Showing posts with label Judge Mehalchick. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Judge Mehalchick. Show all posts

Thursday, August 21, 2025

Article: AI and Its Proper Use in the Practice of Law

The below article written by both myself and my son, Michael, entitled "AI and Its Proper Use in the Practice of Law" appeared in the August 14, 2025 edition of the Pennsylvania Law Weekly and is republished here with permission.   Michael is a computer science and philosophy major at Ursinus College with a focus on AI research.














Expert Opinion  Artificial Intelligence


AI and Its Proper Use in the Practice of Law


August 14, 2025, Pennsylvania Law Weekly

By

Daniel E. Cummins

Michael Cummins
















While many articles on AI and the law have shouted “AI is coming! AI is coming!” like Paul Revere galloping through the night, very few of those articles actually provide advice on how to incorporate AI into your law practice.

With this article by a practicing attorney and a budding computer scientist, information is provided not only on the basic terms of art relative to AI and its uses, but advice is also provided on the nuts and bolts of how to begin to properly utilize AI as part of your practice.

Duty to be Competent With Technology

Under Pennsylvania Rule of Professional Conduct 1.1, lawyers are required to continue to work to maintain and improve their competency in the practice of law. Rule 1.1 states, in part, that the provision of competent legal representation to a client “requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.”

This rule has been construed to require attorneys to remain competent with advancements in technology that can improve one’s ability to represent clients. As such, it is not only good for one’s practice to begin the process of becoming proficient in the use of AI in your practice, some may argue that it is required under the rules of ethics.

Common AI Terms to Know

Here are some common terms related to AI that attorneys should know and understand:

Algorithm—A process or set of instructions written by a computer programmer to be followed by a computer.

Artificial intelligence—The development of a series of algorithms that instruct computers to complete tasks which typically require human intelligence, reasoning, and understanding, including visual and audio perception, speech recognition, decision making, etc.

Machine learning/deep learning—Machine learning is a branch of AI which focuses on enabling computers to learn from data and improve their performance without explicit, ongoing programming. Deep learning is a form of machine learning where the computer utilizes multiple layers of processing in order to extract even more information from data.

Large language model (LLM)—A type of AI which utilizes deep learning to process and can generate human language by recognizing patterns and associations. Such AI models are described as "large" due to the massive data sets containing billions of words and parameters. ChatGPT and Gemini are examples of Large Language Models

ChatGPT—An AI tool developed by OpenAI to engage in written conversations with humans to answer questions, complete tasks or follow prompts. You can try it for free at www.chat.com.

Gemini—An AI tool developed by Google very similar to ChatGPT that can generate responses to queries by pulling information from the internet and presenting it in a conversational manner to the reader.

Hallucinations—Hallucinations occur when an AI model produces a response that is factually incorrect and/or nonsensical, but is supported by the existing data that the AI was trained on. This can occur due to datasets that are poorly gathered and maintained or incomplete. Examples of hallucinations would be ChatGPT providing case citations that are inaccurate or even totally fabricated.

AI Is Just Guessing

While it is a common misperception to say that ChatGPT "knew" the answer or that Google AI Overview "understood" what you were searching for, that is actually far from the truth.

Artificial intelligence is essentially a prediction algorithm using an unimaginable number of parameters and associations to give the appearance of knowledge; in other words, AI platforms such as ChatGPT or Google’s Gemini give you their best guess at what you would want to hear based on your prompt and the data it was trained on.

On many occasions, an AI platform may produce a result that is factually correct since it has been trained only on the adequate data for a specific need. However, if it is asked a question or prompted on something that it has not been trained on, there is a good chance it may hallucinate and give a false response. Since AI is predictive in nature, it will only ever give you its "best" response possible within the limitations of the tool. Of course, AI can never give a "truthful" response because truth is foreign to predictive AI.

A good analogy is to think of AI as a contestant on Final Jeopardy. The contestant (AI) is given a query or a prompt. The contestant (AI) then searches through the recesses of his or her mind and knowledge (the data it was trained on) in the hopes of coming up with the correct response. The contestant (AI) provides the response, not knowing if it is a correct response. The only difference between the contestant and AI is that the contestant may give up and admit they do not know the answer; AI will always generate its "best guess" even if it has been trained on none of the relevant information.

Nuts and Bolts of How to Use AI

For instructions on how to try out AI, we will use the most popular AI tool at the moment, ChatGPT.

ChatGPT is free to try out. There are more detailed uses of ChatGPT that you could pay to utilize but, at least for now, anyone can use the basic form of ChatGPT for free.

