Showing posts with label Consolidation. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Consolidation. Show all posts

Tuesday, January 18, 2022

Request For Consolidation of Cases "For All Purposes" Denied Where Each Action Sought Different Remedy


In the case of Montage Mountain Resorts, L.P. v. PA American Water Company, No. 20-CV-4926 (C.P. Lacka. Co. Jan. 7, 2022 Nealon, J.), the court addressed a Motion by the Plaintiff seeking to consolidate two (2) related lawsuits “for all purposes.” This request was opposed by the Defendant.

The courted noted that the Plaintiff ski resort initially commenced a tort action against a water utility company seeking compensatory and punitive damages based upon the utility’s alleged discharge of pellets from its water treatment facility into the reservoir which also served as the water source for the resort’s snowmaking systems. The resort asserted that the improperly released pallets clogged its snowmaking machinery which resulted in substantial repair costs, lost snowmaking capacity, closed ski trails due to inadequate snow, and diminished ski season revenue.

The ski resort later instituted a second action against the utility company under the Clean Streams Law in which the ski resort requested the abatement of an alleged public nuisance allegedly created by the utility company’s alleged discharge or pollution.

Before the court in this case was the ski resort’s Motion to Consolidate its two (2) lawsuits “for all purposes.”

Judge Terrence R. Nealon of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas reviewed the Motion under the applicable standards set forth pursuant to Pa. R.C.P. 213(a), regarding consolidation of actions. 

The court noted that matters may be consolidated where they involve common questions of law or fact or arise from the same occurrence. The court found that this standard was met by the allegations in the two (2) lawsuits at issue in this case. The court also noted that consolidation of the matters would reduce the parties’ litigation expenses, would avoid duplicate trials, and would promote judicial economy.

However, the court rejected the request for a “complete consolidation” of the separate actions “for all purposes” as there was not a complete identity of parties, claims, defenses, and issues as required by the law. 

The court also noted that the Plaintiff was seeking different relief in each action in that the first tort action sought a monetary relief from a jury, whereas the second nuisance action sought an abatement remedy from a judge and did not require a finding of negligent fault and which involved different elements of proof.

Given that the claims, defenses, and legal issues in both matters were not identical, the request for a complete consolidation for all purposes was denied.

In the end, the court granted the resort’s request to consolidate the actions for purposes of discovery and trial but noted that each action would retain its separate identity and require its own judgment.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Monday, September 21, 2020

Post-Koken Decision Out of Philadelphia County in Favor of Consolidation of Claims


In the case of Little v. Bond and GEICO, June Term 2020, No. 1539 (C.P. Phila. Co. Sept. 8, 2020 New, J.), Judge Arnold L. New of the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas denied a UIM carrier's Preliminary Objections seeking to sever the third party negligence claims from the UIM claims under an improper joinder argument.  This decision is by Order only and no Opinion.

Please click this LINK to view the Order.

I send thanks to Attorney John Trotman of the Philadelphia law firm of Silverman, Trotman & Schneider for bringing this decision to my attention.

This is the latest Post-Koken decision seen out of Philadelphia County on this issue, where there is a split of authority amongst the trial court judges within that County on how to address that issue.

There also remains a split of authority across the Commonwealth with at least 24 Counties in favor of keeping these cases consolidated and 24 Counties ruling in favor of severance (in matters not also involving companion bad faith claims).

To date, there has been no appellate decision on this issue.

For more details, check out the Post-Koken Scorecard on www.TortTalk.com.  You can find the Scorecard on the blog by scrolling down the right hand column of the blog until you find "Post-Koken Scorecard."  Click on the date under that title and you will be taken to the Scorecard where you will find a compilation of Post-Koken cases broken down first by issue and then by Federal and County Courts in terms of decisions handed down.

I have been keeping the Scorecard updated since December of 2009.  I don't represent the Scorecard to be a complete listing of Post-Koken decisions since that time but it is comprehensive.

Hoping you can please copy me on any Post-Koken decisions you may generate or see in order that the Post-Koken Scorecard can be continually updated for the benefit of all.

Thanks for reading Tort Talk.



Friday, May 15, 2020

Motion To Consolidate Two Separate Post-Koken Cases Denied in Lackawanna County


In the case of Pikula v. Ciabocchi, No. 18-CV-1753 (C.P. Lacka. Co. May 11, 2020 Nealon, J.), the court denied a motion by a tortfeasor Defendant to consolidate, for trial, two (2) separate post-Koken matters arising out of the same motor vehicle accident. 

