On February 2, 2011, Judge Linda Wallach Miller of the Monroe County Court of Common Pleas entered a summary judgment in favor of the Defendants in the limited tort case of Stout v. Deleo, No. 970 - Civil - 2007 (Monroe Co. 2011, Miller, J.).
Judge Miller's Opinion provides a thorough review of both the history and the requisite analysis of the serious injury threshold of the limited tort alternative.
The Stout case involved a plaintiff who lost control of his vehicle on an icy roadway and was just coming to a stop when his vehicle was struck from the rear by another driver of another vehicle that had lost control on the ice. The plaintiff alleged injuries to his shoulder, neck, and back. He also noted symptoms down his right arm.
The court noted that the Plaintiff did not go to the emergency room and did not begin to treat until he visited his family doctor until a few days after the accident. According to the Opinion, the treatment thereafter was minimal and the plaintiff only took over-the-counter Motrin on occasion for his symptoms. Judge Miller also noted that the plaintiff only missed three shifts of work as a police officer but was otherwise able to complete his job duties after the accident.
The court was unimpressed with the plaintiff's claims of limitations in his ability to complete recreational activities and his claims of sleep disturbance from his ongoing pain symptoms. In the end, summary judgment was entered and the case was dismissed.
The prevailing defense attorney was Shawna McLaughlin of the Moosic, Pennsylvania Travelers Insurance in-house law firm of Thomas Kelley & Associates.
I thank Attorney Carmina Rinkunas of the Moosic, Pennsylvania Travelers Insurance in-house counsel office of Thomas Kelley & Associates.
Anyone desiring a copy of this Opinion may contact me at dancummins@comcast.net.
Friday, February 4, 2011
Summary Judgment Entered in Monroe County Limited Tort Case
Thursday, February 3, 2011
Amicus Briefs Filed for Pennsylvania Defense Institute in Two Separate Post-Koken Venue Cases
I recently filed an Amicus Brief on behalf of the Pennsylvania Defense Institute in two separate matters appealed up to the Pennsylvania Superior Court, Wissinger v. Brady out of Luzerne County and Sehl v. Neff out of Philadelphia County.
Both of of these appeals revolved around the same central issue of the proper venue for post-Koken motor vehicle accident cases in which negligence claims against the defendant driver are joined with claims against the underinsured (UIM) motorist carrier defendant.
In each Brief, I joined the appellee-tortfeasor defendant in an argument against the injured party's contention that such claims could be filed in any county because the UIM insurance company conducted business in all counties of the Commonwealth.
No argument date has been set yet in either matter.
Should you wish to review the Amicus Briefs filed (perhaps they will help you in your research efforts if you are faced with a similar issue), please scroll down the right hand column of this blog to the label "My Published Articles" and locate the two briefs inside the JDSupra.com box. Once you click on the title of the briefs there it should take you to the online site where you should be able to review and/or print out the Briefs.
Again, the Briefs are essentially identical and I believe the Brief in Sehl, which was the second one I did, came out in a more focused, tighter fashion in terms of the legal argument. That would be the one I would suggest you review if you are interested.
Last but not least, I highly recommend that you consider signing up to use JDSupra.com. It's a free, easy-to-set-up-and-use online portal for you to display your written legal work to the public. It's a great way to increase your online exposure and allow potential clients to view your work product in other matters, whether it be articles or briefs. Here's a link to the site: www.jdsupra.com.
Both of of these appeals revolved around the same central issue of the proper venue for post-Koken motor vehicle accident cases in which negligence claims against the defendant driver are joined with claims against the underinsured (UIM) motorist carrier defendant.
In each Brief, I joined the appellee-tortfeasor defendant in an argument against the injured party's contention that such claims could be filed in any county because the UIM insurance company conducted business in all counties of the Commonwealth.
No argument date has been set yet in either matter.
Should you wish to review the Amicus Briefs filed (perhaps they will help you in your research efforts if you are faced with a similar issue), please scroll down the right hand column of this blog to the label "My Published Articles" and locate the two briefs inside the JDSupra.com box. Once you click on the title of the briefs there it should take you to the online site where you should be able to review and/or print out the Briefs.
Again, the Briefs are essentially identical and I believe the Brief in Sehl, which was the second one I did, came out in a more focused, tighter fashion in terms of the legal argument. That would be the one I would suggest you review if you are interested.
Last but not least, I highly recommend that you consider signing up to use JDSupra.com. It's a free, easy-to-set-up-and-use online portal for you to display your written legal work to the public. It's a great way to increase your online exposure and allow potential clients to view your work product in other matters, whether it be articles or briefs. Here's a link to the site: www.jdsupra.com.
Labels:
Automobile Insurance,
Cummins,
Koken,
Pennsylvania Defense Institute,
UIM,
Underinsured Motorists Claims,
Venue
New A.3d Cite for Important Medicare Case
Zaleppa v. Seiwell, 9 A.3d 632 (Pa.Super. 2010)(MSPA did not allow private entity to assert rights of government regarding potential claim for reimbursement of Medicare lien.).
