Nursing Home Arbitration Agreement Found To Be Invalid and Unenforceable as Unconscionable

In the case of Blackshear v. Providence Operator, LLC, No. 250102454 (C.P. Phila. Co. May 28, 2026 Carpenter, J.), the trial court issued a Rule 1925 Opinion requesting the Superior Court to affirm the trial court’s decision overruling a Defendant’s Preliminary Objections in a professional liability action regarding a nursing home negligence case. The Defendants, through Preliminary Objections, sought to transfer this litigation to private litigation pursuant to an ADR agreement signed by the Plaintiff’s decedent when he was admitted to the nursing home.

The trial court ruled that the Arbitration Agreement allegedly signed by the Plaintiff’s decedent was invalid and unenforceable where clear and convincing evidence indicated that the resident lacked the capacity to understand and execute the agreement at the time it was signed.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer Common Pleas Case Alert, www.Law.com (July 23, 2026).

Source of image:  Photo by Caleb Oquendo on www.pexels.com.

Court Finds Venue Selection Clause in Medical Provider's Agreement Valid

In the case of McCarney v. Hahn, No. 25084681 (C.P. Phila. Co. Jan. 15, 2026 Carpenter, J.), the court issued a Rule 1925 Opinion requesting the Superior Court to affirm the trial court’s decision to transfer venue in this medical malpractice case out of Philadelphia and into Chester County based upon a venue selection agreement in the relevant documents existing between the parties.

The trial court noted that it had found that numerous signed medical provider venue selection agreements were valid and enforceable given that the contracts utilized unambiguous language. The court also found that the circumstances of the signing of the relevant documents did not indicate any unconscionability.

In its Opinion, the court noted that the medical provider had provided a written agreement that was clear and unambiguous. It was noted that the venue selection clause was not buried in the document or obscured. Rather, the venue selection agreement appeared in a short form and was prefaced by a bolded underlined heading that read, “Pennsylvania Patient Only-Venue Agreement.”

The court also noted that the Plaintiff had signed six (6) other agreements also containing venue provisions which were set forth in separate forms under a section entitled “Claims.”

The court rejected the Plaintiff’s argument that she had been provided inadequate notice, that there was no opt-out option, that there was allegedly a lack of mutual assent. 

The court also rejected the Plaintiff’s argument of unconscionability based upon the Plaintiff’s alleged physical and mental condition when she signed the documents, including her alleged infertility problems when she signed one agreement and including the Plaintiff being in labor when she signed one of the other agreements.

The court noted that, while the Plaintiff was in labor when she signed one of the agreements, she had previously signed five (5) identical agreements before that particular document. The court also held that the Plaintiff’s infertility struggles did not establish a legal incapacity, mutual mistake, undue influence, or unconscionability.

The trial court sustained the Defendants’ Preliminary Objections and ordered the case to be transferred to Chester County and directed the Plaintiffs to pay the cost related to the transfer. In this Rule 1925 Opinion, the trial court requested the Superior Court to affirm the trial court’s decision.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer Common Pleas Case Alert, www.Law.com (July 23, 2026).

Source of image:  Photo by Gabrielle Henderson on www.unsplashcom.

Judge Mannion of Federal Middle District Court Rules in Favor of Consolidated Discovery in Post-Koken UIM Claim

In the case of Alers v. Progressive Preferred Ins. Co., No. 3:25-CV-01371-MEM (M.D. Pa. Aug. 7, 2026 Mannion, J.), Judge Malachy E. Mannion denied a Defendant’s Motion to Sever and Stay Discovery in a post-Koken breach of contract and statutory bad faith case arising out of a motor vehicle accident.

In this case, the Defendant UIM carrier sought to sever and stay all bad faith discovery from the breach of contract claim. The Defendant carrier argued that, through the bad faith claim, the Plaintiff was seeking in discovery the production of privileged information and the carrier’s opinion work product which would prejudice the Defendant carrier in relationship to the ongoing UIM claim.

The court addressed the request for severance under F.R.C.P. 21.

Judge Malachy E. Mannion
Pa. Middle District

In reviewing the applicable factors under this analysis, Judge Mannion found that the claims raised in both the breach of contract claim and the bad faith claim were intertwined. The court also concluded that severance would not promote judicial economy. The court additionally found that there would be no prejudice to the Defendant if the Motion to Severe was denied. 

In terms of any discovery issues with regards to allegedly privileged insurance company documents, the court noted that such concerns could be addressed through incamera review of discovery materials in response to any Motion to Compel rather than through severance or bifurcation or any stay Orders, which would only serve to prolong consideration of various discovery issues.

Overall, the court found that the Defendant carrier had not met its burden in establishing that severance of the claims or stay of discovery with respect to the bad faith claim were warranted. As such, the Defendant’s Motion was denied and this Post-Koken federal court case involving UIM breach of contract and bad faith claims was allowed to proceed through discovery in a consolidated fashion.

