Appellate Court Upholds Auto Carrier's Denial of Coverage.

In the non-precedential case of Halstead v. Progressive Specialty Ins. Co., No. 430 MDA 2025 (Pa. Super. July 28, 2026 Bowes, J., Dubow, J., and Neuman, J.) (Mem. Op. by Bowes, J.), the appellate court reversed an Order of the trial court denying the insurance company’s Motion for Summary Judgment in a declaratory judgment action. The appellate court remanded the case for the entry of a declaratory judgment in favor of Progressive.

According to the Opinion, the tortfeasor was driving a motor vehicle that was insured under a policy issued by Kemper Insurance when he rear-ended a vehicle being operated by the Plaintiff and in which the Plaintiff’s wife was a passenger. The Plaintiff-wife tragically died from the injuries sustained in the incident.

Thereafter, the Plaintiff-husband sued the tortfeasor for the Plaintiff-husband’s own injuries and as the estate representative on the claims for his deceased wife.

The Defendant driver requested excess liability insurance coverage from Progressive.

However, Progressive Insurance denied the claim, contending that its policy, which was issued to the tortfeasor’s father, excluded excess coverage for the tortfeasor’s liability to the Plaintiff.

Thereafter, Kemper Insurance tendered its policy limits in settlement.

At that point in time, the tortfeasor Defendant assigned his rights under the policy to the Plaintiff, who then initiated a declaratory judgment action against Progressive seeking a judicial determination that Progressive was required to provide coverage for the claim.

At some point in the litigation, the tortfeasor Defendant died from causes not apparent from the record. The underlying negligence claim was stayed pending the determination of the declaratory judgment action addressing Progressive’s possible duty to provide coverage.

Progressive filed a Motion for Summary Judgment arguing three (3) bases for its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. First, the carrier claimed that, given that the tortfeasor Defendant had passed way at the time the Plaintiff initiated the declaratory judgment action, it was too late for the Plaintiff to substitute his estate in the caption.

Second, Progressive maintained that the tortfeasor’s assignment of his rights to the Plaintiff was invalid because the insurance policy required Progressive’s written consent to transfer the rights and duties to another person.

Third, Progressive reiterated its claim that coverage was excluded pursuant to the terms of the policy.

The appellate court first addressed the issue of whether the appeal was properly before it. 

In this regard, the appellate court agreed with the carrier’s position that the practical effect of the trial court’s denial of the Motion for Summary Judgment had resolved the entirety of the Plaintiff’s eligibility for declaratory relief. In other words, the appellate court noted that the practical effect of the trial court’s denying Progressive’s Motion for Summary Judgment was to declare that the Plaintiff was entitled to the declaratory relief that was requested.

Given that the trial court’s ruling left no additional issues to be resolved and had the practical effect of deciding the outcome of the case rather than merely narrowing the issues, the appellate court noted that the appeal was properly before it.

On the merits, the appellate court ruled that the tortfeasor Defendant did not meet the definition of a “named insured” under the terms of the policy and the vehicle that the tortfeasor was operating did not fall under the definition of “covered vehicle” under the terms of the policy.

The court otherwise noted that, under the plain terms of the policy and an exclusion, there was no liability coverage for a loss arising from the use of a vehicle that was not listed in the declarations page and that was owned by a relative of the named insured, rather than being owned by the named insured himself, unless the loss was occasioned by the named insured’s use of the relative’s non-covered automobile, which was not the case in this matter.

The appellate court otherwise noted, taken as a whole, it was clear that the intent of the insurance policy was that, for there to be coverage for third-party liability resulting from an automobile that was owned or regularly used by a named insured or a relative of the named insured, the automobile had to be a covered auto that was listed on the declarations page, which was not the case here.

As such, the appellate court held that the trial court erred in declaring that the policy did not exclude coverage for the tortfeasor’s liability to the Plaintiff. As such, the trial court Order denying Progressive’s Motion for Summary Judgment was reversed and the case was remanded for the entry of a declaratory judgment in favor of Progressive on a holding that there was no coverage under the policy.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this non-precedential decision may click this LINK.

Trial Court Finds No Bad Faith in Carrier's Handling of Regular Use Exclusion Dispute in UIM Case

In the case of Erie Insurance Exchange v. Hallam, No. 2021-CV-7526 (C.P. Wash. Co. June 24, 2026 Lucas, J.), the court granted the carrier’s Motion for Summary Judgment on the Plaintiff’s bad faith claim relative to the regular use exclusion.

