court affirmed all of the trial court’s post-trial rulings.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

To view the Tort Talk post on Judge Nealon's trial court Opinion and for access to a Link to that Opinion, please click HERE.

Court Allows Claims of Recklessness and for Punitive Damages To Proceed Relative to Disobeying Instructions of a Flagger

In the case of Marrazzo v. Klim, No. 2025-CV-471 C.P. (C.P. Susq. Co. May 5, 2026 Legg, P.J.), President Judge Jason J. Legg of the Susquehanna County Court of Common Pleas followed the trend in Pennsylvania of denying a Defendant’s Preliminary Objections filed against allegations of recklessness and punitive damages at the pleadings stage.

Judge Legg noted that, according to Superior Court precedent, recklessness is a condition of the mind that may be averred generally. 

The court otherwise noted that, even though recklessness may be generally alleged, the court found that, in this case, the Plaintiff had included the Complaint specific allegations related to the Defendant’s alleged recklessness, including allegations regarding speeding in a work zone despite the presence of a flagger directing traffic, nearly striking the flagger, falling asleep at the wheel, and relative to the Defendant driver striking the Plaintiffs’ vehicle which had stopped for the flagger and was waiting to enter the work zone until the lane was clear.

The court otherwise noted that an allegation related to falling asleep while driving, standing alone, could be sufficient to support an allegation of recklessness at the pleadings stage.

The court also pointed to the same facts as supporting the Plaintiff’s inclusion of the separate claim for punitive damages in the Complaint.

As such, the Preliminary Objections asserted by the Defendant were overruled.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this Order which contains a detailed explanation of the Court’s decision in footnotes, may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney Terrence R. Nealon, Jr. of the Scranton law firm of McDonald and MacGregor, LLC for bringing this decision to my attention.

Recklessness Claims Allowed to Proceed in Case Where Defendant Driver Was Driving While Wearing Medical Boot

In the case of Shea v. Magar, No. 2025-CV-7877 (C.P. Lacka. Co. March 31, 2026 Gibbons, P.J.), President Judge James A. Gibbons of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas addressed Preliminary Objections filed by a Defendant against allegations of recklessness in a motor vehicle accident case.

According to the Opinion, this case matter involved a rear-end accident case. The Defendant was  allegedly wearing a medical boot at the time of the accident against doctor’s orders.  During the course of the accident, the Defendant hit the accelerator with the medical boot instead of the brake.

The court followed the current trend and relied upon the case of Monroe v. CBH2O, LP, 286 A.3d 785, 799 (Pa. Super. 2022) (en banc), and held that, at the pleadings stage, a plaintiff is permitted to make a general averment of gross negligence or recklessness as long as negligence is alleged. 

As such, the court overruled the Defendant’s Preliminary Objection in this regard.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney Brian J. Walsh of the Scranton law firm of Blake & Walsh for bringing this case to my attention

Court Addresses Various Pleadings Issues in a Medical Malpractice Case, Including Allegations of Recklessness

In the case of Limon v. Kontizer, No. 2025-CV-8657 (C.P. Lacka. Co. March 30, 2026 Powell, J.), the court addressed various Preliminary Objections filed by Defendants in a medical malpractice case.

According to the Opinion, this wrongful death medical malpractice case was filed relative to the Plaintiff’s decedent’s treatment in the form of an upper GI endoscopy. According to the Complaint, the Plaintiff alleged that the various medical Defendants failed to properly diagnose, treat, and prevent aspiration pneumonia, sepsis, and multi-organ dysfunction, all of which allegedly led to the Plaintiff’s decedent’s death.

In their Preliminary Objections, the Defendants sought the dismissal of claims for reckless conduct and punitive damages, as well as claims grounded in vicarious liability and negligence.

The court overruled all of the Preliminary Objections filed.

Relative to the claims of recklessness and for punitive damages, the court held that, under Pa. R.C.P. 1019(b), conditions of the mind, such as recklessness, may be alleged in a general fashion as long as negligence is pled.

The court additionally noted that the Complaint sufficiently asserted that the Defendants knowingly disregarded serious, life-threatening risk to the decedent. Accepting these allegations are true, the court concluded that the claims for punitive damages were legally sufficient.

With regards to the issues of vicarious liability, the court rejected the Defendants’ arguments that the Complaint was deficient for failing to identify specific agents or employees. The court noted that Pennsylvania law does not require a Plaintiff in a medical malpractice case to identify every individual agent at the pleadings stage. Rather, the court noted that it is sufficient to allege that the individuals acted within the scope of their employment or agency since the identity of every healthcare professional who was involved in the decedent’s treatment during the approximately one month period at issue could be readily ascertained by the Defendants from their own records.

The court further found that the Plaintiff sufficiently alleged that the Defendants had knowledge of, and allowed the alleged reckless conduct, thereby satisfying the heightened requirements for allegations of vicarious liability for punitive damages under the MCARE Act.

The court otherwise rejected the Defendant’s objections that the Plaintiff’s negligence claims were overly broad and vague.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: Lackawanna Jurist (April 10, 2026).

Court Allows Punitive Damages Claims to Proceed in Dog Bite Case

In the case of Clifford v. Dickson, No. S-1799-25 (C.P. Schuylk. Co. Feb. 12, 2026 Burke, J.), the court addressed various issues raised by way of Preliminary Objections filed against a Complaint in a dog bite case.

Of note, the court rejected the Preliminary Objection filed by the Defendant relative to the Plaintiffs’ description of the Defendant’s dog as “vicious.” The court noted that it did not see any prejudice from the use of the term “vicious” at this early stage of the proceedings.  The court did note that the use of the term “vicious” may not prove to be admissible at trial.

With regards to the Preliminary Objections filed with regards to the Plaintiff’s claims of outrageous conduct and evil motive, as well as with respect to the request for punitive damages, the court found that the facts pled in the Complaint supported the claims and allegations in this regard.

