Tuesday, February 8, 2022

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Pennsylvania Superior Court Addresses Waiver of Psychologist-Patient Privilege Relative to Subpoena For Plaintiff's Mental Health Records [Non-Precedential]


In the case of Boyle v. Mainline Health, Inc., No. 728 EDA 2021 (Pa. Super. Jan. 10, 2022 McCaffery, J., Panella, P.J., DuBow, J.) (Op. by McCaffery, J.) (DuBow, J. dissenting)[Non-Precedential], the Pennsylvania Superior Court reversed a lower court's Order striking the Plaintiff's objections to certain subpoenas the Defendant served in an effort to secure mental health records on the Plaintiff in an alleged birth injury medical malpractice case.

The court found that the psychologist-patient privilege is not waived by a Plaintiff making general allegations of emotional pain and suffering, upset, and mental distress as opposed to making specific claims for specific mental diagnoses.

The Court found that, in order for there to be a waiver of the privilege, allegations of recognized mental conditions such as anxiety, mental injury, severe emotional trauma requiring treatment are required.

The court additionally confirms that the assertion of claim for loss of consortium, in and of itself, does not result in a waiver of the psychiatric privilege.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.  The Dissenting Opinion by Judge Dubow can be viewed HERE.

I send thanks to Attorney James M. Beck of the Philadelphia office of the Reed Smith law firm for bringing this case to my attention.

Source of image:  Photo by Mark Williams on www.unsplash.com.

Friday, February 4, 2022

Plaintiff's Attorney and Firm Disqualified Where Attorney Previously Represented Corporate Defendant in Many Matters


In the case of Darrow v. PPL Electric Utilities Corp., No. 236 MDA 2021 (Pa. Super. Dec. 14, 2021 Panella, P.J., Murray, J. and Stevens, P.J.E.) (Op. by Murray, J.)(Stevens, P.J.E., dissenting), the Pennsylvania Superior Court reversed a trial court’s decision on an issue of whether the Plaintiff’s attorney, who formerly represented the Defendant, PPL, while working as a defense counsel at another law firm, should be precluded, as well as the entire Plaintiff’s firm, from representing the Plaintiff due to the prior representation of the Defendant.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff allegedly sustained injuries when the vehicle he was operating collided with a utility pole and then came into contact with a downed powerline.

The Plaintiff retained his attorney and the Plaintiff’s law firm. Thereafter, the Defendant filed a Motion to Disqualify the Plaintiff’s attorney and the Plaintiff’s law firm representing the Plaintiff given that the Plaintiff’s attorney had previously and extensively defended the Defendant, PPL, in numerous matters.  The Defendant, PPL, asserted that the attorney allegedly had intermittent knowledge of the inner workings of the Defendant’s operations and litigation strategy. In essence, the Defendant asserted that there was an impermissible conflict of interest under the Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct that implicated not only the Plaintiff’s attorney but the entire Plaintiff’s law firm.

According to the appellate Opinion, the trial court had agreed that the specific Plaintiff’s attorney should be disqualified.  However, the trial court ruled that the Plaintiff’s entire law firm did not have to be disqualified.

The appellate court disagreed on appeal. As such, the appellate court reversed the trial court’s Order and directed the trial court to enter an Order disqualifying the entire Plaintiff’s law firm.

In this regarding, the Superior Court ruled that the Plaintiff’s attorney at issue had had a substantial prior relationship with the Defendant that included the attorney having access to the Defendant’s confidential information regarding its internal operations and litigation strategy. 

The appellate court further found that the Plaintiff’s law firm’s small size weighed in favor of disqualification of the firm as it would be difficult to prevent contact between the attorney at issue and the other attorneys in the Plaintiff’s law firm. The court also noted that the Plaintiff’s attorney at issue had already provided substantial work on the Plaintiff’s case prior to the disqualification.

The appellate court was also influenced to rule in its fashion by the fact that the Plaintiff’s law firm had only implemented a conflicts screening policy after the particular attorney had been disqualified from the case.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.  The Dissenting Opinion by Judge Stevens can be reviewed HERE.


Source: “Digest of Recent Opinions.” Pennsylvania Law Weekly (Jan. 4, 2022).

Source of image:  Photo by GR Stocks on www.unsplash.com.

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Thursday, February 3, 2022

No Bad Faith If No Coverage Under UIM Policy


In the case of Miale v. Nationwide Ins. Co. of America, No. 2:21-CV-00702-CCW (W.D. Pa. Dec. 27, 2021 Wiegand, J.), the federal court dismissed a Plaintiff’s UIM bad faith claim given that there was an underlying finding that no coverage existed under the policy at issue such that there was, therefore, no valid breach of contract claim. 

The court noted that there was no coverage under the policy at issue given that the Plaintiff was found to have appropriately waived stacking under that policy.

The court reviewed issues surrounding intra-policy stacking and inter-policy stacking questions.    

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

I send thanks to Attorney Lee Applebaum of the Philadelphia office of Fineman, Krekstein & Harris for bringing this case to my attention. Attorney Applebaum is the writer of the excellent Pennsylvania and New Jersey Insurance Bad Faith Case Law blog which can be viewed HERE.

Source of image:   Photo by Kampus Production from www.pexels.com.

Eastern District Court Magistrate Judge Reviews Validity of UM/UIM Stacking Waiver Forms



In the case of Gramaglia-Parent v. Travelers Home & Marine Ins. Co., No. 2:-20-CV-03480-TR (E.D. Pa. Dec. 30, 2021 Rice, Mag. J.), the court ruled that an inter-policy UM/UIM stacking waiver form was not invalid simply because it contained additional language in a separate instruction section that was superfluous to the language required by the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law.

As such, the carrier’s Motion for Summary Judgment was granted.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: “Digest of Recent Opinions.” Pennsylvania Law Weekly (Jan. 20, 2022).