The Post-Koken Scorecard and the Facebook Discovery Scorecard on Tort Talk have been updated.
To view the Scorecards, please go to www.TortTalk.com and scroll down the right hand column and click on the date noted under the title to the Scorecards.
If you are willing, please forward to my attention a copy of any new judicial Opinions and/or Orders regarding any Post-Koken litigation issues or Facebook/Social Media Discovery issues you may come across for inclusion in the Scorecard.
Here's a Facebook Discovery decision -- the first one seen here in a while.
To date, there still has not been any notable Pennsylvania appellate court decisions addressing this issue. There are a slew of state and federal trial court decisions on the issue, many of which can be viewed on Tort Talk.
Please note that you can always review Facebook Discovery decisions on the Tort Talk Facebook Discovery Scorecard by going to www.TortTalk.com and scrolling down the right hand column until you get to "Facebook Discovery Scorecard" and click on the date under that.
In the case of Harkey v. Stojakovich, No. CV-19-1295 (C.P. Lycoming Co. Oct. 26, 2020 Linhardt, J.), Judge Eric R. Linhardt of the Lycoming County Court of Common Pleas addressed a Defendant’s Motion to Compel Facebook Discovery from a Plaintiff in a tractor trailer accident case.
According to the Opinion, the Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against the Defendant tractor trailer driver and the tractor trailer driver’s company after the tractor trailer driver was involved in an accident with the Plaintiff who was operating the motorcycle.
During the course of discovery, the Defendants filed a Motion to Compel, including with respect to demands for copies of all of the Plaintiff’s social media postings. The defense asserted that all of the Plaintiff’s social media postings were relevant and discoverable because the Plaintiff claimed that he suffered physical disability, loss of life’s pleasures, difficulty walking, and loss of earnings as a result of the accident.
According to the record, the Plaintiff’s social media postings allegedly showed the Plaintiff taking multiple trips after the accident, including motorcycle rides. The social media post also showed the Plaintiff engaging in work at a restaurant and bar.
Judge Linhardt noted that there was no appellate guidance on point and that the issue of the discoverability of social media postings had not been previously addressed in Lycoming County.
Judge Linhardt reviewed cases from other Pennsylvania trial courts and reiterated the rule that, generally speaking, the parties seeking discovery of the non-public information on a party’s social media account is required to show a “factual predicate” that the sought after information could be relevant by demonstrating that relevant information has been posted on the publicly available portions of the website.
However, the court ruled that, while the Defendants made a threshold showing that the Plaintiff’s social media account information could be relevant of the case at hand, the defense requests for the production of all of the postings from the Plaintiff’s social media sites lacked the requisite particularity for discovery requests necessary to avoid undue embarrassment and burden upon the Plaintiff and potential third parties.
As such, the defense Motion to Compel was denied in this instance.
Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.
Source: “Digest of Recent Opinions.” Pennsylvania Law Weekly (Dec. 22, 2020).
Should you hear about or generate any Post-Koken decisions or any Facebook Discovery decisions, I hope and ask that you please email me a copy of the same in order that I may publicize those decisions here on Tort Talk for the benefit of all.
These areas of law continue to have a dearth of appellate decisions to provide any guidance and, as a result, it is important that the common law being created state and federal trial courts across the Commonwealth on these topics be compiled and publicized.
I will be sure to give you credit for sending cases for publication here on Tort Talk. Also, if you wish to remain anonymous, I will honor that as well.
Thanks very much.
The Post-Koken Scorecard and the Facebook Discovery Scorecard have both just been updated and can always be freely accessed on www.TortTalk.com by scrolling down the right hand column and clicking on the date noted under the title of each Scorecard.
I was recently made aware of the below older Facebook Discovery/Admissibility cases
These cases have been added to the Facebook Discovery Scorecard on the Tort Talk Blog and which can always be freely accessed by going to www.TortTalk.com, scrolling down the right hand column and clicking on the date below the title "Facebook Discovery Scorecard."
One of the benefits of the Facebook Discovery Scorecard is that you can click on the case names on the Scorecard to be linked to the actual Opinions or Orders. I have set up the below cases in the same regard, i.e., you can click on the case name to go to the decision online.
The cases are, as follows:
Hanna v. Giant Eagle, Inc., 2016 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 107253 (W.D. Pa. 2016 Mitchell, J.)(Court precludes unfettered access to
Plaintiff's social medial account).
Bryant v. Wilkes-Barre Hosp. Co., LLC, 2016 LEXIS 87103 (M.D. Pa. 2016 Mannion, J)(Court
allows admission of Facebook posts to challenge Plaintiff's credibility at
trial). I send thanks to Attorney Brian J. Murren of the Camp Hill, PA office of Marshall, Dennehey, Warner, Coleman & Goggin for bringing these cases to my attention.
The below article of mine was recently published in the Pennsylvania Law Weekly and is republished here with permission. This article was also previously published in Counterpoint, the newsletter of the Pennsylvania Defense Institute.
The Latest on the Discoverability and Admissibility of Social Media Evidence
By Daniel E. Cummins | February 07, 2019 Pennsylvania Law Weekly
Daniel E. Cummins
Foley, Comerford & Cummins
Scranton, PA
Over the past year, the Pennsylvania state trial and
appellate courts have continued to grapple with issues pertaining to social
media discovery as well as the admissibility of social media evidence at trial.
Discoverability of Social Media Content
In Kelter v. Flanagan, No. 286-Civil-2017 (C.P.
Monroe Co. Feb. 19, 2018 Williamson, J.), Monroe County Judge David J.
Williamson followed the developing common law that permits a party access to
another party’s private social media pages only when it has been first
established that information relevant to the litigation can be seen on the
public pages of that profile. In Kelter, Williamson granted a
defendant’s motion to compel a plaintiff to provide the defendant’s counsel
with her Instagram account log-in information in order to allow for further
discovery of the information on that profile.
This case arose out of a motor vehicle accident. According
to the opinion, the plaintiff initially testified at her deposition that she
did not maintain any social media accounts. When confronted with proof to the
contrary, the plaintiff then admitted that she maintained an Instagram account
and asserted that she had allegedly misunderstood the question presented.
