Claims Regarding Duty to Provide Safe Drinking Water Flow Through Summary Judgment Motion

In the case of McNair v. Pennsylvania-America Water Co., No. 2024-CV-5834 (C.P. Lacka. Co. June 11, 2026 Nealon, J.), Judge Terrence R. Nealon of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas addressed a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by a water company in a class action suit by residents of a Monroe County lake community in which the Plaintiffs had asserted claims of public nuisance under the safe drinking water statute, private nuisance, and breach of implied contract for failing to provide clean, safe, and reliable water surface to their company.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiffs asserted that the drinking water supplied by the utility company was chronically tainted with excessive levels of manganese that adversely affected the color, case, smell, and safety of the water.

The utility company filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on several grounds.

Relative to the request for the dismissal of certain nuisance claims based upon the statute of limitations, the court ruled that there were issues of fact under the discovery rule to the statute of limitations that prevented the entry of summary judgment in that regard.

Judge Terrence R. Nealon
Lackawanna County

Judge Nealon also found that the record before the court confirmed that the Plaintiff’s claims for breach of the utility’s implied duty to provide safe drinking water should be allowed to proceed to the jury.

Relative to the utility’s argument that the Plaintiff’s claims failed due to the Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust their administrative remedies, the court found that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies only applies where the available administrative remedy is adequate and complete with respect to the alleged harm sustained and the specific relief requested. 

Here, the court found that, given that the resident’s public nuisance claims sought to recover compensatory and punitive damages for the diminution of the value of their property, the loss of the use and enjoyment of the land, and the inconvenience, discomfort and annoyance that they have endured, the circumstances did not meet the elements of the doctrine given that the appropriate state administrative agency had no authority to award damages. 

As such, the court found that residents were not required to first exhaust their available administrative procedures before filing suit in a court of law.

In the end, the court denied the utility’s Motion for Summary Judgment.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Source of top image:  Photo by Wallace Chuck on www.pexels.com.

Court Addresses Various Breach of Contract and Bad Faith Allegations in a First Party Medical Benefits Case

In the case of Castellani v. Travelers Ins. Co., No. 2025-CV-3425 (C.P. Lacka. Co. May 18, 2026 Nealon, J.), the court addressed various issues raised in a claim for breach of contract and bad faith in a first party medical benefits case.

The Plaintiff basically asserted that the insurance company had allegedly fraudulently induced her to purchase medical expense benefits coverage that it allegedly never truly intended to provide. 

The Plaintiff also asserted that the carrier unjustifiably initiated numerous peer reviews by allegedly biased medical professionals in order to allegedly manufacturer a sham basis upon which to deny coverage for allegedly reasonable and necessary treatment.

In additional to suing the carrier for breach of contract and bad faith, the Plaintiff also sued the individual claims representative as well.

The carrier filed Preliminary Objections relative to the Plaintiff’s demand for counsel fees under §1716 and §1798 of the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law. 

The carrier also filed Preliminary Objections against the bad faith claim.

The claims representative also filed a demurrer on the claims against that party.

Challenges were also made against the claims under the UTPCPL.

The court granted the demurrer asserted by the claims adjuster after finding that the Plaintiff was not able to demonstrate a duty of care owed to the claims adjuster to the insured so as to expose the adjuster to individual tort liability.

The court otherwise found that the Plaintiff had stated a valid cause of action against the carrier for bad faith. The court also found that the claims were not barred by the gist of the action doctrine. The court additionally found that the economic loss doctrine did not preclude the tort claims asserted by the Plaintiff.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Source of image:  Photo by Marek Studzinski on www.unsplash.com.

Superior Court Finds That Having Lunch At Mom's House Doesn't Make You a Resident of that House When You Have Your Own Apartment

In the case of Lanunziata v. Penn. Nat’l Mut. Cas. Ins., No. 2026 Pa. Super. 97 (Pa. Super. May 13, 2026 Bowes, J., Dubow, J., and Neuman, J.) (Op. by Dubow, J.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the entry of summary judgment in favor of an insurance company in a declaratory judgment action in which the child of the insured was seeking UIM benefits under his parent’s automobile policy following an accident.

According to the Opinion, under the policy in question, an insured included the named insured and any family member.  A family member was defined, in part, as a resident of the insured's household. 

Here, the record before the court confirmed that the child had moved out of his parents’ home several years before the incident and spent a majority of his time in his own apartment.

After reviewing the case law on the issue of "residency" in this context, the Superior Court rejected the claim that the Plaintiff was a resident of his parents’ home.  The Plaintiff asserted that he ate lunch at his parents' house on a regular basis, had his mail delivered there, and had left a few personal items at his parents’ home.

The Court noted that the Plaintiff had graduated from college in 2016 and had leased an apartment in 2019 and had no intention of returning to his parents' home to live. 

The Court found that the evidence confirmed that the quantity of contacts and time that the Plaintiff spent in his own apartment greatly outweighed his contacts with his parents home.

As such, the Superior Court affirmed the entry of summary judgment in favor of the carrier on the coverage question presented.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: “Court Summaries” by Timothy L. Clawges of The Pennsylvania Bar News (June 15, 2026).

Artificial Citations Lands Another Attorney in Trouble in Pennsylvania

Another Pennsylvania attorney has been sanction for submitting filings in federal court containing AI hallucinations.

In the case of Twigg v. BSN Sports, Inc., No. 4:23-CV-00067-MWB (M.D. Pa. June 18, 2026 Brann, C.J.), Chief Judge Matthew W. Brann sanctioned an attorney by fining him $1,500 and suspending him from practicing in the Middle District Federal Court for six months due to the submission of filings by the attorney containing AI-generated hallucinated citations.

The Court found that the attorney had violated Rule 11 by submitting fabricated and inaccurate case citations.  In his Opinion, Judge Brann also expressed his displeasure with the attorney attempting to shift the blame relative to his responsibility for submitting the erroneous citations contained in the brief that was filed with the Court.

Anyone wishing to review Judge Brann's May 21, 2026 decision in this case may click this LINK.  The portion of the Opinion covering the AI issues is near the end of the Opinion.

The Court's June 18, 2026 Order entering sanctions can be viewed at this LINK.

Source: Article - "Fed. Court Suspends Pa. Attorney for AI-Hallucinated Citations," by Riley Brennan of The Legal Intelligencer (June 22, 2026).

Source of image: Photo by Zach M on www.unsplash.com.