Here, the court found that the conduct of the Defendant was allegedly more than mere or ordinary negligence. In the Complaint, there were allegations that the Defendant acted in an intentional, willful, wanton, or reckless manner. More specifically, the court noted that there were allegations that the Defendant not only allowed her two pitbulls and another large dog to be unleashed, unrestrained, and uncontrolled on the day of the accident, it was also alleged that the Defendant dog owner had allowed this to happen on prior occasions as well.

The court also pointed to the allegations that the Defendant had failed to vaccinate the dogs in question.

The court additionally noted that it would be premature to dismiss the Plaintiff’s request for punitive damages at the pleadings stage. Rather, based, in part, on the Superior Court's decision in the case of Monroe v. CBH2O, LP, 286 A.3d 785, 799-800 (Pa. Super. 2022), the court felt that it would be more appropriate for the Defendant to seek to attempt to have the punitive damages claims dismissed after the close of discovery by way of a Motion for Summary Judgment.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney Thomas J. Newell, a plaintiff's attorney who exclusively represents dog attack victims, for bringing this decision to my attention.

Source of image:  Photo by Pozva on www.unsplash.com.

Trial Court Overrules Preliminary Objections to Allegations of Recklessness and Claims For Punitive Damages

In the case of Fisher v. Leo, No. 2025-CV-05941 (C.P. Luz. Co. Feb. 4, 2026, Pierantoni, J.), the court overruled a Defendant’s Preliminary Objections to allegations of recklessness and punitive damages. 

In so ruling, the court cited to the Pennsylvania Superior Court case of Monroe v. CBH20, L.P., 286 A.3d 785, 798 (Pa. Super. 2022).

The court also noted that the issue of the validity of claims for recklessness and punitive damages are more appropriate for consideration at the summary judgment stage.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney Peter Biscontini of Biscontini Law for bringing this case to my attention.

Motion For Summary Judgment Denied in Zipline Accident Case

In the case of Witkowski v. Hellerick’s Family Farm, Inc., No. 230900999 (C.P. Phila. Co. Sept. 18, 2025), the trial court issued a Rule 1925 Opinion requesting the Superior Court to affirm its decision denying a Motion for Summary Judgment in a premises liability case.

According to the Opinion, this matter arises out of a fatal accident that occurred when the Plaintiff died after experiencing difficulties on a zipline course at the Defendant’s farm.

Prior to the incident, the Plaintiff has signed liability waivers acknowledging the risks involved in the activity.

After the accident, the Plaintiff filed a negligence suit in which recklessness was alleged as well.

The Defendant farm moved for summary judgment arguing that the signed waivers and the Agritourism Activity Protection Act shielded the Defendants from liability.

According to the Opinion, the Agritourism Activity Protection Act limits liability for agritourism providers unless gross negligence or recklessness is proven.

The court found that issues of fact with regards to whether the Defendant’s conduct constituted gross negligence or recklessness, which would negate the protections of the waivers and the act existed in the case presented. As such, the court noted that the issues should be permitted to proceed to a jury.

The trial court otherwise noted that the appeal should be dismissed on procedural grounds as its order did not meet the criteria for an appealable Order under Pennsylvania law given that the Order at issue was not a final Order.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer Common Pleas Case Alert, www.Law.com (Jan. 8, 2026).

Judge Linhardt of Lycoming County Rules that Allegations of Recklessness Must Be Supported By Facts Pled in the Complaint

In the case of Charles v. Martin, No. CV25-00, 974 (C.P. Lyc. Co. Dec. 12, 2025 Linhardt, J.), Judge Eric R. Linhardt of the Lycoming County Court of Common Pleas overruled a Defendant-driver’s Preliminary Objections against allegations of recklessness in a motor vehicle accident case in a matter in which intoxication on the part of the Defendant-driver was alleged.

Notably, in his decision, Judge Linhardt held that, while allegations of recklessness could be pled generally, a plaintiff still also has to plead facts in the Complaint to support such a claim.   

According to the Opinion, this matter arose out of a fatal motor vehicle accident during which it was alleged that the Defendant-driver crossed the center line and was involved in a head-on collision with the decedent’s vehicle.  As noted, included in the Complaint were allegations that the Defendant-driver was intoxicated and under the influence of a controlled substance at the time of the incident.

After the Plaintiff filed a Complaint alleging, in part, that the Defendant driver was negligent, careless and reckless, the Defendant-driver filed Preliminary Objections for a variety of reasons. In part, the Defendant asserted that the Complaint contained non-specific allegations of recklessness which should be stricken or dismissed. The Defendant also requested that the Plaintiffs’ claim for punitive damages also be stricken or dismissed.

After reviewing the current status of Pennsylvania law regarding the pleading of recklessness allegations and claim for punitive damages, the court noted that, while Pennsylvania is a fact-pleading state which requires a Plaintiff to plead the material facts upon which a cause of action is based, notwithstanding this rule, allegations regarding conditions of a tortfeasor’s mind may be alleged generally.

However, in his decision, even after referring to the Superior Court's decision in the case of Monroe v. CBH2O, LP, 286 A.3d 785, 798-99 (Pa. Super. 2022), Judge Linhardt noted that the exception to the general rules of pleading permitting a party’s state of mind to be pled generally does not dispense with the requirement that material facts constituting the conduct of a Defendant must also still be pled. See Op. at 7 citing Ammlung v. City of Chester, 302 A.2d 491, 497-98 (Pa. Super. 1973).

Judge Eric R. Linhardt
Lycoming Co.

Accordingly, Judge Linhardt held that, although a Plaintiff may generally allege that the Defendant- driver acted recklessly, the Plaintiff still “must allege sufficient material facts to support their general allegation and, if the material facts proposed in their Complaint operate to disprove their allegations of recklessness, those allegations must be dismissed.” See Op. at 7 citing with see, e.g. signal, Orange Stones Co. v. City of Reading, 87 A.3d 1014, 1025-26 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014).

