A recent Post-Koken severance Order was handed down in Dauphin County in the case of Phaler v. Ray and Westfield Ins. Co., No. 2014 CV 7332 (C.P. Dauph. Co. April 3, 2015 Bratton, J.).
The court granted a third party tortfeasor's Preliminary Objections seeking the severance of the negligence claims asserted against him from the breach of contract claims asserted against the UIM carrier.
This decision was by Order only.
Notably, this decision goes against the trend of several prior Dauphin County decisions that went the other way, i.e., in favor of the consolidation of such claims through discovery. No rationale for this change of position is noted in the Phaler Order.
Anyone desiring a copy of this Order may contact me at dancummins@comcast.net.
I send thanks to the prevailing defense attorney, W. Darren Powell, Esq. from the Lemoyne, PA law firm of Johnson, Duffie, Stewart & Weidner for bringing this case to my attention.
Thursday, April 30, 2015
Wednesday, April 29, 2015
Attorney-Client Privilege and Subject Matter Waiver of Privilege Analyzed by Lackawanna County Judge Minora
By way of background, the case arose out of claims for breach of contract and a request for the entry of a declaratory judgment that coverage was owed under an insurance policy issued to the a local insured entity by Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Company.
This matter involved an argument that One Beacon had disclosed a privileged attorney-client communication which disclosure served to waive that privilege and thereby allowed for the discovery of the document at issue. The communication was contained in a claim note in which an unidentified adjuster referred to the opinion of in-house counsel.
In his Opinion, Judge Minora provided a detailed review on the current status and parameters of the attorney-client privilege under Pennsylvania law as well as the recognized "subject matter waiver" of the privilege. This particular type of waiver recognizes that a voluntary disclosure of a communication protected by the attorney-client privilege results in a waiver of the privilege for all communications on the same subject matter.
After reviewing the matter, Judge Minora concluded that the document at issue could not waive privilege since it was not a communication from a client to an attorney. Therefore, the document was not protected by the attorney-client privilege. Since the document was not protected under the attorney-client privilege, it could not serve as the basis for a subject matter waiver of the attorney-client privilege.
Judge Minora also went on to analyze the five-part test of whether the inadvertent disclosure amounted to a waiver of the privilege under the circumstances of the case. Judge Minora ultimately ruled that the five-part test was not satisfied.
As such, the defendant's motion to compel the production of the documents at issue was denied.
This Opinion serves as an excellent primer on the issues raised by an inadvertent disclosure of a document or communication asserted to be protected by the attorney-client privilege.
Anyone wishing
to secure a copy of this case may contact me at dancummins@comcast.net.
I send thanks
to Attorney Matt Clayberger of the Harrisburg, PA office of Thomas, Thomas
& Hafer for bringing this case to my attention.
Labels:
Attorney-Client Privilege,
Judge Minora
Monday, April 27, 2015
Summary Judgment in Food Fight Slip and Fall Case Upheld on Appeal
Tort Talkers may recall the blog post reporting on the granting of Summary Judgment in the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas decision of Rovinsky v. Lourdesmont, No. 2011-CV-2304 (C.P. Lacka.
That decision was recently affirmed in a non-precedential Opinion by the Pennsylvania Superior Court. Notably the appellate court upheld the trial court's decision that the record confirmed that the Plaintiff assumed the risk of walking across a floor rendered dangerous by the food fight and that, given that assumption of the risk by the plaintiff, no duty was owed to her by the Defendant possessor of land.
Anyone wishing to review the Superior Court's "Non-precedential" decision may contact me at dancummins@comcast.net.
The prevailing defense attorney in this matter was Attorney Daniel D. Stofko of the Scranton office of the Cipriani & Werner law firm.
Source of photo: John Belushi from Animal House (1978).
TORT TALK EXPO 2015 Approved for 4 CLE Credits
The Tort Talk Expo 2015, set to take place on Thursday, September 24, 2015 at the Mohegan Sun Casino in Wilkes-Barre, PA, has been approved for 4 CLE Credits by the Pennsylvania CLE Board. There will be 3 Substantive and 1 Ethics CLE Credits offered at the program.
For a Program Agenda, click HERE
To Register to save your spot, please click this LINK.
To reserve a room at the Mohegan Sun Casino, please click HERE
Friday, April 24, 2015
Compromise Verdict Upheld Even Though Parties Stipulated to Amount of Economic Damages
In its recent decision in Kinderman v. Cunningham, No. 1604 EDA 2013, 2015 Pa. Super. 30 (Pa. Super. Feb. 11, 2015 Bowes, Ott, Jenkins, J.J.) (Op. by Bowes, J.)(Ott, J., Dissenting), the Pennsylvania Superior Court ruled that a new trial ordered by the lower court on the issue of damages was improper where the jury’s award of only a fraction of the uncontested economic damages presented at trial likely represented a compromise verdict based upon the substantial conflict over the issue of liability.
This case arose out of a fractured ankle that allegedly resulted from a boating accident. In its Opinion, the court noted that the issue of liability was hotly contested and witnesses provided conflicting accounts as to how the accident happened and who was at fault.