You can find ChatGPT at www.chat.com. When you go to the site, a box may pop up asking you to log in or sign up, but that is not necessary. You can click “Stay logged out” instead.

You can utilize ChatGPT to conduct a search like you would on Google, but be sure to verify and triple check the responses. You can also give ChatGPT an “assignment” such as following examples:

Research the current status of the law on Limited Tort in Pennsylvania and include case citations;

Draft a Brief outlining the Hills and Ridges Doctrine in Pennsylvania and include case Citations

Draft Interrogatories applicable to a fire loss subrogation case

Provide deposition questions applicable to a dog bite case

ChatGPT will search within its pretrained database for information and will respond with detailed information in response to the queries.

It is crucial to keep in mind that the most important practice to follow when using AI is to verify everything it generates. Whether you are asking it to give you a starting point for research, assist with discovery efforts, or draft documents, you should double check every aspect of its output for hallucinations, that is, for inaccurate, inapplicable or even false information.

How you prompt AI, or submit your queries, is also very important as it can assist in generating more accurate and beneficial responses. When writing prompts, giving the AI context as to your goals and relevant background information is very important. Clarity is also important, and, therefore, breaking down a singular prompt into multiple parts with clear instructions can also yield better results.

Ultimately, AI should be used as more of a tool to assist in menial tasks, rather than a one-stop-shop to replace human ingenuity. To paraphrase what one judge wrote in an Opinion involving an AI issue, the use of artificial intelligence also requires the use of human intelligence.

As noted in greater detail below, the reliance upon artificial intelligence to complete legal research without also verifying the veracity of the citations through other trusted resources is not only dumb, but can also land you in hot water.

Hallucinations All Around the World

Attorneys and judges from all around the world have begun to utilize AI to assist with their legal research and brief writing. As such, a few of those attorneys and judges have been getting in trouble for failing to check the validity and accuracy of the legal citations secured through the use of AI platforms prior to filing documents of record.

An attorney/computer data scientist located in Paris, France by the name of Damien Charlotin has created a worldwide scorecard of sorts documenting cases from around the world where attorneys have been sanctioned for filing briefs and other documents with a court that contain AI hallucinations, or case citations that are improper, invalid, or just fabricated.

As noted on the compilation created by Charlotin, not only lawyers, but judges have also been tripped up by the use of AI. In Georgia, it took an appeals court to reveal that, not only did an attorney in the lower court, but also the lower court itself, had relied upon and cited to bogus case citations secured via AI research. In that case of Shahid v. Esaam, 2025 Ga. App. LEXIS 299, at *3 (Ga. Ct. App. June 30, 2025), the Georgia court of appeals struck the lower court order, remanded the case and sanctioned the attorney involved.

More recently, a New Jersey district court judge withdrew his decision in the biopharma securities case of In Re CorMedix Securities Litigation, 2:21-CV-14020 (D. N.J. July 22, 2025 Neals, J.), after the lawyers involved in the case complained that his opinion contained numerous errors, including made up quotes, misstated case outcomes and incorrect case citations, all presumably secured from research on an AI platform. The court withdrew its published decision and noted that another opinion and order would be issued.

With regards to attorneys running afoul from the use of AI research in their filings, according to the above scorecard, as of July 25, 2025, there were at least 230 cases from around the world where a court had determined that a filing contained AI produced hallucinated content, typically fake citations. Of the 230 instances from around the world, 130 of those cases were found in the United States. Of those numerous cases found in the United States, at least four cases arose in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

Attorneys From Pennsylvania Who Hallucinated

As noted, the filing of court documents containing hallucinations in the form of faulty or fake legal citations has led to sanctions in at least four Pennsylvania cases. The Pennsylvania federal courts who have addressed these issues have found that the submission of court filings with faulty citations amounts to violations of Fed.R.C.P. 11 (by signing a filing, an attorney certifies the accuracy of the legal arguments contained therein), and violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct 1.1 (Competency) and 3.3 (Candor Towards a Tribunal).

In the nonprecedential decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in the case of McCarthy v. U.S. DEA, No. 24-2704 (3d Cir. July 21, 2025 Chung, J.)(Not Precedential), the court addressed the DEA’s revocation of a physician’s assistant’s certificate of registration. The petitioner’s attorney was caught having submitted a filing that relied, in part, on “summaries” of eight previous DEA adjudications in support of arguments on behalf of the petitioner.

