PA Superior Court Rules that a Worker's Compensation Carrier Does Not Have a Right To Force a Plaintiff To Take Action Against a Third Party Tortfeasor To Recover a Lien

In the case of Loftus v. Decker, No. 611 WDA 2021 (Pa. Super. March 10, 2022 Olson, J., Murray, J., and Pellegrini, J.) (Op. by Pellegrini, J.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court quashed an appeal by a worker’s compensation carrier who had appealed the trial court’s denial of its Motion to Intervene in a personal injury case.

The record before the Court indicated that the injured party was a school bus driver who was injured during a motor vehicle accident.  During the course of the underlying matter, the injured party incurred a worker's compensation lien in excess of $196,000. 

According to the Opinion, the worker’s compensation carrier attempted to intervene after the Plaintiff-employee filed a Writ of Summons against an alleged tortfeasor.

The appellate court found that §319 of the Worker’s Compensation Act did not give a party any right, directly or indirectly, to take any action against a third-party tortfeasor. As such, the appellate court found that a worker’s compensation carrier could not force a Plaintiff employee to seek a recovery to satisfy a worker’s compensation statutory lien.

The Superior Court also noted that the Order from which the worker’s compensation carrier had appealed was not an appealable collateral Order.  Notably, the Pennsylvania Superior Court stated that it was addressing the issue of whether the Order at issue was an appealable collateral Order within its decision on the merits.  As such, the Court in this decision addressed the merits of the issues presented in this case relative to the ability of the worker's compensation carrier to intervene in the action.

As noted, this appeal was quashed.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.  The Dissenting Opinion written by Judge Murray can be viewed HERE.


Source: “Digest of Recent Opinions.” Pennsylvania Law Weekly (March 29, 2022).

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Worker's Compensation Carrier Allowed to Intervene in Third Party Action to Recover Lien

 

In the case of Gleason v. Alfred I. Dupont Hospital, No. 1872 EDA 2020 (Pa. Super. Aug. 5, 2021 McLaughlin, J., King, J., Pellegrini, J.) (Op. by Pellegrini, J.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court permitted a worker’s compensation carrier to intervene in a third party personal injury litigation as part of the worker’s compensation carrier’s efforts to protect its subrogation rights on its lien by challenging the parties’ allocation of the settlement proceeds.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff-husband sustained burn injuries as a result of a work-related event.

During the course of the third party litigation, the injured Plaintiff entered into a sizeable settlement with one of the alleged tortfeasor Defendants. A petition was then filed by the Plaintiff with the court for court approval of that settlement, including the allocation of 60% of that settlement to the loss of consortium claim.

The worker’s compensation carrier filed a Petition to Intervene in order to protect its subrogation rights. The worker’s compensation carrier was asserting that the allocation of a substantial portion to the settlement funds to the loss of consortium claim was unfair and was designed to preclude the worker’s compensation carrier from fully recovering on its subrogation rights.

When that initial Petition to Intervene filed by the worker’s compensation carrier was denied, the worker’s compensation carrier eventually filed a second Petition to Intervene which was also denied. An appeal followed.

As noted above, on appeal, the Pennsylvania Superior Court ruled that the worker’s compensation should have been allowed to intervene in a third party action to protect its interests.

The court found that the requirements of the Collateral Order Doctrine had been met under the case presented such that the worker’s compensation carrier should be entitled to intervene.

The court noted that, where the worker’s compensation carrier had paid nearly a $1 million dollars on behalf of the injured party as a result of the workplace accident, justice required that it be allowed to intervene in a case where the settlement agreement against the third party tortfeasor was structured in a manner that limited the worker’s compensation lien to only about a third of the amount of the lien.

As such, the Superior Court found that the trial court had abused its discretion in denying the intervention sought by the worker’s compensation carrier as that intervention was necessary to fully protect the worker’s compensation carrier’s subrogation rights and rights to challenge the apportionment of the settlement proceeds in the third party matter relative to the loss of consortium claim.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

I send thanks to Attorney Thomas B. Helbig of Helbig Mediation and Arbitration for bringing this case to my attention.

Source of Image (not of structure in question):  Photo by Markus Spiske on unsplash.com.

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Reviews Collateral Order Doctrine for Appeals

Tort Talkers may recall prior posts on the Lebanon County case of Shearer v. Hafer pertaining to whether a Plaintiff is entitle to have a representative present during portions of a neuropsychological IME. 

The Tort Talk post on the Superior Court's decision in this case can be viewed HERE.  The post on the trial court's decision can be viewed HERE.  Concisely, the Superior Court affirmed the trial court's order allowing a representative of the Plaintiff to be present during the preliminary interview phase of the neuropsychological evaluation, but not during the standardized testing portion of the evaluation.

Now comes the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision recently handed down in this case on January 18, 2018 ruling that the Pennsylvania Superior Court erred in even considering the issue on appeal as the trial court's order was not an appealable order as of right under Pa.R.A.P. 313 where the trial court order only met one of the three prongs of the collateral order doctrine.  As such, the Superior Court's decision on the issue was vacated.

The Majority Opinion of the Court in Shearer v. Hafer, No. 93 MAP 2016 (Pa. Jan. 18, 2018), written by Justice Todd, can be viewed HERE.

Justice Wecht's Concurring Opinion can be viewed HERE.

Justice Mundy's Dissenting Opinion can be viewed HERE.

This Opinion may be a good one to consult if you have a question on whether a trial court order is appealable under the collateral order doctrine under Pa.R.A.P. 313. 

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reaffirmed the rule of law that the collateral order doctrine is to be narrowly construed and that each of the three prongs to allow for an appeal must be clearly present.

The three prongs of the collateral order doctrine as set forth under Pa.R.A.P. 313(b) are:

(1) the order is separable from and collateral to the main cause of action

(2) the right involved in the order is too important to be denied review by the appellate court, and

(3) the question presented is such that if review is postponed until the final judgment of the case, the claim will be irreparably lost.