At the time of the accident, the Plaintiff was injured while in an accident while driving a salt truck for his employer.  In addition to other recoveries, the Plaintiff sought to recover UIM benefits under an Erie Insurance policy that covered one of his personal vehicles at home.

According to the Opinion, the insurance company commenced this action seeking to enforce the “regular use” exclusion found in its personal automobile insurance policy issued to the Defendant. Erie asserted that the Plaintiff had regular access to a work vehicle,i.e. a vehicle that was not covered under the Erie policy.  The Plaintiff was allegedly injured while driving that work vehicle. As such, Erie was seeking a ruling that it did not have to pay UIM benefits to the insured.

The insured argued that, at the time he made a claim for his personal UIM benefits, Erie knew that its interpretation of its “regular use” exclusion had been rejected by the Pennsylvania Superior Court. More specifically, the Plaintiff argued that, as of that time, the Superior Court had determined in the case of Rush v. Erie Insurance Exchange that Erie’s “regular use” exclusion was invalid and therefore, unenforceable.

The insured otherwise argued that, in any event, he was not regularly using the work vehicle that he was injured in. Rather, he asserted that the use of the work vehicle was incidental. 

As such, the insured asserted a breach of contract a statutory bad faith claim against the carrier in a counterclaim. In response, Erie filed a summary judgment motion.

Erie argued that, further up the appellate ladder, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had more recently ruled in Rush v. Erie Insurance Exchange that the regular use exclusion was still valid in at least certain circumstances, which circumstances applied in this case.

Erie argued that there can be no bad faith where the carrier correctly applies a policy exclusion.  Erie asserted that, despite conflicting decisions in recent years on the validity of the regular use exclusion, Erie argued that it had reasonably relied upon existing legal precedent on the regular use exclusion to deny UIM benefits to the insured.

The Plaintiff countered by arguing that, at the time Erie denied coverage, the law was that the exclusion was “invalid.” The Plaintiff asserts that Erie had no good faith basis to disregard the Superior Court’s ruling and to deny coverage when it did so in this matter.

In this decision, the trial court noted that, in order to show bad faith on the part of an insurance company, an insured must show that the carrier breached its duty of good faith through some motive of self-interest or ill-will. The court also noted that bad faith must be shown by clear and convincing evidence. The insured must additionally show that the carrier did not have a reasonable basis for denying benefits under the policy, and that the carrier knew or recklessly disregarded its lack of a reasonable basis in denying the claim.

The trial court in this case noted that the carrier had remained in regular communication with the insured regarding the status of the claim. It was also noted that the carrier had informed the insured’s attorney that Erie was requesting a reconsideration of the Rush decision. In light of this, Erie requested that no further action be taken until a decision was made on that request by the appellate courts.

The court also noted that the insured in this case did not go so far as to argue that Erie lacked a bona fide belief that it had a good chance of ultimately succeeding in having the Pennsylvania Supreme Court declare that the “regular use” exclusion was valid under Pennsylvania law.

The court emphasized that, in this case, the insured did not offer any evidence to demonstrate that Erie’s manner in handling the claim was anything other than an attempt to enforce a written exclusion in the contract. 

The court went on to find that, where an insurer has no duty to provide coverage, there can be no bad faith. 

Here, the insured argued that Erie failed to take enough steps to limit the enforceability of the Superior Court decision in Rush while the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania considered whether or not to accept the case for review and then decide the case.  In essence, the insured argued that Erie should have paid him UIM benefits even though Erie had otherwise appealed the Superior Court decision in Rush to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.

The trial court in this matter found that this fact, alone, did not amount to potentially clear and convincing evidence of a dishonest purpose, a lack of a reasonable basis to deny benefits, or a knowing or reckless disregard of a reasonable basis to deny coverage on the part of the carrier.

The trial court also noted that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision in Rush made clear that the Superior Court decision in Rush deviated from well-established precedent that had continually upheld the validity of the regular use exclusion.

Accordingly, the trial court in this case found that the insured did not produce evidence to establish any bad faith on the part of the carrier. As such, Erie’s Motion for Summary Judgment was granted and the Plaintiff’s bad faith clam was dismissed.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney Joseph Hudock of the Pittsburgh office of the law firm of Summers, McDonnell, Hudock, Guthrie & Rauch, P.C. for bringing this interesting case to my attention.