In this case, the court noted that the Plaintiff’s Complaint alleged that the Defendant acted recklessly because he operated a motor vehicle while intoxicated and under the influence of a controlled substance. The Complaint also alleged a number of ways in which the Defendant was reckless by violating several provisions of the Motor Vehicle Code.

Judge Linhardt pointed to case law confirming that the operation of a vehicle while under the influence is sufficient to support allegations that a Defendant driver acted recklessly and may be exposed to an award of punitive damages.

Accordingly, the court found that the Plaintiff had sufficiently pled their allegations of recklessness such that the Preliminary Objections were overruled. 

Judge Linhardt ended his decision by noting that, should facts emerge during discovery calling the Plaintiff’s allegations into question, the Defendant had the right to file an appropriate Motion.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer Common Pleas Case Alert, www.Law.com (Jan. 8, 2026).

Source of image:  Photo by Olia Danilevich on www.pexels.com.

Various Pre-Trial Motions in Limine Decided in Federal Court Trucking Accident Case

In the case of Kozak v. Klikuszewski, No. 4:21-CV-01609 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 5, 2025 Schwab, J.), the court decided a variety of Motions In Limine prior to a motor vehicle accident trial.

This matter arose out of an accident between the Plaintiff's car and the Defendant's tractor trailer during a snow squall on Interstate 80.   

Of note, the court denied the Defendant’s Motion for Bifurcation after finding that the Defendant offered no reason in support of bifurcation other that the Plaintiffs were claiming a serious injury. The court found this to be an insufficient reason to support a request for bifurcation.

The court also found evidence to support the claim to allow the punitive damages claims to go forward.

The court noted that, when there is a punitive damages claim against a supervisor, negligent supervision, hiring, and entrustment claims may also proceed.

The court additionally ruled that evidence of a driver’s past traffic citations and accidents was relevant to the Plaintiff’s claims for negligent hiring, retention, and entrustment. As such, that evidence was ruled as admissible.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.  The Court's companion Order can be viewed HERE.


I send thanks to Attorney James Beck of the Philadelphia office of the Reed Smith law firm for bringing this case to my attention.

THE 2025 TORT TALK TOP TEN

THE 2025 TORT TALK TOP 10

10. “Farcical” Fad of Allegations of Recklessness Continues

Despite the well-settled law since the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure first went into effect 78 years ago on January 1, 1947 establishing that Pennsylvania is a fact-pleading state when it comes to pleadings, the trial courts of Pennsylvania have continued to allow plaintiffs to plead recklessness in every case regardless of the facts. Click this LINK to see the many recent Tort Talk blog posts on this topic.

These trial court rulings allowing such pleading are based on a reading of Pa.R.C.P. 1019(b) as found in the errant Pennsylvania Superior Court decision in the case of Monroe v. CB H20 LP, 286 A.3d 785 (Pa. Super. 2022) (en banc). Judge Victor P. Stabile noted in his Dissenting Opinion in that case that the Majority’s decision was based on “farcical” reasoning. Monroe, 286 A.3d at 830 (Dissenting Opinion).This ‘farcical’ fad of allowing plaintiffs to plead recklessness with reckless abandon regardless of the facts of the case continued in 2025 in the Pennsylvania state courts.

While the state trial court judges from all around the Commonwealth continued to routinely allow claims of recklessness in every case, at least one federal district court judge over the past year ruled to the contrary. In McKinney v. GM, LLC, No. 1:24-CV-00140-SPB (W.D. Pa. Aug. 28, 2025), Judge Susan Paradise Baxter of the Western District Federal Court granted a partial Motion to Dismiss claims of punitive damages after finding that the Plaintiff failed to plead sufficient facts to support a punitive damages claim. The court noted well established rule of law in Pennsylvania that allegations of recklessness that could support a punitive damages claim must involve more than claims of ordinary negligence.

The Tort Talk blog post on the McKinney case can be viewed HERE.

9. Nearly 200 Year Old Gist of the Action Doctrine Ruled Invalid

The gist of the action doctrine generally holds that an injured party can not plead both a negligence cause of action and a breach of contract cause of action in the same lawsuit. The purpose of the doctrine was to maintain the difference between the two theories of liability in civil litigation matters.

In the case of Swatt v. Nottingham Village, 324 A.3d 23 (Pa. Super. July 2, 2025) (en banc) (Op. by Kunselman, J.), an en banc panel of the Pennsylvania Superior Court boldly ruled that the gist of the action doctrine, which has been essentially recognized in English and American jurisprudence for over 200 years, was no longer valid.

The Tort Talk blog post on the Swatt case can be viewed at this LINK.

The court essentially ruled in Swatt that the law has always recognized an injured parties right to choose and pursue either theory of liability, that is, a negligence theory of liability or a breach of contract theory, and that, under the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure, injured parties are permitted to plead their theories of liability in the alternative under a single personal injury Complaint.

The Superior Court’s decision in Swatt, which was handed down in July of this year, was followed by another Superior Court panel in a December 11, 2025 decision in the case of Poteat v. Asteak, ___ A.3d ___, 729 EDA 2023 (Pa. Super. 2025). The Tort Talk post on this case can be reviewed HERE.

Keep an eye out in 2026 for an upcoming article on this topic written by myself and my son, Daniel E. Cummins, Jr., a second year student at Virginia Law School, to be published this upcoming spring in the Pennsylvania Bar Association Quarterly.


8. Test to Show Good Cause for IME

In Verba v. Erie Insurance Exchange, 326 A.3d 973 (Pa. Super. 2024 ), the Pennsylvania Superior Court held that the requirement of good cause set forth in Rule 4010 regarding requests for medical examinations (IMEs) in civil litigation matters is designed to protect parties against an unwarranted invasion of their privacy and to preclude the use of such a medical examination for improper purposes.

The court in Verba ruled that good cause can exist to support a request for an IME in a pending litigation if there is a controversy, or a dispute between the parties, regarding the validity of the plaintiff’s injury claims.