After it was determined that seven of the summaries were inaccurate and that the eighth decision did not even exist, the petitioner’s attorney acknowledged the same and admitted that the summaries had been secured through research on an AI tool. The court confirmed in its decision that the petitioner’s attorney confirmed that “he never took care to confirm the accuracy of the summaries or even that the decisions existed.” See McCarthy at p. 7. The court ruled that it would not consider the portion of the brief that contained the hallucinated information and issued a separate Order requiring the at fault attorney “to show cause why he should not be sanctioned for his conduct, particularly for his lack of candor to the court.”

In the separate case of Bunce v. Visual Technology Innovations, No. 2:23-CV-01740 (E.D. Pa. 2025 Kai, J.), a defense attorney admittedly utilized ChatGPT to draft his filings at issue relative to a discovery issue. The filings submitted by the defense counsel contained fake citations that could not be located on trusted resources.

The court in Bunce found violations of Fed.R.C.P. 11 and sanctioned counsel. While the court emphasized that nothing in Rule 11 prohibits use of AI in the practice of law, Rule 11 makes clear that an attorney who signs a filing is responsible for verifying the accuracy of the legal and factual claims contained within the filing.

In the case of Jakes v. Youngblood, No. 2:24-cv-1608 (W.D. Pa. June 26, 2025 Stickman, J.), the court faulted an attorney for submitting briefs with wholly fabricated quotations from case law, including fabricated quotations from this court’s own prior opinion. The court also noted that, “even more outrageously,” a review of the attorney’s reply brief filed in the same case revealed that that brief also contained fabricated quotes and misrepresented case law.

The court noted that it found it to be “very troubling” that, when accused of serious ethical violations, the attorney at fault “chose to double down.” In the end, the court noted that it viewed the attorney’s “conduct as a clear ethical violation of the highest order.” In its opinion, the court noted that the attorney at fault had filed a withdrawal of appearance.

This Pennsylvania federal court cited Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 and Pennsylvania Rule of Professional Conduct 3.3 (Candor Toward Tribunal) as confirming that attorneys have legal and ethical duties owed to the court. The court noted that, an attorney who signs and files a brief authored by a nonlawyer, such as a paralegal or an intern or a clerk, is personally responsible for all that the filing contains. In the end, the Jakes court dismissed the filings presented by the at fault attorney and ordered that attorney to show cause as to why his filings should not be viewed as having violated Rule 11 and Pa. R.P.C. 3.3.

In another Pennsylvania case involving an attorney utilizing AI hallucinations in a court filing, the court issued sanctions. In Bevins v. Colgate-Palmolive, No. 25-576 (E.D. Pa. April 10, 2025 Baylson, J.), the attorney in trouble had provided the court with case citations that were inaccurate and did not lead to any identifiable court opinions. The court noted that, based upon its research, it could not locate a case relative to the two (2) citations at issue and could not detect a possible typographical error in the citations provided.

When the court ordered the attorney to provide an explanation, the attorney asserted that the inclusion of the incorrect citations was unintended given that he planned to replace the wrong citation with a proper one but failed to do so in his final draft. The court noted its concern as to why the attorney was silent as to his act of providing the court with case citations to decisions that did not even exist and, as such, the court noted that it was “unconvinced by counsel’s explanations.”

This court also referred to Rule 11 and sanctioned the attorney. The court additionally referred the matter to the state bar, struck the attorney’s appearance in the case, thereby actually removing the attorney from the case. The court further ordered the attorney to advise the client of the sanctions and the fact that, should the Plaintiff choose to refile her case, she must find new counsel.

The above court decisions confirm that the use of unverified AI legal research in court filings could lead to serious sanctions if hallucinated citations or quotes or summaries are utilized. As one court noted, confirming the validity of one’s legal research and case citations is one of the most basic requirements that has always been present in the practice of law. The decisions on this issue confirm that the courts will rightfully take a hard stance against attorneys who submit hallucinated content to the court. Such a hard stance is required to protect the integrity of the record and the court system as a whole.

Anticipated Rules of Court on the Use of AI

With the rise of the use of AI in the practice of law, the federal and state courts have begun to take steps to promulgate rules and parameters to monitor the same.

In innovative fashion, U.S. District Court Judge Karoline Mehalchick of the Middle District of Pennsylvania crafted a civil practice order on the use of generative artificial intelligence, which appears to be the first of its kind at least in Pennsylvania.

Under that order, issued in all of Mehalchick’s civil cases, attorneys who utilize AI in the drafting of any of their court filings are required to file a certification with the court that identifies what AI platform was utilized, delineates what portion of the filing contains AI generated content, and certifies to the court that the filing attorney checked the accuracy of the AI generated content, including all references to case citations and legal authority.