According to the Opinion, the case involved a Plaintiff-driver and a Plaintiff-passenger, who were located in the same vehicle during the course of a rear-end accident. These Plaintiffs filed separate personal injury lawsuits. 

The Plaintiff-passenger filed suit against the tortfeasor Defendant as well as her own UIM carrier. 

The Plaintiff-driver, however, only sued the tortfeasor and did not present any UIM claim to date. 

The court also noted that, during the course of discovery, the tortfeasor Defendant had admitted liability for causing the accident. 

It was also noted that the Plaintiff-passenger had certified her case for trial but that the Plaintiff-driver had not yet had her separte case under a separate docket number certified as ready for trial. 

After the Plaintiff-passenger had filed a Certificate of Readiness for Trial, the tortfeasor Defendant filed a motion requesting the consolidation of both cases for a joint trial pursuant to Pa. R.C.P. 213(a).  
In his Opinion, Judge Nealon noted that, generally speaking, cases may be consolidated for trial under Rule 213(a) if they involve a common question of law or fact or arise from the same transaction or occurrence. 

The court ruled that, since the tortfeasor had admitted liability, these two (2) car accident lawsuits “no longer present any common question or law or fact and instead involve individual injuries, different items of damages, and distinct supporting evidence.” 

The court also noted that the tortfeasor’s acceptance of liability also eliminates the prospect of inconsistent verdicts regarding liability. 

The court additionally noted that, the Plaintiff-passenger’s case was scheduled for trial to take place in less than four (4) months, while the Plaintiff driver’s lawsuit has not yet been certified for trial. 

For these reasons, the court found that the consolidation of these matters for a joint trial is not warranted and the Motion to Consolidate these post-Koken actions for trial was denied. 

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Thursday, March 28, 2019

Split of Authority Continues on Consolidation vs. Severance/Bifurcation of Post-Koken Claims

 
In the case of Ali v. Erie Insurance Company, No. 2017-CV-03544 (C.P. Dauph. Co. March 1, 2019 Cherry, J.), the court denied a Plaintiff’s Motion to Consolidate a third party negligence claim with a companion UIM claim in a post-Koken motor vehicle accident matter.  
 
In his detailed Order, Judge John F. Cherry of the Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas held that the “consolidation of these matter[s] would not serve the interests of judicial efficiency, but rather, create confusion to the jury.”  
 
The court additionally noted that the cases involved “separate and distinct causes of action” against the two (2) types of Defendants, that is, a negligence claim for bodily injury against the Defendant driver and owner and a separate contract claim against the UIM carrier.  
 
Anyone wishing to review a copy of this detailed Order may click this LINK.

 
I send thanks to Attorney John A. Statler of the Lemoyne, Pa law firm of Johnson, Duffie, Stewart & Weidner for bringing this case to my attention.  

Thursday, February 18, 2016

Another Luzerne County Post-Koken Decision in Favor of Consolidation During Discovery (But Leaving the Door Ajar for Bifurcation Later at Trial)

In a recent February 11, 2016 Order without Opinion in the case of Rhoades v. Johnson and Erie Insurance Company, No. 9659 - CV - 2015 (C.P. Luz. Co. Feb. 11, 2016 Amesbury, J.), Judge William H. Amesbury of the Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas denied the Defendant UIM carrier's Preliminary Objections/Motion to Sever filed in response to a Post-Koken Complaint.

This matter arose out of a motor vehicle accident during which the Defendant tortfeasor driver was allegedly driving under the influence.

The Defendant UIM carrier filed Preliminary Objections asserting a misjoinder of negligence claims against the alleged tortfeasor and UIM breach of contract claims under a single Complaint.  The carrier combined the Preliminary Objections with a Motion to Sever pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 213 asserting, in part, that it would be prejudicial for the UIM carrier to have to proceed through the same jury trial with the inflammatory facts associated with a Co-Defendant accused of a DUI and facing punitive damages.

Judge William H. Amesbury
Luzerne County
 
Following the trend in Luzerne County, Judge Amesbury denied the Preliminary Objections of the UIM carrier Defendant but noted in his Order that "Defendant Erie Insurance Company retains the right to file a Motion to Sever with the Trial Judge."