Defense counsel then reviewed posts from the plaintiff’s
Instagram account from the time period shortly after the accident that were
available for public access on the plaintiff’s Instagram account. According to
the opinion, those posts seem to indicate that, despite the plaintiff’s claims
of limitations following the accident, the plaintiff had engaged in vigorous
physical activity both before and after the accident, such as references to
shoveling snow and going to the gym.
When the plaintiff declined to provide any additional
Instagram account information, the defense filed this motion to compel, which,
as noted, was granted by the court.
The court ruled in this fashion given that the defense had
made the required threshold showing that the public pages on the plaintiff’s
profile suggested that more information may be found on the private pages of
the same profile.
In granting the defense limited access to the private pages
of the site for discovery purposes the court ordered that the defense not share
that information with anyone not related to the case. The court’s order further
mandated that the plaintiff would not remove or delete any content from that
account.
Confirming that there is a split of authority on this issue
among the trial courts of Pennsylvania, a contrary result was handed down in
the recent Northampton County Court of Common Pleas ruling in Allen
v. Sands Bethworks Gaming, No. C-0048-CV-2017-2279 (C.P. North. Co. Aug.
6, 2018 Dally, J.).
The Allen case arose out of a plaintiff’s alleged
slip-and-fall in a bathroom at the Sands Casino in Bethlehem, Pennsylvania.
During the course of discovery, the plaintiff provided
limited information in response to social media interrogatories seeking
information regarding her online activity. The plaintiff confirmed in her
responses that she used Facebook and Twitter but declined to provide any more
detailed information other than to confirm that nothing had been deleted from
her accounts since the date of the incident.
The defense responded with a motion to compel for more
information, including information from the private portions of the plaintiff’s
social media profiles.
In his detailed opinion, Judge Craig Dally of Northampton
County provided an excellent overview of the general rules of discovery
pertinent to this issue as well as a review of the previous social media
discovery decisions that have been handed down around the commonwealth by
various county Courts of Common Pleas as well as by courts from other
jurisdictions.
No Pennsylvania appellate court decision was referenced
by the Allen court as there are apparently still no such
decisions to date on this emerging issue.
In his opinion, Dally noted that the defense had pointed out
discrepancies between the plaintiff’s deposition testimony regarding her
alleged limitations from her alleged accident-related injuries and the photos
available for review on the public pages of the plaintiff’s Facebook profile
depicting the plaintiff engaging in certain activities.
Nevertheless, after reviewing the record before the court,
Dally still ruled that the defense had failed to establish the factual
predicate of showing sufficient information on the plaintiff’s public pages to
allow for discovery of information on the plaintiff’s private pages.
In a footnote, the court emphasized that such a factual
predicate must be established with respect to each separate social media site
the defendant wishes to access further.
The court additionally noted that, in any event, “it would
be disinclined to follow the line of Common Pleas cases that have granted
partiescarte blanche access to another party’s social media
account by requiring the responding party to turn over their username and
password, as requested by the defendant in this case.” The court found that
this type of access would be overly intrusive, would cause unreasonable
embarrassment and burden, and represented a request for discovery that was not
properly tailored with reasonable particularity as required by the Rules of
Civil Procedure pertaining to discovery efforts. In light of the above
reasoning, the defendant’s motion to compel was denied.
As such, it appears that Dally was generally opposed to the
notion that discovery should be allowed into the private areas of parties’
social media sites and, as such, he tailored his opinion to secure this desired
result.
The above recent trial court cases on the discoverability of
social media information continues to confirm that, in the absence of appellate
guidance on the issue, there will be uncertainty as to whether a particular
Court of Common Pleas in a given county will allow for further access of a
social media site in response to a motion to compel.
Admissibility of Social Media
Content
Over the past year a notable appellate social media
evidentiary decision on the separate topic of admissibility of such information
at trial was also handed down in a criminal court setting.
In the case of Commonwealth v. Mangel, 181 A.3d 1154
(Pa. Super. 2018), the Pennsylvania Superior Court ruled that social media
posts are inadmissible in criminal cases unless prosecutors can present
evidence of who actually authored the commentary. It is expected that this
ruling in the criminal court context will be the same when it eventually arises
in a civil litigation matter.
The court in Mangel affirmed an Erie County trial
court decision denying a prosecutor’s motion in limine seeking to introduce
into evidence Facebook posts and messages allegedly authored by the defendant.
The Mangel court ruled in this fashion after noting that social
media accounts can be easily hacked or faked. Both the trial court and the
appellate court in Mangel found that merely presenting evidence that the
posts and messages came from a social media account bearing the defendant’s
name was not enough to admit the evidence at trial.
The court noted that Facebook posts and messages must
instead be authenticated under Pa.R.E. 901 in a manner similar to how text messages
and email messages are authenticated. The Superior Court in Mangel
relied on its own 2011 decision in Commonwealth v. Koch, 39 A.3d
996, 1005 (Pa. Super. 2011), affirmed by an equally divided court, 106 A.3d 705
(Pa. 2014), which dealt with the separate but similar issue of the
admissibility and authentication of cellphone text messages.
In the 2018 Commonwealth v. Mangel decision,
the court noted that the Koch court had previously held that
“authentication of electronic communications, like documents, requires more
than mere confirmation that the number or address belonged to a particular
person. Circumstantial evidence, which tends to corroborate the identity of the
sender, is required.”
The Mangel court ruled, in a case of first
impression, that the same analysis should also apply to social media
posts in the criminal court context. As stated, it can be expected that a
similar ruling would be handed down in the context of a civil litigation matter
should this issue resurface in the future.
Publication of New Social Media
Decisions
To review a comprehensive compilation of social media
discovery decisions handed down to date in Pennsylvania, one can freely access
the Facebook
Discovery Scorecard on the Tort Talk blog at www.TortTalk.com. Copies of the decisions
found on the scorecard can be downloaded by clicking on the case names.