In her order, Mehalchick also directs that the parties review the joint formal opinion of the Pennsylvania Bar Association and the Philadelphia Bar Association on the “Ethical Issues Regarding the Use of Artificial Intelligence.”

On the state court level, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court created the advisory committee on artificial intelligence in the Pennsylvania courts in order to monitor the use of AI in the court system. One possible recommendation that may come out of the advisory committee might be for the promulgation of a statewide rule of civil procedure on the use of AI in the practice of law, particularly with regards to court filings.

As the future continues to arrive, it is anticipated that the attorneys and judges in Pennsylvania will continue to adapt and the practice of law, hopefully, will improve as a whole.

Daniel E. Cummins is the managing attorney at Cummins Law where he focuses his practice on motor vehicle and trucking liability cases, products liability matters, and premises liability cases. He also serves as a mediator for the Federal Middle District Court and for Cummins Mediation. He is additionally the sole creator and writer of the Tort Talk Blog at www.TortTalkcom. Michael Cummins, Daniel's son, is a computer science and philosophy major at Ursinus College with a focus on researching artificial intelligence.

Reprinted with permission from the July 24, 2025 edition of the "The Pennsylvania Law Weekly © 2025 ALM Global Properties, LLC. All rights reserved. Further duplication without permission is prohibited, contact 877-256-2472 or asset-and-logo-licensing@alm.com.

Friday, December 13, 2024

ARTICLE: THE RISE OF AI AND OTHER CHANGES ABOUND IN THE LAW: A 2024 YEAR-END REVIEW

This article of mine was published in the Pennsylvania Law Weekly on December 9, 2024 and is republished here with permission.


The Rise of AI and Other Changes Abound in the Law: A 2024 Year-End Review

December 09, 2024

By Daniel E. Cummins

CUMMINS LAW



As 2024 goes into the books, here is a look back at the notable trends and decisions in Pennsylvania civil litigation over the past year.

The Advent of AI in Legal Filings


An apparent emerging trend in civil litigation practice involves counsel utilizing artificialintelligence (AI) platforms in order to draft motions and briefs to be filed with the court.

In May of this year, the Pennsylvania Bar Association and the Philadelphia Bar Association issued a joint formal opinion providing advice on the use of artificial intelligence in the legal profession.

The opinion itself notes that it is an "advisory only" opinion, that is, an opinion that is not binding on the Disciplinary Board of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court or any other court.

Generally speaking, the opinion suggests that attorneys be aware of, and competent with, the use of AI in the legal profession. The opinion recommends that all information generated through the use of AI, including citations to legal authority, be checked for accuracy and confirmed for veracity. The opinion also cautions that client confidentiality should be protected at all times when utilizing AI platforms.

In addition to the joint formal opinion by bar associations, the courts of Pennsylvania have also begun to craft parameters for the use of AI in the creation of documents to be filed with the courts.

In the federal courts of Pennsylvania, U.S. District Court Judge Karoline Mehalchick of the Middle District of Pennsylvania crafted and issued what appears to be the first civil practice order on use of generative artificial intelligence to be issued in the commonwealth.

Under this order, Mehalchick requires any party to any litigation pending before her that has utilized AI in preparation of any filing, to include with the filing a certificate of use of generative AI. In that certificate of use of generative AI, the party is required to disclose and certify the following information:

  • The specific AI tool utilized

  • Identification of the portions of the filing prepared by the AI program; and

  • Certification that a person filing the document has checked the accuracy of any portion of the document generated by AI, including all citations and legal authority


In the order, Mehalchick cautioned that failure to comply with this civil practice order could result in sanctions.

At the state court level, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has created an advisory committee on artificial intelligence in the Pennsylvania courts. That committee was created to propose appropriate statewide rules to provide guidance to counsel on the use of AI with filings in the state court systems.

Rather than utilizing a time consuming committee possibly bound by red tape, one may wonder why the Pennsylvania Supreme Court does not just simply ask an AI platform to craft such rules and then determine if those AI-generated rules meet the satisfaction of the Court.


Regular Use Exclusion Upheld as Valid and Enforceable


Back on Jan. 29, 2024, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court issued its long-awaited, much anticipated decision in the regular use exclusion case of Rush v. Erie Insurance Exchange, 308 A.3d 780, and, in the process, showed moderation with respect to its previous trend of favoring plaintiffs’ causes.

In Rush, much to the surprise of some,the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled that, as presented in this case, the regular use exclusion contained in motor vehicle insurance policies did not violate the express language of Pennsylvania's Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (MVFRL).