Medical Malpractice Case Transferred Under Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens

In the case of Gearhart v. Geisinger Health, No. 2025-CV-44 (C.P. Lacka. Co. June 5, 2026 Nealon, J.), Judge Terrence R. Nealon of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas granted the Defendants’ Motion to Transfer Venue of this case from Lackawanna County to Mifflin County under the doctrine of forum non conveniens.  

According to the Opinion in this medical malpractice case, Mifflin County Plaintiffs commenced a suit against a Mifflin County podiatrist and nurse practitioner, a Union County physician assistant, a Mifflin County hospital, and their employer and corporate parent, which were both headquartered in Montour County. 

After reviewing the evidence presented to the court, Judge Nealon noted that a trial of this matter in Lackawanna County, which is more than 130 miles from the sites of the primary treatment locations and associated evidence would be unduly burdensome for the individual Defendants and would impose considerable hardships relating to their professional and family responsibilities.  

The court also held that Mifflin County would provide far easier access to material witnesses possessing pertinent information and other sources of proof regarding the claimed negligence and damages.  

Accordingly, based upon a totality of the circumstances, the court found Lackawanna County was an oppressive forum for the continued litigation of the malpractice action.  Consequently, the court granted the Defendants’ Motion to Transfer the Case to the Court of Common Pleas of Mifflin County under Pa. R.C.P. 1006(d)(1).  

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Article: Remedies for Late Payment of Settlement Funds

The below article of mine recently appeared in the June 18, 2026 edition of the Pennsylvania Law Weekly and is republished here with permission.

Remedies for Late Payment of Settlement Funds

June 18, 2026

By

Daniel E. Cummins


In most instances, once a civil litigation matter is settled, the defendant’s liability insurance carrier promptly issues payment. In this regard, the carrier has an interest in both protecting its insured in this regard and in closing out another file. However, in rare instances, a settlement payment may be delayed for an inordinate period of time for one reason or another.

When a settlement payment is delayed, plaintiffs have options to compel the production of the settlement payment or to secure sanctions against the defendant relative to the delay. Most settlement agreements themselves outline when payment is due. And, whether or not there is such a provision in a release regarding the timing of a payment, plaintiffs also have the benefit of the mandate under Pa.R.C.P. 229.1, which requires that the settlement payment be “delivered … within 20 calendar days from the defendant’s receipt of an executed release.”

In terms of the status of Pennsylvania law in this regard, it is often said by many that, if one needs a thorough overview of the current status of a particular area of the law, one should look for a decision on the issue written by Judge Terrence R. Nealon of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas. This advice holds true with Nealon’s recent opinion in the case of Hill v. Riverside Healthcare and Rehabilitation Center, No. 2023-CV-3399 (C.P. Lacka. Co. May 22, 2026 Nealon, J.), in which Nealon addressed the topic of remedies available to a plaintiff under Pa.R.C.P. 229.1 where a defendant fails to produce a settlement payment in a timely fashion after the receipt of an executed release.

According to the opinion, this matter involved a professional liability action against the health care and rehab center. The plaintiff’s decedent’s had been a patient at the defendant’s facility. The defendant facility owner at issue in this case eventually became insolvent and filed for bankruptcy.

During the course of this litigation, the parties agreed to participate in a settlement conference with a private mediator. Prior to the mediation, the defendant’s attorney confirmed in writing that the parent and affiliate entities of the defendant were insolvent and in bankruptcy proceedings. Defense counsel also confirmed that, as such, the defendant would not be able to satisfy the first $75,000 of any settlement as that represented the amount of the defendant’s deductible, but that any obligation above that amount would be covered by the defendant’s liability insurance policy.

As a result of the mediation, the parties reached a settlement agreement for a net payment of $175,000. The total amount of the party’s settlement was actually $250,000 but the plaintiff agreed to waive the defendant’s payment of its $75,000 deductible. The net settlement payment of $175,000 was to be paid entirely by the defendant’s liability insurance carrier.

The court’s opinion emphasized that the insurance company’s adjuster had agreed to the settlement without any indication of any coverage issues existing between the defendant and its insurance company.

After the settlement, the plaintiff proceeded to court on a petition for court approval of the settlement in this death case. The court granted the Plaintiff’s petition and approved the settlement. The parties then executed the settlement agreement.

Plaintiff’s counsel then sent the signed release, the court order approving the settlement and other closing documents to the defendant’s counsel and requested the settlement payment.

In his opinion in this Hill case, Nealon emphasized that noticeably absent from the settlement agreement was any indication or even a suggestion that a coverage issue may exist between the defendant and its insurance company. Nor was there any reference that any such coverage issue needed to be resolved before the plaintiff would receive the settlement payment.

Thereafter, when plaintiff’s counsel wrote for the status of the settlement check, defense counsel indicated that there was some issue that the adjuster had to work out. Again, there was no reference made to any insurance coverage issues.

The opinion of the court noted facts that showed that the plaintiff’s attorney showed great patience and was more than accommodating in his repeated efforts to secure the production of the settlement check over the next several months. After several months then went by with no production of the settlement check, counsel for the plaintiff filed a motion under Pa.R.C.P. 229.1 relative to the defendant’s failure to produce the settlement check in a timely fashion after the production of the executed release.

Judge Nealon reviewed Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 229.1 which governs the prompt delivery of settlement funds within 20 days of the receipt of an executed release by the defendant.

The rule otherwise provides that, if court approval of the settlement is required, the mandated 20-day time period under Rule 229.1 does not become operative until the settlement is so approved.

Nealon noted that, under Rule 229.1, if a defendant fails to timely deliver settlement funds, a plaintiff has the right to seek either of two remedies. First, a plaintiff can seek to invalidate the settlement agreement and request that the matter return to the trial list. Second, a plaintiff can seek certain sanctions against the defendant.

The court in Hill noted that, if the plaintiff opt to pursue sanctions against the defendant, Rule 229.1(e) directs the plaintiff to file an affidavit “attesting to nonpayment,” and to submit six items for the court’s review with the affidavit. Among the documents to be submitted with the affidavit are a copy of “any document evidencing the terms of the settlement agreement,” a copy of “the executed release,” a copy of “a receipt reflecting delivery of the executed release,” a certification by counsel “the applicable interest rate,” and “that the affidavit and accompanying documents have been served on the attorneys for all interested parties.” Lastly, also attached to the affidavit should be “the form of order prescribed by subdivision (h)” of Pa.R.C.P. 229.1 for execution by the court.

