Showing posts with label Judge Leeson. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Judge Leeson. Show all posts

Thursday, September 12, 2024

Lessons In Federal Court Complaint Drafting


In the case of Fike v. Global Pharma Healthcare Private, Ltd., No. 5:23-CV-2981 (E.D. Pa. July 18, 2024 Leeson, J.), the court granted in part and denied in part a Motion to Dismiss filed by Amazon in a products liability case.

In his decision, Judge Leeson ruled that the Complaint was sufficiently pled so as to avoid dismissal under an argument of a shotgun pleading. However, the court noted that the allegations against “Defendants” were improperly grouped together.

The court also struck the Plaintiff’s claims alleging a post-sale duty to recall in this products liability case since no such claim is recognized under Pennsylvania law.

The court additionally ruled that shippers or distributors of products do not owe a duty of inspection or investigation into the products that they ship on to customers.

In this case, the court noted that the risk of a bacterial contamination from the product at issue was not foreseeable as to impose a duty upon the shipper. Imposing such an inspection duty on a shipper could hamper the shipper’s ability to distribute and ship products, which is an extremely socially useful service provided to the public at large.

The court additionally struck the punitive damages claim alleged by finding that punitive damages allegations cannot be based on allegations presented “on information and belief.”

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.  The Court's companion Order can be viewed HERE.


I send thanks to Attorney James M. Beck of the Reed Smith law firm in Philadelphia for bringing this case to my attention.

Source of image:  Photo by Christian Wiediger on www.unsplash.com.

Thursday, October 20, 2022

Slip and Fall Case Against Store Dismissed, But Allowed To Proceed Against Realty Company


In the case of Pukanecz v. Target Corp., No. 5:22-CV-00327 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 1, 2022 Leeson, J.), the court granted a Defendant store’s Motion for Summary Judgment in a slip and fall case but denied a similar Motion filed by a realty company.

According to the Opinion, Plaintiff slipped in the store parking lot.

The Plaintiff sued the store, a realty company whose subsidiary owned the shopping center where the store was located. That subsidiary had contracted with a snow and ice removal contractor.

In this case, the Defendant store and the realty company moved for summary judgment.

The court found that no reasonable jury could find that the store had a duty to maintain the parking lot. More specifically, the terms of the store’s lease agreement required the landlord to maintain, repair, and operate the common elements, which were defined to include all parking areas.

The realty company argued that it did not own the property and was not liable for events that occurred on it. The realty company attempted to assert that any ownership liability lay with the subsidiary to whom the property was deeded. The Plaintiff countered with an argument that the realty company was directly liable for virtue of its direct involvement with an operation of the property.

The court found that there were genuine issues of material fact as to liability in this regard. As support for this finding, the court noted, in part, that the contract for the snow and ice removal referred, in multiple instances, to both the realty company as well as the subsidiary. That contract also required the snow removal company to indemnify the realty company against certain losses.

As such, the Court granted the Defendant store's Motion for Summary Judgment, finding that the store itself owed no duty to the Plaintiff.  Accordingly, Target was dismissed from the case.  

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.  The Court's companion Order can be viewed HERE


Source: “Digest of Recent Opinions.” Pennsylvania Law Weekly (Sept. 27, 2022).


Source of above image:  Photo by Joshua on www.pexels.com.



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Thursday, August 25, 2022

Federal Court Confirms That There is No Recognized Cause of Action for Spoliation of Evidence But...



In the case of Atlantic States Ins. Co. v. Copart, Inc., No. 5:22-CV-1177 (E.D. Pa. June 30, 2022 Leeson, J.), the court denied in part, the Plaintiff insurance company’s Motion for Summary Judgment on a claim of a breach of duty on the part of Copart to preserve a vehicle.

In this matter, a worker's compensation carrier, had paid over a million dollars to compensate an injured employee.  The employee had been involved in an accident while driving a Mack truck.  By way of subrogation, the compensation carrier brought suit against several alleged tortfeasor to recover the monies the carrier had paid out to the injured employee.