The plaintiff in Rush was a police officer who was injured in a motor vehicle accident while driving his police vehicle. The plaintiff recovered the liability limits from the tortfeasor's policy and the UIM limits on the police vehicle. The plaintiff then sought to obtain additional compensation from the Erie Insurance policies that covered his own personal vehicles at home. Erie Insurance relied upon a regular use exclusion contained in the policy to deny coverage on the UIM claim.

Generally speaking, the regular use exclusion is a standard provision in automobile insurance policies that precludes coverage for injuries sustained by an insured who, at the time of the accident, was in a vehicle that the insured did not own but which vehicle, unbeknownst to the insurance company, was regularly available for the insured’s use. The inclusion protects the carrier from having to provide coverage for risks that the insured did not pay a premium for protection against. In other words, the exclusion upholds the all-American principle that you cannot get something (coverage) for nothing.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the erroneous decisions of the trial court and the Superior Court in this Rush case and thereby upheld the validity and enforceability of the regular use exclusion. In so ruling, the Supreme Court rejected the plaintiff's unduly expansive argument that UIM coverage must be provided in all circumstances regardless of which vehicle the injured party was located in at the time of the accident. The court noted that, to accept such an argument, would render all insurance policy exclusions invalid.

The Supreme Court also rejected the plaintiff's reliance upon the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's previous decision in Gallagher v. GEICO for the proposition that the regular use exclusion should be eradicated across the board just as the Household Exclusion had been eradicated in Gallagher as allowing for a de facto waiver of stacked coverage when the MVFRL requires carriers to secure a written waiver of coverage from its insureds.

In this Rush case, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court once again confirmed that it had previously clarified and narrowly limited its erroneously overly broad opinion in Gallagher case in the court’s more recent decision in the case of Erie Insurance Exchange v. Mione.  

The Supreme Court in Rush specifically held that the regular use exclusion remained a permissible limitation of UIM coverage within the parameters of the MVFRL. The court confirmed that, "with decades of reliance by insureds and insurers, and no justification to allow this court to depart from decades of established law," the court would maintain its continued course on this issue of upholding the validity of the regular use exclusion "unless and until the General Assembly or the Insurance Department acts in a way that would suggest we do otherwise." 


Service of Process


In the spring of this past year, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court also provided its latest guidance on the issue of proper and timely service of process in civil litigation matters.

In the case of Ferraro v. Patterson-Erie, 313 A.3d 987 (Pa. April 25, 2024), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court addressed service of process issues in a slip and fall case. According to the opinion, the plaintiff slipped and fell at a Burger King and, thereafter, filed a negligence lawsuit against the operators of the restaurant.

The plaintiff filed her complaint within the two-year statute of limitations. However, the plaintiff encountered difficulties with serving the complaint on the defendants due to issues with the Sheriff’s unsuccessful attempts at service during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The plaintiff eventually served the complaint on the defendant through the separate means of a private process server. Such service was not in accordance with the mandates of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires service on in-state defendants by a Sheriff’s Department. As such, the plaintiff later reinstated the complaint and then served it through the Sheriff. However, this service by the Sheriff occurred after the statute of limitations period had elapsed.

The defendants argued that the action was barred by the statute of limitations because the plaintiff did not make a good faith effort to serve them in a timely manner.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the plaintiff had failed to meet her burden of demonstrating that she made a good faith effort in diligently and timely serving process on the defendants. Accordingly, the Supreme Court found that the defendants’ informal receipt of actual notice was irrelevant to the analysis.

The court emphasized that the plaintiffs are not permitted to opt out of the Rules of Civil Procedure regarding service in order to give notice of the commencement of a lawsuit by way of informal means. As such, the plaintiff’s case was dismissed due to the lack of timely, proper service of the lawsuit upon the defendant.

Justice David Wecht's dissenting opinion in this case provides an excellent and thorough overview of the current jurisprudence in Pennsylvania on the requirements relative to proper service of process and the uncertainties related thereto. Wecht also proposed ways to provide clarity on this area of law going forward.


Punitive and Treble Damages

In the case of Dwyer v. Ameriprise Financial, 313 A.3d 969 (Pa. April 25, 2024), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, showing that it still had a penchant for favoring plaintiffs’ causes, held that a trial court may, under the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law (UTPCPL), award both punitive damages and treble damages.