Source of image:  Photo by Jay Brand at www.pexels.com.

Superior Court Upholds Application of Regular Use Exclusion

In the case of Erie Insurance Exchange v. Russo, No. 1138 MDA 2024 (Pa. Super. July 22, 2025 Murray, J., King, J., and Stevens, P.J.E.) (Op. by Stevens, P.J.E.), the court affirmed the trial court’s decision in a declaratory judgment action brought by the UIM carrier denying UIM coverage through the application of the regular use exclusion present in the Plaintiff’s automobile insurance policy.

This matter arose out of a motor vehicle accident that occurred during the course and scope of the Plaintiff’s employment. At the time of the accident, the Plaintiff was operating a vehicle that had been supplied by his employer.

After recovering UIM benefits under his employer’s policy, the Plaintiff sought UIM benefits under his personal automobile insurance policy. 

The personal automobile insurance carrier filed this declaratory judgment action and asserted that the regular use exclusion supported a denial of the requested coverage.

The trial court had otherwise ruled that there was no “stacked” underinsured motorist coverage available on the Plaintiff’s personal automobile insurance policy atop of the UIM benefits recovered under the Plaintiff’s employer’s vehicle policy.

The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s finding that the Plaintiff was not an “insured” under the employer’s policy for purposes of the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law. As such, the Plaintiff could not “stack” benefits under his personal automobile insurance policy in any event.

The Superior Court emphasized that merely receiving UIM coverage for injuries sustained as an occupant in a first priority vehicle does not make one “an insured” under that vehicle’s policy such that the person would then be entitled to stack one’s personal automobile policy UIM coverage.

Accordingly, the appellate court ruled that, because the Plaintiff was not entitled to stack his personal policy UIM coverage with the UIM coverage he received from his employer’s policy, the Plaintiff could not establish any error in the trial court’s declaration that there existed no UIM coverage available to the Plaintiff under his personal automobile insurance policy.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: “The Legal Intelligencer State Appellate Case Alert,” www.Law.com (Aug. 13, 2025).

ARTICLE: THE RISE OF AI AND OTHER CHANGES ABOUND IN THE LAW: A 2024 YEAR-END REVIEW

This article of mine was published in the Pennsylvania Law Weekly on December 9, 2024 and is republished here with permission.

The Rise of AI and Other Changes Abound in the Law: A 2024 Year-End Review

December 09, 2024

By Daniel E. Cummins

CUMMINS LAW

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As 2024 goes into the books, here is a look back at the notable trends and decisions in Pennsylvania civil litigation over the past year.

The Advent of AI in Legal Filings

An apparent emerging trend in civil litigation practice involves counsel utilizing artificialintelligence (AI) platforms in order to draft motions and briefs to be filed with the court.

In May of this year, the Pennsylvania Bar Association and the Philadelphia Bar Association issued a joint formal opinion providing advice on the use of artificial intelligence in the legal profession.

The opinion itself notes that it is an "advisory only" opinion, that is, an opinion that is not binding on the Disciplinary Board of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court or any other court.

Generally speaking, the opinion suggests that attorneys be aware of, and competent with, the use of AI in the legal profession. The opinion recommends that all information generated through the use of AI, including citations to legal authority, be checked for accuracy and confirmed for veracity. The opinion also cautions that client confidentiality should be protected at all times when utilizing AI platforms.

In addition to the joint formal opinion by bar associations, the courts of Pennsylvania have also begun to craft parameters for the use of AI in the creation of documents to be filed with the courts.

In the federal courts of Pennsylvania, U.S. District Court Judge Karoline Mehalchick of the Middle District of Pennsylvania crafted and issued what appears to be the first civil practice order on use of generative artificial intelligence to be issued in the commonwealth.

Under this order, Mehalchick requires any party to any litigation pending before her that has utilized AI in preparation of any filing, to include with the filing a certificate of use of generative AI. In that certificate of use of generative AI, the party is required to disclose and certify the following information:

• The specific AI tool utilized

• Identification of the portions of the filing prepared by the AI program; and

• Certification that a person filing the document has checked the accuracy of any portion of the document generated by AI, including all citations and legal authority

In the order, Mehalchick cautioned that failure to comply with this civil practice order could result in sanctions.

At the state court level, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has created an advisory committee on artificial intelligence in the Pennsylvania courts. That committee was created to propose appropriate statewide rules to provide guidance to counsel on the use of AI with filings in the state court systems.