The truck at issue had been sold by Copart before the compensation carrier could complete an expert inspection of the vehicle.   As such, the carrier had to discontinue its action against the tortfeasors.

The carrier then sued Copart for the damages the carrier suffered from having to discontinue the action against the tortfeasors.  The Defendant responded with a Motion to Dismiss.  

The court noted that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not recognized a cause of action for negligent spoliation of evidence.

However, Judge Leeson held that, while Pennsylvania law does not impose on third parties a duty to preserve evidence, the Plaintiff could still have a cause of action for negligence generally if the court found that another duty, either contractual or otherwise, to maintain the truck involved in the accident was implicated by the facts of the case.

As such, the court denied, in part, the Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment on this basis in this matter.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: “Digest of Recent Opinions.” Pennsylvania Law Weekly (July 21, 2022).




Friday, December 3, 2021

Slip and Fall Complaint Dismissed Where Sole Factual Allegation Was That "There Must Have Been a Substance" Which Caused Plaintiff To Fall


In the case of Staiger v. Weis Markets, Inc., No. 5:21-CV-03709 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 2, 2021 Leeson, J.), the court granted a Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss a Plaintiff’s slip and fall action where the court found that the Plaintiff failed to allege facts that would plausibly support a claim that a dangerous condition was the cause of the Plaintiff’s fall.  Leave to file an Amended Complaint was granted.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff allegedly slipped and fall in the supermarket while shopping. The Plaintiff asserted that she believed that some substance on the floor in an aisle of the store caused her to fall.

The court noted that the Plaintiff’s Complaint largely relied upon legal conclusions to suggest the existence of a dangerous condition.

The lone factual allegation found in the Complaint was that “as [the Plaintiff] has no medical conditions, [the Plaintiff] believes and avers that there must have been a substance in the aisle which caused her to fall.”

Judge Joseph F. Leeson
Eastern Federal District Court of PA


Judge Leeson noted that a well-settled maxim of law is that the mere fact that an accident occurred does not give rise to any inference that any injury occurred as a result of any negligence on the part of another person.

Although the Complaint was dismissed, the Plaintiff was granted the opportunity to attempt to file an appropriate Amended Complaint.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.  The companion Order can be viewed HERE.



Source: “Digest of Recent Opinions.” Pennsylvania Law Weekly (Nov. 23, 2021).

Source of top photo: Photo by Eduardo Soares on Unsplash.com.

Tuesday, August 31, 2021

UIM Rejection Form for Commercial Auto Policy Found Valid


In the case of Eberly v. Firemen’s Ins. Co. of Washington, D.C., No. 5:20-CV-05471 (E.D. Pa. July 13, 2021 Leeson, J.), Judge Joseph Leeson of the Eastern District Federal Court granted a Defendant carrier’s Motion to Dismiss in a UIM case.

This matter involved a commercial auto policy.  The Plaintiff challenged the UIM rejection form on the basis that the document did not contain a policy number and because the document did not indicate the authority of the signatory to execute the document on behalf of the commercial insured.     

The court found that the form executed by the Plaintiff rejecting equal UIM coverage under a commercial automobile insurance policy was valid where that form was signed by the corporate insured’s owner, who was the only individual who had ever acted as a signatory for the company. 

The court also found the form to be valid where the relevant policy number was listed in an attached schedule to the coverage forms.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.  The companion Order can be viewed HERE.


Source: “Digest of Recent Opinions.” Pennsylvania Law Weekly (July 29, 2021).

Source of image: Photo by Andrea Piacquadio from Pexels.com.

Friday, July 9, 2021

Another Covid-19 Related Claim for Business Interruption Coverage Dismissed


In the case of Star Buick v. Sentry Ins., No. 5:20-CV-03023 (E.D. Pa. May 26, 2021 Leeson, J.), the court entered a declaratory judgment for the carrier after finding that the insurance policy providing coverage for direct physical loss, which phrase was not defined in the policy, did not provide coverage for loss of business income to an auto dealership due to the suspension of business operations during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court additionally found that the civil authority provision in all-risks policy did not provide coverage to the auto dealership given that the business was not denied access to the property as a result of damage sustained to another property.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.  The companion Order can be viewed HERE.