While the Facebook Discovery Scorecard is comprehensive, it
is not represented to be complete. There may be other decisions out there that
have not been publicized.
Continuing publication and widespread dissemination of the
trial court decisions on these still novel social media issues is important and
beneficial to the bench and the bar as a whole. Should you happen to have or
come across a social media decision, please send a copy to dancummins@comcast.net in order that the
Facebook Discovery Scorecard can be continually updated as this new common law
develops at the trial court level and without any appellate guidance to date.
Daniel E. Cumminsis a partner in the Scranton, Pennsylvania insurance defense firm of Foley,
Comerford & Cummins where he focuses his practice on the defense of car and
trucking accident matters, UM/UIM matters, premises liability cases and
products liability litigation. He is the sole creator and writer of the Tort
Talk blog (www.TortTalk.com) and also
offers mediation services through Cummins Mediation Services. Contact him at
dancummins@comcast.net.
For the latest social media discovery decision, check out the Northampton County Court of Common Pleas ruling in Allen v. Sands Bethworks Gaming, LLC, No. C-0048-CV-2017-2279 (C.P. North. Co. Aug. 6, 2018 Dally, J.).
This case arose out of the Plaintiff's alleged slip and fall in a bathroom at the Sands Casino in Bethlehem, Pennsylvania.
During the course of discovery, the Plaintiff provided limited information in response to social media interrogatories seeking information regarding her online activity. The Plaintiff confirmed in her responses that she used Facebook and Twitter but declined to provide any more detailed information other than to confirm that nothing had been deleted from her accounts since the date of the incident.
The defense responded with a motion to compel for more information, including information from the private portions of the Plaintiff's social media profiles.
In his detailed Opinion, Judge Dally provided an excellent overview of the general rules of discovery pertinent to this issue as well as a review of the previous social media discovery decisions that have been handed down around the Commonwealth by various county courts of common pleas as well as by courts from other jurisdictions.
No Pennsylvania appellate court decision was referenced by the Allen court as there are apparently still no such decisions to date.
In his Opinion, Judge Dally noted that the Defendant had pointed out discrepancies between the Plaintiff's deposition testimony regarding her alleged limitations from her alleged accident-related injuries and photos available for review on the public pages of the Plaintiff's Facebook profile depicting the Plaintiff engaging in certain activities.
After reviewing the record before the court, Judge Dally ruled that the defense had failed to establish the factual predicate of showing sufficient information on the Plaintiff's public pages to allow for discovery of information on the Plaintiff's private pages.
In a footnote 6, the court also emphasized that such a factual predicate must be established with respect to each separate social media site the Defendant wishes to access further.
The court additionally noted that, in any event, "it would be disinclined to follow the line of Common Pleas cases that have granted parties carte blanche access to another party's social medial account by requiring the responding party to to turn over their username and password, as requested by the Defendant in this case." This the court found would be overly intrusive, would cause unreasonable embarassment and burden, and represented a discovery request that is not properly tailored with reasonable particularity as required by the Rules of Civil Procedure pertaining to discovery efforts.
In light of the above reasoning, the Defendant's Motion to Compel was denied.
Anyone wishing to review this decision may click this LINK.
To review the Tort Talk Facebook Discovery Scorecard click this LINK.
The Scorecard can always be freely accessed by going to www.TortTalk.com and scrolling down the right hand column and clicking on the date noted under "Facebook Discovery Scorecard."
If you are willing to do so, please do not hesitate to send me a copy of any Social Media discovery or admissibility decisions you may come across in order that the Tort Talk Facebook Discovery Scorecard and be continually updated. Thanks very much. DEC
This article of mine appeared in the April 10, 2018 edition of the Pennsylvania Law Weekly and is republished here with permission.
Authentication in the Digital Age:
In Recent Cases, Old and New Collide
By Daniel E. Cummins|April 05, 2018
Daniel E. Cummins
As they say, “The more things change, the more they remain the same.” And so it is with the changing forms of evidence in the digital age including various types of electronic messages and a wide variety of social media platforms designed for the exchange of information, photos and videos. But what has not changed are the long-standing and staid Rules of Evidence applicable to all forms of evidence.
The old and the new are colliding in recent cases in which the state and federal courts of Pennsylvania have addressed the novel issues of how different forms of digital evidence are to be authenticated before such evidence may be ruled admissible in a court of law.
While the seminal decisions laying down the requirement and parameters of the authentication of digital evidence have all come out of the criminal court context, it can be anticipated that identical rulings will be handed down in the civil litigation context as well in the future.
Rule of Evidence 901
Under Pa.R.E. 901(a), which is consistent with its counterpart Federal Rule of Evidence, it is provided that “to satisfy the requirement of authenticating or identifying an item of evidence, the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is.”
The rule goes on to give specific examples of how different types of evidence may potentially be authenticated. Currently, there is no specific example provided with respect to the new situation of social media or digital evidence. Perhaps there is a need for an amendment of Rule 901 in this regard in light of the recent case law on the issue.
According to the commentary under Pa.R.E. 901, “the authentication or identification requirement may be expressed as follows: When a party offers evidence contending either expressly or impliedly that the evidence is connected with a person, place, thing, or event, the party must provide evidence sufficient to support a finding of the contended connection,” see Pa.R.E. 901, Commentary, citing Commonwealth v. Hudson, 414 A.2d 1381 (1980); Commonwealth v. Pollock, 606 A.2d 500 (1992).
ADVERTISEMENT
Recent decisions handed down in Pennsylvania have begun to confirm that the mandates of Rule 901 apply to all forms of electronic and social media messages.
A Case of First Impression
In a 2005 decision issued during the dawn of the digital age, the Pennsylvania Superior Court addressed, for the first time, the issue of authentication of evidence of instant messages in a criminal court matter in the case of In the Interest of F.P., a minor, 878 A.2d 91 (Pa.Super. 2005).
In the case of F.P., the Superior Court rejected the argument that instant messages, which were the precursor to emails and text messages, are inherently unreliable because of their relative anonymity and the occasional difficulty connecting a message with its author given that any person could be using the computer from which the message originated (assuming that person had the appropriate password).