Nealon additionally noted that the type of sanctions allowed in this instance are spelled out under Pa.R.C.P. 229.1. More specifically, under Rule 229.1(g), if the court determines that a defendant has failed to deliver the settlement funds within 20 days and there is no material dispute as to the terms of the settlement or the terms of the release, the court “shall impose sanctions in the form of interests calculated at the rate equal to the prime rate as listed in the First Edition of the Wall Street Journal published for each calendar year for which interest is awarded, plus 1%, not compounded, running from the 21st day to the date of delivery of the settlement funds, together with reasonable attorney fees incurred in the preparation of the affidavit.”

Nealon otherwise ruled in the Hill case that the fact that the insurance company’s noncompliance with the payment requirement may be attributable to a post-settlement assertion of a potential coverage issue did not warrant the denial of the plaintiff’s request for sanctions relative to the failure of the carrier to produce the settlement check within 20 days of the production of the executed release.
Conclusion

The Hill decision written by Judge Nealon provides thorough guidance on the steps to take in securing sanctions relative to a late payment of settlement funds required by an executed release.

As evidenced by plaintiff’s counsel’s actions in the Hill case, it is advisable for the plaintiff to show some patience while repeatedly requesting, in writing, the settlement payment once the mandated 20-day time period has expired for the timely production of the check. By showing some patience and creating a written record of repeated requests for the production of the check, the plaintiff will be able to bolster their request for sanctions as opposed to the case where a plaintiff runs to the courthouse on a motion for sanctions on the 21st day after the release was received by the defense counsel.

Daniel E. Cummins is the managing partner at Cummins Law in Clarks Summit, Pennsylvania. Contact him at dancummins@cumminslaw.net.




Reprinted with permission from the June 18, 2026 edition of the "The Pennsylvania Law Weekly © 2026 ALM Global Properties, LLC. All rights reserved. Further duplication without permission is prohibited, contact 877-256-2472 or asset-and-logo-licensing@alm.com.

Court Finds That Determination of Whether Plaintiff Was an Invitee, Licensee, or Trespasser is for the Jury

In the case Martin v. Cable Services Co., Inc., No. CV-2025-00988 (C.P. Lyc. Co. April 23, 2026 Carlucci, J.), the court denied Preliminary Objections filed by various Defendants in a premises liability case involving the death of the Plaintiff. One of the Defendants involved was charged with criminal homicide.

According to the Opinion, an incident took place at the business premises of Cable Services Co., Inc. which resulted in the death of the Plaintiff’s decedent. As a result of that incident and death, one of the Defendants was charged with criminal homicide. No more details regarding the facts of the incident were provided in the Opinion.

This Opinion addressed various Preliminary Objections filed by certain Defendants against the Complaint. The Defendants essentially asserted that the Plaintiff’s reference to a corporate safety manual in the Complaint was insufficient to establish any duty owed to the decedent because the decedent was not an employee of Cable Services on the date of the incident.

The Defendants additionally asserted that the allegations in the Plaintiff’s Complaint failed to establish that the decedent was a public invitee to whom the Defendants owed a duty of care.

Judge William P. Carlucci
Lycoming County

Judge William P. Carlucci noted that he was declining to determine whether or not the Defendants owed a duty of care to the decedent at this Preliminary Objections stage. The court noted that, generally speaking, in premises liability cases, the determination of whether an individual is an invitee, licensee, or trespasser is a question of fact for the jury.

The court also noted that the issues of foreseeability with respect to the harm suffered by the decedent is also ordinarily a question of fact for the jury.

As such, the various Preliminary Objections filed by the Defendant were overruled.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer Common Pleas Case Alert, www.Law.com (May 28, 2026).

Judge Allows Trip And Fall Case To Proceed Beyond Summary Judgment

In the case of Bonnell v. Knight-Confer Funeral Home, Inc., No. CV0-2023-01345 (C.P. Lyc. Co. March 23, 2026 Carlucci, J.), the court denied a Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment in a trip and fall case based upon the expert opinion of the Plaintiff’s expert engineer creating questions of fact to be decided decision by the jury.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff allegedly tripped and fell on a step on the Defendant’s premises. During her deposition, the Plaintiff did not assert that there was any debris on the step where she fell,  Nor did the Plaintiff point to any defect in the step itself.

Rather, the Plaintiff testified that she opened the door and thought she was stepping onto the sidewalk and, as a result, missed the step and fell.

The Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment arguing that the complete absence of any debris or any defects with regards to the step confirm that there was no material evidence upon which a jury could base any finding of negligence. The Defendant additionally pointed out that the Plaintiff had traveled over the same step on her way into the building without incident.

The Plaintiff’s opposition to the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment was based, in part, on the fact that the Plaintiff produced an expert engineering report. That expert offered an opinion that the single step condition at the threshold of the doorway created a hazardous condition which endangered the public. The expert further concluded that the actions and/or inactions of the Plaintiff did not cause the incident to occur. The expert otherwise noted that the step was below the normal line of sight and the Plaintiff was therefore unable to perceive it as she exited the doorway.

After reviewing the record before him as applied to Pennsylvania law, the judge noted that, if the jury believed the testimony of the Plaintiff’s engineering expert, a jury could reasonably find that the condition at the threshold of the doorway was a hazardous condition which endangered the Plaintiff and that the Plaintiff’s own conduct was not a legal cause of her injuries. 

Accordingly, the court denied the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment and allowed the case to proceed forward.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer Common Pleas Case Alert, www.Law.com (May 28, 2026).

Source of image:  Photo by Becca Lavin on www.unsplash.com.

Trial Court Provides Lessons on Propriety of New Matter Pleading by Defendants

In the case of Cancilliere v. Custom Etch, Inc., No. 11163 of 2025, C.A. (C.P. Lawr. Co. May 4, 2026 Flannery, J.), the court addressed the propriety of allegations contained in a Defendant’s New Matter in a civil litigation case.

According to the Opinion, the civil litigation matter arose out a dispute relative to the application of a trust agreement.

After the Plaintiffs filed a Complaint and the Defendants filed an Answer and New Matter, the Plaintiffs filed Preliminary Objections to the Defendant’s New Matter asserting that the allegations contained within the New Matter were improper pursuant to Pa. R.C.P. 1030 and that the allegations lacked the specificity required by Pa. R.C.P. 1019(a).

More specifcally, the Plaintiff initially asserted that the allegations contained within the Defendant’s New Matter were improper under Pa. R.C.P. 1030 as the allegations did not set forth affirmative defenses.

The court noted that, under Pa. R.C.P. 1030(a), it is provided that a Defendant may assert affirmative defenses in a New Matter in response to a Complaint. The court also noted, howerver, that Pa. R.C.P. 1030(a) additionally expressly provides “[a] party may set forth as new matter any other material facts which are not merely denials of the averments of the preceding pleading.” See Op. at p. 4.