Anyone desiring a copy of this Order only may contact me at dancummins@comcast.net.
 

Monday, April 20, 2015

Bifurcation/Consolidation of Post-Koken Trials Uncovered To Date

In follow up to Friday's Tort Talk post on Lackawanna County Judge Terrence R. Nealon's decision in the case of Kujawski v. Fogmeg and Allstate, No. 2012-CV-3395 (C.P. Lacka. Co. April 15, 2015, Nealon, J.), in which Judge Nealon ruled in favor of consolidated Post-Koken trials, below is a listing of other cases on the Bifurcation/Consolidation of Trial issue uncovered to date.
 
This list is copied over from the Tort Talk Post-Koken Scorecard that is always freely accessible at www.TortTalk.com (scroll down the right hand column until you get to the "Post-Koken Scorecard" label and click on the date thereunder).
 
This list, which is updated as of April 16, 2015, is detailed but is not represented to be exhaustive and one should conduct their own additional research in an effort to uncover any other cases.
 
I welcome receiving copies of any decisions any Tort Talkers may come across in order that this list may be updated from time to time.
 
The list below confirms that there is a split of authority among the trial courts of Pennsylvania.  It is noted that the Pennsylvania Superior Court case of Stepanovich v. McGraw and State Farm supports an argument that favors the consolidation of Post-Koken trials.  However, the Stepanovich decision has been read by others as suggesting that a consolidated trial is permissible, but not finally deciding the issue. 
 
To date, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not had an opportunity to address the issue.
 
 
 
MOTION TO BIFURCATE TRIAL

FEDERAL COURT DECISIONS (Split of Authority)

SEPARATE TRIALS ALLOWED


Eastern District Federal Court

Moninghoff v. Tilet and Allstate Insurance Company, No. 11-Civil-7406 (E.D. Pa. June 27, 2012 McLaughlin, J.),(Federal Eastern District Court Judge Mary A. McLaughlin granted the Defendant, Allstate Insurance Company’s Motion to Stay Plaintiffs’ bad faith claims in a post-Koken litigation).


REQUEST FOR BIFURCATED TRIAL DENIED


Western District Federal Court

Cracker v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 11-0225, 2012 U.S. Dist. Lexis 109357 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 3, 2012 Lancaster, C.J.)(United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania denied State Farm’s Motion In Limine to bifurcate a breach of contract and bad faith post-Koken lawsuit.).




STATE COURT DECISIONS ON BIFURCATION

State Appellate Court Decision

Stepanovich v. McGraw and State Farm, 78 A.3d 1147 (Pa.Super. Oct. 15, 2013 Ford Elliott, P.J.E., Ott, J., Musmanno, J.)(Opinion by Ott, J.)(Concurring and Dissenting Op. by Ford Elliott, P.J.E.), appeal denied 11 WAL 2014 (Pa. April 22, 2014)  (Superior Court found no due process violation by the trial court's decision to allow the Post-Koken trial involving a tortfeasor defendant and a UIM carrier defendant to proceed in front of a jury without mention of the UIM carrier as a party Defendant.  Yet, the Court did rule that Pa.R.E. 411, pertaining to preclusion of mention of liability insurance at trial, does not apply in context of references to UIM insurance at trial.   However, open issue remains on whether common law prohibition of mentioning other forms of insurance at trial serves to preclude evidence of insurance in this context;  Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Petition to Appeal.).
 

(Split of Authority at trial court level)


SEPARATE TRIALS ALLOWED


Allegheny County

Vecchio v. Tunison and Erie Insurance Exchange, No.: GD11-009690 (C.P. Allegheny Oct. 9, 2012 Folino, J.) (In Order without Opinion, trial court granted Motion to Bifurcate filed by UIM carrier in the combined negligence/UIM action, which motion was filed less than two (2) months before this scheduled date of the trial listing.  The trial court ordered that the Plaintiffs’ third party negligence claim would be tried before the jury first, with the UIM claim tried separately thereafter.) .


Lehigh County

Purta v. Blower and Erie Ins. Exch., No. 2010-C-2515 (C.P. Lehigh Co. Sept. 20, 2011 Reibman, J.)(Court addressed the seemingly novel issue presented by a Motion to Severance filed by the UIM carrier Defendant to bifurcate jointly filed third party and underinsured motorist (UIM) claims into separate trials. In a detailed Order, Judge Reibman granted the UIM carrier's Motion for Severance and ordered that the case proceed to trial with only the Plaintiffs and Defendant tortfeasor being involved in the first trial.).




