Issues of Fact Results In Reversal of Entry of Summary Judgment in Medical Malpractice Case

In the case of Azaravich v. Wilkes-Barre Hospital Company, LLC, No. 44 MDA 2023 (Pa. Super. June 5, 2024 Lazarus, J., Nichols, J., and Stevens, J.) (Op. by Nichols, J.), the court reversed a summary judgment that was entered by the trial court by the Plaintiff in a medical malpractice case involving a suicide by the Plaintiff’s decedent.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff decedent was taken to the Wilkes-Barre General Hospital where he checked himself into the emergency room after calling the police and expressing suicidal thoughts. After evaluations by different medical providers, the decedent, during which one of which interactions, the decedent indicated that he did not have any intent to harm himself, and that he wanted outpatient treatment, the decedent was released. Unfortunately, two (2) days later, the decedent committed suicide.

The decedent’s estate filed claims for medical negligence against the Defendant hospital and other medical providers.

At the summary judgment stage at the trial court level, the court had granted the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and denied the Plaintiff’s Cross Motion for Summary Judgment.

On appeal, the Pennsylvania Superior Court noted that issues of fact existed on the claims presented such that the case should have been allowed to proceed to a jury.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: Article – “Superior Court Revives Medical Negligence Suit Against Wilkes-Barre General Hospital Following Discharged Patient’s Suicide,” By Riley Brennan of the Legal Intelligencer (www.law.com June 7, 2024).

"Psychological Autopsy" Report Related to Inmate Suicide Ruled Discoverable In Case Against Prison

In the case of Williams v. The GEO Group, Inc., No. 396 E.D.A. 2021 (Pa. Super. Aug. 24, 2022 Dubow, J., McLaughlin, J., and King, J.) (Op. by McLaughlin, J.), the court affirmed the trial court’s granting of a Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel discovery of a “psychological autopsy” report that the Defendant prepared after a prison inmate’s suicide.

This case arose out of the Plaintiff's decedent's suicide while an inmate in a private prison owned by the Defendant.    

In discovery, the Defendant had provided the Plaintiff with all requested documentation except a report called a "psychological autopsy."  The Defendant claimed that the document was protected as being privileged as a peer review document, as a work product document, and due to the attorney-client privilege.

The court found that this report was not privileged under the Peer Review Act.

The court additionally found that the report was not privileged under the scope of Pa. R.C.P. 4003.5 and was relevant under Pa. R.C.P. 4003.1.  As such, the appellate court affirmed the trial court's granting of a motion to compel the production of the report at issue.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: “Digest of Recent Opinions.” Pennsylvania Law Weekly (Sept. 15, 2022).

Source of image:  Photo by Rodnae Productions on www.pexels.com.

Section 1983 Civil Rights Claim Allowed to Proceed

In the case of Reed v. City of Philadelphia, No. 20-3640 (E.D. Pa. June 17, 2021 DuBois, J.), the court denied a city and doctor’s Motions to Dismiss the Plaintiff’s §1983 Civil Rights Claims filed over a decedent’s suicide in jail.

The court found that the Plaintiff, who was the administratrix of the decedent’s estate, had adequately pled a monell’s claim based upon allegations of inadequate training.

The court additionally found that the Plaintiff had adequately pled that the doctor’s deliberate indifference to the decedent’s serious medical needs allowed the case to proceed.

The court also denied the doctor’s Motion to Dismiss the punitive damages claim presented.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.  The companion Order can be viewed HERE.


Source: “Digest of Recent Opinions.” Pennsylvania Law Weekly (July 6, 2021).

Court Rules No Breach and No Bad Faith Where Exclusion Precluded Coverage

In the case of Tarttour v. Safeco Ins. Co., No. 17-1896 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 28, 2020 DuBois, J.), the court granted the carrier’s Motion for Summary Judgment in a breach of contract and bad faith claim after finding that coverage did not apply under the case presented. 

