Third Circuit Affirms Denial of Post-Trial Motions in a Trucking Accident Case

In the case of Sweigart v. Voyager Trucking Corp., No. 23-2397 (3d Cir. July 29, 2024 Bumb, J., Jordan, J., and Smith, J.) (Op. by Bumb, C.J.), the Third Circuit affirmed a trial court decision denying post-trial motions in a trucking accident case that resulted in verdict for the Plaintiff in the amount of $25 million.

In this case, the court ruled that there was no abuse of discretion by the trial court in denying a bifurcation of the liability and damages issues.  The defense sought bifurcation given the serious nature of the Plaintiff's injuries and the fear that that evidence would "infect" the jury's decision on the liability issues.   The court noted that many personal injury case involved serious injuries. The Third Circuit also stated that to hold that a trial court abuses its discretion in denying bifurcation just because a case involves serious personal injuries would flip the presumption against bifurcation. Under the law, the jury is presumed to be able to follow jury instructions to compartmentalize the evidence.

The court also noted that the fact that a juror fainted at trial in response to the presentation of graphic injury evidence does not require a mistrial. The appellate court found that it was not an abuse of discretion by the trial court to deny a mistrial motion where the jury questioning confirmed that the juror could continue and remain impartial.

The appellate court also found that the fact that the Plaintiff’s treating physician rendered medical help to the juror that fainted also did not support a mistrial since the physician was only a witness and to an opposing party.

The court noted that, on appeal, a trial judge’s estimation of a prospective juror’s impartiality shall not be second guessed.

Turning to other issues, the appellate court held that the trial court properly balanced the sudden emergency doctrine with an instruction on the assured clear distance rule. The court agreed that it was for the jury to decide if a sudden emergency existed.

The appellate court also found that it was not an abuse of discretion to exclude evidence of the Plaintiff’s lack of a motorcycle license. The court noted that there was no causal connection between the accident and the Plaintiff’s lack of a motorcycle license. 

The court also found that it was not an abuse of discretion to exclude videos of reckless driving by the Plaintiff at other times. The court noted that prior bad acts cannot be admitted to show a propensity to act in the same way all the time. The evidence at issue in this case did not rise to the level of habit evidence.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney James M. Beck of the Reed Smith law firm in Philadelphia for bringing this case to my attention.

Court Addresses Issues Arising From Accident Between Rider Mower and Passing Motorist

In the case of Barrick v. Koontz, No. 2019-SU-001700 (C.P. York Co. Jan 8, 2024 Vedder, J.), the court granted summary judgment in favor of the Defendants in a case involving a collision between a Plaintiff on a rider lawnmower and a truck that was passing on the roadway.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff-husband, who was on the lawnmower, did not have any memory of the accident and the Plaintiff-wife was not present to witness the accident. The only individuals with any memories of the crash were the Defendant driver and a motorist who was traveling in another vehicle behind the Defendant’s vehicle.

The record also confirmed that the Plaintiff admitted in the case that, as the Defendant driver was driving his truck past the Plaintiff’s property, the Plaintiff’s lawnmower came off a bank and from behind a bush on the property and entered the roadway.

In his Opinion, Judge Vedder addressed multiple issues on the liability question as presented by both sides of the case, including issues regarding the law of negligence, duties owed when entering roadways, expert issues, the last clear chance doctrine, the assured clear distance ahead rule and the mere happening of an accident rule. In the end, the court found that the Plaintiff failed to produce evidence to establish a prima facie case of negligence against the Defendants, specifically with respect to the alleged breach of any duty.

As noted, the court entered summary judgement in favor of the Defendant motorist.    

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

I send thanks to Attorney Stephen M. Hickey of the York, PA law firm of Griffith, Lerman, Lutz & Scheib for bringing this case to my attention.

Pennsylvania Superior Court Rules that Rear End Accident is Evidence of Negligence Per Se

In the case of Smith v. Wells, No. 2254 EDA 2018 (Pa. Super. June 7, 2019 Kunselman, J., Murray, J., and Pelligrini, J.) (Op. by Kunselman, J.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court granted a Plaintiff a new trial in a case where the trial court refused to grant the Plaintiff judgment as a matter of law in a case where the trial court erroneously refused to find that the Defendant’s actions in rear-ending the Plaintiff’s vehicle on the Pennsylvania Turnpike and causing a chain reaction accident amounted to negligence per se under the assured clear distance ahead rule found under 75 Pa. C.S.A. §3361.  