Source: “Court Summaries” by Timothy L. Clawges, Pennsylvania Bar News (June 28, 2021).


Source of image:  Photo by Kaique Rocha from Pexels.com

Monday, May 10, 2021

Judge Leeson of Eastern District Court Confirms No Direct Claim of Liability Against Trucking Company Recognized in Certain Cases




In the case of Carson v. Tucker, No. 5:20-CV-00399 (E.D. Pa. March 30, 2021 Leeson, J.), Judge Joseph F. Leeson, Jr. of the Eastern District Federal Court granted a Defendant trucking company’s Partial Motion for Summary Judgment.

This case arose out of a motor vehicle accident involving two (2) tractor trailers.

In the Motion before the court, the trucking Defendant’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment was being considered in a case where the Plaintiff filed negligence claims including both vicarious liability and direct liability claims. 

The trucking Defendants sought summary judgment only on the direct liability claims.

Judge Leeson noted that, under Pennsylvania law, in addition to vicarious liability for that actions of its employees, a corporation may also be subject to direct liability for a negligent entrustment, instruction, supervision, monitoring and hiring of its employees. 

However, Judge Leeson noted that, under the standard “nearly universally adopted” by federal district courts applying Pennsylvania law, a Plaintiff’s direct liability claim against the Defendant driver’s trucking company employer could not survive where the employer had admitted an agency relationship with the driver and where the Plaintiff did not have a viable claim for punitive damages. 

The court found that the Plaintiff’s claim of direct liability against the trucking company therefore failed as a matter of law under the circumstances presented in this case.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: “Digest of Recent Opinions.” Pennsylvania Law Weekly (April 15, 2021).

Tuesday, September 15, 2020

Discovery Rule/Statute of Limitations Applied in Products Case



In the case of Kennedy v. Ethicon, Inc., No. 5:20-CV-00185 (E.D. Pa. July 20, 2020 Leeson, J.), the court granted a Defendant’s summary judgment under the two (2) year statute of limitations and after an application and review of the discovery rule.   The case involved a pelvic mesh products liability action.

The court noted that Pennsylvania’s discovery rule tolls the statue of limitations only until an injury is discoverable and can be linked to another person’s conduct.

Judge Leeson noted that the discovery rule is objective and requires that a Plaintiff exercise reasonable diligence in pursuing a claim.

In this matter, it was indicated that the Plaintiff had first learned that her new and unusual pain was caused by something associated with the Defendant’s product more than two (2), and possibly more than four (4), years before she filed suit.  According to the record before the court, the Plaintiff’s treating doctor’s diagnosis had linked the Plaintiff’s injuries to the product.  Given the Court's finding that the Plaintiff had failed to act timely in filing the claim, the case was dismissed.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.  The companion Order can be viewed HERE.

I send thanks to Attorney James M. Beck of the Philadelphia office of the Reed Smith law firm for bringing this case to my attention.

Friday, August 7, 2020

Allegations of Recklessness Stricken in Federal Court Trucking Accident Case Where No Outrageous Facts Pled



In the trucking accident case of Carson v. Tucker, No. 5:20-CV-00399 (E.D. Pa. July 16, 2020 Leeson, J.), the Court granted the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Plaintiff’s claims of punitive damages and the defense's Motion to Strike the references to “gross,” “wanton,” and “reckless” throughout the Complaint where the Plaintiff could not factually justify the allegation of those terms. 

According to the Opinion, the accident involved one (1) tractor trailer rear-ending another tractor trailer, resulting in alleged injuries to the Plaintiff-tractor trailer driver. 

It is noted that the court previously granted the defense motion with respect to the Plaintiff’s original Complaint and allowed the Plaintiff the opportunity to amend. The case then came back to the court on similar objections to the Amended Complaint. 

The Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss under 12(b)(6). While the court agreed to review their Motion to Dismiss the punitive damages claims under this standard, the court noted that the more proper standard to review the Defendant’s request to dismiss the allegations of gross, wanton, and reckless conduct throughout the Complaint would be under a Rule 12(f) Motion to Strike rather than a Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). 

After applying those applicable standard of review and after reviewing the requirements to pursue a punitive damages claim under Pennsylvania law, the court granted the Motions at issue. 

Judge Leeson reviewed the facts of numerous cases in which punitive damages were permitted to proceed against a tractor trailer defendant engaging in outrageous conduct or conduct confirming reckless indifference to the safety of others.  The court noted that, in this matter, simple allegations limited only to the Defendant allegedly failing to comply with traffic laws were not sufficient to support a claim for punitive damages. 

The court dismissed a claim for punitive damages in this case after finding that the Plaintiff did not plead facts sufficient to show that the Defendant tractor trailer driver’s actions were “outrageous enough to warrant punitive damages.” The court also found that the Plaintiff’s claims or conclusory and did not satisfy the requirement of asserting something more than mere negligence to support the claims.

The court also noted that the Plaintiff did not pled any facts to sufficiently illustrate that the Defendant driver had the necessary mental state of either intent or reckless indifference to justify the claim for punitive damages. 

With regards to the claims of gross, wanton, and reckless conduct, the court ruled that, since the punitive damages claims were dismissed, such terms became immaterial and had no essential or important relationship to other claims for the relief alleged. As such, the Motion to Strike was granted. 

With this ruling, it appears that this Eastern Federal District Court follows the line of those decisions that require sufficient facts to be pled in order to assert a claim for recklessness in a Complaint and not under that line of cases that allows recklessness to be pled in any case whatsoever regardless of the facts alleged.

Anyone wishing to review this decision  may click this LINK.
 

I send thanks to Attorney James DeCinti, Esquire of the Harrisburg, PA office of the Pion, Nerone, Girman, Winslow & Smith, P.C. law firm for bringing this case to my attention.


For more cases on outlining the issue regarding allegations of recklessness in a tort Complaint, please go to www.torttalk.com, scroll down the right hand column until you get to the “Labels” section, and then scroll down alphabetically to the label for “Allegations of Recklessness” and click on that to get to all of the Tort Talk posts on this issue.

Wednesday, June 3, 2020

Judge Leeson of Eastern District Court Provides Lessons in Complaint Drafting



In the case of Carson v. Tucker, No. 5:20-CV-00399 (E.D. Pa. April 23, 2020 Leeson, J.), Judge Joseph Leeson provided lessons in Complaint drafting in his decision in which he granted a Motion for a More Definite Statement in a Complaint and also granted a Partial Motion to Dismiss in a tractor trailer accident case. 

Judge Leeson noted that vague and sweeping allegations of negligence that “include but are not limited to” multiple theories, must be made more specific. 

The court also noted that allegations with respect to “negligence that may be ascertained during discovery” must also be made more specific. Specific acts and supporting facts must be alleged in any negligence claim to pass muster.

The court additionally ruled that references by the Plaintiff to violations of unspecified statutes, ordinances, and rules must be made more specific. Judge Leeson held that allegations that a Defendant violated the law, without more, does not support a claim for punitive damages. 

Given that the court dismissed the punitive damages claims for failing to properly plead the same, other conclusory adjectives contained in the Complaint such as “gross,” “wanton,” and “reckless” were stricken.  
Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.  The companion Order of the Court can be viewed HERE.

I send thanks to Attorney James M. Beck of the Philadelphia office of the Reed Smith law firm for bringing this case to my attention.

Wednesday, April 3, 2019

Judge Leeson of Eastern Federal District Court Gives Lessons on Bad Faith Pleadings


In the case of Krantz v. Peerless Insurance Company, No. 18-CV-3450, 2019 WL 1123750 (E.D. Pa. March 11, 2019 Leeson, Jr., J.), the court granted a Motion to Dismiss a bad faith claim in a UIM case and then remanded the matter back to state court.