The Tort Talk post on the Verba can be viewed HERE.


7. New Jury Selection Rule Goes Into Effect

On April 1, 2025, the new Pa.R.C.P 220.3 went into effect requiring trial court judges to be present in the courtroom for jury selections in civil cases unless the litigants opt out of the requirement.


6. Archaic Local Rules Overruled

In the case of Scheibe v. Woodloch Resort, No. 1478 EDA 2024 (Pa. Super. May 20, 2025), Superior Court issued a decision that invalidated the archaic local rule of the Pike County Court of Common Pleas that required original signatures on all filings with the Court. As such, going forward electronic signatures may be utilized on documents being filed in Pike County.

The Tort Talk blog post on the Scheibe case can be viewed at this LINK.

Over this past year, the Superior Court struck down another archaic local rule in its decision in the case of Biros v. U Lock, Inc., No. 113 WDA 2024 (Pa. Super. Aug. 1, 2025). In Biros, the appellate court found that Westmoreland County’s archaic requirement that notices of appeal could only be filed in person or by mail was such a local rule. Accordingly, the appellate court ruled that the appellant’s initial filing was properly and timely filed and was sufficient to initiate the appeal.

The Tort Talk blog post on the Biros case can be viewed HERE.


5. Arbitration Clauses and Children

In the case of Shultz v. Skyzone, No. 25 EAP 2023 (Pa. Sept. 25, 2025) (Op. by Donohue, J.), a case that involved the claims brought on behalf of several minors who were injured at trampoline parks operated by Skyzone, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that a parent who signs an Arbitration Agreement cannot bind a non-signing spouse or a minor child to the terms of that agreement.

The Supreme Court held that parents lacked the authority to bind a minor to an agreement to arbitrate, as this would deprive the minor of judicial protections and oversight designed to safeguard their interests. As noted, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court also held that a parent who signs an Arbitration Agreement cannot bind a non-signing parent, or minor child, to its terms.

The Tort Talk blog post on this Pennsylvania Supreme Court case can be viewed HERE.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court handed down the same decision on the same date in the consolidated case of Santiago v. Philly Trampoline Park, No. 24 EAP 2023 (Pa. Sept. 25, 2025) (Op. by Donohue, J.).


4. Statutory Employer Doctrine Upheld

In the case of Yoder v. McCarty Construction, 43 MAP (Pa. Oct. 23, 2025), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reaffirmed the validity of the statutory employer doctrine under the Worker’s Compensation Act and rejected arguments from the plaintiff seeking to abolish this doctrine.

The Supreme Court reaffirmed the law behind the statutory employer doctrine that has been in effect in Pennsylvania since 1930 as enunciated in the case of McDonald v. Levinson Steel Co., 153 A. 424, 426 (Pa. 1930).

That long-standing law provides that, under Section 203 of the Workers’ Compensation Act (Act), 77 P.S. § 462, a general contractor that hires a subcontractor to perform work on a jobsite is deemed to be an “employer” of employees of the subcontractor in certain circumstances. In those instances where the subcontractor does not make payment, the general contractor will be considered liable for the worker’s compensation payments.

In exchange for this imposition of secondary liability on the general contractor, the Act’s statutory employer provision in Section 203 of the Act, 77 P.S. § 52, extends to a general contractor the same tort immunity afforded to the subcontractor of the injured worker in any third party lawsuit arising out of the same accident.

In this Yoder case, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected arguments by the Plaintiff that the statutory employer doctrine should be rejected and/or that the immunity afforded to employers under the doctrine should be deemed to be waivable in certain circumstances.

The Tort Talk blog post on the Yoder case can be viewed HERE.


3. New Cell Phone Law

While texting while driving has been banned in Pennsylvania since 2012, in June of this year, a new law went into effect on June 5, 2025 that banned any and all cell phone use while driving on the roads of Pennsylvania. Under certain exceptions noted in the law, a driver may use a cell phone for emergency purposes. A driver may also use a mobile device if they pull off to the side of the road and stop where a vehicle may safely remain in a stopped position.

The law, known as “Paul Miller’s Law,” went into effect on June 5, 2025 and made it illegal to use a cell phone in your hands in any way while driving. The law even prohibits these activities even when one is stopped at a red light or in a traffic jam.

Under the language of the law, it appears that an overhead bluetooth system can be used to make calls as long as one uses the buttons on the steering wheel and the dash and not by way of the cell phone in your hand while driving.

For the next year through June of 2026, the penalty for a violation will be a written warning. Starting June 5, 2026, the penalty will be a summary offense with a $50 fine, plus court costs and other fees. Moreover, if a driver is convicted of both vehicular homicide and driving while distracted, they may be sentenced up to an additional five years in prison.


2. Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens Clarified

Over the past year, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court provided clarity on the test to be applied in reviewing a Petition to Transfer Venue under the doctrine of forum non conveniens in the case of Tranter v. Z & D Tour, Inc., No. 32 EAP 2024 (Pa. Sept. 25, 2025) (Op. by Wecht, J.).

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania that the Superior Court’s imposition of a “key witness” requirement in the analysis was inconsistent with Pennsylvania precedent on the issue of the type of evidence required to secure a transfer of a matter under the doctrine of forum non conveniens.

The Supreme Court otherwise clarified that a party seeking a transfer of a matter under the doctrine of forum non conveniens must identify the burdened witnesses and provide a general statement of their respective testimony. The Supreme Court confirmed that the petitioner need not show that the testimony of the witnesses is “critical” or “necessary” to the defense.

The Tort Talk blog post on this notable Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision can be viewed HERE.


1. Artificial Intelligence

In the year 2025, courts and litigators found a steady rise in the use of artificial intelligence (AI) in many aspects of the law. AI platforms have begun to be used to assist in the evaluation of cases and also with respect to legal research and brief writing.