The court in F.P. noted that these issues were no different from letters or other paper documentary evidence that could be forged or denied by the alleged writer. While the court in F.P. acknowledged that, “unless the purported author is actually witnessed sending the email, there is always the possibility it is not from whom it claims, … the same uncertainties exist with traditional written documents.” For example, a “signature can be forged; a letter can be typed on another’s typewriter; distinct letterhead stationary can be copied or stolen.”
The court reiterated its belief that that email messages and similar forms of electronic communication could be properly authenticated within the existing framework of Pa.R.E. 901 and Pennsylvania case law and without the need for the creation of new rules or law for this new form of evidence.
As such, the court in the F.P. case held that, like documentary evidence, electronic messages could be properly authenticated within the framework set forth under Pa.R.E. 901.
The F.P. case laid out the framework for authenticating digital evidence by first reaffirming the basic principle that the admission of evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will be reversed only upon a showing that the trial court clearly abused its discretion.
It was additionally noted that, like paper evidence, evidence of paperless electronic messages could also be authenticated by either direct proof or by circumstantial evidence. The court noted that, under Pa.R.E. 901, such direct evidence in support of authentication could be in the form of testimony of a witness with personal knowledge that the evidence is what the proponent claims it to be.
The court also held that proof of any circumstances which will support a finding that the writing is genuine can also suffice in court to authenticate the writing.
In the F.P. case, the court pointed to circumstantial evidence relating the content of the messages to prior statements and actions by the alleged sender. The court also was influenced to allow the evidence of the text message as it appeared that the alleged sender sent the message given that he used his own first name in the message sent.
Accordingly, the court in F.P. found that the evidence of the instant messages had been properly authenticated and were, therefore, properly admitted into evidence.
Another Case of First Impression
Six years later, another case of first impression, this time pertaining to text messages, was handed down in the matter of Commonwealth v. Koch, 39 A.3d 996, 1005 (Pa. Super. 2011), affirmed by an equally divided court, 106 A.3d 705 (Pa. 2014). The split affirmance by the Supreme Court leaves the Superior Court decision in Koch as good law.
Koch involved an appeal by a criminal defendant from a Cumberland County conviction for drug offenses based, in part, on evidence from text messages allegedly sent by the defendant. On appeal, the defendant challenged the admissibility of the evidence of text messages on the basis of lack of authentication.
The Pennsylvania Superior Court in Koch ruled that text messages were not admissible unless they were properly authenticated, i.e., unless there was evidence presented that the messages did indeed come from the alleged sender.
The defendant in the criminal case asserted that there was no evidence to establish that she had sent any of the drug transaction-related text messages. She also asserted that it had not been established that the drug transaction-related texts received on the phone were specifically directed to her. Moreover, the defendant offered evidence that her cellphone was also allegedly being used by someone else at the time the messages were sent.
On appeal, the Superior Court found that the text messages were not properly authenticated and, therefore, should not have been admitted into evidence during the course of the trial. The criminal conviction was overturned.
As support for its ruling, the Superior Court in Koch pointed to the above-noted Pennsylvania Superior Court decision in In the Interest of F.P., a minor, 878 A.2d 91 (Pa.Super. 2005) pertaining to instant messages.
The Superior Court in Koch agreed with the analysis of the F.P. case that electronic messages could be authenticated in the same manner that paper evidence was authenticated. The court in Koch noted that “electronic writings typically show their source, so they can be authenticated by contents in the same way a communication by postal mail can be authenticated.” However, the Koch court cautioned that, while text messages and emails can almost always be electronically traced back to their source cellphone or computer, the sender of such messages is not always thereby automatically identified. In other words, particular cellphones and computers can arguably be utilized by anyone at anytime to send the messages.
The Superior Court in Koch reviewed similar decisions from around the United States and noted that, “in the majority of courts to have considered the question, the mere fact that an email bears a particular e-mail address is inadequate to authenticate the identity of the author; typically, courts demand additional evidence.”
As such, the Superior Court held that there must also be “circumstantial evidence, which tends to corroborate the identity of the sender,” before an electronic message may be authenticated and admitted.
Ultimately, the court found that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the text messages where the cellphone’s physical proximity to the defendant at the time of her arrest had no probative value with regard to whether she authored the messages.
The Koch requirements for authentication of a criminal defendant’s text messages were followed in the more recent case of Commonwealth v. Mosley, 114 A.3d 1072, 1082 (Pa. Super, 2015). In Mosely, the court found that there was no evidence, direct or circumstantial, clearly proving that the defendant was the author of the drug-related text messages, or any corroborating witness testimony regarding authenticity of the messages. Consequently, the court in Mosely held that the trial court erred in determining that the drug-related texts were properly authenticated.
In Commonwealth v. Murray, 174 A.3d 1147 (Pa.Super., 2017), the Superior Court affirmed a trial court finding that text messages had been properly authenticated. The Murray court noted that ‘the trial court determined that the text messages in question were properly authenticated based on the contextual clues in the messages and the fact that [the officer] retrieved the phone from Murray’s person.”
A similar ruling pertaining to the authenticity of a text message was also handed down in the case of Commonwealth v. Woods, No. 1324 MDA 2013 (Pa. Super.,2014)(unpublished, nonprecedential).
A Third Case of First Impression
In a very recent March 15 decision in Commonwealth v. Mangel, No. 2018 Pa. Super. 57, the Pennsylvania Superior Court ruled, for the first time in state court, that social media posts are inadmissible in criminal cases unless prosecutors can present evidence of who actually authored the posts. That is, the evidence was inadmissible unless it was properly authenticated.
The court in Mangel supported its requirement of authentication by noting that, in this day and age, social media accounts can be easily hacked or even entirely faked.
The Mangel court affirmed an Erie County trial court decision denying a prosecutor’s motion in limine seeking to introduce into evidence Facebook posts and messages allegedly authored by the defendant.
Judge John L. Musmanno wrote in Mangel that “authenticating social media evidence is to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis to determine whether or not there has been an adequate foundational showing of its relevance and authenticity.”