Rather than utilizing a time consuming committee possibly bound by red tape, one may wonder why the Pennsylvania Supreme Court does not just simply ask an AI platform to craft such rules and then determine if those AI-generated rules meet the satisfaction of the Court.

Regular Use Exclusion Upheld as Valid and Enforceable

Back on Jan. 29, 2024, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court issued its long-awaited, much anticipated decision in the regular use exclusion case of Rush v. Erie Insurance Exchange, 308 A.3d 780, and, in the process, showed moderation with respect to its previous trend of favoring plaintiffs’ causes.

In Rush, much to the surprise of some,the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled that, as presented in this case, the regular use exclusion contained in motor vehicle insurance policies did not violate the express language of Pennsylvania's Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (MVFRL).

The plaintiff in Rush was a police officer who was injured in a motor vehicle accident while driving his police vehicle. The plaintiff recovered the liability limits from the tortfeasor's policy and the UIM limits on the police vehicle. The plaintiff then sought to obtain additional compensation from the Erie Insurance policies that covered his own personal vehicles at home. Erie Insurance relied upon a regular use exclusion contained in the policy to deny coverage on the UIM claim.

Generally speaking, the regular use exclusion is a standard provision in automobile insurance policies that precludes coverage for injuries sustained by an insured who, at the time of the accident, was in a vehicle that the insured did not own but which vehicle, unbeknownst to the insurance company, was regularly available for the insured’s use. The inclusion protects the carrier from having to provide coverage for risks that the insured did not pay a premium for protection against. In other words, the exclusion upholds the all-American principle that you cannot get something (coverage) for nothing.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the erroneous decisions of the trial court and the Superior Court in this Rush case and thereby upheld the validity and enforceability of the regular use exclusion. In so ruling, the Supreme Court rejected the plaintiff's unduly expansive argument that UIM coverage must be provided in all circumstances regardless of which vehicle the injured party was located in at the time of the accident. The court noted that, to accept such an argument, would render all insurance policy exclusions invalid.

The Supreme Court also rejected the plaintiff's reliance upon the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's previous decision in Gallagher v. GEICO for the proposition that the regular use exclusion should be eradicated across the board just as the Household Exclusion had been eradicated in Gallagher as allowing for a de facto waiver of stacked coverage when the MVFRL requires carriers to secure a written waiver of coverage from its insureds.

In this Rush case, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court once again confirmed that it had previously clarified and narrowly limited its erroneously overly broad opinion in Gallagher case in the court’s more recent decision in the case of Erie Insurance Exchange v. Mione.  

The Supreme Court in Rush specifically held that the regular use exclusion remained a permissible limitation of UIM coverage within the parameters of the MVFRL. The court confirmed that, "with decades of reliance by insureds and insurers, and no justification to allow this court to depart from decades of established law," the court would maintain its continued course on this issue of upholding the validity of the regular use exclusion "unless and until the General Assembly or the Insurance Department acts in a way that would suggest we do otherwise." 

Service of Process

In the spring of this past year, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court also provided its latest guidance on the issue of proper and timely service of process in civil litigation matters.

In the case of Ferraro v. Patterson-Erie, 313 A.3d 987 (Pa. April 25, 2024), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court addressed service of process issues in a slip and fall case. According to the opinion, the plaintiff slipped and fell at a Burger King and, thereafter, filed a negligence lawsuit against the operators of the restaurant.

The plaintiff filed her complaint within the two-year statute of limitations. However, the plaintiff encountered difficulties with serving the complaint on the defendants due to issues with the Sheriff’s unsuccessful attempts at service during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The plaintiff eventually served the complaint on the defendant through the separate means of a private process server. Such service was not in accordance with the mandates of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires service on in-state defendants by a Sheriff’s Department. As such, the plaintiff later reinstated the complaint and then served it through the Sheriff. However, this service by the Sheriff occurred after the statute of limitations period had elapsed.

The defendants argued that the action was barred by the statute of limitations because the plaintiff did not make a good faith effort to serve them in a timely manner.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the plaintiff had failed to meet her burden of demonstrating that she made a good faith effort in diligently and timely serving process on the defendants. Accordingly, the Supreme Court found that the defendants’ informal receipt of actual notice was irrelevant to the analysis.

The court emphasized that the plaintiffs are not permitted to opt out of the Rules of Civil Procedure regarding service in order to give notice of the commencement of a lawsuit by way of informal means. As such, the plaintiff’s case was dismissed due to the lack of timely, proper service of the lawsuit upon the defendant.

