Superior Court Finds That Jury Should Have Been Allowed To Consider Comparative Negligence Where Evidence Plaintiff's Alleged Excessive Speed Presented

In the case of Dailey v. Smith, No. 2024 Pa. Super. 235 (Pa. Super. Oct. 10, 2024 Collins, J., Stabile, J., and McLaughlin, J.) (Op. by Collins, J.) (McLaughlin, J. dissenting), the Superior Court reversed a trial court’s decision to remove comparative negligence issues from the jury's consideration in a motor vehicle accident case.

According to the Superior Court’s Opinion, in the trial below, Plaintiff admitted to speeding at the time of the accident.

As such, the appellate court found that the trial court had abused its discretion in removing the issue of Plaintiff’s comparative negligence from the jury’s consideration. The Superior Court noted that where there is evidence in a case that a Plaintiff was negligent and that the Plaintiff’s negligence may have caused the Plaintiff’s alleged injuries, such issues must be allowed to proceed to a jury.

The appellate court noted that speeding is not just mere negligence, but could be negligence per se.

The Superior Court additionally confirmed that causation and routine automobile accident negligence cases do not require expert testimony on the liability issues. In this case, neither side had an expert on the liability issues presented.

The appellate court noted that a vehicle's speed could have affected both the time to avoid a collision and the forces involved in the collision.

The Superior Court noted that the jury in this case was incorrectly prevented from considering the causal effect of the Plaintiff’s speed. The appellate court noted that this evidence was not only important to the liability issues but also was intertwined with the damages issues as the evidence implicates whether, if at all, the speed of the Plaintiff’s vehicle contributed to the Plaintiff’s own injuries.

In the Dissenting Opinion, Judge McLaughlin asserted that the Plaintiff's speed should not have been considered because, even if the Plaintiff was speeding, although this does amount to negligence per se, there was no evidence to conclude that the accident would not have happened if the Plaintiff was not speeding and/or that there was no evidence that, if the Plaintiff was traveling slower, the Plaintiff's injuries would have been less.   

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.  The Dissenting Opinion can be viewed HERE.

I send thanks to Attorney James M. Beck of the Philadelphia office of Reed Smith law firm for bringing this case to my attention.

Plaintiff Precluded From Testifying as to Defendant's Speed Where Only Saw Vehicle a Split Second Before Impact

In the case of Berklovich v. Quarrick, No. 2567-CV-2018 (C.P. Westmoreland Co. 2020 Scherer, J.), the court granted a defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and dismissed a Plaintiff's claim for punitive damages based upon allegations of excessive speed and cell phone use by the defendant during a motor vehicle accident.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff was rear ended and, as a result, her vehicle was propelled forward across two lanes of traffic.

After discovery, the defense filed a partial motion for summary judgment seeking a dismissal of the punitive damages claims.  The court granted the motion.

While the court agreed that driving at an excessive rate of speed and using a cell phone could constitute conduct sufficient to support a claim for punitive damages, the court also found that the Plaintiff had not presented sufficient evidence to support such a claim.

The court noted that the only testimony on the speed of the defendant's vehicle was from the Plaintiff.  The Plaintiff admitted that she only saw the defendant's vehicle a split second before the impact.  Relying upon the case of Guzman v. Bloom, 198 A.2d 499, 502 (Pa. 1964) and the case of Anderson v. Perta, 10 A.2d 898 (Pa.Super. 1940), the court ruled that observing the defendant's vehicle for such a short amount of time before the accident did not lay a proper foundation for the Plaintiff to offer her lay opinion as to the speed of the defendant's vehicle.

On the issue of the defendant's cell phone use, the court noted that the Plaintiff did not secure the defendant's cell phone records or otherwise present evidence to confirm that the defendant was using his phone at the time of the accident.  The court rejected the Plaintiff's effort to rely upon an allegation in the Complaint that the defendant was unconscious after the accident and had no recollection of whether he was on his cell phone at the time of the accident or not.

Anyone wishing to review this case may click this LINK.

I send thanks to Attorney Joseph Hudock of the Pittsburgh office of the Summers, McDonnell, Hudock, Guthrie & Rauch, P.C. for bringing this decision to my attention.

Lay Witness Testimony on Speed Need Not Be Precise

In the case of Melgar v. Weinstein, No. 3:12-cv-1916 (M.D. Pa. May 23, 2014 Caputo, J.), Federal Middle District Judge A. Richard Caputo denied summary judgment in an automobile accident negligence matter based upon disputed testimony regarding the speed of the vehicle involved in the accident.  

 

This case is notable for the acknowledgement by the court that lay witnesses may testify regarding vehicle speed generally and without the need for precise accuracy in stating the speed witnessed.  More specifically, in this matter, there is deposition testimony that the speed limit was 45 mph and there were witnesses that stated that the vehicles involved were moving at approximately 50-60 mph at the time of the accident in a tunnel.  

Anyone wishing to review this Opinion may click this LINK.