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff was driving on the Pennsylvania Turnpike when he saw traffic braking ahead. The Plaintiff successfully brought his vehicle to a stop within the assured clear distance between himself and the car ahead without striking any vehicles.   The Defendant, who was traveling behind the Plaintiff’s vehicle, did not. 

During his testimony, the Defendant admitted that he did not stop quick enough and rear-ended the Plaintiff’s vehicle in front of him.  

In his opening statement to the jury, the defense counsel advised the jury that the collision was the Defendant’s fault “no question about it.”   At trial, the defense focused on the issue of whether the accident actually caused any injuries to the Plaintiff.   The defense also asserted that the Plaintiff had an extensive prior medical history and was already suffering from the same symptoms that he sought to attribute to the Defendant’s conduct in this matter.  

The Plaintiff moved for a directed verdict on the grounds that the Defendant negligently drove his vehicle into the rear of the Plaintiff's vehicle and breached the standard of care as a matter of law. The trial court denied that motion and submitted a verdict slip to the jury that contained a question of whether or not the Defendant was negligent. The jury answered that question in the negative.

The Plaintiff moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the question of negligence which was denied.  The Plaintiff also filed a post-trial motion seeking the same result.  The trial court denied that motion as well.  This appeal followed. 

On appeal, the Pennsylvania Superior Court reversed and rejected a prior statement by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in a case from 1938, Cirquitella v. C.C. Callaghan, Inc., 200 A.588 (Pa. 1938), in which that Court noted, in part, that “the mere happening of a rear-end collision does not [at common law] constitute negligence as a matter of law on the part of the driver in the rear….” 

The Pennsylvania Superior Court in this Smith v. Wells case limited the Cirquitella decision to its facts and its ancient time period of 1938. The Superior Court noted that, in the recent times, the Pennsylvania legislature had passed 75 Pa. C.S.A. §3361 in which it is provided, in pertinent part, that “No person shall drive a vehicle at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under the conditions and having regard to the actual and potential hazards then existing, nor at a speed greater than will permit the driver to bring his vehicle to a stop within the assured clear distance ahead.   * * *”

The Pennsylvania Superior Court in Smith v. Wells noted that “§3361 is a unified statute on safe-driving speeds and distances.”   The Smith v. Wells court held that this statute prohibits two distinct forms of illegal driving.  “The first is driving at any speed that is unreasonable and imprudent for the conditions and hazards of the road.   The second is driving at any speed that prevents a driver from fully braking before striking a car, pedestrian, or other object ahead."  

The Superior Court noted that a violation of these provisions of this statute amount to negligence per se on the part of the driver.  

In review the facts before it, the court stated that the evidence firmly established that the Defendant drove at a speed that made it impossible for him to stop his vehicle within the assured clear distance ahead and that the trial court, therefore, erred when it did not find that the Defendant’s violation of §3361 amounted to negligence per se. 

Significantly, the Pennsylvania Superior Court also noted that there was no claim by the defense that a sudden emergency existed or any other affirmative defenses “such as brake-failure, ice on the highway, or the Plaintiff’s contributory negligence to excuse this rear-end collision."  

As such, the Superior Court vacated the judgment entered in favor of the Defendant below and also reversed the Order denying the Plaintiff’s request for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.   The case was remanded for a new trial on the issues of causation and damages only (with the issue of negligence being considered decided).

Anyone wishing to review this decision may click this LINK.

Federal Middle District Court Judge James M. Munley Grants Offensive Motion for Summary Judgment Filed by Plaintiff on Liability in Car Accident Case

In the case of Broe v. Manns, No. 3:15-cv-985 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 27, 2016 Munley, J.), Judge James M. Munley of the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania granted an offensive Motion for Summary Judgment filed by the Plaintiffs on the issue of liability in a motor vehicle accident case.  

According to the Opinion, this case arose out of a rear-end motor vehicle accident.  

The Plaintiff filed a Complaint alleging negligence and loss of consortium. Thereafter, the Plaintiff moved for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability.  

After reviewing the summary judgment standard of review, the court granted the Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on liability.  

The Plaintiff main contention was that the Defendant’s admission that he failed to brake to avoid the Plaintiff’s vehicle constituted negligence per se.  

The Defendant countered with an argument that his admission, given during a deposition, was an insufficient basis upon which to grant summary judgment.   The Defendant also asserted that the sudden emergency doctrine relieved him from liability. 