Consistent with the rulings in the Koch and F.P. decisions, both the trial court and the appellate court in Mangel found that merely presenting evidence that the posts and messages came from a particular social media account bearing the defendant’s name was not enough to rule the evidence admissible. Citing to the F.P. and Koch decisions, the Mangel court noted that these types of Facebook posts and messages must instead be authenticated under Pa.R.E. 901 in a manner similar to the authentication of text messages and instant messages.
The Superior Court also relied upon a prior U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit decision requiring authentication of Facebook posts in the case of United States v. Browne, 834 F.3d 403 (3d Cir. 2016).
The Third Circuit rejected the government’s argument that pursuant to F.R.E. 902(11) the contents of the “chats” exchanged over Facebook were “self-authenticating” as business records when accompanied by a certificate from Facebook’s records custodian. The court more specifically ruled that the “chats” on Facebook were not business records under FRE 803(6) and thus could not be self-authenticated under FRE 902(11).
The Browne court nonetheless affirmed the appellant’s conviction after finding that the trial record reflected more than sufficient extrinsic evidence to link the defendant to the chats and thereby satisfied the government’s authentication burden under a F.R.E. 901 analysis.
Anticipated impact in civil matters
While all of the above cases pertaining to the authentication of various types of electronic messages arose in the criminal law context, it is safe to predict that identical rulings will be handed down when these issues are raised in a state court or federal court civil litigation matter. The Rules of Evidence pertaining to authentication of evidence are the same regardless of in which type court and which type of litigation the issue arises.
It can be anticipated that this issue of authentication will continue to reoccur not only with respect to authenticating emails and text messages but also tweets, along with commentary, photos, and videos on social media sites such as Facebook, Youtube, Linkedin, Snapchat, Instagram and any other social media platforms that may come into existence.
When planning to rely upon these forms of digital evidence, litigators, prosecutors, and criminal defense attorneys should be prepared to produce the related direct or circumstantial evidence necessary to authenticate the electronic evidence at issue, or risk not being able to utilize the evidence at all.
Daniel E. Cumminsis a partner with the Scranton law firm of Foley, Comerford & Cummins. He focuses his practice on the defense of auto accident, premises liability and products liability matters. His Tort Talk Blog can be viewed at www.TortTalk.com.
In the case of Kelter v. Flanagan, No. 286-Civil-2017 (C.P. Monroe Co. Feb. 19, 2018, Williamson, J.), the court granted a Defendant’s Motion to Compel a Plaintiff to provide the Defendant’s counsel with her Instagram account log-in information.The Order further mandated that the Plaintiff would not remove or delete any content from that account.Judge Williamson also ordered defense counsel not to share this information with any one not related to the case.
According to the Opinion, this personal injury action arose out of amotor vehicle accident. Following the deposition of the Plaintiff, the Defendant filed the subject Motion to Compel.The defense believed that there would be relevant information on the Plaintiff’s Instagram social media account concerning the Plaintiff’s alleged injuries suffered in the accident. In his Opinion, Judge Williamson noted that the use of a party’s social networking account information and litigation are becoming more frequent, even though there is limited case authority on the issues presented. The court confirmed that, as has been held before in the Monroe County Court of Common Pleas and within other trial courts, social networking accounts can be discoverable if it appears likely that the accounts contain information that could be relevant. Judge Williamson noted that “[a]rguably, there does not even appear to be an expectation of privacy on social media as it relates to litigation because the account holder is sharing information with others in a public or quasi-public domain.”See Op. at p. 2 [citations omitted]. According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff initially testified at her deposition that she did not maintain any social media accounts. When confronted with proof to the contrary, the Plaintiff admitted that she maintained an Instagram account and asserted that she had misunderstood the question presented. Defense counsel then reviewed posts from the Plaintiff’s Instagram account from the time period shortly after the accident that were available for public access on the Plaintiff’s Instagram account.According to the Opinion, those posts seem to indicate that the Plaintiff was engaged in vigorous physical activity both before and after the accident, such as references to shoveling snow and going to the gym. When the Plaintiff declined to provide any additional Instagram account information, the defense filed this Motion to Compel, which, as noted, the court granted.
Anyone wishing to review this decision may click this LINK.
The Post-Koken Scorecard and the Facebook Discovery Scorecard are also always freely accessible by going to www.TortTalk.com and scrolling down the right hand column of the blog and clicking on the dates noted under "Post-Koken Scorecard" and "Facebook Discovery Scorecard."
I ask that Tort Talkers please continue to forward to my attention a copy of any Orders or Opinions you may generate on Post-Koken or Facebook Discovery issues in order that these Scorecards may be continually updated for the benefit of all
There is still a dearth of appellate cases on these areas of the law and, until appellate decisions are handed down, the resolution of these issues will handled on a county-by-county basis depending upon how the trial court judges of a particular county have previously decided (and there are still some splits of authority within certain counties on certain issues).
Thank you for reading Tort Talk and supporting the blog with your submissions.
In
the case of Landau v. Lamas, 3:15 –
CV - 1327 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 15, 2017 Carlson, M.J.)(Mem. Op.), Federal Magistrate
Judge Carlson discussed "Guiding Principles" for social media
discovery under the general mandates of F.R.C.P. 26 pertaining to permitted discovery
efforts.
This
case arises out of a Section 1983 civil rights suit by a prison inmate. According
to the Opinion, the Plaintiff motioned to compel what the court described as
"extremely intrusive inquiry" into the Defendant's social media
pages. The
Court denied the motion to compel to the extent the motion sought
"wholesale access to electronic social media.”However, the Court allowed the Plaintiff to
attempt to craft more specifically tailored discovery requests. The
Court also directed the defense to preserve all social media content from the
relevant time period and to make inquiries regarding any social media that may
have been deleted.The defense was also
told to voluntarily produce relevant social media content in accordance with
the requirements of F.R.C.P. 26.The
defense was also ordered to specify what content was being withheld and to
state why it was being withheld. Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision, may click this LINK. I send thanks to Attorney Brian Murren of the Camp Hill, PA office of Marshall, Dennehey, Warner, Coleman & Goggin for bringing this case to my attention.