REQUEST FOR BIFURCATED TRIAL DENIED
 
Lackawanna County

Kujawski v. Fogmeg and Allstate, No. 2012-CV-3395 (C.P. Lacka. Co. April 15, 2015, Nealon, J.)(In an Order, Court denies tortfeasor Defendant's motion for bifurcation;  court also outlines appropriate jury instructions for a Post-Koken trial involving both a third party tortfeasor and UIM carrier defendants).
 
 

Luzerne County

Loefflad v Nauks &Allstate Fire & Casualty Ins. Co., No. 8673 of 2010 (C.P. Luz. Co. June 20, 2012) (By Order only, Judge Gelb denies request to bifurcate Post-Koken case for trial).


Price v Price, Auto Glass Unlimited & State Farm, No. 13625 of 2010(C.P. Luz. Co. June 20, 2012)(By Order only, Judge Gelb denies request to bifurcate Post-Koken case for trial).

Borthwick v. Webb, No. 2735-Civil-2010 (C.P. Luz. Co. Sept. 7, 2012 Vough, J.)(Court ruled at consolidated Post-Koken trial that “Plaintiff is limited to informing the jury that he had an underinsured policy with Defendant, GEICO Insurance Company.  There shall be no other evidence presented to the jury regarding insurance.”).


Schuylkill County

Post v. Schnerring and Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., No. S-1887-12 (C.P. Schuylkill Co. Oct. 22, 2013 Dolbin, J.)(Judge Cyrus Palmer Dolbin of the Schuylkill County Court of Common Please denied Motions to Bifurcate the trial filed by both the UIM carrier, Liberty Mutual Insurance Company and the third party Defendant.).
 


Thursday, April 16, 2015

Judge Nealon Rules in Favor of Consolidation for Post-Koken Trials (And Also Rules on Appropriate Jury Instructions)


In his April 15, 2015 decision in the case of Kujawski v. Fogmeg and Allstate, No. 2012-CV-3395 (C.P. Lacka. Co. April 15, 2015, Nealon, J.), Judge Terrence R. Nealon of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas issued another notable post-Koken decision in which he became one of the first few judges from across the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to address the issue of whether or not a post-Koken third party/UIM matter should proceed to trial in a consolidated or bifurcated fashion - - Judge Nealon came down on the side of the consolidation and against bifurcation.  

However, Judge Nealon did rule that separate coverage issues presented with respect to the UIM claim should and would be bifurcated from the liability and damages claims presented in the negligence and UIM matters.  

According to the Opinion, the issue before the court revolved around whether a Plaintiff’s third party liability claim and underinsured motorists (UIM) claim may be tried in a single proceeding before the same jury, and if so, what jury instructions should be provided regarding the named parties and the questions to be decided by the jury.

In this matter, the tortfeasor Defendant was objecting to a consolidated trial with an insurance company as a Co-Defendant.  According to the Opinion, the UIM carrier did not object to a consolidated trial. 

Judge Terrence R. Nealon
Lackawanna County
Judge Nealon ruled that, since the potential liabilities of the tortfeasor and the UIM carrier for damages arose out of the same factual background and involved common questions of law in fact, the Plaintiff’s liability and UIM claims would be consolidated for a single trial pursuant to Pa. R.C.P. 2229(b).  

The court also ruled that, given that the identification of the UIM carrier as a real party in interest and as a potential provider of UIM coverage did not introduce evidence of the tortfeasor’s liability insurance in violation of Pa. R.E. 411, the UIM carrier would be identified to the jury as a named Defendant who was furnishing prospective UIM coverage.  Judge Nealon noted that this identification of the UIM carrier by name as well as the reason as to why that carrier was in the case was necessary so that the jury would understand the participating UIM insurance carrier’s status as an adverse party to the Plaintiff.  

As noted above, Judge Nealon separately ruled that the UIM coverage dispute involving the Plaintiff’s residency and her entitlement to UIM benefits from the UIM carrier did not arise out of the same occurrence or involve common questions of law or fact as the parties’ liability and damages disputes.  Accordingly, the court ruled that the trial would be bifurcated on that separate issue pursuant to Pa. R.C.P. 213(b).  The court noted that the jury would first address the merits of the Plaintiff’s personal injury claims and render a verdict on the liability and damages issues.  