This case involved plaintiffs who sued Ameriprise Financial for negligent and fraudulent misrepresentation relative to a life insurance policy. The plaintiffs alleged that the carrier misrepresented to them that their quarterly premium payments would remain the same for the life of the policy. In reality, if the plaintiff’s premium payment had remained the same, the policy allegedly would have lapsed for insufficient funds in 2020.

The trial court found Ameriprise guilty of violating Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law and awarded compensatory damages. The trial court declined to award treble damages under the UTPCPL under a rationale that such damages would be duplicative of the punitive damages that were awarded by the jury on the common law claims. The Pennsylvania Superior Court had affirmed this decision.

Going up to the appellate ladder to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, that court reversed and held that treble damages under the UTPCPL are to be considered a separate, additional remedy available to the plaintiffs and must be considered by the trial court without regard to a punitive damages award that may be awarded in the same case on related common law claims.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted that nullifying the availability of a statutory award because of an entitlement to a common law award was not a permissible exercise of discretion by the trial court. Accordingly, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s decision and remanded the case back down to the trial court for reconsideration of the appropriate amount of damages under the UTPCPL.


Plaintiff Must Answer Questions at IME or DME


Another recurring issue that typically arises in personal injury civil litigation matters is the extent to which a plaintiff may refuse to answer questions posed to the plaintiff by a doctor at a medical examination arranged by the defense in accordance with Pa.R.C.P. 4010.

Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure sets out the parameters for examinations in personal injury matters arranged by the defense which are typically called independent medical examinations (IMEs) by the defense and defense medical examinations (DMEs) by plaintiffs counsel.

In the Monroe County case of Nelson v. Wilkins, No. 1381-CV-2022 (C.P. Monroe Co. Jan. 26, 2024 C. Daniel Higgins, Jr., J.) from earlier this year, the court granted a defendant’s motion to compel a plaintiff to provide information to the IME doctor during an independent medical examination of a plaintiff in a case arising out of a motor vehicle accident.

According to this decision, the plaintiff had appeared for an examination but refused to answer the IME doctor’s questions, asserting that the questions were allegedly outside the scope of Pa. R.C.P. 4010 about the occurrence of the accident that led to the plaintiff’s alleged injuries.

Judge C. Daniel Higgins Jr. of Monroe County noted that Rule 4010 provides that the examiner is limited to inquiring into matters regarding the facts of liability that were germane to the issue of damages. Rule 4010 itself provides that “the examiner's oral interrogation of the person to be examined shall be limited to matters specifically relevant to the scope of the examination.”

The court found that the plaintiff’s attorney’s position that the IME doctor should not ask questions regarding the history of the accident that could relate to liability and the plaintiff’s argument that the doctor could avoid the problem by reviewing depositions, police reports, Interrogatories, and other discovery materials “was untenable” because it placed too high of a burden on the examining doctor.

In granting the defendant’s motion to compel in this regard, the court ordered that the plaintiff was required to cooperate and answer the questions of the examining doctor. The court noted that, as set forth under Rule 4010, the plaintiff could have her counsel or other representative present during the examination.


Use of Exhibits in Opening Statements


A common dispute at civil litigation trials is the extent to which one party or the other may utilize demonstrative exhibits during the course of opening statements. Typically, trial court judges have punted on the issues and have stated that such exhibits will only be permitted during opening statements if the attorneys have agreed on the same.

In what appears to be the first detailed opinion of its kind, Judge Terrence R. Nealon of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas addressed the recurring issue of whether a party may utilize demonstrative exhibits during an opening statement in the case of Webb v. Scranton Quincy Hospital, No. 2021-CV-4073 (Lacka. Co. March 8, 2024 Nealon, J.). In this decision, Nealon provided a thorough analysis of the law applicable to the reference to admissible evidence during the course of an opening statement.

In this medical malpractice case, the plaintiff filed a motion in limine seeking leave of court to utilize admissible excerpts of videotaped depositions of certain witnesses during the course of the opening Statement to be presented by plaintiff’s counsel.

As confirmed by Nealon's opinion, there is a dearth of precedent on this common issue.

After reviewing the sparse law on the issue, Nealon noted that the reference and showing of admissible evidence during the course of an opening statement can be permitted by a trial court judge under the broad discretionary powers of judges to run trials that occur before them.

On the basis of that general law, Nealon ruled that, since the video deposition testimony of the parties, their officers, directors, managing agents, any designated witnesses, and any nonparty medical witnesses and expert witnesses “may be used against any party” at trial “for any purpose” pursuant to Pa. R.C.P. 4017.1(g) and 4020(a)(2) and (5), then “any part or all” of those video depositions of those types of witnesses may be shown to the jury during an Opening Statement to the extent that those excerpts from the video depositions would be admissible at the trial.