The court stated that it is well-settled that a violation of the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Code constitutes negligence per se.   Relying upon Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Code provisions, including the assured clear distance ahead statute at 75 Pa. C.S.A. §3361, and noting that the police cited for violating that statute, the court found that the Defendant’s admission in this regard eliminated any genuine issue of material fact.   The court found that the Defendant’s admissions, coupled with the citations for violating the assured clear distance ahead statute, sufficiently established negligence per se.   Since the Defendant had not identified any genuine issues of material fact, the court found that there was no sufficient evidentiary basis upon which a reasonable jury could find in the Defendant’s favor on the liability issue.  

The court also rejected the Defendant’s reliance upon the sudden emergency doctrine noting that, under the applicable law, a person cannot avail himself of the protections of that doctrine if that person was himself driving carelessly.   The court stated that, based upon the Defendant’s citation for violating the motor vehicle code, along with his admissions on the issue of liability, the undisputed evidence before the court was found to establish, at the very least, that the Defendant was driving carelessly.  As such, the court found that the Defendant could not rely upon the sudden emergency doctrine to relieve him from liability.  

As stated, overall, the court granted Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the issue of liability.

 

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may contact me at dancummins@comcast.net.

 

I send thanks to Attorney Michael J. Foley of The Foley Law Firm of Scranton, Pennsylvania for bringing this case to my attention.  

 

 

Vehicles Traveling in Same Direction Are Not Static Objects Under Sudden Emergency Doctrine

In its recent decision in the case of Drew v. Work, 2014 Pa.Super. 137 (Pa. Super. June 30, 2014 Shogan, J., Olson, J., and Wecht,J.)(Op. by Olson, J.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court provided one of its latest decisions on the application of the sudden emergency doctrine in a motor vehicle accident case. 

 

In this case, the Plaintiff testified that the Defendant’s vehicle clipped the Plaintiff’s vehicle while the Plaintiff was passing.   The Defendant testified, instead, that the Plaintiff cut off the Defendant’s vehicle.  

 

At trial, the Plaintiff’s requested Points for Charge on negligence per se related to the Defendant’s alleged unsafe departure from his lane, as well as a request for instructions on the sudden emergency doctrine.  

 

The trial court rejected jury instructions on both charges after deeming the Defendant’s vehicle to be a “static object” since both vehicles were traveling in the same direction.  

 

The jury returned a defense verdict finding the Defendant 40% negligence and the Plaintiff  60% negligent.  

 

On appeal, the Plaintiff argued, in part, that the trial court erred in not providing any requested jury instructions on per se negligence and the sudden emergency doctrine. 

 

The Pennsylvania Superior Court rejected the trial court’s determination that the fact that both parties’ vehicles were traveling in the same direction meant that the Defendant’s vehicle was a “static object.”   The court found that such an analysis to be too rigid of an application of the “static object” and “clear distance ahead” rules.  

 

To the contrary, the Pennsylvania Superior Court stated that the Plaintiff was entitled to an instruction on the sudden emergency doctrine under the four part standard of that doctrine, i.e., (1) an individual suddenly and unexpectedly finds himself or herself confronted with a dangerous situation, (2) that permits no opportunity to assess the danger, (3) and that such a person is entitled to the application of the doctrine if he or she responds appropriately, and (4) where the person invoking the doctrine proves that he or she did not create the emergency.

 

The Superior Court noted that, in the case before it, the testimony supported the jury instruction as there was evidence that the Defendant unexpectedly presented the Plaintiff with a dangerous situation that the Plaintiff responded to appropriately, and where the Plaintiff did not create or contribute to the emergency.

 

The Superior Court also ruled that the trial court erred in not providing the jury instruction on the per se negligence rule given that there was evidence to support such a jury instruction.   

Anyone wishing to review this decision may click this LINK.

Source:  "Case Digests."  Pennsylvania Law Weekly (July 8, 2014).

 

LINK to the One Where the Plaintiff Rear-Ended the Defendant and Sued and Court Entered Summary Judgment For Defendant

Tort Talkers may recall that I highlighted the case of Marchese v. Jacobs out of Lycoming County - you know, the one where the Plaintiff motorcyclist rear-ended the Defendant and then sued the Defendant and the Defendant secured a summary judgment.

Many were interested in the case and a number sent me a copy to disseminate.  Here is a LINK to the Marchese decision if you'd like to read it.

