Thursday, January 9, 2020

ARTICLE: YEAR-END REVIEW: ANOTHER YEAR OF NOTABLE DECISIONS IN Pa.

This article recently appeared in the January 2, 2020 edition of the Pennsylvania Law Weekly and is reprinted here with permission.  Images have been added here that were not in the original article.

My year-end review article covering the top cases and trends in Auto Law matters is forthcoming.




Year-End Review: Another Year of Notable Decisions in Pa.

By Daniel E. Cummins | January 02, 2020 at 10:24 AM



A number of notable decisions were handed down over the past year by the various courts of Pennsylvania on general civil litigation issues not involving motor vehicle accident matters. Here is a sampling of decisions of note from 2019.

Attorney Work Product Doctrine


In BouSamra v. Excela Health, No. 5 WAP 2015 (Pa. June 18, 2019), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court provided its latest review of the attorney work product doctrine. The court addressed the issue of whether a law firm’s pre-litigation emails sent to a public relations firm served to waive the attorney work product doctrine. 

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded the work product doctrine was not waived by disclosure unless the alleged work product was disclosed to an adversary or disclosed in a manner that significantly increased the likelihood that an adversary or anticipated adversary would obtain it. This matter was remanded back to the trial court for an application of the newly articulated work product waiver analysis.

Premises Liability


Decisions handed down in 2019 served to continue the trend of courts ruling that plaintiffs cannot recover for injuries resulting from slip-and-fall events that occur while it is still snowing. 

In the case of Rosatti v. McKinney Properties, No. 2017-0022 (C.P. Centre Co. Jan. 22, 2019 Grine, J.), the court entered summary judgment in favor of a defendant landowner under the Hills and Ridges Doctrine. 

According to the opinion, the plaintiff slipped and fell while leaving the property while snow and freezing rain was falling.

In reviewing the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, the court in Rosatti cited to Collins v. Philadelphia Suburban Development, 179 A.3d 69, 75 (Pa. Super. 2018), and emphasized that, under the prevailing case law, “a landowner has no obligation to correct the conditions until a reasonable time after the winter storm has ended.” The court additionally noted that “a property owner does not have a duty to clear ice or snow from walkways as soon as it forms or falls. As such, summary judgment was granted.

In the case of Beauford v. Second Nature Landscaping & Construction, No. 20 16-CV-8925 (C.P. Del. Co. Nov. 19, 2018 Green, J.), the court also cited to the Collins case and held that a defendant landowner was not liable for alleged injuries suffered by a plaintiff in a slip and fall event that occurred during an active storm since the defendant had no obligation under Pennsylvania law to correct the conditions until a reasonable time after the storm ended. 

Service of Process

In 2019, there was a plethora of cases that were dismissed due to a plaintiff’s failure to properly or timely complete service of original process.
The latest appellate court review of the application of the Lamp v. Heyman line of cases can be found in Sawyers v. Davis, 2019 Pa. Super. 219 (Pa. Super. Oct. 22, 2019). In Sawyers, the Pennsylvania Superior Court ruled that a trial court erred in dismissing the plaintiff’s personal injury action against a defendant motorist for improper service. 

The central issue in the matter involved the Plaintiff properly serving an out-of-state defendant by way of a certified letter, return receipt requested. According to the opinion, the green return receipt card was lost by the U.S. Post Office. However, the post office did supply tracking documentation that confirmed delivery of the letter. Also produced was a scanned signature of the person who accepted the letter. There was also additional evidence presented that the defendant driver, who was a cousin of the plaintiff, otherwise had notice of the lawsuit.

The appellate court found that the technical defects at issue in this case did not warrant the dismissal of the action, particularly where it was clear that the defendant had notice of the suit and no prejudice was found.

Bad Faith

Over the past year, one recurring bad faith issue reviewed by the federal courts involved the proper pleading of a bad faith claim against an insurance company. The Pennsylvania and New Jersey Insurance Bad Faith Case Law Blog written by Lee Applebaum of the Philadelphia law firm of Fineman, Krekstein & Harris is an excellent resource to find the latest cases on a wide variety of bad faith issues.