Near the end of this year, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court issued its “Interim Policy On The Use Of Generative Artificial Intelligence By Judicial Officers And Court Personnel." This policy is designed to serve as an interim policy to guide judges and court personnel who desire to use artificial intelligence (AI) in their day-to-day work. This policy allows for judges and court personnel to utilize AI for summarizing documents, conducting preliminary legal research, and drafting initial versions of documents.

As noted in the August 14, 2025 Pennsylvania Law Weekly article entitled “AI and Its Proper Use in the Practice of Law” by Daniel E. Cummins and Ursinus College Computer Science major, Michael Cummins, a number of lawyers in Pennsylvania and across the country have been sanctioned for submitting fake legal citations, known as hallucinations, as a result of utilizing AI platforms for legal research and the writing of briefs and not checking the accuracy of such citations.


The “AI Hallucinations Cases Database” maintained by Damien Charlotin, an attorney in France, confirms that attorneys all over the world have been getting in trouble for filing motions and briefs with courts that contain fake, AI generated citations and information. According to that database, which can be viewed at this LINK, as of December of 2025, there were at least four (4) reported decisions handed down in Pennsylvania in which attorneys were in trouble in this regard.

It is anticipated that, in the near future, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court may also come out with rules to guide attorneys on the proper use of AI in the practice of law relative to any filings with the state courts.

In the Pennsylvania federal courts, Judge Karoline Mehalchick of the Federal Middle District Court has been leading the way by crafting a civil practice order that is issued in all of her matters that requires attorneys to identify any AI-created portions of their court filings and to certify to the court that any citations contained therein have been checked for accuracy.



New Book To Consider Purchasing To Improve Your Practice of Law

Last but not least, it is noted that, over the past year, the Pennsylvania Bar Institute (PBI) published an e-book entitled Raising the Bar: A Practical Guide to the Practice of Law written by Daniel E. Cummins. 

The book compiles articles written by the author over the past 25 years providing practice and professionalism tips for lawyers and judges.. The book is designed to provide lawyers, whether they be new or experienced, with tips and reminders on how to improve their day-to-day practice of law and efforts at a work-life balance.

ARTICLE: Out With the Old, In With the New: A Civil Litigation Year-End Review

The below article of mine appeared in the December 11, 2025 edition of the Pennsylvania Law Weekly and is republished here with permission.

Expert Opinion // Civil Procedure

Out With the Old, In With the New: 

A Civil Litigation Year-End Review

By

Daniel E. Cummins

December 11, 2025

Over the past year, there was a steady flow of notable decisions handed down by the various state and federal courts across the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania as another year of civil litigation jurisprudence goes down in the books. Those decisions are reviewed below.

Overall, some old rules have been ousted as no longer viable, and some new rules have been enunciated to guide civil litigation practice going forward.

Readers may secure more details on the decisions summarized below, as well as a copy of the actual court decisions referenced, by going to the Tort Talk Blog and typing the name of the plaintiff into the search box in the upper right-hand corner of the blog.

Good Cause for IME

In a decision that was handed down near the end of the previous year in the case of Verba v. Erie Insurance Exchange, 326 A.3d 973 (Pa. Super. 2024 ), the Pennsylvania Superior Court addressed the standard for determining whether good cause exists to compel the Plaintiff to cooperate with a request for a medical examination under Pa.R.C.P. 4010.

The court noted that the requirement of good cause set forth in Rule 4010 is designed to protect parties against an unwarranted invasion of their privacy and to preclude the use of such a medical examination for improper purposes. Simply put, the court in Verba held that good cause can exist in a pending litigation if there is a controversy, or a dispute between the parties, regarding the validity of the plaintiff’s injury claims.

Allegations of Recklessness

The year 2025 began as 2024 ended—with state trial court judges looking past the fact that Pennsylvania is a fact-pleading state and allowing plaintiffs to plead recklessness and punitive damages claims in complaints with reckless abandon in all personal injury matters regardless of the facts involved. This trend continued throughout this year with trial court judges relying upon the errant Pennsylvania Superior Court decision in the case of Monroe v. CB H20, 286 A.3d 785 (Pa. Super. 2022) (en banc).

While the state trial court judges from all around the commonwealth continued to routinely allow claims of recklessness in every case, at least one federal district court judge said not so fast. In McKinney v. GM, No. 1:24-CV-00140-SPB (W.D. Pa. Aug. 28, 2025), Judge Susan Paradise Baxter of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania granted a partial motion to dismiss claims of punitive damages after finding that the plaintiff failed to plead sufficient facts to support a punitive damages claim.

The court noted that allegations of recklessness that could support a punitive damages claim must involve more than claims of ordinary negligence. In McKinney, the court found that the products liability complaint contained no factual allegations identifying the nature of the alleged defect, how the defendant allegedly became aware of it, or what actions the defendant failed to take in conscious disregard of that risk.

Baxter, applying Pennsylvania law, emphasized that punitive damages are to be considered an extreme remedy that are not available for conduct arising from mere inadvertence, mistake or errors in judgment. The court found that the complaint in the McKinney case failed to contain any factual allegations that even suggested that the defendant acted with an evil motive or in conscious disregard of a known risk.

Attorney Discipline

The first notable decision handed down by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court over this past year was handed down in February. In the case of Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Anonymous Attorney, [docket no. withheld by court] (Pa. Feb. 12, 2025), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court clarified the standard of proof for a disciplinary hearing involving allegations of attorney misconduct. The court opted for a higher burden.

According to the opinion, prior to this ruling, the previously accepted standard of proof for disciplinary cases against attorneys was “a preponderance of the evidence through clear and satisfactory evidence.” In this case, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the burden of proof of disciplinary cases going forward should be “clear and convincing evidence.”

In ruling in this fashion, the court noted that “attorney disciplinary proceedings are not civil disputes for money damages, and the public’s and the attorney’s interests are not clearly minimal.” The court otherwise noted that “disciplinary proceedings are not strictly civil nor criminal in nature, but rather have been styled as ‘quasi criminal.’” For these reasons, the court chose to go with a higher burden of proof.