The court read this portion of the Rule in to indicate that a responding party may assert new facts in a New Matter which were not previously pled in the Complaint.

The court additionally noted that a New Matter may include conclusions of law, such as an allegation that a Complaint failed to state a cause of action, but that, under Pennsylvania law, no responsive pleading by the Plaintiff is required in response to any conclusions of law contained in a New Matter. See Op. at p. 4.

Based upon the above, the court additionally noted that, when the allegations in a New Matter are either mere conclusions of law or merely a reiteration of the same facts that may have already been placed into issue in the Complaint of the Plaintiff or the Answer of the Defendant, then the Plaintiff is not required to provide a response to the same allegations in a New Matter. Rather, such allegations would be deemed to be denied, and the court is not otherwise required to strike those paragraphs in the New Matter in response to any Preliminary Objections that may be filed by a plaintiff.

The court reiterated that the inclusion of conclusions of law by a Defendant in a New Matter does not require the court to strike the same from the pleading as such pleadings are permissible.

The court did go on to note, however, that general assertions by a Defendant of affirmative defenses lacking any factual allegations in a New Matter do violate Pa. R.C.P. 1019(a) given that a Plaintiff would be unable to confirm or deny those paragraphs. Such general allegations within a New Matter can be attacked by Preliminary Objections. 

The court noted that a Defendant must pled facts to support the existence of an affirmative defense and, the failure to do so, will result in the court sustaining a Preliminary Objection for lack of specificity in violation of the requirements of Pa. R.C.P. 1019(a) with regards to pleadings.

The court also noted that, when a court sustains a Preliminary Objection for lack of specificity relative to a New Matter defense, the Defendant should generally be given an opportunity to amend its New Matter to comply with Pa. R.C.P. 1019.

Here, in this case, the court denied the Preliminary Objections given that while the Defendant’s allegations in the New Matter were insufficient to create a factual basis for potential affirmative defenses, in this case, the Defendants were not attempting to assert affirmative defenses in the New Matter but rather, were providing additional facts on the case presented as permitted by Pa. R.C.P. 1030.

The court also noted that its review of the factual allegations in the New Matter confirmed that the Plaintiff had the capability of either admitting or denying the Defendant's factual allegations.

With regards to the Plaintiff’s complaint that the New Matter contained legal conclusions, the court reiterated that the Plaintiff was not required to file a response to those types of allegations as they would be deemed to be denied.  The court reiterated that there is no legal basis for the court to strike those paragraphs simply because such allegations may have amounted to legal conclusions.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer Common Pleas Case Alert, www.Law.com (June 4, 2026).

Source of image:  Photo by G. Fring on www.pexels.com.

Court Allows Plaintiff's Expert To Testify in Medical Malpractice Case

In the case of Pratt v. Shahid, No. CV-23-00720 (C.P. Lyc. Co. April 14, 2026 Carlucci, J.), the court denied the Defendants’ Motion In Limine seeking to preclude the Plaintiff from introducing the testimony of a doctor in a medical malpractice case.

In this case, the court denied the Defendants’ request for an exclusion of the Plaintiff’s medical expert’s testimony given that the Plaintiff’s expert’s opinion was found to be supported by medical literature.

The court also noted that the Defendants’ challenge went to the Plaintiff’s expert’s conclusions rather than the methodology utilized by the expert. 

The court found that the Plaintiff’s expert’s methodology was not novel, as it was similar to the methodology used by the Defendants’ expert. The court further noted that, even if the Plaintiff’s methodology was considered to be novel, it was still generally accepted in the scientific community as supported by articles from scientific journals submitted by the Plaintiff.

In the end, the court ruled that, while the Plaintiff’s expert’s conclusions differed from those advanced by the Defendants’ expert, that difference is not a proper basis for excluding the testimony of the Plaintiff’s expert.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer Common Pleas Case Alert, www.Law.com (May 28, 2026). 

Issues of Fact Preclude Entry of Summary Judgment in Case Challenging the Design of an Intersection

In the case of Leger v. Martin, No. 253 C.D. 2025 (Pa. Cmwlth. May 19, 2026 Cohn Jubelirer, J., Wolf, J., Leadbetter, J.) (Op. by Cohn Jubelirer, J.), the Commonwealth Court reversed a lower court’s entry of summary judgment granting a township summary judgment in a motor vehicle accident matter in which allegations were made that the intersection at issue was a dangerous intersection.

According to the Opinion, this matter arose out of a motor vehicle accident during which the Plaintiff commenced a left hand turn from a stop sign and was hit by a tractor trailer.

The Plaintiff sued various parties including the township. The Plaintiff alleged that the township was liable under a duty to design, construct, and maintain its roads in a safe condition for travelers, including having proper signage and intersection site triangles. The Plaintiff also asserted that the township placed and/or directed to be placed a stop sign at the intersection with insufficient sight distances. The Plaintiff otherwise noted that the stop sign created a dangerous condition of which the township had actual or constructive notice, making the township liable under exceptions to the governmental immunity provided under §8542 of the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act.

The trial court had granted the township’s Motion for Summary Judgment. 

The primary argument by the township on appeal was that the Plaintiff had not produced evidence showing that the stop sign had caused or contributed to his injuries, that the township had notice of any dangerous condition, or that the township owned the intersection because it was controlled by PennDOT.

On appeal, the Commonwealth Court concluded that the notice issue was for the jury and that summary judgment had, therefore, been improperly entered. The court pointed to evidence before it, including expert reports, indicating that the township would have been responsible for the initial design of the intersection and that the evidence established that reasonable minds could differ as to whether the alleged dangerous condition was apparent upon reasonable inspection before the subject crash.

Accordingly, the granting of summary judgment in favor of the township was reversed and the matter was remanded for further proceedings.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer State Appellate Case Alert, www.Law.com (June 9, 2026).

Source of image:  Photo by Josiah Niklas on www.unsplash.com.

Appellate Court Finds that Plaintiff's Med Mal Claims Were Sufficiently Stated in Complaint

In its non-precedential decision in the case of Dasilva v. Abington Memorial Hospital, No. 1707 EDA 2025 (Pa. Super. June 2, 2026 Kunselman, J., Nichols, J., and Sullivan, J.) (Op. by Kunselman, J.), the court reversed a trial court’s decision in a medical malpractice case sustaining the Preliminary Objections of the Defendant hospital dismissing the Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint with prejudice.