In the case of Nicolaou
v. Martin, No. 58 MAL 2017 (Pa. Aug. 18, 2017), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has
issued an Order agreeing to hear the appeal of a woman whose case against
medical providers over an alleged misdiagnosis of her Lyme disease was
dismissed partly because of Facebook posts indicated that she knew that she
suffered from the disease years before filing the suit.
The court has agreed to more specifically address the issue
of whether the Plaintiff’s claims met an exception to the discovery rule
related to the statute of limitations where the Plaintiff “did not and was
financially unable to, confirm [the Defendant’s] negligent misdiagnosis until
final medical testing confirmed she had Lyme disease.”
Here is a LINK to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's Order.
A split Pennsylvania Superior Court panel previously ruled
that the Plaintiff’s claims were barred by the two (2) year statute of
limitations.
Source:Article: “Pa. Justices Agree to Eye Facebook
Post’s Impact on Discovery Rule By Max Mitchell of The Legal Intelligencer (Aug. 21, 2017).
A copy of the Facebook Discovery decision in the case of Clapsadle v. Barkman, No. 2015-1896 (C.P. Franklin Co. Sept. 15, 2016) has been secured and has been added to the Facebook Discovery Scorecard on Tort Talk.
I send thanks to Attorney Matthew S. Crosby of the Harrisburg, PA law firm of Handler, Henning & Rosenberg, LLP for providing me with a copy of this decision.
The Facebook Discovery Scorecard can always be accessed by going to www.TortTalk.com and scrolling down the right hand column and clicking on the date noted under "Facebook Discovery Scorecard." There are Links to all of the Facebook decisions noted on that Scorecard.
Here is a shortcut LINK to the Facebook Discovery Scorecard for your easy reference.
Another Facebook Discovery decision has been uncovered. In the case of Clapsadle v. Barkman, No. 2015-1896 (C.P. Franklin Co. Sept. 15, 2016), the court denied a defendant's motion to compel plaintiff to answer interrogatories regarding the content of the plaintiff's private portions of his Facebook profile after finding that the information contained on the public pages did not support an argument that relevant information would be revealed from a review of the private pages.
The court did order a hearing to address issues of spoliation after finding that the plaintiff violated a prior court order that specifically directed the plaintiff not to delete or erase any information on the profile.
I do not have a copy of this decision. If anyone has access to this decision and is willing to email a copy to me I will upload it online and advise as to its availability in a future Tort Talk post.
Source: Course Material from PAAJ's 2017 Annual Auto Law Update CLE.
A Pennsylvania Facebook Discovery decision from last August of 2016 has
been brought to my attention.
In the case Hanna
v. Giant Eagle, Inc., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107253 (W.D.Pa. Aug. 10, 2016
Mitchell, M.J.), a Magistrate Judge in the Western District considered a
Defendant's Motion to Compel the production of a Plaintiff's social media
information.
According to the Opinion, the court had ordered
Plaintiff to release her social media information to defendants with an
Affidavit that her production was all-inclusive.Plaintiff produced nineteen pages from her
social media websites, but failed to include the court-mandated Affidavit.
The Defendants then filed the Motion to Compel. The Plaintiff
then produced the Affidavit and thirty-nine additional pages of new social
media entries.The Plaintiff attested
that she provided her attorneys with access to her Facebook, Instagram and
Linkedin profiles.The Plaintiff's
attorneys represented to the Court that they reviewed Plaintiff's social media
pages and had produced all responsive, discoverable material.
Thereafter, the Defendants requested unfettered
access to Plaintiff's social media pages and requested that a third party
vendor be permitted review the Plaintiff’s social media pages and provide all
relevant material to the parties.The
Defendants also sought sanctions in the form of the dismissal of the action, or
fees and costs incurred as a result of having to file the Motion to
Compel.
The Court in Hanna
denied the Defendant’s request for the broad third party access and sanctions,
relying on the Plaintiff's Affidavit which confirmed that she had provided
direct access to the social media pages to her attorneys, and given that
Plaintiff's counsel represented to the court that he and his staff reviewed the
social media accounts prior to making the production.
As such, some of the Plaintiff’s social media was
discoverable, but unrestricted access was denied.
Anyone wishing to review this decision may click this LINK.
I send thanks to Brian J. Murren, a Dickinson Law
student and a law clerk with the Camp Hill, PA office of Marshall, Dennehey,
Warner, Coleman & Goggin for bringing this case to my attention.
I have recently updated both the Post-Koken Scorecard and the Facebook Discovery Scorecard on Tort Talk at www.TortTalk.com.
These Scorecards can always be freely accessed by going to the Tort Talk blog, scrolling down the right hand column until you get to the title "Post-Koken Scorecard" or "Facebook Discovery Scorecard," and clicking on the dates under those titles to get to the pages listing the various cases under these novel, evolving areas of law.
Here is a quick LINK to the Post-Koken Scorecard for your easy reference.
Here is a quick LINK to the Facebook Discovery Scorecard for your easy reference.
Hoping you can please help me to continue to update these Scorecards by providing me with copies of any Orders or Opinions you may secure in Post-Koken matters or with respect to Facebook/Social Media discovery or admissibility issues. The publication of these decisions, whether favorable or not, will help to educate the bench and the bar on the developing common law in these new areas of litigation until appellate guidance is received to lay some of the issues to rest. Thank you, Dan Cummins
The below article of mine was published in the December 1, 2016 edition of the Pennsylvania Law Weekly and is republished here with permission:
Civil Litigation
A Year in Review: The Top
Recurring Issues
By Daniel E. Cummins
December 1, 2016/Pennsylvania Law Weekly
Daniel E. Cummins
Foley, Comerford & Cummins
Scranton, PA
A number of
recurring issues rose to the top of attention in the past year, many of which
are expected to remain on the forefront of civil litigation trends into 2017.
Here's a look back at some of the top topics in 2016 in personal injury
matters.