New Jury Selection Rule Goes Into Effect

In April, the new Pa.R.C.P 220.3 went into effect on April 1 requiring trial court judges to be present in the courtroom for jury selections in civil cases unless the litigants opt out of the requirement. This rule was set to take effect on April 1, 2025, and can be found under Pa. R.C.P. 220.3.

Avenues of Recovery in Worker’s Compensation Cases Expanded

In May of this year, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court overturned decades of precedent with its decision in the case of Steets v. Celebration Fireworks, (Workers' Compensation Appeals Board), 335 A.3d 1076 (Pa. May 30, 2025), in order to allow a new line of worker’s compensation claims to go forward.

In this decision, the Supreme Court created new law and cleared the way for the estates of those individuals who died as a result of work-related injuries to collect benefits related to claims for disfigurement and injury. The court overturned long-standing case law regarding whether specific loss benefits are payable after an employee’s death from causes related to the work injury.

Archaic Local Rule Overruled

In another decision of note from May of this year, the Superior Court struck down a trial court’s local rule.

In the case of Scheibe v. Woodloch Resort, No. 1478 EDA 2024 (Pa. Super. May 20, 2025), the archaic local rule at issue from the Pike County Common Pleas Court required original signatures on all filings with the court, which did not allow for electronic signatures.

In Scheibe, the Pennsylvania Superior Court noted that the trial court had improperly refused to docket paperwork relative to the initial filing of the lawsuit. The prothonotary had rejected the filing because the documents contained only an electronic signature in violation of the local rules that required original signatures.

The appellate court first confirmed that there was no requirement in the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure for any filing to be hand-signed by a party or their attorney. Rather, the statewide Rules of Civil Procedure contemplated that a “signature” could include a computer-generated signature.

The Superior Court additionally held that, under the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure, documents mailed to the prothonotary’s office were deemed to be filed when received by that office as a litigant would have no control over when that office would stamp and process the filing. The Superior Court also confirmed that the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure expressly prohibited the rejection of a filing that complied with the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure where that filing did not meet the requirements of a local rule.

For all of these reasons, the Superior Court agreed that the complaint was timely filed. In the process, the appellate court struck down the archaic local rule of court.

New Cellphone Law

While texting while driving has been banned in Pennsylvania since 2012, in June of this year, a new law went into effect that banned any and all cellphone use while driving on the roads of Pennsylvania. Under certain exceptions noted in the law, a driver may use a cellphone for emergency purposes. A driver may also use a mobile device if they pull off to the side of the road and stop where a vehicle may safely remain in a stopped position.

The law, known as “Paul Miller’s Law,” went into effect on June 5, 2025, and made it illegal to use a cellphone in your hands in any way while driving. The law even prohibits these activities even when one is stopped at a red light or in a traffic jam. Under the language of the law, it appears that an overhead bluetooth system can be used to make calls as long as one uses the buttons on the steering wheel and the dash and not by way of pushing buttons on the cellphone.

For the next year through June 2026, the penalty for a violation will be a written warning. Starting June 5, 2026, the penalty will be a summary offense with a $50 fine, plus court costs and other fees. Moreover, if a driver is convicted of both vehicular homicide and driving while distracted, they may be sentenced up to an additional five years in prison.

Gist of the Action Doctrine

In July, the Pennsylvania Superior Court addressed the viability of the gist of the action doctrine. Under this doctrine, a negligence claim cannot be recast in a complaint as a breach of contract claim and vice versa.

In the case of Swatt v. Nottingham Village, 2025 Pa. Super. 138 (Pa. Super. July 2, 2025) (en banc) (Op. by Kunselman, J.), an en banc panel of the Pennsylvania Superior Court addressed the issue of whether the gist of the action doctrine should continue to be applied to contract actions as it has been for the past 26 years.

This case arose out of a nursing home malpractice claim. The plaintiff filed claims for both malpractice and breach of contract.

Despite a number of prior cases confirming that the gist of the action doctrine does apply as a defense where a breach of contract claim is added to a negligence claim, this en banc panel of the Superior Court concluded, after completing an exhaustive review of the case law allowing for alternative pleadings, that the gist of the action doctrine should no longer apply to prevent the pleading of an alternative breach of contact claim in a negligence action. Rather, the court noted that, under any set of facts, plaintiff could make claims for both negligence and breach of contact in the alternative wherever warranted.

This ruling eradicating this defense could prove important in those cases where a plaintiff’s negligence claim is potentially barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations, but where the plaintiff attempts to keep the lawsuit alive by pleading, in the alternative, a breach of contract claim which has a four-year statute of limitations claim.

Another Archaic Local Rule Overruled

In August, the Superior Court struck down another archaic local rule in its decision in the case of Biros v. U Lock, No. 113 WDA 2024 (Pa. Super. Aug. 1, 2025).

In Biros, the Superior Court vacated a trial court order out of the Westmoreland County Common Pleas Court of in which the trial court had denied, with prejudice, an appellant’s motion to file her Pa. R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal, nunc pro tunc.

The Superior Court noted that, Pa. R.C.P. 205.4(e)(2) bars any refusal by a trial court of an otherwise compliant pleading for filing based upon a requirement of a local rule pertaining to the electronic filing of legal papers. The appellate court found that Westmoreland County’s archaic requirement that notices of appeal could only be filed in person or by mail was such a local rule. Accordingly, the appellate court ruled that the appellant’s initial filing was properly and timely filed and was sufficient to initiate the appeal.

Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens Clarified

In September of this year, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court provided clarity on the test to be applied in reviewing a petition to transfer venue under the doctrine of forum non conveniens in the case of Tranter v. Z & D Tour, No. 32 EAP 2024 (Pa. Sept. 25, 2025) (Op. by Wecht, J.).