The trial court had dismissed the Plaintiff’s Complaint due to the alleged insufficiency of the factual allegations in the Second Amended Complaint. Primarily, the Defendants asserted, in part, that the Plaintiff’s allegations of negligence and agency were vague and/or insufficiently specific.

On appeal, the Pennsylvania Superior Court reinstated the medical malpractice action after finding that the Plaintiffs had plausibly alleged that the medical staff failed to properly monitor a patient who was experiencing a psychiatric episode by allowing the patient to leave the emergency room at which point he was then struck by a vehicle.

The appellate court concluded that the Plaintiffs had met the state’s fact-pleading standard by outlining key facts, including the Plaintiff’s mental state, the awareness of the hospital staff of the Plaintiff’s condition, and the alleged failure of the hospital staff to monitor or prevent the patient’s departure from the hospital.

The appellate court otherwise held that a Plaintiff need not identify any specific employees in the medical malpractice case in order to pursue vicarious liability claims against a hospital. The court noted that references contained in the Complaint to the emergency room staff were sufficiently specific to enable the Defendants to respond to the Complaint.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this non-precedential decision of the Pennsylvania Superior Court in the Dasilva may click this LINK.

Source: Article – “Abington Hospital Must Face Med Mal Claims Over Patient’s ER Escape, Pa. Appellate Court Says,” By Riley Brennan of The Legal Intelligencer (June 4, 2026).

Source of image:  Photo by National Cancer Institute on www.unsplash.com.

Court Gives Detailed Opinion on Sanctions Applicable to Late Payment of Settlement Funds

In the case of Hill v. Riverside Healthcare and Rehabilitation Center, No. 2023-CV-3399 (C.P. Lacka. Co. May 22, 2026 Nealon, J.), the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas addressed a Petition filed by a Plaintiff seeking to impose sanctions against a Defendant under Pa. R.C.P. 229.1 for failing to deliver settlement funds in a timely fashion after an executed Release was produced by the Plaintiff.

According to the Opinion, this matter involved a professional liability action against a healthcare and rehab center.

In this matter, the Defendant facility owner at issue in this case eventually became insolvent and filed for bankruptcy.

During the course of this litigation, the parties agreed to participate in a settlement conference with a private mediator. Prior to the mediation, the Defendant’s attorney confirmed in writing that the parent and affiliate entities of the Defendant were insolvent and/or in bankruptcy proceedings and confirmed that the Defendant would not be able to satisfy the first $75,000.00 of any settlement but that any obligation thereafter would be covered by insurance.

After a mediation, the parties reached a settlement agreement for a net payment of $175,000.00. The total amount of the party’s settlement was actually $250,000.00 but the Plaintiff agreed to waive the Defendant’s payment of its $75,000.00 deductible with a net settlement payment of $175,000.00 to be funded entirely by the Defendant's insurance carrier.

The court’s Opinion in this matter emphasized that the insurance company’s adjuster agreed to the settlement without any indication of any coverage issue between the actual Defendant and its insurance company.

Thereafter, in this death case, the court granted the Plaintiff’s Petition for Court Approval of the Settlement. 

The Plaintiff then executed the settlement agreement and sent the signed Release, the court Order approving the settlement, and other closing documents to the Defendant’s counsel and requested payment.

The court point out that noticeably absent from the settlement agreement was any indication, or even a suggestion, that a coverage issue may exist between the Defendant and its insurance company or that any such coverage issue needed to be resolved before the Plaintiff would receive the settlement payment. 

After the closing documents were produced and the settlement check was not forthcoming, Plaintiff’s counsel wrote for the status of the settlement check.  Defense counsel indicated that there was some issue that the adjuster had to work out. There was no reference made to any insurance coverage issue during that interaction.

After several months then went by with no production of the settlement check, counsel for the Plaintiff filed the Motion at issue.

Judge Terrence R. Nealon of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas reviewed Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 229.1 which governs the prompt delivery of settlement funds within twenty (20) days of the receipt of an executed Release by the Defendant. 

The Rule otherwise provides that, if court approval of the settlement is required, then the 20 day deadline under Rule 229.1 does not begin to run until the settlement is so approved.

Judge Nealon noted that, under Rule 229.1, if the Defendant fails to timely deliver settlement funds, the Plaintiff has the right to seek one of two possible remedies. First, a Plaintiff can seek to invalidate the settlement agreement and allow the matter to return to the trial list. Second, the Plaintiff can seek sanctions against the Defendant.

The court noted that, if a plaintiff opts to pursue sanctions against a defendant, Rule 229.1(e) directs the Plaintiff to (1) file an affidavit “attesting to non-payment,” to submit copies of “any document evidencing the terms of the settlement agreement,” and/or “the executed Release,” and “a receipt reflecting delivery of the executed Release,” (2) file certifications by counsel “of the applicable interest rate,” and “that the affidavit and accompanying documents have been served on the attorneys for all interested parties,” and (3) file “the form of order prescribed by subdivision (h)” for execution by the court.

The court also noted that under Rule 229.1(g), if the court determines that the Defendant has failed to deliver the settlement funds within twenty (20) days and there is no material dispute as to the terms of the settlement or the terms of the Release, the court “shall impose sanctions in the form of interests calculated at the rate equal to the prime rate as listed in the first edition of the Wall Street Journal published for each calendar year for which interest is awarded, plus one (1) percent, not compounded, running from the 21st day after the production of the executed Release to the date of delivery of the settlement funds, together with reasonable attorneys’ fees incurred in the preparation of the affidavit.

The court otherwise ruled that the fact that the insurance company’s noncompliance with the payment requirement may be attributable to a post-settlement assertion of a potential coverage issue did not warrant the denial of the Plaintiff’s request for sanctions.  Accordingly, the court granted the Plaintiff’s Motion and awarded sanctions pursuant to Rule 229.1.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Source of image:  Photo by kaboom pics on www.pexels.com.

Law Allowing For Fines For Holding A Cell Phone While Driving Starts Tomorrow June 5th

A new Pennsylvania law that bans a driver from holding a cell phone while behind the wheel goes into effect tomorrow, June 5, 2026.

These fines are starting after a year of police officers issuing warning tickets in this regard.

Starting tomorrow, officers may issue tickets carrying a $50 fine, plus court costs and other fees.

Note that simply holding a phone, propping up a phone, or reaching for a phone can trigger a ticket.  You could even be issued a ticket for holding your phone at a red light or while stopped in traffic.

Drivers are permitted to use their phones to alert authorities in an emergency.

Also, drivers may still use hands-free technology to make phone calls, to use a GPS, or to listen to music.

It remains to be seen how a related violation of this statute may impact a personal injury motor vehicle accident matter.