One case from 2019 that involved proper pleadings in a bad faith complaint was the case of Rosenthal v. American States Insurance, No. 1:18-cv-01755 2019, M.D. Pa. March 26, 2019 Kane, J.). In Rosenthal, the court dismissed a bad faith count in a UIM case but allowed the plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint. 

Generally speaking, the court in Rosenthal noted that failing to plead descriptions of what a carrier actually did or failed to do, or why they did it, can be fatal to a bad faith claim under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

Judge Yvette Kane additionally held that identifying the difference between a demand and an offer alone cannot serve as the basis for claim for bad faith, absent allegations that the carrier acted unreasonably and in bad faith by making the lower offer. 

As noted, despite the many faults found with the complaint, as is typical, the court in Rosenthal allowed a second bite at the apple by granting the plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint. Other cases from the past year show that the federal courts are not wont to allow more than two attempts to file a properly pleaded bad faith complaint.

For example, in the case of Moran v. USAA, No. 3:18-cv-2085 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 14, 2019 Caputo, J.), the court had previously dismissed a plaintiff’s bad faith claim without prejudice and leave to amend to correct certain issues with the complaint. However, when challenges were again made to the amended complaint that was filed, the court dismissed the action

In Moran, the court noted that the only additional pleadings added to the original complaint were facts that possibly supported the plaintiff’s evaluation of the claims presented, but no new facts were added to support the allegation that the carrier’s settlement offer was allegedly unreasonable. Nor were any new facts to show how the carrier allegedly knew or recklessness disregarded the fact that its offer was unreasonable. Further leave to amend the Complaint was not granted. 


Fraternities

Last year also gave rise to a number of decisions in cases involving personal injuries at fraternities.

In Rose v. Vilmatelo, No. 2018-SU-450 (C.P. Adams Co. April 12, 2019 George, J.), the court addressed preliminary objections filed by Gettysburg College seeking the dismissal of a plaintiff’s personal injury claim arising out of allegations that the plaintiff, a college student, was injured by an allegedly inebriated participant at a fraternity function on campus. 

The court dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint against the college based upon the case of Alumni Association v. Sullivan, 572 A.2d 1209 (Pa. 1990), in which it was held that college students were no longer minors, but rather adults who were capable of protecting their own self interests. As such, under that case, a college was found not to have any duties in loco parentis with respect to its students. 

A motion to dismiss was also addressed in the federal court case of Piazza v. Young, No. 4:19-CV-00128 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 27, 2019 Brann, J.), which arose out of fatal injuries allegedly sustained by a student at Pennsylvania State University allegedly as a result of hazing activities in a fraternity. The court granted the motions in part and denied the motions in part. 

Of note, with respect to those fraternity brothers defendants who were under the age of 21, the court allowed the claims of the plaintiff to proceed against those underaged defendants under the plaintiff’s theory of recovery to hold the defendants liable for breaching an alleged protective duty that the defendants, as fraternity members, allegedly owed to the plaintiff’s son, a fraternity pledge.

In this regard, Judge Matthew Brann refused to apply the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in the case of Kapres v. Heller, 640 A.2d 888 (Pa. 1994) in as an expansive manner as requested by those moving defendants who were under the age of 21. Under the Kapres case, the Supreme Court generally ruled that individuals under the age of 21 cannot be held liable under the social host doctrine to a guest or third party injured on the premises relative to the service of alcohol. 

The court in this Piazza case refused to read the Kapres case as immunizing the fraternity defendants in this case from alleged liability for their otherwise allegedly wrongful conduct that involved the provision of alcohol. The court also noted that an expansive reading of the Kapres decision in the context of this case would not serve to further the social utility of the Pennsylvania statutes against hazing activities.