Judge Nealon went on to note that, if the jury awarded damages in excess of the tortfeasor’s liability insurance policy limits, such that UIM coverage was triggered, the second phase of trial would be conducted on the coverage issue to determine whether the Plaintiff was a resident of her grandparents’ home at the time of the accident so as to be entitled to UIM benefits under that UIM policy at issue.

Judge Nealon further noted that, in the event a jury awards damages in an amount less than the tortfeasor’s liability insurance limits, the issue of the Plaintiff’s residency and the applicability of her grandparents’ UIM coverage would be rendered moot.

In his thorough Opinion on the issue of joinder or bifurcation of post-Koken claims at trial, Judge Nealon confirmed that he had reviewed the law of other jurisdictions in this case as well as in his prior decision in the case of Bingham v. Poswistilo, 24 Pa. D. & C. 5th 17 (C.P. Lacka. Co. 2011 Nealon, J.), which research revealed that of the decisions on the separate, but similar, issue of consolidation/severance at the commencement of the case arising out of 33 other states, 27 jurisdictions allowed for the joinder of UM/UIM claims with civil actions against tortfeasors, while six (6) states favored severance of UM/UIM claims from tort actions.  

In ruling that liability in UIM claims may be joined for a single trial, Judge Nealon relied in part on the Pennsylvania Superior Court decision in Stepanovich v. McGraw and State Farm, 78 A.3d 1147 (Pa. Super. 2013), appeal denied, 89 A.3d 1286 (Pa. 2014).

 
On the separate issue of the content of the jury instructions for a Post-Koken trial, the Plaintiff requested the court to utilize those instructions Judge Nealon had crafted in his prior decision in the case of Moritz v. Horace Mann Property and Casualty Insurance Company, 2014 W.L. 5817681 (C.P. Lacka. Co. 2014 Nealon, J.).  The court noted that Allstate objected to certain portions of those jury instructions set forth in the Moritz case.  

The tortfeasor Defendant was additionally arguing that neither the identity of the UIM carrier as a party, nor the question of the Plaintiff’s UIM claims, should be disclosed to the jury in the jury instructions.  

Judge Nealon agreed that the entirety of his proposed jury instructions as crafted in the Moritz case should not be read to the jury in this matter as the jury instructions drafted in the Moritz case were “appropriate only a case in which the Plaintiff has sued the UIM insurer alone after having secured payment of the tortfeasor’s insurance policy limits.”  

For this reason, Judge Nealon agreed to somewhat limit the extent of his jury instructions in this case involving both a negligence claim against the third party tortfeasor and a UIM claim against the Plaintiff’s own carrier.  The court also tailored its jury instructions in this matter in light of the separate coverage dispute that was still pending with regards to the potential UIM claim.  

Overall, Judge Nealon agreed that the jury instructions in this matter should not reference the existence or amount of the tortfeasor’s liability insurance coverage as that would prejudice the tortfeasor in violation of the mandate under Pa. R.E. 411 prohibiting any reference to a tortfeasor's liability coverage at trial.  

In this Kujawski case, Judge Nealon stated that he would instruct the jury that the Plaintiff was required by law to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the tortfeasor was negligent, that the tortfeasor’s negligence caused harm to the Plaintiff, and that the Plaintiff suffered damages as a result of her injuries.  

The court noted that the jury would also be informed in this Post-Koken matter that the policy of the UIM carrier (referenced by name in the instructions) provided underinsured motorists coverage, which may be available to pay some of the damages that may be awarded. 

Judge Nealon also planned to instruct the jury that the UIM carrier (again, referenced by name) should not be treated “any differently than any other Defendant in a civil action simply because [name of the UIM carrier] is an insurance company.”  

Judge Nealon also ruled that, given his ruling in favor of bifurcation on the separate coverage issue, the jury would also be advised that, depending upon its verdict at the conclusion of the liability and damages portion of the trial, the jury may be required to hear additional evidence and render a second verdict with regards to the Plaintiff’s residency at the time of the accident.    

Anyone wishing to review this Opinion may click this LINK
I send thanks to Attorneys Chad DeFelice and Joseph Pulcini, Jr. of the Bethlehem, PA office of the Thomas, Thomas & Hafer law firm for bringing this case to my attention.