Justice David Wecht's dissenting opinion in this case provides an excellent and thorough overview of the current jurisprudence in Pennsylvania on the requirements relative to proper service of process and the uncertainties related thereto. Wecht also proposed ways to provide clarity on this area of law going forward.

Punitive and Treble Damages

In the case of Dwyer v. Ameriprise Financial, 313 A.3d 969 (Pa. April 25, 2024), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, showing that it still had a penchant for favoring plaintiffs’ causes, held that a trial court may, under the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law (UTPCPL), award both punitive damages and treble damages.

This case involved plaintiffs who sued Ameriprise Financial for negligent and fraudulent misrepresentation relative to a life insurance policy. The plaintiffs alleged that the carrier misrepresented to them that their quarterly premium payments would remain the same for the life of the policy. In reality, if the plaintiff’s premium payment had remained the same, the policy allegedly would have lapsed for insufficient funds in 2020.

The trial court found Ameriprise guilty of violating Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law and awarded compensatory damages. The trial court declined to award treble damages under the UTPCPL under a rationale that such damages would be duplicative of the punitive damages that were awarded by the jury on the common law claims. The Pennsylvania Superior Court had affirmed this decision.

Going up to the appellate ladder to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, that court reversed and held that treble damages under the UTPCPL are to be considered a separate, additional remedy available to the plaintiffs and must be considered by the trial court without regard to a punitive damages award that may be awarded in the same case on related common law claims.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted that nullifying the availability of a statutory award because of an entitlement to a common law award was not a permissible exercise of discretion by the trial court. Accordingly, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s decision and remanded the case back down to the trial court for reconsideration of the appropriate amount of damages under the UTPCPL.

Plaintiff Must Answer Questions at IME or DME

Another recurring issue that typically arises in personal injury civil litigation matters is the extent to which a plaintiff may refuse to answer questions posed to the plaintiff by a doctor at a medical examination arranged by the defense in accordance with Pa.R.C.P. 4010.

Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure sets out the parameters for examinations in personal injury matters arranged by the defense which are typically called independent medical examinations (IMEs) by the defense and defense medical examinations (DMEs) by plaintiffs counsel.

In the Monroe County case of Nelson v. Wilkins, No. 1381-CV-2022 (C.P. Monroe Co. Jan. 26, 2024 C. Daniel Higgins, Jr., J.) from earlier this year, the court granted a defendant’s motion to compel a plaintiff to provide information to the IME doctor during an independent medical examination of a plaintiff in a case arising out of a motor vehicle accident.

According to this decision, the plaintiff had appeared for an examination but refused to answer the IME doctor’s questions, asserting that the questions were allegedly outside the scope of Pa. R.C.P. 4010 about the occurrence of the accident that led to the plaintiff’s alleged injuries.

Judge C. Daniel Higgins Jr. of Monroe County noted that Rule 4010 provides that the examiner is limited to inquiring into matters regarding the facts of liability that were germane to the issue of damages. Rule 4010 itself provides that “the examiner's oral interrogation of the person to be examined shall be limited to matters specifically relevant to the scope of the examination.”

The court found that the plaintiff’s attorney’s position that the IME doctor should not ask questions regarding the history of the accident that could relate to liability and the plaintiff’s argument that the doctor could avoid the problem by reviewing depositions, police reports, Interrogatories, and other discovery materials “was untenable” because it placed too high of a burden on the examining doctor.

In granting the defendant’s motion to compel in this regard, the court ordered that the plaintiff was required to cooperate and answer the questions of the examining doctor. The court noted that, as set forth under Rule 4010, the plaintiff could have her counsel or other representative present during the examination.

Use of Exhibits in Opening Statements

A common dispute at civil litigation trials is the extent to which one party or the other may utilize demonstrative exhibits during the course of opening statements. Typically, trial court judges have punted on the issues and have stated that such exhibits will only be permitted during opening statements if the attorneys have agreed on the same.

In what appears to be the first detailed opinion of its kind, Judge Terrence R. Nealon of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas addressed the recurring issue of whether a party may utilize demonstrative exhibits during an opening statement in the case of Webb v. Scranton Quincy Hospital, No. 2021-CV-4073 (Lacka. Co. March 8, 2024 Nealon, J.). In this decision, Nealon provided a thorough analysis of the law applicable to the reference to admissible evidence during the course of an opening statement.