Anyone wishing to review this case may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney Jesse B. Hallinan and Attorney Thomas W. Munley of the Scranton law firm of Minora, Krowiak, Munley & Batyko for bringing this case to my attention.

This decision has been added to the Post-Koken Scorecard on the Tort Talk Blog.  The Post-Koken Scorecard is a compilation of many of the Post-Koken decisions handed down by the Pennsylvania state and federal courts since 2009.  The list does not reference all of the cases but is still a comprehensive compilation.

That Scorecard can always be freely accessed by going to www.TortTalk.com, scrolling down the right hand column of the blog to "Post-Koken Scorecard" and clicking on the date under that title.  For now, here is a quick LINK to the Post-Koken Scorecard on the Tort Talk Blog compiled by Daniel E. Cummins, Esquire.

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Addresses the Appeal Period for Appeals From Collateral Orders Where a Motion for Reconsideration Was Filed

In the case of Khalil v. Mary Jane Home Enrichment Center, Inc., No. 16 EAP 2025 (Pa. Aug. 5, 2026) (Op. by Donohue, J.), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court addressed issues relative to the time period within which an appeal may be filed from the entry of a collateral Order where a Motion for Reconsideration had been filed relative to that collateral Order.

The case arose out of a pro se dispute involving a landlord-tenant matter.

During the course of the case, pro bono counsel who had entered an appearance for the pro se tenant withdrew from the case after the completion of an Arbitration.

The tenant later challenged the withdrawal by the pro bono attorney, arguing that the attorney had not obtained leave of court to withdraw.

After a series of Motions, the trial court ultimately granted the pro bono attorney’s Motion to Withdraw as counsel. That amounted to the collateral Order at issue.

Following the entry of that collateral Order, the pro se tenant filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied.

The pro se litigant then filed a Notice of Appeal more than thirty (30) days after the entry of the collateral Order that had allowed the attorney to withdraw.

On appeal, the Pennsylvania Superior Court quashed the appeal as untimely. The Superior Court explained that appeals from collateral Orders must be filed within thirty (30) days of the entry of that Order.

The Superior Court also ruled that neither a Motion for Reconsideration nor an Order denying that Motion for Reconsideration tolls or resets the appeal period.

The Superior Court also noted that the Order denying the reconsideration Motion was also not appealable in this case.

Further up the appellate ladder, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the rulings of the Superior Court.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed that a party must file a Notice of Appeal within thirty (30) days from the entry of a collateral Order in order to attempt an appeal. Otherwise, a party must wait until a final Order is entered before any appeal could be filed.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court additionally confirmed that the filing of a Motion for Reconsideration, or an Order denying that Motion for Reconsideration, does not affect the thirty (30) day deadline within which to attempt to file an appeal from a collateral Order.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: Justia Daily Opinion Summaries (Aug. 6, 2026).

Named "LAWYER OF THE YEAR" for Insurance Law in Northeastern Pennsylvania By the BEST LAWYERS IN AMERICA Directory

 

Proud to note the notification received yesterday from The Best Lawyers in America Directory confirming that I have been named the 2027 "Lawyer of the Year" for Insurance Law in Northeastern Pennsylvania.

The Directory noted that this is a particularly meaningful distinction in that it is awarded to individual lawyers who recieved the highest overall peer feedback in a specific practice area and geographic region.

The Directory also noted that I will be recognized in the 2027 Edition of The Best Lawyers in America for my work in Insurance Law as well as in Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants.  I am additionally proud to note that this is the 16th year in a row that I have been so recognized in the Directory.

I am grateful for all of my clients who have entrusted their matters to me for handling and I thank all those fellow members of the bar and the judiciary who have pushed me to provide the best legal services possible.

Judge Nealon of Lackawanna County Reviews the Law on Wrongful Discharge Claim Under Medical Marijuana Act

In the case of Mauger v. Scranton Hospital Company, LLC, No. 2023-CV-2381 (C.P. Lacka. Co. Aug. 5, 2026 Nealon, J.), Judge Terrence R. Nealon of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas issued a detailed Opinion outlining the law surrounding a cause of action for wrongful discharge as a tort claim.

This matter arose out a situation involving a hospital nurse who filed suit against his former hospital employer asserting a single cause of action for wrongful discharge.

Judge Nealon's Opinion provides a thorough review of the law regarding an employee's use of medical marijuana any impact of the need for such medication on that person's employment status. 

The Plaintiff cited to the Medical Marijuana Act, which, in part, prohibits an employer from discharging or otherwise discriminating or retaliating against an employee based upon the employee’s status as a certified medical marijuana user. The Plaintiff alleged that he was terminated by the hospital based upon a drug screen test that was positive for marijuana that was due to his prescribed use of medical marijuana.