The court otherwise ordered the plaintiff to identify which portions of what video deposition they intended to utilize during the course of the opening statement so that the opposing party could argue any reserved evidentiary objections to those excerpts so that any required rulings on admissibility could be made prior to the opening statement.

Hills and Ridges Doctrine


The Hills and Ridges Doctrine is a doctrine that applies in wintry slip and fall cases and generally provides that a landowner cannot be held liable unless the plaintiff can establish that the owner had allowed ice or snow on the property to unreasonably accumulate over time into ridges and elevations.

Over the past year, one court addressed the issue of whether the Hills and Ridges Doctrine should be applied where a plaintiff fell in an area that was covered by an awning or a canopy.

In the case of Johnson v. Harris-Dent, No. 23-00,097 (C.P. Lyc. Co. July 8, 2024 Linhardt, J.), Judge Eric R. Linhardt denied a motion for summary judgment in a slip and fall case that occurred when the plaintiff allegedly slipped on alleged black ice that was allegedly located on the top step of a homeowner's porch that was covered by an awning.

The court denied the motion based upon issues of fact. In this case, Linhardt relied upon the case of Heasley v. Carter Lumber, 843 A.2d 1274 (Pa. Super. 2004), for the proposition that the Hills and Ridges Doctrine is not applicable where the incident occurred in an area that was covered by an awning.

Lindhart noted that, in the Heasley case, the plaintiff’s slip and fall occurred while the plaintiff was walking in a shed that had three walls, with the fourth side open. The shed had an overhead roof with an awning extending from it. In that case, the Pennsylvania Superior Court held that the Hills and Ridges Doctrine did not apply to a fall occurring inside an outdoor storage shed.

In the Heasley case, the court reasoned that the Hills and Ridges Doctrine was intended to protect property owners from an undue burden of ensuring that open spaces such as sidewalks and parking lots are constantly kept clear of snow and ice. The court in Heasley found that the defendant did not present anything that demonstrated that keeping a structure, which is only partially open to the elements, free of snow and ice presented any burden at all, let alone an undue burden on its owners. The Heasley court also indicated that the extension of the Hills and Ridges doctrine to structures and/or other partially opened areas would raise many difficult questions. As such, the Pennsylvania Superior Court in the Heasley case declined to extend the application of the Hills and Ridges Doctrine to an incident that occurred in a structure covered by a roof and/or an awning.

Linhardt applied the rationale of the Heasley case to this Johnson case in which the plaintiff alleged that he fell on black ice on the top step of the defendant’s covered porch which step was allegedly covered by an awning. Linhardt noted that, under the current status of Pennsylvania law, if that allegation was proven, then it appeared that the Hills and Ridges Doctrine would not be applicable to this litigation. The court therefore found that genuine issues of material fact must be resolved by the jury in this regard and that, as such, the defendant’s motion for summary judgment was denied by the court.

Certificates of Merit in Medical Malpractice Cases


Over the past year, there were a couple of decisions of note that came down regarding certificates of merit that are required in medical malpractice cases in Pennsylvania.

In the case of Rightmyer v. Philly Pregnancy Center, No. 23-1925 (E.D. Pa. March 1, 2024 Quinones Alejandro, J.), the court granted a defendant’s motion to dismiss after confirming that the certificate of merit requirements for medical malpractice claims under Pennsylvania state law also applied in federal court proceedings. In this case, the court also held that a nurse is not qualified to execute a required Pennsylvania certificate of merit in a medical malpractice action against a medical doctor.

In the separate case of Berk v. Rothman Institute Orthopedic Foundation, No. 23-1437 (E.D. Pa. March 28, 2024 Murphy, J.), the court addressed the extent to which a plaintiff could attempt to compel one of the plaintiff’s own doctors to write a certificate of merit to enable the plaintiff to pursue a claim against another medical provider in a medical malpractice action.

In Berk, the plaintiff sued his own doctors who declined to give him certificates of merit to allow the plaintiff to pursue a medical malpractice claim against other doctors. The plaintiff sought to compel his own doctors to provide him with the necessary certificates of merit.

The court granted the doctors' motion to dismiss after finding that treating physicians do not owe their patients any fiduciary duty to provide them with a Certificate of Merit that would allow the patient to sue other doctors for medical malpractice. The rationale for this decision was, in part, the general rule that potential experts may not be compelled to issue expert opinions against their will.