Facebook Discovery Issues
In past years,
with the rapid expansion of social media, the primary issue was to what extent
a party may seek discovery of another party's social media activity,
particularly with respect to Facebook. Now that the courts have generally
allowed parties to delve into the private portions of another party's social
media accounts provided that a predicate showing has been made that relevant
information will be uncovered, a more recent trend of cases has considered when
any such discovered information must be produced, i.e., before or after a
party's deposition.
Typically, the
courts have previously held, at least in the case of video surveillance
completed on a party, that such surveillance information need not be produced
in state court civil litigation matters until after the completion of a party's
deposition.
The trial court
judges in Dauphin County, including Judge Andrew H. Dowling and Judge Bruce F.
Bratton, appear to be among the first to address the issue of when virtual
surveillance information, i.e., social media search results from Facebook,
Instagram, Tumblr and the like, must be produced have taken a different
approach. These judges have ruled that social media information should be
produced to an opposing party before that party's deposition, as in Vogelsong
v. Cruz-Ramirez, No. 2015-CV-234 CV (C.P. Dauph. Co. July 29, Dowling, J.);
Vinson v. Jackson, No. 2015-CV-05150-CV (C.P. Dauph. Co. Aug. 23, Bratton, J.);
and Appleby v. Erie Insurance Exchange, No. 2016-CV-2431 (C.P. Dauph. Co. Sept.
9, Dowling, J.).
Whether other
trial court judges from around the commonwealth will rule in a similar fashion
or will, instead, apply the same rule of discovery pertaining to video
surveillance remains to be seen.
Claims of Privileged Information in Discovery
In its decision
in the case Brown v. Greyhound Lines, No. 1167 EDA
2015, 2016 Pa. Super. 108 (Pa. Super. May 24), the Pennsylvania
Superior Court addressed issues pertaining to the attorney-client privilege and
the work product doctrine as applied between attorneys and third-party
administrators in personal injury civil litigation matters.
The issue raised
in this matter involved a request for production of documents sent by the
plaintiff to a defendant carrier seeking the contents of claims files,
correspondence, and emails discussing the bus accident that were sent to or
from any individual employed by Gallagher Bassett, a third-party adjustment
company which contractually handled claims and investigations for the carrier.
The defendants objected to these discovery requests on the basis that the
materials were confidential under the attorney-client privilege and attorney
work product privilege.
Applying the
law to the case before it, the appellate court found that the defendants had
failed to establish that the trial court's rulings allowing for the discovery
of certain documents should be overturned. In part, the court faulted the
defendants in failing to carry their burden of proof on the privilege by
failing to make any specific arguments beyond citing general precepts
concerning the attorney-client and work product privileges.
The issue of
the admissibility of communications between defense counsel and a third-party
claims administrator was also addressed in the Middle District court decision
by Judge Matthew W. Brann in the case of Heller's Gas v. International
Insurance of Hannover, 4:15-CV-01350 (M.D. Pa. June 1).
In this breach
of contract and bad-faith case relative to a policy that provided commercial
premises coverage, the plaintiff insured claimed that documents withheld or
redacted in discovery did not fall within the attorney-client privilege, the
work product doctrine, and did not pertain to reserve information. The
plaintiff more specifically asserted that all but one of the documents at issue
was either sent to or from employees of the insurer's third-party administrator
or its authorized claim representative, and as neither of these entities were
subsidiaries of, or owned by, the insurer, the communications were not
privileged.
The carrier
countered with the argument that the communications between the third party administrator's
in-house counsel and the claim representative's in-house counsel with the
insurer all fell within the scope of attorney-client privilege.
The court
reviewed the unredacted documents during an in camera session. Thereafter the
court, referring to F.R.C.P. 26, decided: "After thoroughly examining the
documents, this court finds that the information redacted appropriately falls
within the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine and is
consequently information directly related to or referencing legal strategy
regarding the instant litigation. The correspondence further supports [the
insurer's] latterly advanced argument that [the third party administrator and
authorized claims representative] are essentially agents of [the insurer]."
As such, the court found that the redactions were appropriate.
In a more
recent decision on issues pertaining to assertions of privilege in response to
discovery requests, the Superior Court emphasized that such issues were
immediately appealable on an interlocutory basis as collateral orders.
In Farrell v. Regola, 2016 Pa. Super.
241 (Pa. Super Nov. 8), a case that involved claims of the
attorney-client privilege and psychologist/patient privilege, the court held
that in the event that a trial court orders the production of the privileged
information in response to a motion to compel, even for the purpose of an in
camera review by the trial court, the aggrieved party is allowed an immediate
interlocutory appeal as of right as a collateral order.
The Superior
Court ruled that, if matters are indeed privileged, no one, not even a trial
judge, may have access to them. The Superior Court also ruled that the application
of privileges is subject to a de novo review.
Waiver/Release from Liability Forms
A number of
decisions were handed down over the past year upholding waiver or release forms
executed by injured parties prior to participating in recreational activities.
In an apparent
case of first impression of Feleccia v. Lackawanna College, No. 12-CV-1960
(C.P. Lacka. Co. Feb. 2), Judge James A. Gibbons of the Lackawanna County Court
of Common Pleas was faced with the issue whether two junior college students who
were injured at a preseason football practice were barred from recovering
against the college because both signed waivers of liability prior to their
injuries.
In his opinion,
Gibbons noted that, while Pennsylvania courts have upheld exculpatory releases
for skiing, white water rafting, weight lifting, skating, and motorcycling,
among other types of activities, no case was found involving collegiate
football.
Gibbons
nevertheless ruled that neither the applicable law nor the facts of this case
required the court to distinguish between the inherently dangerous nature of
football and these other types of sporting activities noted. As such, the court
ruled that waivers of liability executed by the students precluded their
recovery.
In the Superior Court case of Hinkal v. Gavin
Pardo & Gold's Gym, No. 165 MDA 2014, 2016 Pa. Super. 11 (Pa.