The Plaintiff was later reinstated by the hospital following the filing of a union grievance. However, the Plaintiff subsequent resigned from his position allegedly due to the constant micromanagement and correction by a supervisor.  The Plaintiff later filed suit for wrongful discharge.

The issues in this matter came before the court on a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by the hospital.

Given the presence of various issues of fact before the court, the hospital’s Motion for Summary Judgment was denied with respect to the nurse’s wrongful discharge claim.

However, the court did grant the hospital’s Motion for Summary Judgment relative to claims of a hostile work environment, and relative to claims of constructive discharge.

The court otherwise also granted the hospital's Motion for Summary Judgment relative to the nurse’s claims for punitive damages and for counsel fees.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Source of image:  Photo by Budding on www.unsplash.com.

Superior Court Ruling Affects Multi-Million Dollar Jury Verdict

In the case of Newlin v. Vita Healthcare Group, No. 259 EDA 2024 (Pa. Super. Aug. 4, 2026 Olson, J., Dubow, J. & McLaughlin, J.) (Op. by Dubow, J.)(Concurring and Dissenting Op. by McLaughlin, J), the Pennsylvania Superior Court found that a new trial on damages was required in a nursing home death case. The Superior Court’s ruling did away with what remained of a nearly $20 million dollar jury verdict in favor of the Plaintiffs.

In part, the Superior Court ruled that the trial court had erred in its handling of both the $4 million dollar compensatory award and the $5 million punitive damages award.

With regards to the compensatory award, the appellate court ruled that the trial court had erred in agreeing to dismiss two Defendants from the case after the jury’s verdict. According to the Opinion, the jury had not apportioned liability to each Defendant in the verdict slip. The Superior Court noted that the trial court had erred in that the trial court had no basis to determine how much of its award that the jury had intended to apportion to the dismissed Defendant.

Relative to the punitive damages award, the Superior Court ruled, based upon its review of the record, that the Plaintiffs had failed to make a case supporting the punitive damages award.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

The Concurring and Dissenting Opinion issued by Judge McLaughlin can be viewed at this LINK.


Source: Article – “Pa. Appeals Court Wipes Out Nearly $10M In Damages In Nursing Home Death Suit, Remands For New Trial,” By Riley Brennan of the Legal Intelligencer (Aug. 5, 2026).

Superior Court Finds That Defendant Waived Right to Arbitration by Participating in the Litigation Process

In the case of Estate of Smalling v. 2990 Holme Operating, LLC, No. 2172 EDA 2025 (Pa. Super. June 30, 2026 Lazarus, P.J., Sullivan, J., and Stevens, P.J.E.) (Op. by Stevens, P.J.E.), the court affirmed a trial court Order finding that the Defendants had waived the contractual right to compel Arbitration in a wrongful death and survival action by failing to raise a request for Arbitration promptly.

The court also noted that the Defendants had substantially invoked the judicial process by way of participating in the litigation of a lawsuit, including through Preliminary Objections, other pleadings, participating in discovery and also participated in other case management activities before the Defendants sought Arbitration fourteen (14) months into the lawsuit.

As such, the Defendants were found to have waived their contractual right to arbitration.   

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer State Appellate Case Alert, www.Law.com (July 24, 2026).

Source of above image:  Photo by Felix Mittermeier on www. unsplash.com.

Superior Court Affirms Trial Court's Refusal To Open and/or Strike a Default Judgment

In the case of Davis v. Woodbury Financial Services, Inc., No. 804 WDA 2025 (Pa. Super. July 7, 2026 Nichols, J., McLaughlin, J., and Sullivan, J.) (Op. by McLaughlin, J.), the Superior Court affirmed a trial court’s denial of a Petition to Strike and/or Open a Default Judgment in a dispute over the alleged mishandling of retirement funds.

The appellate court held that service by publication pursuant to a trial court Order did not reveal a fatal defect on the face of the record such that the Defendant was not entitled to an opening of a default judgment. 

The appellate court noted that the record supported the trial court’s findings that the Defendant did not act promptly, did not provide a reasonable excuse and did not otherwise assert any additional valid arguments in support of the opening of the default judgment.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer State Appellate Case Alert, www.Law.com (July 24, 2026).

Source of above image:  Photo by Sasun Bughdarya on www.unsplash.com.

Appellate Court Upholds Auto Carrier's Denial of Coverage.

In the non-precedential case of Halstead v. Progressive Specialty Ins. Co., No. 430 MDA 2025 (Pa. Super. July 28, 2026 Bowes, J., Dubow, J., and Neuman, J.) (Mem. Op. by Bowes, J.), the appellate court reversed an Order of the trial court denying the insurance company’s Motion for Summary Judgment in a declaratory judgment action. The appellate court remanded the case for the entry of a declaratory judgment in favor of Progressive.