In this case, the UIM Plaintiff argued that the insurer improperly interpreted the policy in refusing to pay full policy limits.   The Complaint alleged that the carrier relied upon an invalid and unlawful set-off provision in withholding a substantial amount of the policy limits.  

However, the court found that the Plaintiff failed to plead facts to show that this set-off provision was invalid, “or, more importantly, that [the carrier] knew or should have known that it was denying the full amount of benefits based on an invalid provision.”  

The court also found additional allegations in the Complaint to be conclusory and lacking in other supporting factual allegations to make the averments plausible under the pleading requirements in federal court.   For example, the court faulted the following allegations:

(1)        The insurer did not make any good faith offers to settle despite repeated demands;
(2)        The insurer “failed to objectively and fairly evaluate his claim”;
(3)        The insurer “failed to promptly tender payment of the fair value of the claim”; and,
(4)        The insurer failed to reasonable investigate the claim.

The court concluded that the Plaintiff’s cursory allegations generally asserted that the carrier lacked the reasonable basis for denying the Plaintiff’s claim for benefits, “but do not provide any factual allegations from which the Court could make a plausible inference that Defendant knew or recklessly disregarded its lack of a reasonable basis for denying benefits.”  

After dismissing the bad faith count, the court found the Plaintiff’s claims no longer exceeded $75,000.00 and, as such, the court remanded the case to the Lancaster County Court of Common Pleas.  

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this case may click this LINK.

I send thanks to Attorney Lee Applebaum of the Philadelphia law firm of Fineman, Krekstein & Harris.   This case was found on Attorney Applebaum excellent Pennsylvania and New Jersey Insurance Bad Faith Case Law blog.  



Tuesday, September 18, 2018

PA Eastern Federal District Court Finds Long Arm Statute for Personal Jurisdiction Not Abrogated



In the case of Allstate Insurance Company v. Electrolux Home Products, Inc., No. 5:18-00699(E.D. Pa. Aug. 3, 2018 Leeson, J.), the court granted a Motion to Sever and Transfer a portion of the case.

The court ruled that the Plaintiff’s Complaint, joining together 86 separate subrogated incidents from many different states, could not stand before the Eastern District Federal Court.  

This decision is notable in that the court reaffirmed the rule that registration to do business in Pennsylvania, without more, is sufficient to establish general personal jurisdiction over a corporate Defendant.

Judge Leeson also reaffirmed the precedent holding that cases interpreting the Pennsylvania long arm statute in this regard have not be abrogated by more recent United States Supreme Court precedent.  

Relative to the claims in this matter, which arose under different states’ laws, the court felt that the claims should be severed.   After severance, the cases are considered to be separate cases, and many of them in this matter were found to fail to satisfy the diversity amount in controversy requirement, which necessitated the dismissal of those claims.   The remaining valid non-Pennsylvania cases  were ordered to be transferred to a more appropriate forum. 

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this case may click this LINK.  The Court's Order can be viewed HERE

I send thanks to Attorney James M. Beck of the Philadelphia office of the Reed Smith law firm for bringing this case to my attention.

Tuesday, July 3, 2018

Summary Judgment Granted in Fall From Ladder Products Liability Case


In the case of White v. The Home Depot, Inc., No. 5:17-cv-4174 (E.D. Pa. May 10, 2018 Leeson, Jr., J.), the court granted Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment in Plaintiff’s action for strict liability, negligence, and breach of warranty due to the Plaintiff’s fall off of a ladder while painting his bathroom. 

According to the Opinion, the Defendants contended that the Plaintiff tried to move the ladder while still standing on it.   It was the Plaintiff’s contrary assertion that he did not feel the ladder move before he fell and that he did not know what happened.  

The court noted that the Plaintiff did not allege that there was any mechanically wrong with the ladder, its structure or its design.  