Trial Court Rules that Plaintiff's Medical Malpractice Experts are Competent to Testify on Causation

In the case of Kenny v. Lackawanna Health and Rehab Center, No. 2021-CV-1360 (C.P. Lacka. Co. May 28, 2026 Nealon, J.), Judge Terrence R. Nealon of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas addressed various Motions in Limine filed by a Defendant in a medical malpractice case.

The Defendants filed a Motion In Limine seeking to bar the decedent’s treating orthopedic surgeon and the Plaintiff’s skilled nursing care and nursing home administration expert from expressing opinions regarding the cause of the Defendant’s hip fracture.

The Defendant more specifically asserted that the decedent’s treating orthopedic surgeon failed to state his medical causation opinion with the requisite degree of medical certainty in his pre-trial reports. 

After reviewing the record before him, the court ruled that a review of all of the reports issued by the orthopedic surgeon confirmed that the doctor had articulated his medical causation opinion with the requisite degree of medical certainty. The court noted that any objection regarding the particular terminology used by the expert in his reports went to the weight of the evidence rather than the admissibility of the expert testimony. As such, this Motion In Limine was denied.

With regards to the Plaintiff’s nursing expert and the defense argument that this expert should be precluded from testifying regarding causation on the grounds that the expert lacked the required education, training or experience in orthopedics, the court noted that the most recent law in Pennsylvania is that a registered nurse is competent to testify concerning the relevant nursing standard of care as well as on the issue of medical causation. Accordingly, the court overruled the Defendant’s argument that the nursing expert is incompetent to testify as to causation.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Superior Court Affirms Trial Court's Refusal to Open a Default Judgment Against a Defendant

In the case of Kitner’s Lawn & Landscaping, LLC v. LRM Masonry, LLC, No. 699 MDA 2025 (Pa. Super. March 24, 2026 Panella, P.J.E., King, J., and Lane, J.) (Op. by Lane, J.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court found that a trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied a Defendant’s Petition to Open a Default Judgment.

According to the Opinion, there was a contract between the parties under which it was agreed that the Plaintiff landscaping business would provide services as a subcontractor to the Defendant masonry company.

After a dispute arose between the parties, the Plaintiff filed a Complaint seeking payment for services rendered. The Writ of Summons was personally served on the owner of the Defendant, who accepted service.

Thereafter, the Plaintiff filed a Complaint and served the Defendant by mail. The mailing was not returned.

The trial court later entered a default judgment against the Defendant for failing to file an Answer to the Complaint.

Sixty-seven days after the entry of the default judgment, the Defendant filed a Petition to Open the Judgment. The Defendant asserted that the Plaintiff was aware that the Defendant’s principal place of business was at the Defendant’s home and not another address at which the ten day notice of intent to enter a default was sent and.  The Defendant also noted that the mailing of the ten day notice was filed of record with the court and was marked as “undeliverable.”

The appellate court agreed that the trial court did not abuse its discretion and refusing to open the default judgment. The appellate court emphasized that the Defendant had no official address filed with the Department of State in Pennsylvania. It was additionally noted that the sheriff had successfully served original process, which was the Writ of Summons, on the Defendant.

The appellate court also noted that the Plaintiff sent the Complaint, the Notice of the Default Judgment, and other filings to the same address that was on the Writ of Summons. That address was noted to also appear on the Defendant’s website. Accordingly, the appellate court found that the Plaintiff had met the service requirements under the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The appellate court also agreed that the Defendant did not establish a reasonable excuse for failing to file a responsive pleading to the Complaint.

The court otherwise noted that it saw no fatal defect on the record to support any separate Motion to Strike.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer State Appellate Case Alert, www.Law.com (April 7, 2026).

EARLY REGISTRATION DISCOUNT DEADLINE EXTENDED

 

PLEASE CONSIDER CUMMINS MEDIATION AS A MEANS TO BRING YOUR CASE TO A CLOSE

LOOKING TO BRING YOUR CASE TO A CLOSE?

LIMITED SLOTS AVAILABLE

PLEASE CALL TODAY TO SCHEDULE YOUR APPOINTMENT

570-319-5899

dancummins@cumminslaw.net

Defendant Found to Be Statutory Employer and Entitled to Immunity

In the case of Edie v. George Junior Republic In Pennsylvania, No. 546 C.D. 2025 (Pa. Cmwlth. March 27, 2026 Cohn Jubelirer, P.J., Covey, J. Wallis, J.) (Op. by Covey, J.), the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court addressed the application of the statutory employer doctrine in a third party negligence case.

According to the Opinion, the Defendant operated a youth residential institution and contracted with a food service company to provide food services at the facility.

The Plaintiff, who was employed by the food services facility, was cleaning a grill while working in the kitchen at the facility when the Plaintiff was caused to fall and suffer injuries.

The Plaintiff filed a Complaint against the youth residential institution alleging negligence due to unsafe conditions in the kitchen.

The Defendant youth residential institution responding by asserting immunity under the Worker’s Compensation Act as a statutory employer.

The trial court agreed with the Defendant and dismissed the case under a summary judgment motion. The Plaintiff appealed.

The Commonwealth Court applied the McDonald test, which requires that five (5) elements be established to establish a statutory employer status. Those elements include the existence of a contract with the owner, proof that the premises were occupied or controlled by the employer, a subcontract between the parties at issue, and proof that part of the employer’s regular business was entrusted to the subcontractor, and, finally, that the Plaintiff was an employee of the subcontractor.

Here, the Plaintiff only contested the second element, arguing that the Defendant did not have the necessary level of control or occupancy to meet this element of the doctrine.

The appellate court found that the youth residential institution occupied the premises given that its food services director was present daily and oversaw the food services provider’s operations by ensuring compliance with contractual and regulatory requirements. 

The court additionally noted that the residential facility’s employees were also regularly present in the kitchen. It was additionally noted that the residential facility maintained control over the kitchen's equipment and operation.

As such, the Commonwealth Court agreed that the Defendant residential facility had met the occupancy requirement, thereby satisfying that contested element of the McDonald test.

Accordingly, the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of the Defendant as a statutory employer of the Plaintiff.  As a statutory employer, the Defendant facility was found to be entitled to immunity under the Worker’s Compensation Act from the claims presented in the third party personal injury liability lawsuit.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Source: The Legal Intelligencer State Appellate Case Alert, www.Law.com (April 14, 2026).

Source of image:  Photo by Pylyp Sukhenko on www.unsplash.com.