In this medical malpractice case, the plaintiff filed a motion in limine seeking leave of court to utilize admissible excerpts of videotaped depositions of certain witnesses during the course of the opening Statement to be presented by plaintiff’s counsel.

As confirmed by Nealon's opinion, there is a dearth of precedent on this common issue.

After reviewing the sparse law on the issue, Nealon noted that the reference and showing of admissible evidence during the course of an opening statement can be permitted by a trial court judge under the broad discretionary powers of judges to run trials that occur before them.

On the basis of that general law, Nealon ruled that, since the video deposition testimony of the parties, their officers, directors, managing agents, any designated witnesses, and any nonparty medical witnesses and expert witnesses “may be used against any party” at trial “for any purpose” pursuant to Pa. R.C.P. 4017.1(g) and 4020(a)(2) and (5), then “any part or all” of those video depositions of those types of witnesses may be shown to the jury during an Opening Statement to the extent that those excerpts from the video depositions would be admissible at the trial.

The court otherwise ordered the plaintiff to identify which portions of what video deposition they intended to utilize during the course of the opening statement so that the opposing party could argue any reserved evidentiary objections to those excerpts so that any required rulings on admissibility could be made prior to the opening statement.

Hills and Ridges Doctrine

The Hills and Ridges Doctrine is a doctrine that applies in wintry slip and fall cases and generally provides that a landowner cannot be held liable unless the plaintiff can establish that the owner had allowed ice or snow on the property to unreasonably accumulate over time into ridges and elevations.

Over the past year, one court addressed the issue of whether the Hills and Ridges Doctrine should be applied where a plaintiff fell in an area that was covered by an awning or a canopy.

In the case of Johnson v. Harris-Dent, No. 23-00,097 (C.P. Lyc. Co. July 8, 2024 Linhardt, J.), Judge Eric R. Linhardt denied a motion for summary judgment in a slip and fall case that occurred when the plaintiff allegedly slipped on alleged black ice that was allegedly located on the top step of a homeowner's porch that was covered by an awning.

The court denied the motion based upon issues of fact. In this case, Linhardt relied upon the case of Heasley v. Carter Lumber, 843 A.2d 1274 (Pa. Super. 2004), for the proposition that the Hills and Ridges Doctrine is not applicable where the incident occurred in an area that was covered by an awning.

Lindhart noted that, in the Heasley case, the plaintiff’s slip and fall occurred while the plaintiff was walking in a shed that had three walls, with the fourth side open. The shed had an overhead roof with an awning extending from it. In that case, the Pennsylvania Superior Court held that the Hills and Ridges Doctrine did not apply to a fall occurring inside an outdoor storage shed.

In the Heasley case, the court reasoned that the Hills and Ridges Doctrine was intended to protect property owners from an undue burden of ensuring that open spaces such as sidewalks and parking lots are constantly kept clear of snow and ice. The court in Heasley found that the defendant did not present anything that demonstrated that keeping a structure, which is only partially open to the elements, free of snow and ice presented any burden at all, let alone an undue burden on its owners. The Heasley court also indicated that the extension of the Hills and Ridges doctrine to structures and/or other partially opened areas would raise many difficult questions. As such, the Pennsylvania Superior Court in the Heasley case declined to extend the application of the Hills and Ridges Doctrine to an incident that occurred in a structure covered by a roof and/or an awning.

Linhardt applied the rationale of the Heasley case to this Johnson case in which the plaintiff alleged that he fell on black ice on the top step of the defendant’s covered porch which step was allegedly covered by an awning. Linhardt noted that, under the current status of Pennsylvania law, if that allegation was proven, then it appeared that the Hills and Ridges Doctrine would not be applicable to this litigation. The court therefore found that genuine issues of material fact must be resolved by the jury in this regard and that, as such, the defendant’s motion for summary judgment was denied by the court.

Certificates of Merit in Medical Malpractice Cases

Over the past year, there were a couple of decisions of note that came down regarding certificates of merit that are required in medical malpractice cases in Pennsylvania.

In the case of Rightmyer v. Philly Pregnancy Center, No. 23-1925 (E.D. Pa. March 1, 2024 Quinones Alejandro, J.), the court granted a defendant’s motion to dismiss after confirming that the certificate of merit requirements for medical malpractice claims under Pennsylvania state law also applied in federal court proceedings. In this case, the court also held that a nurse is not qualified to execute a required Pennsylvania certificate of merit in a medical malpractice action against a medical doctor.