As part of these proceedings, the Defendants moved to exclude the testimony of the Plaintiff’s experts opining that the warnings on the ladder were inadequate.  The court found that this expert testimony was inadmissible because it did not satisfy the reliability and fit requirements.   According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff’s expert did not inspect the ladder or the bathroom floor, did not conduct any witness interviews, and did not reconstruct the accident or even perform any test on the ladder.  

Accordingly, the court held that the Plaintiffs’ claims failed because no reasonable jury could conclude that the ladder was defective.   To the contrary, the court stated that the Defendants did warn of the dangers of the ladder slipping on the surface below and that the Plaintiff knew or that warning.  As the Plaintiff never testified as to any additional warnings he felt that he needed with respect to the ladder and otherwise failed to explain while the general warning not to set the ladder on a loose or slippery surface was inadequate, the court entered summary judgment.  

To review this decision, click this LINK.

Tuesday, March 29, 2016

Eastern Federal District Court Addresses Addresses Motion to Stay/Discovery Issues in Post-Koken Bad Faith Context

In the case of the post-Koken case of Wagner v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 5:14-cv-07326 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 19, 2016 Leeson, J.), Judge Joseph Leeson of the Federal Eastern District Court of Pennsylvania refused the UIM carrier’s effort to stay the Plaintiff’s bad faith claim but, in the end, rejected most of the insured’s bad faith discovery requests.  

According to the Opinion, the UIM carrier’s primary argument in favor of its request for a stay on bad faith discovery was that, to allow such bad faith discovery would require the UIM carrier to give up protection for work product that it prepared in anticipation of litigating the underlying breach of contract UIM claim.   The court rejected this argument and asserted that a “mere claim of bad faith is not shattered the work-product privilege.”  

Overall, the court found that a stay of bad faith discovery is not required to eliminate any prejudice or to promote economy.   The court observed the different terms in granted or denying stays of bad faith discovery in Pennsylvania’s state in federal courts but attributed this split in authority, in part, to the fact that bad faith is tried by a judge in the state court but by a jury in the federal courts.  

In reviewing the bad faith discovery issues as applied to work-product issues, the court found that an insurance company could not reasonably argue that the entirety of its claims file materials are accumulated in anticipation of litigation.   However, the court also stated that this did not mean that the work-product doctrine was wholly in applicable to insurers’ claims files.   The court stated that, at some point in its investigation, an insurance company’s activity shifts from mere claims evaluation to an anticipation of litigation.  

Accordingly, the court rejected the Plaintiff’s assertion that all of the insurers’ claims and investigation files were created in the ordinary course of business.  Rather, the court in Wagner found that “[w]hether Plaintiffs may be entitled to a subset of that information would hinge upon a fact-specific inquiry into the nature of the information that they seek, when [the insurer] reasonably anticipate litigation, Plaintiffs’ need for the particular information, and whether they can obtain the information through other means.”  

The court further noted that this inquiry requires very specific arguments and typically the need for an in-camera review of the documents by the court.   Here, the Plaintiffs were found to have made no such arguments as it was the Plaintiff’s primary position that there was no work-product privilege.  Accordingly, the Motion was denied, but without prejudice.  

Judge Leeson did go on to determine the date when the insured was deemed to have reasonably anticipated litigation.   The court found that that date occurred after the insured’s first demand for the policy limits because the carrier had asked for certain information to be able to evaluate the claim and the demand.   The court found that it was only after receiving that information that litigation could have reasonably been anticipated.  

The court also noted that, even materials prepared after litigation was reasonably anticipated by the carrier might turn out to be discoverable if exceptions to the work-privilege could be established by the Plaintiff.  In other words, if the Plaintiffs were able to show that they have a substantial need for the particular materials and cannot, without undue hardship, obtain those materials or their substantial equivalent by other means, Plaintiffs may be permitted to obtain the discovery they seek, provided that the discovery did not include mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of the carrier, its attorneys, or other representatives.  

Anyone wishing to read the Wagner v. Allstate case online may click this LINK.  
Source:   Pennsylvania and New Jersey Insurance Bad Faith Case Law Block (March 15, 2016) at www.pabadfaithlaw.com