DEADLINE TO SECURE EARLY REGISTRATION DISCOUNT FOR LACKAWANNA PRO BONO GOLF TOURNAMENT EXTENDED

 

Court Allows Claims of Recklessness and for Punitive Damages To Proceed Relative to Disobeying Instructions of a Flagger

In the case of Marrazzo v. Klim, No. 2025-CV-471 C.P. (C.P. Susq. Co. May 5, 2026 Legg, P.J.), President Judge Jason J. Legg of the Susquehanna County Court of Common Pleas followed the trend in Pennsylvania of denying a Defendant’s Preliminary Objections filed against allegations of recklessness and punitive damages at the pleadings stage.

Judge Legg noted that, according to Superior Court precedent, recklessness is a condition of the mind that may be averred generally. 

The court otherwise noted that, even though recklessness may be generally alleged, the court found that, in this case, the Plaintiff had included the Complaint specific allegations related to the Defendant’s alleged recklessness, including allegations regarding speeding in a work zone despite the presence of a flagger directing traffic, nearly striking the flagger, falling asleep at the wheel, and relative to the Defendant driver striking the Plaintiffs’ vehicle which had stopped for the flagger and was waiting to enter the work zone until the lane was clear.

The court otherwise noted that an allegation related to falling asleep while driving, standing alone, could be sufficient to support an allegation of recklessness at the pleadings stage.

The court also pointed to the same facts as supporting the Plaintiff’s inclusion of the separate claim for punitive damages in the Complaint.

As such, the Preliminary Objections asserted by the Defendant were overruled.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this Order which contains a detailed explanation of the Court’s decision in footnotes, may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney Terrence R. Nealon, Jr. of the Scranton law firm of McDonald and MacGregor, LLC for bringing this decision to my attention.

Superior Court Clarifies Application of Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens

In the case of Duxbury v. Reconstructive Orthopedic Assoc. II, P.C., No. 2876 EDA 2024 (Pa. Super. March 25, 2026 Bowes, J., Murray, J., and Beck, J.) (Op. by Beck, J.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court addressed an appeal from an Order entered by the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas in a medical malpractice case granting a Motion to Dismiss under the doctrine of forum non conveniens filed by the Defendant. The trial court had directed that the action be refiled in New Jersey.

The Plaintiffs argued that the trial court erred in its application of the existing precedent regarding the doctrine of forum non conveniens. The Plaintiffs more specifically argued that a review of the facts under a correct application of the doctrine did not support the transfer of the action to New Jersey.

On appeal, the Pennsylvania Superior Court reversed the trial court’s Order and remanded the case for further proceedings in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas. Here, the court noted that the trial court was obligated to further weigh the circumstances linking the case to Pennsylvania to determine whether Pennsylvania was an inconvenient forum, and not simply review whether New Jersey was a more convenient forum for the Defendants.

In other words, the court noted that Pennsylvania law requires that, when courts review arguments under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, at least in a case involving two (2) separate states as here, the court is required to consider the relative convenience of allowing the claim to proceed in either of the states at issue.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer State Appellate Case Alert, www.Law.com (April 14, 2026).

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Rules that Sexual Abuse Exception To Governmental Immunity Only Applies to Minor Victims

Capitol Building
Pennsylvania Supreme Court

In the case of City of Philadelphia v. J.S. Sr., No. 34 EAP 2024 (Pa. March 26, 2026) (Op. by McCaffery, J.), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered the parameters of the sexual abuse exception to the general governmental immunity from tort claims as set forth in Section 8542(b)(9) of the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act.

This matter arose out of claims by an adult Plaintiff alleging that the Plaintiff was subjected to sexual abuse or assaults while the Plaintiff was incarcerated. The record before the court confirmed that the Plaintiff was not a minor at the time of the alleged abuse.

The more specific issue addressed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court is whether this waiver of the immunity afforded to governmental agencies under the sexual abuse exception applies when the victim of the sexual abuse is an adult, or whether the waiver of immunity is limited to only those cases involving sexual abuse committed against a minor.

As noted in Justice Wecht's Concurring Opinion, "[t]he sexual-abuse exception to the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act applies to '[c]onduct which constitutes an offense enumerated under Section 5551(7).'  The offenses enumerated in Section 5551(7), in turn, require that 'the victim was under 18 years of age at the time of the offense.'"

In the end, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled that the unambiguous language of Section 8542(b)(9) waives immunity in favor of political subdivisions or their employees only if the Plaintiff was a minor at the time of the sexual abuse.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of the Majority decision may click this LINK.  Justice Wecht's Concurring Opinion can be viewed HERE.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer State Appellate Case Alert, www.Law.com (April 14, 2026).



Source of image: Photo by Lacey Reapsome on www.unsplash.com.

HAPPY BIRTHDAY TORT TALK

Tort Talk was created 17 years ago today back in 2009.  There have been over 4,600 blog posts on Tort Talk and the blog is still going strong.

Sending thanks out to all the Tort Talkers who read Tort Talk and refer to it to begin and streamline your legal research.  

And thank you to all who have provided tips on important cases and copies of the same so that they can be publicized on Tort Talk for the benefit of all who practice civil litigation in Pennsylvania.

EARLY REGISTRATION DISCOUNT EXPIRES ON MAY 8TH

Recklessness Claims Allowed to Proceed in Case Where Defendant Driver Was Driving While Wearing Medical Boot

In the case of Shea v. Magar, No. 2025-CV-7877 (C.P. Lacka. Co. March 31, 2026 Gibbons, P.J.), President Judge James A. Gibbons of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas addressed Preliminary Objections filed by a Defendant against allegations of recklessness in a motor vehicle accident case.

According to the Opinion, this case matter involved a rear-end accident case. The Defendant was  allegedly wearing a medical boot at the time of the accident against doctor’s orders.  During the course of the accident, the Defendant hit the accelerator with the medical boot instead of the brake.

The court followed the current trend and relied upon the case of Monroe v. CBH2O, LP, 286 A.3d 785, 799 (Pa. Super. 2022) (en banc), and held that, at the pleadings stage, a plaintiff is permitted to make a general averment of gross negligence or recklessness as long as negligence is alleged. 

As such, the court overruled the Defendant’s Preliminary Objection in this regard.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney Brian J. Walsh of the Scranton law firm of Blake & Walsh for bringing this case to my attention

Court Addresses Various Pleadings Issues in a Medical Malpractice Case, Including Allegations of Recklessness

In the case of Limon v. Kontizer, No. 2025-CV-8657 (C.P. Lacka. Co. March 30, 2026 Powell, J.), the court addressed various Preliminary Objections filed by Defendants in a medical malpractice case.