By way of background, Defendant Safeco, provided a homeowner’s insurance policy to its insured. The insured lived in the home covered by the policy with his two (2) children. The insured became ill and went to the hospital where he had to be put on life support. 

When a decision was made by the insured’s wife and one of his children to remove the insured from life support, the insured’s other adult child did not agree with the decision and began to threaten suicide. As part of that process, that adult son set his room on fire in an effort to commit suicide but then changed his mind and survived. 

A fire loss claim was submitted to the carrier for coverage. The carrier denied coverage asserting that the accidental loss provision in the policy did not apply and/or that coverage was excluded under the intentional loss exclusion. 

After reviewing the facts of the case before it and noting that coverage disputes were initially to be decided by the court, the court ruled that the facts presented did not fall under the accidental loss provision of the policy and/or that the facts implicated the intentional loss exclusion. As such, the breach of contract claim was dismissed.

The court also dismissed the companion bad faith claim after finding that the undisputed evidence demonstrated that the carrier has a reasonable basis for denying the Plaintiff’s claim for coverage.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

I send thanks to Attorney Lee Applebaum of the Philadelphia law firm of Fineman, Krekstein & Harris, as well as the writer of the excellent Pennsylvania and New Jersey Insurance Bad Faith Case Law blog, for bringing this decision to my attention.

Court Finds that Homeowner's Carrier Required to Defend Insureds Against Claims that Insured Caused Another's Suicide by Cyber-Bullying

In what may be a case of first impression, in State Farm Fire and Cas. Co. v. Motta, No. 18-3956 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 11, 2018 Kearney, J.), Judge Mark A. Kearney of the Federal Eastern District Court of Pennsylvania held that a homeowner’s policy was required to defend a case on behalf of a Defendant-homeowner whose son allegedly bullied another high school student with text messages, allegedly causing that other student to commit suicide as a result.  

After the parents of the deceased student sued the harasser and his parents for negligence, the defendants turned to their carrier for liability coverage under their homeowner's policy.  The policy provided coverage for any "occurrence" which was defined in the policy as an "accident."

In this declaratory judgment action on coverage, the carrier argued that, because the harasser sent a text message to the victim, there was no "accident" as to his actions.

In response, the insured defendants argued that Pennsylvania law requires, in the analysis of whether an "accident" occurred in the context of the policy, that the question of foreseeability be viewed from the insured's perspective.  In this regard, the insured defendants asserted that, although it cannot be disputed that the insured sent the text message, the victim's suicide thereafter constituted an extraordinary intervening event far beyond anything contemplated under the circumstances and was therefore unforeseeable to the insured and, in the end, fell within the definition of an "accident."

The court noted that "[t]he parties have not cited, and we cannot find, Pennsylvania law addressing whether the [insured'] alleged negligence possibly leading to this ever more prevalent tragedy among our students is an occurrence mandating coverage."

Ultimately, after analyzing the facts before it, the court held that the homeowner's insurance carrier was indeed required to provide a defense and possible indemnity on negligence claims presented in this unfortunate case.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.  The Court's companion Order can be viewed HERE.

Student Suicide Case Allowed to Proceed Under Rehabilitation Act and ADA Claims

In the case of Beam v. Western Wayne School District, No. 3:15-CV-01126 (M.D. Pa. 2018 Caputo, J.), the Federal Middle District Court of Pennsylvania denied a Defendant school district’s motion for summary judgment relative to claims filed by parents following their son's suicide.

In this case, the Plaintiffs alleged that the school district failed to properly implement an educational plan under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA on behalf of a disabled student who had ADHD.  According to the allegations, the student committed suicide on the last day of school allegedly as a result of academic failures stemming from the failures of the school to implement the educational plan.  The parents asserted that the school was responsible for their son's suicide because officials failed to notify them that their son was struggling academically, which was allegedly required under the education plan.