In the separate case of Berk v. Rothman Institute Orthopedic Foundation, No. 23-1437 (E.D. Pa. March 28, 2024 Murphy, J.), the court addressed the extent to which a plaintiff could attempt to compel one of the plaintiff’s own doctors to write a certificate of merit to enable the plaintiff to pursue a claim against another medical provider in a medical malpractice action.

In Berk, the plaintiff sued his own doctors who declined to give him certificates of merit to allow the plaintiff to pursue a medical malpractice claim against other doctors. The plaintiff sought to compel his own doctors to provide him with the necessary certificates of merit.

The court granted the doctors' motion to dismiss after finding that treating physicians do not owe their patients any fiduciary duty to provide them with a Certificate of Merit that would allow the patient to sue other doctors for medical malpractice. The rationale for this decision was, in part, the general rule that potential experts may not be compelled to issue expert opinions against their will.

The court otherwise found that there is no valid cause of action for an alleged intentional deprivation of legal recourse for an alleged injury.

2024 National Champion

As this year comes to an end, here’s one last tip of the hat to the 2024 Abington Heights Mock Trial Team from Clarks Summit, Pennsylvania (near Scranton) for their incredible run during which they became the first team from Pennsylvania in the 40-year history of the competition to win the National High School Mock Trial Championship, essentially beating out over 2,300 teams from all across the nation.

Looking Ahead

In terms of looking ahead for anticipated notable decisions in 2025, keep an eye out for a decision from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court on the parameters of the doctrine of forum non conveniens in the case of Tranter v. Z & D Tour. Also keep an eye out for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to possibly issue statewide rules governing the use of AI platforms in the drafting of court filings. Here’s to hoping that 2025 brings a year of zealous but civil litigation.

Daniel E. Cummins is the managing partner of the Clarks Summit law firm of Cummins Law, a civil litigation practice. He also conducts mediations of civil litigation matters through Cummins Mediation Services. Cummins is also the sole creator and writer of the Tort Talk Blog (www.TortTalk.com), which is designed to provide continuing updates on important cases and trends in Pennsylvania civil litigation law. He can be reached at dancummins@cumminslaw.net.

Reprinted with permission from the July 26, 2024 edition of the Pennsylvania Law Weekly (c) 2024 ALM Global Properties, LLC.  All rights reserved.  Further duplication without permission is prohibited, contact 877-256-2472 or asset-and-logo-licensing@alm.com.

Third Circuit Applies Regular Use Exclusion as a Valid Exclusion

In a recent non-precedential opinion issued by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in the case of Eberly v. LM General Ins. Co., No. 21-2995 (3d Cir. Aug. 1, 2024),  that court determined that the regular use exclusion does not violate Section 1738 of the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law. 

In Eberly, the Third Circuit rejected the insured’s argument that Gallagher controls whether the regular use exclusions violate Section 1738 by acting as de facto waivers of stacking.

However, the Third Circuit noted that the Supreme Court, in the case of Rush v. Erie Insurance Exchange, had expressly rejected the argument that Gallagher stands for the proposition that “insurance policy provisions that conflict with the specific requirements of the MVFRL will be declared invalid and unenforceable.

The Third Circuit decided that the regular use exclusion does not act as a de facto waiver of stacked coverage because, in this case, Plaintiffs could still access stacked coverage on their cars and on any cars they drove provided they do not fit within any applicable exclusions to such coverage. 

However, the Third Circuit also noted that the regular use exclusion only applies in the limited circumstance presented in the case before it, that is, where the injured party was operating a vehicle which he did not own but that was provided to him for his regular use and which was not covered under the policy at issue.

As such, the Third Circuit ruled that the regular use exclusion did not violate Section 1738 of the MVFRL under the facts at issue in this matter.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Another Decision by Third Circuit Upholding the Validity of the Regular Use Exclusion

In a non-precedential decision in the case of Burton v. Progressive Adv. Ins. Co., No. 23-1574 (3d Cir. Aug. 6, 2024 Porter, J. Montgomery-Reeves, J. and Roth, J.) (Op. by Roth, J.), the Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court judge's finding that the regular use exclusion precluded UIM coverage for a plaintiff.

In so ruling, the court relied upon the recent Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision in the case of Rush v. Erie Insurance Exchange, 308 A.3d 780, 802 (Pa. 2024) in which that Court upheld the continued enforceability of the regular use exclusion.