Products Liability

In the case of Davis v. Volkswagen, No. 1405 EDA 2018 (Pa. Super. July 19, 2019), the Pennsylvania Superior Court held that the Lehigh County Court of Common Pleas did not commit any error in a products liability case when it instructed the jury on both the consumer expectation test and the risk-utility test that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court established in the case of Tincher v. Omega-Flex, even though the plaintiff only litigated the case under the consumer expectation test. 

The court in Davis noted that, although the plaintiff argued that the trial court judge should not have instructed the jury on both tests, Pennsylvania law under Tincher allowed jury instructions on both tests where evidence was presented by the defense at trial regarding the same. According to the opinion, the defense put in evidence that, according to the trial court and the appellate court, put the risk-utility test at issue in this crashworthiness case.

Medical Malpractice

Typically, a medical malpractice action is governed by a two-year statute of limitation. However, there may be some cases where a plaintiff does not discover an injury that is allegedly the result of medical negligence within that two-year period. Under the Medical Care Availability and Reduction of Error Act’s (MCARE) statute of repose, medical malpractice actions must be brought within seven years of alleged medical malpractice.

In the case of Yanakos v. UPMC, No. 10 WAP 2018 (Pa. Oct. 31, 2018), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in a 4-3 decision, ruled that MCARE’s statute of repose was unconstitutional.

The rationale of the majority opinion in Yanakos striking down the statute of repose under the MCARE Act was that the statute of repose was not substantially related to a governmental interest as was necessary to uphold the statute. The court also found that the statute of repose in the MCARE Act violated the Pennsylvania Constitution’s guarantee of open access to the courts.

Medical Marijuana

With the recent allowance of medical marijuana in Pennsylvania, a number of legal issues can be expected to arise. One area of civil litigation will involve whether a person’s use of medical marijuana can impact her status as an employee at work.

In a case of first impression called Palmiter v. Commonwealth Health Systems, No. 19-CV-1315 (C.P. Lacka. Co. Nov. 22, 2019), Judge Terrence R. Nealon addressed preliminary objections filed by employers in this employment litigation raising the issue of whether 35 P.S. Section 2103(b)(1) of the Medical Marijuana Act (MMA), which states that “no employer may discharge … or otherwise discriminate or retaliate against an employee … solely on the basis of such employee’s status of an individual who is certified to use medical marijuana” creates a private cause of action for a medical assistant who was terminated by her health care employers due to the employee’s prescribed use of medical marijuana while not working in her place of employment.

The defendants filed preliminary objections to the complaint and asserted that the Department of Health had the exclusive authority to enforce the MMA’s provisions such that the employee’s sole remedy for her termination was to seek the assessment of a civil penalty by the Department of Health.

After his review of the law, Nealon held that there was nothing the MMA or related regulations that vests the Department of Health, or any other state agency, with the authority to enforce the act against private employers. The court also noted that the anti-discrimination provisions in the act would be rendered meaningless if an aggrieved employee could not pursue a private cause of action and seek to recover compensatory damages from an employer that had violated the MMA. As such, the court recognized an implied right of action under the act and, therefore, denied the employers’ demurrer to the employee’s private cause of action based upon Section 2103(b)(1).

It remains to be seen how the allowance of the use of medical marijuana will continue to give rise to civil litigation issues going forward.

Looking Ahead


The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has granted allocatur in the case of Bourgeois v. Snow Time, No. 768 MAL 2018 (Pa. June 25, 2019) involving a snow tubing accident. Notably, the court will address the duties owed by a snow tubing facility (previously established in Tayar v. Camelback), and whether evidence of industry standards is required to sustain a cause of action in recklessness or gross negligence.

Another future decision to watch out for will be the Pennsylvania Superior Court’s decision in the case of Fisher v. Erie Insurance Exchange, No. 1597 WDA 2018, in which the court will address whether documentation in a defense attorney’s file regarding the evaluation of a UM/UIM case is protected from discovery by the attorney-client privilege and the attorney work product doctrine.