Judge A. Richard Caputo
M.D. Pa.

In a previous ruling in this case, Judge Caputo had dismissed a failure to prevent suicide claim presented by the Plaintiffs.

The defense asserted that the Plaintiff's were attempting to recast a failure to prevent suicide claim as a violation of the Section 504 and the ADA.  The Court rejected this defense and noted that issues of fact compelled the Court to deny the school district's request for summary judgment on the claims presented.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.  The Court's companion Order can be viewed HERE.

Decision by Judge Minora Expands the Law of Negligent Liability for a Suicide

In his recent March 19, 2014 Opinion (31 pages) in the case of Hudak-Bisset v. County of Lackawanna et al., No. 2007-CV-2401 (C.P. Lacka. Co. March 19, 2014 Minora, J.), Lackawanna County Judge Carmen D. Minora addressed the unfortunate issue of whether a Plaintiff's Motion to Amend a Complaint should be granted to allow for the inclusion of Wrongful Death/Survival Act claims where the death of the Plaintiff resulted from a suicide that was allegedly brought on by the decedent's pain from a motor vehicle accident.

Judge Carmen D. Minora
Lackawanna County

Judge Minora more specifically describe the matter as involving the "vexing and complicated question of whether a Plaintiff ought to be allowed to recover damages for a suicide allegedly secondary to accident related injuries and chronic pain caused by the Tortfeasor/Defendant."  Op. at p. 3. 

The court noted that the resolution of this issue was found to be particularly vexing in light of the fact that it has been addressed on previous occasions in the context of a wide variety of factual scenarios subjected to different standards of review in the case law such as the legal standards applicable to preliminary objections, motions for summary judgment, and motions to amend to name a few.

After reviewing the procedural  law of Pa.R.C.P. 1033 which allows for the liberal construction of requests to amend pleadings and analyzing the substantive law with a  a "Palsgraf-like" assessment of the extent and duration of the duty and proximate cause which the alleged tortfeasor defendant owed the plaintiff, Judge Minora ultimately digressed from a line of cases to hold that the amendment should be allowed.

Judge Minora differed with a line of cases dating back to 1989 that have generally ruled that a  wrongful death action can not be based upon a suicide event as a suicide was viewed as an independent intervening act that is considered so extraordinary as to be deemed essentially unforeseeable to the tortfeasor.  That line of cases therefore held as a matter of law that the tortfeasor's negligence could not be the proximate cause of a later suicide since such injuries were not foreseeable.  See McPeake v. William T. Cannon, Esq., P.C., 553 A.2d 439 (Pa.Super. 1989).

With his ruling in this Hudak-Bisset case, Judge Minora can not be said to be yet another judge who "rigidly follow[s]" the McPeake line of cases.  Rather, Judge Minora relied in part on retired Lackawanna County Judge S. John Cottone's decision in the case of Mackin v. Arthur J. McHale Heating & Air Conditioning Co., Inc., 76 D.&C.4th 544 (C.P. Lacka. Co. 2005) to rule differently.  Judge Cottone ruled in Mackin, noted to possibly one of the only decisions on record that did not follow the McPeake rule of law, that the above-referenced line of cases on this issue of non-liability for a suicide on the grounds that the injuries were totally unforeseeable was too "restrictive" and that, in some factual contexts, a jury should be allowed to assess whether or not a plaintiff has met their burden of proving the element of proximate causation.

Judge Minora distinguished the McPeake decisions on its facts, on public policy grounds, by the legal standard of review applied (preliminary objections in McPeake versus a liberal motion to amend a Complaint standard in this Hudak-Bisset case), and by the fact that the defendant in this Hudak-Bisset case before him was a common carrier bus company who, by law, is held to the highest degree of care in negligence actions.  Judge Minora was also influenced in this matter on the proximate causation question by the fact that the decedent left a suicide note indicating that the decedent had ended his life in part due to the inability to continue on with the chronic ongoing pain caused by the subject accident with the defendant.