This matter arose out of a multi-vehicle collision that occurred in Westmoreland County, Pennsylvania involving a passenger bus and commercial vehicles. The crash resulted in five deaths and numerous injuries. The plaintiffs who resided in various locations across the country and abroad, filed personal injury lawsuits in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas against several corporate defendants, all of which conducted business nationwide. The defendants sought to transfer the cases to Westmoreland County under the doctrine of forum non conveniens.

The Supreme Court held that the Superior Court’s imposition of a “key witness” requirement in the analysis was inconsistent with Pennsylvania precedent on the issue of the type of evidence required to secure a transfer of a matter under the doctrine of forum non conveniens.

The Supreme Court otherwise clarified that a party seeking a transfer of a matter under the doctrine of forum non conveniens must identify the burdened witnesses and provide a general statement of their respective testimony. The Supreme Court confirmed that the petitioner need not show that the testimony of the witnesses is “critical” or “necessary” to the defense. As such, the Supreme Court upheld the trial court’s decision to transfer the cases out of Philadelphia County and to Westmoreland County as a proper exercise of the trial court’s discretion.

Arbitration Clauses and Children

On the same day in September that it issued its decision in the Tranter case, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that a parent who signs an arbitration agreement cannot bind a nonsigning spouse or a minor child to the terms of that agreement.

The case of Shultz v. Skyzone, No. 25 EAP 2023 (Pa. Sept. 25, 2025) (Op. by Donohue, J.), involved the claims brought on behalf of several minors who were injured at trampoline parks operated by Skyzone in Philadelphia. In each instance, only one parent had signed a “participation agreement, release, and assumption of the risk” on behalf of their child. That agreement contained an arbitration provision waiving the right to sue in court.

After the lawsuits for personal injuries were filed, the defendant filed petitions to compel arbitration, relying upon the signed agreements. The issue was litigated all the way up to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court held that parents lacked the authority to bind a minor to an agreement to arbitrate, as this would deprive the minor of judicial protections and oversight designed to safeguard their interests. As noted above, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court also held that a parent who signs an arbitration agreement cannot bind a nonsigning parent, or minor child, to its terms.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court handed down the same decision on the same date in the consolidated case of Santiago v. Philly Trampoline Park, No. 24 EAP 2023 (Pa. Sept. 25, 2025) (Op. by Donohue, J.).

Statutory Employer Doctrine Upheld

In October, in the case of Yoder v. McCarty Construction, 43 MAP (Pa. Oct. 23, 2025), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reaffirmed the validity of the statutory employer doctrine under the Worker’s Compensation Act and rejected arguments from the plaintiff seeking to abolish this doctrine.

According to the opinion, the plaintiff suffered a workplace injury. The plaintiff was an employee of a subcontractor. The general contractor asserted the defense of statutory employer immunity in the personal injury action arising out of the accident.

The Supreme Court began its decision by reaffirming the law behind the statutory employer doctrine that has been in effect in Pennsylvania since 1930 as enunciated in the case of McDonald v. Levinson Steel, 153 A. 424, 426 (Pa. 1930).

That long-standing law provides that, under Section 203 of the Workers’ Compensation Act (Act), 77 P.S. Section 462, a general contractor that hires a subcontractor to perform work on a jobsite is deemed to be an “employer” of employees of the subcontractor in certain circumstances. In those instances where the subcontractor does not make payment, the general contractor will be considered liable for the worker’s compensation payments. In exchange for this imposition of secondary liability on the general contractor, the act’s statutory employer provision in Section 203 of the act, 77 P.S. Section 52, extends to a general contractor the same tort immunity afforded to the subcontractor of the injured worker in any third-party lawsuit arising out of the same accident.

As noted, at the Supreme Court level in this Yoder case, the court rejected arguments by the plaintiff that the statutory employer doctrine should be rejected or that such immunity should be deemed to be waivable in certain circumstances.

Artificial Intelligence

In the year 2025, courts and litigators found a steady rise in the use of artificial intelligence (AI) in many aspects of the law. AI platforms have begun to be used to assist in the evaluation of cases and also with respect to legal research and brief writing.

Near the end of this year, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court issued an interim policy to guide judges and court personnel who desired to use AI in their day-to-day work.

This policy allows for judges and court personnel to utilize AI for summarizing documents, conducting preliminary legal research, and drafting initial versions of documents. These rules, which are compiled under a document entitled the “Interim Policy On The Use Of Generative Artificial Intelligence By Judicial Officers And Court Personnel" was set to go into effect on Dec. 8, 2025.

It is anticipated that, in the near future, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court may also come out with rules to guide attorneys on the proper use of AI in the practice of law relative to any filings with the courts.

In the Pennsylvania federal courts, Judge Karoline Mehalchick of the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania has been leading the way by crafting a civil practice order that is issued in all of her matters that requires attorneys to identify any AI-created portions of their court filings and to certify to the court that any citations contained therein have been checked for accuracy.

As noted in the Aug. 14, 2025, the Pennsylvania Law Weekly article titled “AI and Its Proper Use in the Practice of Law,” by Daniel E. Cummins and Michael Cummins, a number of lawyers in Pennsylvania and across the country have been sanctioned for submitting fake legal citations, known as hallucinations, as a result of utilizing AI platforms for legal research and the writing of briefs and not checking the accuracy of such citations. Such issues have caused a need for the above rules as well as a rise in continuing legal education courses designed to educate attorneys to be careful in utilizing these emerging technologies.

New Book

Last but not least, it is noted that, over the past year, the Pennsylvania Bar Institute (PBI) published an e-book titled Raising the Bar: A Practical Guide to the Practice of Law, written by Daniel E. Cummins. The book compiles articles written by me over the past 25 years providing practice and professionalism tips for lawyers and judges, many of which articles were originally published right here in the Pennsylvania Law Weekly. The book is designed to provide lawyers, whether they be new or experienced, with tips and reminders on how to improve their day-to-day practice of law and efforts at a work-life balance.