At trial, the Plaintiff’s medical bills and lost wages were stipulated to by both parties. More specifically, the parties agreed that the Plaintiff's medical expenses amounted to $28,541.15 and his wage losses totalled $8,872.50. As such, going into the trial, the parties had stipulated that the Plaintiff's economic damages claims amounted to a total sum of $37,413.65.
Nevertheless, the jury returned a verdict finding the Plaintiff and the Defendant equally negligent (i.e., 50-50) and awarded damages only in the amount of $10,000.00, which were reduced to $5,000.00 to reflect the Plaintiff’s 50% contributory negligence.
On appeal, the Plaintiff argued that the jury’s award was arbitrary and contrary to the uncontested evidence of the economic damages presented.
The defense argued that the jury was permitted to compromise its award of damages in light of the contested issues of liability.
The Pennsylvania Superior Court recognized that compromise verdicts were permissible under Pennsylvania law. The appellate court again emphasized that there were contested arguments and conflicting testimony on the liability issues. It appeared to the Pennsylvania Superior Court that it was likely that the jury reached an impasse and compromised on the verdict to reach an agreement on the question of liability. Ultimately, the Superior Court found that the jury’s verdict was sufficiently supported by the record.
As such, the Pennsylvania Superior Court found that, where a substantial conflict on the issue of liability indicated that the jury reached a compromise verdict, it would have been an abuse of discretion for the trial court to grant a new trial on the issue of damages. As such, Superior Court ruled that the trial court properly denied a request for a new trial in this regard.
Anyone wishing to review the Majority Opinion of the Superior Court written by Judge Bowes may click this LINK.
The Dissenting Opinion by Judge Ott can be viewed HERE.
Thursday, April 23, 2015
Non-Precedential Superior Court Opinion on Fair Scope of Expert Reports (Check Out the Dissent)
In a recent Memorandum Opinion, the Pennsylvania Superior Court addressed the fair scope of expert report rule, as well as issues pertaining to the untimely production of an expert report, in the medical malpractice case of Chiodetti v. Fernandez, No. 63 EDA 2013 (Pa. Super. Feb. 6, 2015 Bowes, Ott, Strassburger, J.J.) (Mem. Op. by Ott, J.)(Bowes, J., Dissenting).
As this Opinion was issued only as a Memorandum Opinion and
has been identified by the Superior Court as a “non-precedential” Opinion was a
detailed summary is not provided.
(Why does the Superior Court all-too-often label written Opinions as "non-precedential" when every bit of guidance from the appellate courts on important and recurring issues, such as the fair scope of expert report rule in this case, is helpful to both the bar and the lower courts in addressing the same questions in future cases?)
Judge Bowes' strongly worded Dissenting Opinion in this case can be viewed HERE. Although not precedential, this Dissenting Opinion would serve as an excellent guide to formulate a brief supporting an argument that an opposing party's expert had improperly testified beyond the fair scope of his or her report at trial.
Source of Image: www.logolog.co
Tuesday, April 21, 2015
Pennsylvania Superior Court Addresses Requirements for Valid Reservation of Rights Letter
The defendant driver was involved in a motor vehicle accident while she was allegedly driving under the influence.
After the underlying personal injury suit was filed by the allegedly injured plaintiff against the parents, as owners of the vehicle, and the defendant driver-daughter, the parents filed preliminary objections and were dismissed from the matter.
Thereafter, about three and a half months after that dismissal of the parent defendants, and about seven months after the filing of the Complaint, the liability carrier issued a reservation of rights letter to the lawyer of the defendant driver daughter.
In this separate declaratory judgment action, the parties were seeking a judicial declaration on whether the liability carrier was required to defend or indemnify the defendant daughter driver in the underlying action based upon the application of certain exclusions in the liability policy.
The trial court granted the carrier's disclaimer of coverage with respect to the defendant driver on the basis of a "controlled substances" exclusion contained in the policy. The insured defendant driver and the underlying plaintiff appealed that decision to the Superior Court.
The Superior Court reversed the trial court and held that liability coverage should be afforded by the carrier to the defendant driver because carrier did not reserves its rights properly and waited too long to reserve its rights and disclaim coverage for the driver.
The Court noted that the reservation of right letter to the defendant driver was only addressed to the parent named insureds and not the daughter driver. Accordingly, the Court found that that letter did not properly notify the daughter of the reservation of the rights to the claim against her.
The Superior Court also ruled that the fact that the reservation of rights letter was sent to the defendant driver's counsel did not serve to impute notice to the insured.
The appellate court rejected the liability carrier's argument that there was no prejudice to the defendant driver with respect to the timeliness of the reservation of rights letter given the fact that the defendant driver was defended by assigned counsel all the while. The court noted that Pennsylvania law allows for prejudice to the insured defendant may be presumed in these circumstances where a liability carrier allegedly fails to issue a timely reservation of rights letter.
For these primary reasons, the Superior Court reversed the trial court's ruling in favor of the liability carrier's disclaimer of coverage for the defendant driver.
Anyone wishing to review this decision may click this LINK.
I send thanks to Attorney Scott Cooper of the Harrisburg, PA law firm of Schmidt Kramer for bringing this case to my attention.
Source of image: www.firstcallclaims.com
Labels:
Automobile Insurance,
Coverage Questions,
Declaratory Judgment Actions,
Reservation of Rights Letter
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