The court otherwise found that there is no valid cause of action for an alleged intentional deprivation of legal recourse for an alleged injury.

2024 National Champion


As this year comes to an end, here’s one last tip of the hat to the 2024 Abington Heights Mock Trial Team from Clarks Summit, Pennsylvania (near Scranton) for their incredible run during which they became the first team from Pennsylvania in the 40-year history of the competition to win the National High School Mock Trial Championship, essentially beating out over 2,300 teams from all across the nation.

Looking Ahead


In terms of looking ahead for anticipated notable decisions in 2025, keep an eye out for a decision from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court on the parameters of the doctrine of forum non conveniens in the case of Tranter v. Z & D Tour. Also keep an eye out for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to possibly issue statewide rules governing the use of AI platforms in the drafting of court filings. Here’s to hoping that 2025 brings a year of zealous but civil litigation.


Daniel E. Cummins is the managing partner of the Clarks Summit law firm of Cummins Law, a civil litigation practice. He also conducts mediations of civil litigation matters through Cummins Mediation Services. Cummins is also the sole creator and writer of the Tort Talk Blog (www.TortTalk.com), which is designed to provide continuing updates on important cases and trends in Pennsylvania civil litigation law. He can be reached at dancummins@cumminslaw.net.


Reprinted with permission from the July 26, 2024 edition of the Pennsylvania Law Weekly (c) 2024 ALM Global Properties, LLC.  All rights reserved.  Further duplication without permission is prohibited, contact 877-256-2472 or asset-and-logo-licensing@alm.com.

Friday, November 1, 2024

Federal Court Addresses Products Liability Claims Involving a Medical Device


In the case of Ford v. St. Jude Medical, LLC, No. 3:21-CV-01765 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 23, 2024 Mehalchick, J.), the court granted in part and denied in part the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss.

The case involved allegations that the Plaintiff fell when his pacemaker device failed.  

The court ruled that Pennsylvania law does not permit strict liability claims in prescription medical product liability litigation against medical device manufacturers. This prohibition includes strict liability design and manufacturing claims.

Judge Mehalchick additionally ruled that the Plaintiff’s claims of an implied warranty based upon different or additional Pennsylvania medical device standards were preempted. The court additionally noted that, even if these claims were not preempted, such claims would also be barred by the Restatement of Torts (Second) §402a, comment k.

Judge Mehalchick additionally ruled that a loss of consortium claim cannot be based on a contractual claim for breach of an express warranty.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.  The Court's companion Order can be viewed at this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney James M. Beck of the Philadelphia office of Reed Smith law firm for bringing this case to my attention.

Tuesday, October 15, 2024

Judge Mehalchick of Federal Middle District Addresses Definition of Resident Relative


In the case of Barna v. Progressive Ins. Co., No. 3:22-CV-01845-KM (M.D. Pa. Sept. 11, 2024 Mehalchick, J.), the court addressed a summary judgment filed by Defendant, State Farm, in a UIM case.

The Plaintiff claimed that State Farm wrongfully denied underinsured benefits that he was allegedly entitled to under his parents’ insurance policies.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff was involved in a motor vehicle accident while driving his father’s vehicle.

Due to the alleged severity of the Plaintiff’s injuries, the Plaintiff alleged that the liability coverage available to the at-fault driver and the coverage available on the vehicle that the Plaintiff was driving were insufficient to cover the Plaintiff’s damages. As such, the Plaintiff was also seeking to recover UIM benefits under policies issued to his stepfather and his mother, all of which policies were issued by State Farm.

A central issue in this case is whether the injured party was a “resident relative” under either policy issued by State Farm to the Plaintiff’s stepfather or his mother.

In her thorough Opinion, Judge Mehalchick reviewed the various definitions of the word “resident.” Judge Mehalchick also referred to Third Circuit precedent in which that court referred to Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary to define that a person lives in a location as a resident when they occupy a home on a permanent basis.

Judge Mehalchick also noted that the federal courts have held that, if a resident relative moves out of an insured’s home, they lose the residency status, unless they move back to live with the insured under the policy on a full-time basis. 

The court noted that a “resident relative” who moves out of an insured’s home loses resident relative status except in limited circumstances, such as when the person leaves the home to go to school or on an extended vacation. 

After reviewing the record before her relative to the injured party’s association with his parents’ residence, the court found that no reasonable juror could find that the injured party had lived at his stepfather’s and mother’s residence as of the time of the incident. Accordingly, the injured party was found not to be a resident relative under the State Farm policies at issue. As such, State Farm’s Motion for Summary Judgment was granted.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.