The court additionally noted that the trial court properly found that the regular use exclusion applied in this case where the party at issue was driving her brother’s vehicle which the brother was allowing the driver to continually utilize while her own vehicle was being repaired.

Anyone wishing to review this non-precedential decision by the Third Circuit upholding the enforceability of the regular use exclusion may click this LINK.

Regular Use Exclusion is Alive and Well in Pennsylvania

The Regular Use Exclusion, found in UM/UIM insurance policies, is alive and well in Pennsylvania.

This exclusion allows an automobile insurance carrier to deny coverage where an insured is driving a vehicle that is regularly available for the use of the insured but which is not covered by that insurance company but rather, some other carrier.  

In the case of Jones v. Erie Insurance Exchange, No. 690 WDA 2020 (Pa. Super. July 3, 2024 Stabile, J., Murray, J. and McLaughlin, J.) (Op. by Murray, J.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court addressed the validity of the regular use exclusion in a UIM policy after the case was remanded back down the appellate ladder for further review of the case in light of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decisions in the case Rush v. Erie Insurance Exchange, 308 A.3d 780 (Pa. 2024).

In the Rush decision, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld the validity of the regular use exclusion.

Here in this Jones decision, the Superior Court ruled that the new precedent upholding the validity of the regular use exclusion in UIM policies supported the trial court’s judgment in favor of the carrier in this case which involved an accident where the insured was injured while operating a regularly used, employer/owned work vehicle. As such, the judgment of the trial court in favor of the carrier was affirmed.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: “Legal Intelligencer State Appellate Case Alert” Law.com (July 23, 2024).

Judge Mannion of Federal Middle District Court Addresses Continuing Validity of the Regular Use Exclusion and Makes Predictions

In the case of Dayton v. The Automobile Insurance Co. of Hartford, CT, No. 3:20-CV-01833-MEM (M.D. Pa. April 23, 2024 Mannion, J.), the court addressed the issue of whether “regular use” exclusion provision in a motor vehicle insurance policy is unenforceable as contrary to Pennsylvania law under a 75 Pa. C.S.A. §1738 analysis.

Judge Mannion predicted that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would find that the regular use exclusion does not violate §1738 of Pennsylvania’s Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law.

According to the Opinion, this lawsuit arose out of a motor vehicle accident during which the Plaintiff was injured while driving his employer’s truck. 

The Plaintiff sued after he was not allowed to stack his personal automobile coverage limits on top of the separate insurance policy issued by a different insurance company that his employer had for the truck that the Plaintiff had been driving at the time of the accident.

The carrier in this case had denied the Plaintiff’s claim for additional UIM benefits based upon a regular use exclusion which precluded any coverage when injuries were sustained by an insured while occupying a non-insured vehicle that was available for the insured’s regular use.

The court rejected the Plaintiff’s arguments under the Gallagher v. Geico line of cases under which the Plaintiff attempted to argue that the regular use exclusion, like the household exclusion, operates as a impermissible de facto waiver of stacking under certain circumstances.

In addition to noting that the scope of the Gallagher decision had been limited by recent decisions by Pennsylvania Supreme Court, including in the case of Erie Insurance Exchange v. Mione, Judge Mannion also noted that, earlier this year, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had upheld the regular use exclusion as enforceable in the case of Rush v. Erie Insurance Exchange under a 75 Pa. C.S.A. §1731 analysis.

Judge Malachy E. Mannion
M.D. Pa.

The court noted that the separate §1738 analysis was not addressed in the Rush case. In this regard, Judge Mannion found that the Erie Insurance Exchange v. Mione by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was instructive and “dictates the prediction that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would conclude that a regular use exclusion which does not deprive an insured of stacked UIM coverage does not violate §1738.” 

In this case, the court found that the Plaintiff did not have any insurance policy under which §1738 would require stacking of the UIM coverage provided in his personal policy with the insurance company at issue in this case and that, therefore, that policy’s regular use exclusion does not deprive the Plaintiff of stacked coverage and, therefore, did not violate §1738.

Accordingly, the Plaintiff’s arguments that the regular use exclusion violated the MVFRL were rejected by the Court, the regular use exclusion was enforced, and the Defendant carrier was granted summary judgment in this case.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: Article – “Federal Court Predicts How Pa. Supreme Court will Address Unanswered Question About Regular Use Exclusion.” By Riley Brennan, the Legal Intelligencer (April 26, 2024).