Super. Jan. 22) (en banc), the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed a trial
court's entry of summary judgment in favor of the defendant's on the basis of a
waiver agreement signed by the injured party plaintiff as part of a membership
at Gold's Gym.
The
Pennsylvania Superior Court agreed with the trial court's decision that the
waiver language set forth in the Gold's Gym membership agreement was valid and
enforceable. Accordingly, the entry of summary judgment in favor of the
defendant was affirmed.
In another
recent decision by the Superior Court in the case of Toro v. Fitness International, 2016
Pa.Super. 243(Pa. Super. Nov. 10), the Pennsylvania Superior Court
again affirmed the entry of summary judgment in favor of a defendant fitness
center on the basis of an executed waiver form in a slip and fall case.
As part of its
decision, the appellate court ruled that a release or waiver of liability
signed by the plaintiff when joining the health club was valid and binding. The
court stated that, where someone engages in a voluntary athletic or
recreational activity, a release in a contract for the use of the facilities is
not contrary to public policy. The court also ruled that a waiver of liability
in this regard was not a contract of adhesion because there is no requirement
for anyone to engage in recreational activities. The court also referred to the
oft cited rule that a failure to read a release or waiver language before
signing it does not affect its validity.
Neuropsychological IMEs
In its decision
in the case of Shearer v. Hafer, No. 665 MDA 2015
(Pa. Super. March 9), the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed a trial court's
granting of a defendant's motion for a protective order prohibiting the
presence of third-party observers during the standardized test portion of a
neuropsychological evaluation.
Following a
motor vehicle accident that gave rise to this case, the plaintiff treated with
a neuropsychologist and, during that treatment, the plaintiff's treating
neuropsychologist employed standardized testing procedures that were conducted
without the presence of the plaintiff's attorney or any other third party. The
defense hired a doctor to complete an independent neuropsychological
examination. The plaintiff's counsel demanded to be present during all
components of the neuropsychological examination. The IME doctor objected to
this request, including the plaintiff's counsel's request to audio tape the
testing evaluation.
The IME doctor
indicated that he would allow the plaintiff's attorney to be present during the
interview portion of the examination. However, the IME doctor would not permit
either the presence of the plaintiff's counsel and the audio taping during the
standardize test phase of the neuropsychological evaluation.
The Superior
Court noted that there was no Pennsylvania appellate court decision directly on
point that addressed a litigant's right to counsel during a psychological
examination.
On appeal the
appellate court affirmed the trial court's order, which stated that, although
plaintiff's counsel could be present during the preliminary interview phase of
the neuropsychological examination, no individual was allowed in the evaluation
room with the plaintiff and the IME doctor during the phase of the evaluation
that involves standardize testing. The order further provided that no recording
device would be permitted in the evaluation room.
The
Pennsylvania Superior Court ruled that, pursuant to Pa. R.C.P. 4012, the trial
court had the discretion to enter the order at issue. The court also found
support for the trial court's decision under Pa. R.C.P. 4010, pertaining to
physical and mental examination of person.
The Superior
Court also noted that, although there was "no case law [that] address of
the application of Rule 4012 to Rule 4010," the court noted that an
explanatory commenting 1978 amendment to Rule 4012 stressed that the amendment
provides a comprehensive rule, which covers all depositions and all discovery.
Accordingly, the court ruled that it appeared that the legislature intended
that Rule 4012 would empower the trial court with discretion to issue
protective orders in various discovery procedures, including, specifically, the
power to limit the number of individuals present at an independent medical or
psychological examination.
Sever and Stay Post-'Koken' Bad-Faith Claims
Over the past
year there was a rising trend of motions to sever and stay bad-faith claims in
post-Koken automobile litigation matters.
A split of
authority continues in this regard, with some courts allowing the severance and
the stay of bad-faith claims, some courts severing the bad-faith claim but not
staying bad-faith discovery, and some other courts denying these types of
motions altogether. Summaries of at least some of these decisions uncovered,
most by order only and without opinion, can be found on the post-Koken
scorecard on my "Tort Talk" blog at www.TortTalk.com.
It remains to
be seen if this issue, as well as other important post-Koken issues will make
it up the appellate ladder in the year ahead. As the lower courts and the bar
are craving guidance in this still novel area of the law, it is hoped that the
Superior Court would publish any of its decisions on these topics as opposed to
offering unpublished decisions marked "nonprecedential."
'Tincher'
In 2016, the
courts and the bar continued to grapple with how to apply the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's products
liability decision of Tincher v. Omega Flex, 104 A.3d 328 (Pa.
2014), in which the court ruled that the Restatement (Second) of Torts
continued to be the accepted guideline for such cases.
In Tincher, the
Supreme Court more specifically held that the nondelegable duty in a strict
liability case is that the a person or company engaging in the business of
selling a product has a duty to make a product that is expected to and does
reach its user without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold
and free from a defective condition that is unreasonably dangerous to the user
of the product.
The court also
confirmed under Tincher, that to demonstrate a breach of duty in a strict
liability matter, a plaintiff must prove that a manufacturer placed a defective
product on the market. Under Tincher, a case of strict products liability
requires proof, in the alternative, either of the ordinary consumer's
expectations or of the risk-utility of a product.
The court in
Tincher more specifically held that the consumer expectations test defines a
"defective condition" as a condition, upon normal use, dangerous
beyond the reasonable consumer's contemplations. In contrast, the risk-utility
test offers a standard which, in typical common law terms, states that: "a
product is in a defective condition if a 'reasonable person' would conclude
that the probability and seriousness of harm caused by the product outweigh the
burden of costs of taking precautions."
In the past
year, there have been some motions for summary judgment granted and some denied
on the basis of Tincher. The trial courts are also attempting to craft new jury
instructions for trials of post-Tincher matters. It is anticipated that the
Tincher decision will continue to have a significant impact in products
liability litigation matters until the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has a chance
to revisit the issue. •
Special to the Law Weekly Daniel E. Cummins
is a partner and civil litigator with the Scranton law firm of Foley Comerford
& Cummins. His civil litigation blog, Tort Talk, can be viewed at www.TortTalk.com.