Friday, January 30, 2015

Judge Williamson of Monroe County Follows Rule of Consolidation for Post-Koken Negligence/UIM Claims

Another Monroe County decision in favor of consolidation of Post-Koken negligence/UIM claims was recently handed down by Judge David J. Williamson in the case of Cahill v. Fritz and Hartford Ins. Co., No. 7056-CV-2014 (C.P. Monroe Co. Jan. 16, 2015 Williamson, J.).

This automobile accident matter involved claims of negligence and a request for punitive damages against the defendant driver combined with a UIM claim against the Plaintiff's automobile insurance carrier.

The defendant driver was charged with a DUI which led the Plaintiff to plead for punitive damages.  As such, the defendant UIM carrier filed Preliminary Objections seeking a severance of claims in an effort to avoid the potential end result of being at the same trial with that defendant driver and an angry jury.

Judge David J. Williamson
Monroe County
In denying the UIM carrier's preliminary objections requesting a severance of claims based upon a misjoinder of causes of actions argument, Judge Williamson referred to a prior decision by his fellow Monroe County judge, the Hon. Arthur Zulick in the case of Cocuzza v. Castro, No. 406-CV-2012 (C.P. Monroe 2012).  The court found that all claims presented arose out of the same accident and, therefore, could be joined in one action.

As for the argument by the UIM carrier that it would be prejudiced at trial due to the defendant driver's alleged DUI status and the punitive damages claim, Judge Williamson did note that issue of whether the case should be bifurcated for trial purposes could be presented to the court at the conclusion of discovery. 

But for now, at the preliminary objections stage, Judge Williamson found that the case should remain consolidated for discovery purposes in the interests of judicial economy.

Anyone wishing to secure a copy of Judge Williamson's Opinion in the Cahill case may contact me at dancummins@comcast.com.

I send thanks to the prevailing Plaintiff's attorney, Kevin Conaboy, Esq., of the Scranton, PA law firm of Abrahamsen, Conaboy & Abrahamsen for bringing a copy of this decision to my attention.

I also note that the Post-Koken Scorecard has been updated with this decision.


Commentary:  While the Monroe County Court of Common Pleas has repeatedly ruled in favor of the consolidation of Post-Koken negligence and UIM claims, the same court has also repeated ruled in favor of the severance of Post-Koken combined UIM and bad faith claims. 

The relevant decisions in this regard can be found on the Post-Koken Scorecard.

Friday, August 2, 2013

ARTICLE: Accident-Prone Plaintiffs Face Quandary Over Multiple Trials

The below article of mine recently appeared in the July 23, 2013 edition of the Pennsylvania Law Weekly and is republished here with permission from American Law Media. 

Accident-Prone Plaintiffs Face Quandary Over Multiple Trials

By
 
On occasion, a plaintiff comes along who has separate claims for personal injuries arising out of different accidents that occurred close in time.

The dilemma for such a plaintiff becomes whether or not to attempt to pursue both claims under one complaint, or if the cases were filed under two separate complaints, whether to move to consolidate those matters into one trial.

Recent cases handed down confirm that while a plaintiff is not permitted to plead claims for two entirely separate accidents under a single complaint, once two separate complaints are filed by the plaintiff, the plaintiff may be able to consolidate those two actions for purposes of a single trial.

Joinder of Claims Not Permitted in Complaint

Under Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 2229(b), it is provided that a "plaintiff may join as defendants persons against whom the plaintiff asserts any right to relief jointly, severally, separately or in the alternative, in respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence or series of transactions or occurrences if any common question of law or fact affecting the liabilities of all such persons will arise in the action."

According to the case of Richner v. McCance, 13 A.2d 950 (Pa.Super. 2011), each element of this test must be met in order for separate claims to be stated under the caption of one complaint, i.e., joinder is permitted only if both (1) the lawsuits arose out of the same series of transactions or occurrences and (2) a common question of law or fact exists.

For example, in the Pennsylvania Superior Court case of Kalker v. Moyer, 921 A.2d 21 (Pa.Super. 2007), a plaintiff attempted to plead in one complaint claims arising out of separate motor vehicle accidents that occurred in different counties seven months apart. Turning to Pa.R.C.P. 2229(b), the Kalker court ruled that this joinder of claims was not permissible because the two accidents did not arise out of the same occurrence.