According to the Opinion, this wrongful death medical malpractice case was filed relative to the Plaintiff’s decedent’s treatment in the form of an upper GI endoscopy. According to the Complaint, the Plaintiff alleged that the various medical Defendants failed to properly diagnose, treat, and prevent aspiration pneumonia, sepsis, and multi-organ dysfunction, all of which allegedly led to the Plaintiff’s decedent’s death.

In their Preliminary Objections, the Defendants sought the dismissal of claims for reckless conduct and punitive damages, as well as claims grounded in vicarious liability and negligence.

The court overruled all of the Preliminary Objections filed.

Relative to the claims of recklessness and for punitive damages, the court held that, under Pa. R.C.P. 1019(b), conditions of the mind, such as recklessness, may be alleged in a general fashion as long as negligence is pled.

The court additionally noted that the Complaint sufficiently asserted that the Defendants knowingly disregarded serious, life-threatening risk to the decedent. Accepting these allegations are true, the court concluded that the claims for punitive damages were legally sufficient.

With regards to the issues of vicarious liability, the court rejected the Defendants’ arguments that the Complaint was deficient for failing to identify specific agents or employees. The court noted that Pennsylvania law does not require a Plaintiff in a medical malpractice case to identify every individual agent at the pleadings stage. Rather, the court noted that it is sufficient to allege that the individuals acted within the scope of their employment or agency since the identity of every healthcare professional who was involved in the decedent’s treatment during the approximately one month period at issue could be readily ascertained by the Defendants from their own records.

The court further found that the Plaintiff sufficiently alleged that the Defendants had knowledge of, and allowed the alleged reckless conduct, thereby satisfying the heightened requirements for allegations of vicarious liability for punitive damages under the MCARE Act.

The court otherwise rejected the Defendant’s objections that the Plaintiff’s negligence claims were overly broad and vague.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: Lackawanna Jurist (April 10, 2026).

Court Rules That No New UM Sign Down Form Was Required

In the case of Estate of Woloszyn v. Nationwide Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., No. 10246 of 2022, C.A. (C.P. Lawr. Co. Nov. 21, 2025 Hodge, J.), the court granted summary judgment in favor of a UM carrier on a breach of contract and bad faith claim arising out of a dispute over what the appropriate UM limits were under the policy.

According to the Opinion, this matter arose out of a motorcycle accident when a vehicle being operated by an uninsured motorist crossed the centerline and struck the Plaintiff’s son’s motorcycle, resulting in a fatal accident.

Following the accident, the Plaintiff’s estate made a claim for UM coverage under various insurance policies. There was a dispute between the parties as to whether the UM coverage should be $100,000.00 or $15,000.00.

The court noted that, in 2015, the Plaintiff’s family had obtained a vehicle insurance policy No. 858 from the carrier prior to the accident. Relative to that policy, the Plaintiff’s family executed a signed down form opting to decrease the uninsured motorist coverage to $15,000.00 per person even though the bodily injury liability limit was $100,000.00 per person.

In October of 2020, the 858 policy was replaced by a No. 916 policy as part of the Defendant carrier’s One Product initiative.

The Plaintiff’s family received a Notice of Policy Change which indicated that the 858 policy was expiring and that the policy would be renewed under the terms of the 916 policy.

The Plaintiff accepted the renewal by paying the premium for the 916 policy.


The 916 policy provided bodily injury limits of $100,000.00 per person and UM coverage limits of $15,000.00 per person, which was the same coverage as was selected by the Plaintiff’s family under the 858 policy. The court noted, however, that the Defendant carrier did not obtain an executed sign down form for the lesser amount of UM coverage from the Plaintiff’s family prior to the issuance of the 916 policy.

After the Plaintiff’s family sued the Defendant UM carrier for claims for declaratory judgment, statutory bad faith, breach of contract, negligence, and a violation of the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protections Law, the case proceeded to cross motions for summary judgment.

In ressolving the issues presented, the court ruled that there was no doubt that the policy number had changed from the 858 policy to the 916 policy. The court also noted that the Defendant carrier had provided notice to the Plaintiff that the policy number had changed. It was additionally noted that the Plaintiff did not object to that change and continued to pay the premiums for the new 916 policy.

The court otherwise concluded that the policy language and the sign down form that was previously executed by the Plaintiff relative to the 858 policy were not ambiguous.

After reviewing the facts and circumstances before it, the court concluded that the Defendant carrier’s refusal to pay the higher amount that the Plaintiff desired for the UM claim was not frivolous or unfounded given that the Plaintiff’s family had elected to continue with the reduced UM coverage under the new policy and had evidenced the same by paying the premium.

Based upon this ruling, the court also found that there was no basis for the bad faith claim presented by the Plaintiff given that the Defendant had performed its obligations under the policy by paying out the UM coverage that was paid for by the Plaintiff.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer Common Pleas Case Alert, www.Law.com (March 5, 2026).

PLEASE SPONSOR OR REGISTER FOR LACKAWANNA PRO BONO GOLF TOURNAMENT

Plaintiff Found To Have Made Good Faith Efforts To Complete Service of Process in Medical Malpractice Case

In the case of Francis v. Xu, No. 2025-CV-3745 (C.P. Lacka. Co. April 16, 2026 Nealon, J.), the court addressed Preliminary Objections filed by a Defendant-physician in a medical malpractice matter seeking to dismiss the claims asserted against the physician on the grounds that the Plaintiffs failed to effectuate service of original process in a timely fashion or with good faith upon the Defendant-physician prior to the expiration of the two (2) year statute of limitations. 

Judge Terrence R. Nealon, writing for the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas, agreed that, in order to toll the statute of limitations, a plaintiff must indeed make a good faith effort to timely serve initial process on a Defendant. The court also agreed that, if a plaintiff fails to do so, the lawsuit is subject to dismissal where either (a) the plaintiff has demonstrated an intent to stall the judicial machinery, or (b) the plaintiff’s failure to comply with the Rules regarding service of original process has prejudiced the defendant.

After reviewing the record before him, Judge Nealon found that the Plaintiff in this matter made repeated attempts to serve the Defendant at issue at multiple locations while expeditiously and repeatedly reinstating the Complaint along the way.

Accordingly, the court found that service of process upon the Defendant physician resulted from the Plaintiff’s repeated efforts to diligently and timely serve the doctor. The court also found that the Defendant doctor did not identify any prejudice that she allegedly suffered due to any delay in serving initial process.

As such, the doctor’s Preliminary Objections asserting untimely service of original process were overruled.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.