Daniel E. Cummins is a partner in the Scranton area law firm of Cummins Law where he focuses his practice in automobile accident, premises liability, and products liability litigation matters.  He also provides mediation services through Cummins Mediation Services.

Wednesday, January 8, 2020

Summary Judgment Granted in Slip and Fall Where Plaintiff Cannot Prove Dangerous Condition and/or Notice




In the case of Biggs v. Sam’s East, Inc., No. 18-945(W.D. Pa. Oct. 24, 2019 Pupo Lenihan, J.), the court granted summary judgment in favor of a Defendant store after the Plaintiff failed to produce sufficient evidence that the Defendant had actual notice or constructive notice of an allegedly slippery condition on the floor of the premises that allegedly caused the Plaintiff to fall.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff was sitting at a table in a cafĂ© in the store when she noticed an elderly woman at an adjacent table fall. The Plaintiff did not know the cause of the woman’s fall and did not recall seeing anything around her seating area.

The Plaintiff got up from her seat to assist the elderly woman and the Plaintiff fell as she walked towards that person.

The Plaintiff testified that she did not notice the floor in front of her prior to her fall. The Plaintiff alleged that the floor was slippery and that, after the incident, she noticed that her pant leg felt damp. However, she did not identify any foreign substance on the floor.

The court entered summary judgment agreeing with the defense position that the Plaintiff failed to establish the presence of a dangerous condition and failed to establish that the Defendant had any notice of any allegedly dangerous condition.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this case may click this LINK.

Source: “Digest of Recent Opinions.” Pennsylvania Law Weekly (Nov. 12, 2019).


If you need assistance bringing your premises liability case to a close, please consider arranging for a mediation with Cummins Mediation Services.  Please contact me at dancummins@CumminsLaw.net to schedule your Mediation.




Summary Judgment Denied in Fall Down Off of Fitting Platform in Store

Here's a Recipe for Disaster:

-Two high heels

-Pants that require hemming

-One Fitting Platform




In the case of Dorfmiester v. Nordstrom, Inc., No. 19-1958 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 21, 2019 Savage, U.S.D.J.), the court denied a Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment in a premises liability case where the court found issues of fact as to whether or not the tripping hazard was known or obvious to the Plaintiff and/or whether the Defendant’s employees knew or should have known of the risk of injury.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff frequently shopped at the Nordstrom store and often had clothes fitted or altered, during which she was required to step on and off a fitting platform similar to the one involved in the subject incident.

On the date of the incident, the Plaintiff stepped onto the fitting platform. She was wearing pants that were touching the floor and required hemming.

The Plaintiff alleged that an employee instructed the Plaintiff to step back to get a better look at the pant length. However, the Plaintiff’s heel became tangled in the fabric of the pant leg, causing the Plaintiff to fall and fracture her ankle.

The Plaintiff filed suit alleging that the store and its employees were negligent in failing to warn the Plaintiff of the tripping hazard posed by an unhemmed pant leg and in failing to assist her on the fitting platform.

The defense filed a Motion for Summary Judgment arguing that it had no duty to warn of or guard the Plaintiff from an obvious danger.

The court denied summary judgment finding genuine issues of material fact. The court noted that, although the defense asserted that the risk of stepping off of the platform in unhemmed pants while wearing heels was obvious to the Plaintiff in that she failed to exercise reasonable care and judgment for her own safety, a triable issue of fact was found as to whether the danger was known or obvious given the Plaintiff’s allegation that she was acting at the direction of the Defendant’s employee when she fell.

The court ruled that it was for the jury to decide whether the employee’s instructions to the Plaintiff created a false sense of security that interfered with the Plaintiff’s ability to appreciate the dangers of stepping down from the platform.

The court further ruled that there was an issue of fact as to whether the Defendant’s employees should have anticipated the danger to the Plaintiff given that the employees admitted that they did not think the pant length posed a tripping hazard and that the Plaintiff had never requested help in stepping down from the platform.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.  The companion Order can be viewed HERE.

Source: “Digest of Recent Opinions.” Pennsylvania Law Weekly (Dec. 10, 2019).