According to the Opinion, the tortfeasor was driving a motor vehicle that was insured under a policy issued by Kemper Insurance when he rear-ended a vehicle being operated by the Plaintiff and in which the Plaintiff’s wife was a passenger. The Plaintiff-wife tragically died from the injuries sustained in the incident.

Thereafter, the Plaintiff-husband sued the tortfeasor for the Plaintiff-husband’s own injuries and as the estate representative on the claims for his deceased wife.

The Defendant driver requested excess liability insurance coverage from Progressive.

However, Progressive Insurance denied the claim, contending that its policy, which was issued to the tortfeasor’s father, excluded excess coverage for the tortfeasor’s liability to the Plaintiff.

Thereafter, Kemper Insurance tendered its policy limits in settlement.

At that point in time, the tortfeasor Defendant assigned his rights under the policy to the Plaintiff, who then initiated a declaratory judgment action against Progressive seeking a judicial determination that Progressive was required to provide coverage for the claim.

At some point in the litigation, the tortfeasor Defendant died from causes not apparent from the record. The underlying negligence claim was stayed pending the determination of the declaratory judgment action addressing Progressive’s possible duty to provide coverage.

Progressive filed a Motion for Summary Judgment arguing three (3) bases for its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. First, the carrier claimed that, given that the tortfeasor Defendant had passed way at the time the Plaintiff initiated the declaratory judgment action, it was too late for the Plaintiff to substitute his estate in the caption.

Second, Progressive maintained that the tortfeasor’s assignment of his rights to the Plaintiff was invalid because the insurance policy required Progressive’s written consent to transfer the rights and duties to another person.

Third, Progressive reiterated its claim that coverage was excluded pursuant to the terms of the policy.

The appellate court first addressed the issue of whether the appeal was properly before it. 

In this regard, the appellate court agreed with the carrier’s position that the practical effect of the trial court’s denial of the Motion for Summary Judgment had resolved the entirety of the Plaintiff’s eligibility for declaratory relief. In other words, the appellate court noted that the practical effect of the trial court’s denying Progressive’s Motion for Summary Judgment was to declare that the Plaintiff was entitled to the declaratory relief that was requested.

Given that the trial court’s ruling left no additional issues to be resolved and had the practical effect of deciding the outcome of the case rather than merely narrowing the issues, the appellate court noted that the appeal was properly before it.

On the merits, the appellate court ruled that the tortfeasor Defendant did not meet the definition of a “named insured” under the terms of the policy and the vehicle that the tortfeasor was operating did not fall under the definition of “covered vehicle” under the terms of the policy.

The court otherwise noted that, under the plain terms of the policy and an exclusion, there was no liability coverage for a loss arising from the use of a vehicle that was not listed in the declarations page and that was owned by a relative of the named insured, rather than being owned by the named insured himself, unless the loss was occasioned by the named insured’s use of the relative’s non-covered automobile, which was not the case in this matter.

The appellate court otherwise noted, taken as a whole, it was clear that the intent of the insurance policy was that, for there to be coverage for third-party liability resulting from an automobile that was owned or regularly used by a named insured or a relative of the named insured, the automobile had to be a covered auto that was listed on the declarations page, which was not the case here.

As such, the appellate court held that the trial court erred in declaring that the policy did not exclude coverage for the tortfeasor’s liability to the Plaintiff. As such, the trial court Order denying Progressive’s Motion for Summary Judgment was reversed and the case was remanded for the entry of a declaratory judgment in favor of Progressive on a holding that there was no coverage under the policy.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this non-precedential decision may click this LINK.

Court Sees Former Prisoner Plaintiff's Civil Rights Claims as Plausible and Allows Them to Proceed Forward

In the case of Walton v. Lackawanna County, No. 3:25-CV-02461-MEM (M.D. Pa. July 7, 2026 Mannion, J.), the court denied a municipality’s Motion to Dismiss a former prisoner Plaintiff’s civil rights claims.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff was pursuing §1983 civil rights claims, along with other disability claims, relative to allegations that, during a period of incarceration at the Lackawanna County Prison, the Plaintiff was prevented from securing the small plunger-like devices he allegedly required to remove his scleral contact lenses each day for his condition of keratoconus.  The Plaintiff alleged that, due to the fact that he was allegedly prevented from securing the plunger devices, he could not remove his scleral contact lenses, and suffered injuries to his eyes as a result.

After the filing of the Complaint, the municipality filed a Motion to Dismiss the Plaintiff’s various claims, including claims of municipal liability, deliberate indifference claims, and claims of liability under various disability laws.

After reviewing the record before him and applying the allegations against the standard of review, Federal Court Judge Malachy E. Mannion found that the Plaintiff had stated plausible causes of action in all respects. As such, the Defendant’s Motion was denied and the case was allowed to proceed.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.