Judge Minora also pointed to other lines of cases on other important issues that have been allowed to be expanded as part of the living law such as, for example, the slow but steady expansion of the ambit of liability in negligent infliction of emotional distress claims from the "impact" rule, to the "zone of danger" rule, to the "bystander" rule and, most recently the further expansion of that doctrine in the context of medical malpractice cases.

Judge Minora reasoned that, in a similar fashion in this Hudak-Bisset case, the Plaintiff was seeking to amend the Complaint to assert wrongful death and survival claims in the context of a suicide case despite McPeake and its progeny.  The Plaintiffs were proceeding on the grounds that the evolution of the law may allow for a finding that claims of this type and in this context may prove to be valid in the end.  Concisely, the Plaintiffs were fighting for the basic right to "test the limits of the existing law and [to] be allowed to plead [the claim] as a developing area of the law." Hudak-Bisset at p. 15.

Judge Minora also applied on the five part test enunciated by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in the case of Althaus v. Cohen, 756 A.2d 1166 (Pa. 2000), to determine whether any duty exists ((1) the relationship between the parties, (2) the social utility of the actor's conduct, (3) the nature of the risk imposed and the foreseeability of the harm incurred, (4) the consequences of imposing a duty upon the actor, and (5) the overall public interest in the proposed solution."

The court ruled that the Althaus test supported the finding of a duty under the facts presented and in particular, the facts intended to be pled of an alleged suicide note allegedly tying the suicide to the Defendants' alleged negligence.  The court in Hudak-Bisset also pointed out the evolution of jury instructions and verdict slips from the use of the term "substantial factor" to "factual cause" would also support a finding of possible liability in this context, i.e. was the negligence of the tortfeasor a factual cause of the decedent's suicide under this set of facts?"

Accordingly, after revisiting the liberal standard of review applicable to motions to amend pleadings under Pa.R.C.P. 1033, Judge Minora ultimately ruled that, under the facts plead, the Plaintiff's right to try to push for an expansion of the law should be honored. 

As such, the motion to amend the Complaint was granted.

Anyone wishing to read Judge Minora's Opinion in Hudak-Bisset may click HERE.

To review a Tort Talk post on other cases addressing liability under Pennsylvania law relative to a suicide, click on this LINK.

Recovery Against Negligent Third Parties For Suicide Not Recognized in Pennsylvania (Absent Special Duty)

In his recent July 2, 2012 decision in the case of Ferris v. Cleaveland, No. 3:10-1302 (M.D.Pa July 2, 2012 Mannion, M.J.), Federal Middle District Court Judge Malachy E. Mannion addressed the law of causation and negligence of third parties in terms of injuries sustained by an alleged suicide attempts.

The Ferris case stems from a pedestrian/motor vehicle accident where the plaintiff was alleging a left knee injury. During discovery, the plaintiff allegedly attempted suicide. As a result of his suicide attempt, the plaintiff allegedly suffered an anoxic encephalopathy, which left him with severe cognitive injuries.

The plaintiffs, through their neuropsychological expert, claimed that the suicide attempt was a result of the injuries sustained and stressors placed upon the Plaintiff as a result of the pedestrian/motor vehicle accident.
 
The defendant filed a Motion in Limine to preclude the claims for mental and cognitive injury that occurred as a result of the suicide attempt.
 
Federal Magistrate Judge Mannion granted the motion holding that absent a special duty (generally related to mental health professionals and employers) recovery against negligent third parties for suicide is not recognized in Pennsylvania.
 
Anyone desiring a copy of this Opinion may contact me at dancummins@comcast.net.
 
I send thanks to the prevailing defense attorneys Seth Black, Esq. and Thomas McDonnell of the Pittsburgh law firm of Summers, McDonnell, Hudock, Guthrie & Skeel, P.C. for forwarding this interesting decision in the Ferris case to my attention.