Such a joinder under a single complaint will not be allowed even where the plaintiff alleges an injury to the same body part from both accidents. In the Philadelphia case of Alpher v. Yellow Cab, 12 Pa.D.&C.3d 355 (C.P. Phila. 1979), a plaintiff attempted to plead claims in one complaint from two separate motor vehicle accidents that occurred 14 months apart on the basis that both accidents resulted in injuries to the same body part. The court in Alpher found that the two causes of action should not be joined because there was no common question of law or fact and because the claims did not arise out of the same transaction or series or occurrence.

As such, the law of Pennsylvania requires a plaintiff to bring claims arising out of separate motor vehicle accidents under separate complaints. The question remains whether that plaintiff who has filed separate lawsuits may thereafter successfully move to consolidate those separate complaints into one trial.

Consolidation of Separate Claims for Trial

Judge R. Stanton Wettick Jr. of the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas recently addressed this very issue and allowed the consolidation of two separately filed motor vehicle accident lawsuits brought by the same plaintiff in the case of Jackson v. Drew, PICS CASE No. 13-1015, No. GD-12-008737 (C.P. Allegheny April 24, 2013 Wettick, J.).

In Jackson, the plaintiff was involved in two separate car accidents in Allegheny County with similar injuries resulting. The plaintiff filed separate complaints against the drivers.

Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a motion under Pa.R.C.P. 213 to consolidate the cases. The plaintiff asserted a concern that each defendant would try to blame the other for any of the injuries asserted.
Under Pa.R.C.P. 213(a), it is provided that "when actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the court, the court on its own motion or on motion of any party may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all of the matters in issue in the actions, may order all of the actions consolidated, and may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may avoid unnecessary costs or delay."

In Jackson, Wettick granted the motion pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 213(a) and consolidated the cases under the rationale that both accidents arose out of a common question of law, i.e., the common question of fact as to what injuries were caused by which accident.

In his decision, Wettick distinguished the separate standards applicable to the permissive joinder of separate claims in a complaint under Pa.R.C.P. 2229 and to a motion for consolidation under Pa.R.C.P. 213(a). Whereas, the joinder Rule 2229(b) required both elements of the test — that is, actions arising out of the same occurrence and a common question of law or fact — the consolidation Rule 213(a) only mandated that one or the other elements of the test exist.

In the context of the Jackson case, although the separate actions arose out of separate occurrences, where the cases involved the common questions of fact as to which injury caused which accident, Wettick allowed for the consolidation.

Another example of a trial court opinion in which separate complaints were allowed to be consolidated for purposes of trial is Scoggins v. Hardy, 10 Pa.D.&C.4th 64 (C.P. York 1991). In Scoggins, the plaintiff allegedly sustained similar injuries as a result of two separate motor vehicle accidents that occurred several months apart.

The Scoggins court felt that the chances of the plaintiff receiving a fair trial would be enhanced by the consolidation, as one jury would hear the totality of the case and neither defendant would be able to point the finger at a missing defendant. The court also noted that with consolidation, the plaintiff would only need to call her medical experts to testify once and thereby avoid excessive fees. The court additionally noted that if the cases were not consolidated, there was the risk that the plaintiff might be able to collect twice for the same injuries. In granting the motion to consolidate, the Scoggins court pointed to the case of O'Meara v. Wilson, 12 Mercer L.J. 292 (1973), in support of its decision.

In the case of Hamilton v. Gallo, 334 A.2d 692 (Pa.Super. 1975), the Superior Court affirmed a trial court's consolidation of cases arising out of separate motor vehicle accidents that occurred several months apart. The Hamilton court adopted the trial court's reasoning that consolidation prevented the defendants from pointing the finger at the other defendant in separate trials and also prevented the plaintiff from downplaying the injuries from the one accident while emphasizing the other during separate trials.

While the decisions handed down to date all appear to favor the consolidation of separate complaints for separate accidents resulting in similar injuries, such consolidation is not automatic. Rather, under Rule 213, the courts retain broad discretion to consider whether or not to grant such requests to consolidate.

Moreover, as indicated in dicta in the Kalker decision referenced above, a consolidation request may be denied if the accidents arose in different counties, as venue issues may possibly serve to prevent the joinder of the two actions.

Damned If You Do, Damned If You Don't

Regardless of whether or not a decision is made to consolidate the claims, plaintiffs pursuing a recovery for injuries arising out of two separate accidents face challenges.