Daniel E. Cummins is the managing partner at Cummins Law in Clarks Summit, Pennsylvania. Contact him at dancummins@cumminslaw.net.

Reprinted with permission from the December 11, 2025 edition of the "The Pennsylvania Law Weekly © 2025 ALM Global Properties, LLC. All rights reserved. Further duplication without permission is prohibited, contact 877-256-2472 or asset-and-logo-licensing@alm.com.

As Currently Required, Court Follows the Fad of Allowing Claims of Recklessness Regardless of the Facts Pled

In the case of Tierney v. Miggy’s Corporation Six, No. 3632-CV-2025 (C.P. Monroe Co. Sept. 10, 2025 Zulick, J.), the court overruled a Defendant’s Motion to Strike allegations of recklessness and punitive damages from the Plaintiff’s slip and fall Complaint.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff alleged that she slipped and fell on a puddle caused by a leaky air conditioner at the Defendants’ grocery store and sustained injuries as a result. The Plaintiff also claimed, in part, that the puddle in question was caused by the carelessness, recklessness, and negligence of the Defendants. The Plaintiff additionally asserted a claim for punitive damages.

The court followed the current fad of courts allowing general allegations of recklessness to be pled as an allegation of a state mind under Pa. R.C.P. 1019(b). The court noted that the issue of the validity of the claims could be revisited after discovery at the summary judgment stage.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer Common Pleas Case Alert, www.Law.com (Nov. 20, 2025).

Trial Court Addresses Validity of Claims Against a Drugstore

In the case of Burke v. Hoffman Health Partners, P.C., No. 2024-CV-8753 (C.P. Lacka. Co. Aug. 4, 2025 Powell, J.), the court addressed various Preliminary Objections filed in a medical malpractice case.

In this matter, the Plaintiff alleged that she sustained severe injuries after being prescribed and dispensed a medication inappropriately. 

The Plaintiff sued the medical providers relative to the prescription of the medication. She also sued CVS, who allegedly filled the prescription without providing the required counseling, verifying the safety of the prescription, or reconciling what the Plaintiff alleged were inadequacies on the face of the prescription with the prescribing physician.

With regards to the claims against CVS, the court found that the Plaintiff had sufficiently alleged both vicarious and direct liability claims.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff’s Complaint alleged that the CVS agents failed to counsel the Plaintiff, ignored dosage red flags, and did not consult with the prescribing physician. The Plaintiff additionally alleged ischemic failures in the training, policy enforcement, and prescription review within CVS.

The court ruled that, under the facts alleged, such claims could rise to the level of reckless indifference and could warrant a claim for punitive damages. Accordingly, CVS’ Preliminary Objections were overruled.

The court otherwise overruled the preliminary objections asserted against by the medical Defendants against the punitive damages claims as well. The court held that the Plaintiff’s claims of misdiagnosis, discharged despite warning signs, and inadequate supervision of the Plaintiff as a patient, all supported direct claims and warranted the consideration of punitive damages.

The court did, however, sustain the Preliminary Objection filed by Geisinger Clinic to a claim for vicarious liability for punitive damages because the court found that the Complaint failed to allege that the clinic had actual knowledge of its agents’ conduct as required under §505(c) of the MCARE Act.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: Lackawanna Jurist Case Summary (Aug. 15, 2025).

Source of image:  Photo by Marques Thomas on www.unsplash.com.

Trial Court Allows Claims of Recklessness and Punitive Damages to Proceed Where Defendant Driver Took Eyes Off Road Where Something Fell to the Floor of Vehicle

In the case of Lin v. Gutowski, No. 2024-CV-5659 (C.P. Lacka. Co. Aug. 11, 2025 Powell, J.), Judge Mark Powell of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas overruled a Defendant’s Preliminary Objections seeking to strike claims for recklessness, punitive damages, and negligent entrustment in an alleged distracted driver motor vehicle accident case.

Judge Mark Powell
Lackawanna County

Relative to the allegations of recklessness, Judge Powell followed the current trend of allowing allegations of recklessness to be pled generally in cases where negligence has been alleged. With regards to the claims for punitive damages, the court noted that the Plaintiff alleged that the Defendant was distracted by an item that fell to the floor which caused him to remove his eyes from the road while approaching the intersection at a speed that was allegedly too fast for the conditions and while failing to yield to traffic where the Plaintiff was attempting to make a left hand turn.

The court found that the allegations presented by the Plaintiff rendered it unclear as to whether or not a jury could find that such conduct was reckless such that the claim for punitive damages could be supported. In so ruling, Judge Powell cited to a Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision in which it was stated that a more appropriate course of action under the circumstances would be to pull to the side of the road to retrieve the item.

The court otherwise noted that the allegations that the Defendant driver diverted his eyes from the road, in combination with the allegations that the Defendant was traveling too fast for conditions and that he failed to yield to other traffic on the roadway, all served to support the Plaintiff’s potential claim for punitive damages. The court noted that it was otherwise not clear and free from doubt as to the Defendant’s subjective understanding of the risk his conduct posted to the safety of others and whether or the Defendant carelessly disregarded those risks. Accordingly, the court allowed the claim for punitive damages to proceed.

In his decision, Judge Powell also outlined the current status of the law regarding negligent entrustment claims. After applying that law to the case presented, the court noted that the Plaintiff’s claims that the Defendant owner knew or should have known that the Defendant driver had a prior history of motor vehicle violations and that the Defendant driver would allegedly fail to operate the vehicle safely, that the Defendant driver had a propensity for speeding and driving while distracted and for ignoring the law, not only stated claims for negligence, but also supported claims of recklessness for which a jury may decide to award punitive damages. As such, the court also overruled the Defendant’s Preliminary Objections to the Plaintiff’s claims of negligent entrustment.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney Stephen T. Kopko of the Anzalone and Doyle law firm in Wilkes-Barre, PA for bringing this case to my attention.