Tuesday, January 7, 2020

Punitive Damages Claim Allowed to Proceed Against Medical Corporation in Med Mal Case



In the case of Garvey v. Adamo, No. 19-CV-1893 (C.P. Lacka. Co. Dec. 17, 2019 Nealon, J.), the court addressed the issue of vicarious liability of a healthcare provider for punitive damages. 

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff in this matter instituted a medical malpractice action against his former treating physician, that doctor’s medical partners, and their professional corporation, under allegations that the doctor prescribed opioids to the Plaintiff in excessive amounts, causing the Plaintiff to become drug-dependent and require treatment for an opioid addiction. 

The Plaintiff alleged in the Complaint that the doctor’s professional corporation and his partners knew, or had reason to know, of the doctor’s improper administration of opioids, which actually cumulated in the doctor’s guilty plea in a criminal case. 

Before the court were Preliminary Objections filed by the professional corporation seeking to dismiss the punitive damages claim pursuant to §505(b) of the Medical Care Availability and Reduction of Error (MCARE) Act. 

Judge Nealon ruled that, under §505(c) of the MCARE Act, a healthcare provider may be vicarious liability for punitive damages only if it was aware of the agent’s reckless conduct and allowed it to occur. 

Judge Nealon wrote, as he has done in the cases involving motor vehicle accidents that, although recklessness is a condition on the mind that may be averred generally under Pa. R.C.P. 1019(b), in this case the Plaintiff had alleged that the professional corporation “had actual notice” of its doctor’s unconscionable administration of opioids and still “allowed the conduct” by the doctor to continue. Based on these allegations, the court overruled the corporation’s demurrer to the punitive damages claim. 

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

I send thanks to Attorney Jonathan Comitz of the Wilkes-Barre, PA law firm of Comitz Law Firm, LLC for bringing this case to my attention. 

Motion To Bifurcate Coverage Question From Post-Koken UM Case Granted in Part and Denied in Part in Lackawanna County

In the Post-Koken UM case of Caridad v. Caridad, No. 2014-CV-6070 (C.P. Lacka. Co. Nov. 19, 2019 Bisignani-Moyle, J.), Judge Margie Bisignani-Moyle of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas addressed a defendant carrier's motion to bifurcate a trial.

In this case, the defendant carrier was asserting as a defense in this breach of contract UM claim that there was no coverage due to the Plaintiff because the Plaintiff was not a resident of the insured's household at the time of the accident. 

In addition to arguing that bifurcation was not warranted under the case presented and would not support the interests of judicial economy, the Plaintiff argued that a  separate declaratory judgment action on the issue of coverage had not been filed and that, therefore, the coverage action was not in issue in this matter.

The defense countered with the argument that there was no breach of contract as there was no coverage under the policy in the first place.

The Court granted the motion to bifurcate in part and denied it in part.  The court granted the motion to bifurcate to the extent that the court ruled that the issue of residency and coverage would be addressed first.  Although the defense asserted that the coverage question was one of law for the court to decide, the court initially ruled that the coverage question would go to the jury.  The Court appeared to rule in this fashion as there were factual issues on the question of residency to be resolved.

Anyone wishing to review the Court's Order without Opinion may click this LINK.

Postscript:  At a more recent court conference after this Order was issued, the Court agreed to decide the coverage issue after securing and agreement of counsel for the Court to decide that issue.  However, the entire case settled before the bench trial on the coverage issue took place.

Monday, January 6, 2020

Judge Nealon of Lackawanna County Addresses Proper Scope of Deposition Questions to a Medical Malpractice Defendant Doctor



Should a Defendant physician in a medical malpractice case be required to answer questions regarding the standard of care applicable to the treatment she or he provided?

That was the issue decided by Judge Terrence R. Nealon in the case of Howarth-Gadomski v. Henzes, No. 18-CV-2585 (C.P. Lacka. Co. Nov. 27, 2019 Nealon, J.).