If separate trials occur, the plaintiff faces the greater risks attendant with the defendant blaming a missing defendant and another accident in the trial at hand. The same problem still exists in a consolidated trial but perhaps to a lesser degree, as the jury may be turned off by defendants casting blame at each other and refusing to accept responsibility for their own actions.

Plaintiffs claiming similar injuries in two separate accidents that occurred close in time may also have serious problems attempting to prove through expert testimony which accident caused which injury.
Where a plaintiff's medical expert fails to offer an unequivocal opinion, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, as to which accident was responsible for which portion of the alleged injury, the plaintiff may be faced with a pretrial motion in limine seeking to preclude the testimony of the plaintiff's expert or a motion for nonsuit at the close of the plaintiff's case-in-chief at trial.

The courts of Pennsylvania have routinely held that an expert's opinion must be unequivocal, as in Hamil v. Bashline, 392 A.2d 1280, 1285-1286 (Pa. 1980). Stated otherwise, an expert's opinion that amounts to a mere guess or conjecture is not admissible in evidence, as in Laubach v. Haigh, 252 A.2d 683 (Pa. 1969), and Collins v. Hand, 246 A.2d 398, 403 (Pa. 1968).

Thus, the defense argument will be that if the plaintiff's medical expert witness is unable to unequivocally conclude which injuries and symptoms are related to which accident as required by law, it logically and necessarily follows that a jury of laypeople will likewise be unable to render such a decision.

Burden of Proof

As was attempted in the case of Pennfield v. Meadow Valley Electric, 413 Pa. Super 187, 604 A.2d 1082, 1085 (1992), a plaintiff may attempt to shift the burden of proof on the apportionment of the damages to the defendants under the Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section 433B, which pertains to the burden of proof of multiple defendants who have combined to cause an injury.

Similarly, in Smith v. Pulcinella, 656 A.2d 494 (Pa.Super. 1995), the court noted that since "most personal injuries are by their very nature incapable of division," a plaintiff should not be burdened with attempting to apportion the damages among multiple defendants. The court in Smith essentially treated the two separate defendants as joint tortfeasors in a case where the first defendant had rear-ended the plaintiff's vehicle and, shortly thereafter, the second defendant came along and rear-ended both vehicles as they were pulled off the side of the road.

However, defendants may counter with the argument that the rules pertaining to the apportionment of damages amongst multiple defendants only applies to joint tortfeasors, which generally cannot be so in the context of a matter two entirely distinct accidents separated by time.

Such was the finding of the court in a case involving two car accidents in Shamey v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance, 331 A.2d 498 (Pa.Super. 1974). In Shamey, the plaintiffs had been driving up a hill when their vehicle became stuck in snow and ice. The plaintiff's vehicle was then struck in quick succession by two other vehicles.

As to the potential liability of the driver of the first vehicle that hit the plaintiff's vehicle, the Shamey court stated that it would be inappropriate to hold him liable for damages that were not the result of his negligence. Rather, where there were two separate collisions by two allegedly negligent drivers, each could only be found to be responsible for the injuries caused by his negligence.

In McGuire v. Hamper Coal Mining, 49 A.2d 396, 397 (Pa. 1946), the plaintiff suffered an injury to the same spot on his head as a result of two separate accidents two weeks apart.

On the apportionment of damages, the Supreme Court in McGuire reasoned that, since each defendant was only responsible for his own negligence, "it was incumbent upon plaintiff to individuate the injuries and damages" sustained from each accident. In this regard, the court found that the plaintiff was required to offer proof on the damages issues "not with absolute exactitude, but at least with reasonable approximation" so as to prevent impermissible conjecture on the part of the jury in their deliberations.

Ultimately, the Supreme Court in McGuire stated that "it might seem at first blush as though an injustice is being visited upon plaintiff in denying him a recovery from defendant of damages to which he might otherwise be entitled merely because he was unlucky enough to have a second accident and cannot now apportion his injuries between two occurrences. On more mature reflection, however, it should be apparent that it would be at least equally unjust to impose upon defendant a liability for damages which it was not shown to have caused."

Thus, the plaintiff who has the misfortune of having been injured in multiple accidents will have many issues to consider in addressing the quandary of whether to seek recovery at one trial or two.

Daniel E. Cummins is a partner and civil litigator with the Scranton law firm of Foley Comerford & Cummins. His civil litigation blog, Tort Talk, may be viewed at www.torttalk.com.