I send thanks for sending me a copy or a link to the case to Gary Weber of the Williamsport office of Mitchell Gallagher, Anthony J. Gabriel of the Harrisburg office of Thomas, Thomas & Hafer, Attorney Joseph Kulesa of Mount Pocono, Attorney Walt McClatchy, Jr. out of Philadelphia, and another who wished to remain anonymous.

Summary Judgment for Defendant Who Was Rear-Ended by Plaintiff

In a recent Lycoming County Court of Common Pleas decision in the case of Marchese v. Jacobs, PICS Case No. 14-0795 (C.P. Lycoming Co. May 1, 2014, Anderson, J.), the court granted summary judgment in favor of a Defendant driver who was rear-ended by the Plaintiff’s motorcyclist.

[Yes, you read that correctly - a plaintiff rear-ended a stopped vehicle and then sued that person - where there's a will, there's a way].

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff was riding with other motorcyclists and following the Defendant’s car. The Defendant stopped because the car in front of him had stopped while waiting to turn left. The Plaintiff then collided with the Defendant’s stopped vehicle.

In a Motion for Summary Judgment, the Defendant argued that the accident was solely caused by the Plaintiff’s negligence in failing to keep an assured clear distance between his motorcycle and the Defendant’s vehicle ahead.

The Plaintiff countered with the argument that the Defendants came to a sudden stop and it was the sudden stop that caused the accident, all of which allegations allegedly fell within an application of the sudden emergency doctrine.

The Marchese court noted that the appellate courts of Pennsylvania have found that a sudden braking is deemed to be a foreseeable occurrence on the roadways of Pennsylvania.

Accordingly, the trial court ruled here that the facts of this matter fell within the assured clear distance ahead doctrine rather than the sudden emergency doctrine particularly where the sudden emergency doctrine only applies to "moving instrumentalities" thrust into driver’s path.

Here, the court found no evidence that the Defendant’s vehicle was thrust into the Plaintiff’s path of travel. There was also evidence that the Defendant’s vehicle was at a stopped position, and not moving, at the time of the accident.

Since the court ruled that the sudden emergency room doctrine did not apply and that there was no other evidence of negligence on the Defendant’s part, the Defendants were granted summary judgment.

I do not have a copy of this one.  Anyone desiring a copy of this case may contact the Pennsylvania Instant Case Service of the Pennsylvania Law Weekly by calling 1-800-276-7427 and providing the above noted PICS Case No. along with a payment of a small fee.  

Source: "Case Digests," Pennsylvania Law Weekly (May 27, 2014).

The Future is Now: Info from Vehicle "Black Box" Is Admissible in a Pennsylvania Criminal Case

Once in a while there comes along an appellate court criminal law decision (albeit non-precedential) that could impact Pennsylvania civil litigation matters.

In its recent “non-precedential” memorandum decision in the case of Commonwealth v. Safka,  No. 1312 - WDA - 2012 (Pa.Super. June 2, 2014 Panella, J., Olsen, J., and Wecht, J.)(Non-Precedential)(Mem. Opinion by Panella, J.)(Concurring and Dissenting Op. by Wecht, J.),  a criminal court case, the Pennsylvania Superior Court ruled in a case of first impression that information retrieved from a vehicle's "event data recorder," more commonly known as the "black box," was admissible in a criminal court proceeding.

[Why the Superior Court would list this notable, trend-setting Opinion as “non-precedential” is puzzling to say the least].


Surely, it is only a matter of time before this rule of admissibility is also applied in the civil litigation context.

Once that happens (or even already), the issue becomes whether a party may assert a spoliation, or destruction of evidence, defense against an opposing party for failing to preserve such black box information after a car accident.  

If such a defense is found to be warranted, a court may grant a party an adverse inference jury instruction at trial stating that the jury may infer from the opposing party's failure to preserve the black box information that such information would have been adverse to that party's position. 

As such, it may be wise to consider developing procedures to preserve such information after an accident, particularly where a party denies that he or she was speeding or driving carelessly at the time of an accident.

To view the majority Opinion in Commonwealth v. Safka, please click HERE.

To view Judge Wecht's concurring and dissenting Opinion, please click this LINK.

Sources:  Article by Zack Needles in June 4, 2014 The Legal Intelligencer entitled "Vehicle Speed Information From 'Black Box' Ruled Admissible."  Also thanks to Attorney Walt A. McClatchy, Jr. of the Philadelphia law insurance defense firm of McClatchy and Associates for this tip.