According to the Opinion, a Defendant physician’s attorney refused to permit the physician to answer questions at a deposition seeking the doctor’s medical opinions, including those related to the applicable standard of care.

The Plaintiff filed a motion seeking to compel the doctor to answer those questions during a second deposition.

In opposition, the Defendant physician asserted that he cannot be compelled “to testify against himself,” and asserted that the Plaintiff must present their own expert testimony to address the standard of care.

The Plaintiff countered the argument that, under Pa. R.C.P. 4003.1(c), it is not a ground for objection to any discovery inquiry that the information sought involves an opinion.

The court ruled that no Pennsylvania statute, rule, or appellate authority entitles a medical malpractice Defendant/deponent to refuse to answer questions soliciting medical opinions, including those regarding the standard of care.

Judge Nealon noted that the explanatory comments to the Rules of Civil Procedure 4003.1, 4003.5, along with Pennsylvania case law, support the proposition that a party deponent may not object to deposition questions on the basis that they seek opinion testimony. Those rules also confirm that a Defendant-physician need not author a pre-trial expert report since any Plaintiff may discover that party’s opinions at a deposition.

As such, the court in this matter granted the Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel the Defendant physician to attend a second deposition. The court also ordered the Defendant physician to answer medical opinion and standard of care questions.

The court did note that, during the second deposition, defense counsel may direct the Defendant-physician not to answer a specific question only if that instruction is necessary to assert and protect a recognized privileged, to enforce and evidentiary limitation established by any earlier court rulings in this case, or to present a Motion for a Protective Order based on the grounds allowed under Pa. R.C.P. 4012(a).

In this decision, the court also noted that, if the Defendant-physician and his attorney chose to discuss the subject matter of this malpractice care during any recess of the deposition, the questioning attorney may discover whether such a conversation occurred, but may not further question the deponent concerning the contents of that discussion.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Pennsylvania Superior Court Addresses Standards For a Proper Voir Dire Proceeding



Is a judge required to be on the bench during jury selection?

In the case of Smith v. Cordero, 2019 Pa. Super. 340 (Pa. Super. Nov. 15, 2019) (Op. by McLaughlin, J.), the Superior Court ruled that a trial court erred in denying an estate’s Motion to Strike Two Jurors in a medical malpractice case where the jury selection was conducted by a court clerk and where the jurors had where the jurors had expressed the view that medical malpractice lawsuits had affected the cost and availability of medical services. In light of this ruling, the judgment in the underlying case was vacated.

Interestingly, the Superior Court noted that the previous decision in the case of Trigg v. Children’s Hospital of Pittsburgh, 187 A.3d 1013 (Pa. Super. 2018), appeal granted, 201 A.3d 145 (Pa. 2019) did not serve to impose a requirement that a judge be present during voir dire, but rather, only merely addressed the applicable appellate standard of review on a jury selection issue where a judge did not participate in the voir dire.

The court did find that the Trigg appellate standard of review applied in this matter. Under that standard of review, the court ruled as stated.

The Superior Court in this Smith case noted that, while the two (2) jurors at issue stated that they could still follow the judge’s instructions and be fair and impartial, the trial court judge was not present to hear the jurors’ tone of voice or to address their demeanor when they provided this information. As such, the Superior Court found that the trial court judge could not know whether the jurors could really be fair and impartial.

Given that the jurors’ answers expressed the “slightest ground of prejudice” required for their dismissal from the jury pool, the appellate court stated that the trial court should have granted the motions to strike the jurors for cause.

As such, while it appears that a trial court judge may not be required to be on the bench at the time of jury selection, the Pennsylvania Superior Court has again strongly suggested that it is the better practice for a judge to be present during voir dire to assess the demeanor and testimony of a potential juror when that juror is first questioned regarding his or her ability to be fair and impartial to with respect to the parties involved.

As noted in the Trigg citation above, this issue may be addressed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in the near future.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Source: “Digest of Recent Opinions” Pennsylvania Law Weekly (Dec. 3, 2019).