Here's a link to the November 19, 2010Tort Talk posting on this case:
http://www.torttalk.com/2010/11/new-superior-court-case-regarding.html
Here's a link to the November 19, 2010Tort Talk posting on this case:
http://www.torttalk.com/2010/11/new-superior-court-case-regarding.html
Commonwealth Court Addresses Liability of PennDOT for Lack of Rumble Strips
On January 19, 2011, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court issued an Opinion in the case of Brown v. PennDOT et al., No. 1298 C.D. 2010 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2011, Leadbetter, P.J., McCullough, J., Friedman, S.J.)(Opinion by Friedman, S.J.), in which the Court addressed the issue of sovereign immunity for PennDOT in an automobile accident case in which there were allegations that PennDOT was liable for failing to implant rumble strips along a curved portion of the roadway where the injured party left the road and was involved in an accident.
The case is noteworthy in that the Commonwealth Court agreed with the Plaintiff's position that rumble strips, where they have been installed, must be considered part of the road.
However, in favor of PennDOT, the Court also found that where, as in this case, rumble strips have not been installed, the absence of rumble strips does not create a defect of the highway, and DOT has no duty to install them.
This case is therefore good for plaintiffs who argue that installed rumble strips are defective. The case is also good for PennDOT in that it was upheld that there is no duty on the part of PennDOT to install rumble strips.
Here is a link to the Brown Opinion online:
http://www.aopc.org/OpPosting/Cwealth/out/1298CD10_1-19-11.pdf
This Brown decision can be read in conjunction with the Commonwealth Court's recent decision in the case of Lambert v. Katz on the liability of PennDOT for conditions on highways. In Lambert the Commonwealth Court held, in a slip opinion, that the lack of a shoulder does not render a highway unsafe for travel, i.e., condition of shoulder does not constitute a dangerous condition of highway.
Here's a link to the recent Tort Talk write-up on the Lambert case:
http://www.torttalk.com/2010/11/penndot-not-liable-for-shoulder-of.html
I thank Attorney Scott Schermerhorn of Scranton, PA for bringing the Brown case to my attention.
The case is noteworthy in that the Commonwealth Court agreed with the Plaintiff's position that rumble strips, where they have been installed, must be considered part of the road.
However, in favor of PennDOT, the Court also found that where, as in this case, rumble strips have not been installed, the absence of rumble strips does not create a defect of the highway, and DOT has no duty to install them.
This case is therefore good for plaintiffs who argue that installed rumble strips are defective. The case is also good for PennDOT in that it was upheld that there is no duty on the part of PennDOT to install rumble strips.
Here is a link to the Brown Opinion online:
http://www.aopc.org/OpPosting/Cwealth/out/1298CD10_1-19-11.pdf
This Brown decision can be read in conjunction with the Commonwealth Court's recent decision in the case of Lambert v. Katz on the liability of PennDOT for conditions on highways. In Lambert the Commonwealth Court held, in a slip opinion, that the lack of a shoulder does not render a highway unsafe for travel, i.e., condition of shoulder does not constitute a dangerous condition of highway.
Here's a link to the recent Tort Talk write-up on the Lambert case:
http://www.torttalk.com/2010/11/penndot-not-liable-for-shoulder-of.html
I thank Attorney Scott Schermerhorn of Scranton, PA for bringing the Brown case to my attention.
Labels:
Automobile Law,
Civil Litigation,
PennDOT
Tuesday, February 1, 2011
ARTICLE: Are the Winds of Hurricane Koken Dying Down?
The following article of mine appeared last week in the January 25, 2011 edition of The Pennsylvania Law Weekly. (c) 2010 Incisive Media US Properties, LLC.
Insurance Law
Are the Winds of Hurricane Koken Dying Down?
Superior Court touches on consolidation verse severance issue in post-Koken cases
by
Daniel E. Cummins
The Legal Intelligencer/Pennsylvania Law Weekly
January 25, 2011
As previously analyzed in this column, the new era of automobile accident litigation, dubbed "Hurricane Koken " due to the turbulent and uncertain path of the law and procedure in this regard, has continued to be guided by a split of authority among the various common pleas courts across Pennsylvania on how to properly handle such claims.
Now, with the Superior Court's Jan. 6 decision in Richner v. McCance , the sun appears to be peaking from behind the clouds.
The Superior Court specifically and emphatically stated in Richner that they were not in any way addressing the consolidation vs. severance issue found in the typical post- Koken case combining a tort claim and a UIM claim in a single lawsuit. Yet, the court's analysis of the issue in the context of a tort claim, combined with a request for declaratory judgment against the UIM carrier on a coverage question, sheds light on how the Superior Court may address the issue in the tort/UIM benefits claim scenarios in the future.
Origin of The Issue
A review of the history of post- Koken jurisprudence reveals that it has been about five years since the automobile accident litigation landscape was changed by a 2005 state Supreme Court case, Insurance Federation of Pennsylvania v. Commonwealth, Department of Insurance (Koken).
In Koken , the high court ruled for the first time that automobile insurance carriers were not required to include arbitration clauses in their policies for the resolution of disputed uninsured and underinsured motorist benefits claims. Accordingly, many carriers promptly rid their policies of the arbitration clauses, thereby requiring UM/UIM claims to instead be litigated as a typical automobile accident lawsuit in the common pleas court.
Following the basic rule that all matters arising out of a single occurrence, i.e., a motor vehicle accident, should be litigated in one matter, practitioners began to file lawsuits that combined the tort claim against the allegedly negligent driver with the contractual claim against the plaintiff's insurance carrier for UIM benefits in one lawsuit under a single caption.
The tortfeasor defendants in these matters found these new lawsuits objectionable, because it put them in the tough spot of having to go to a jury trial with an insurance company as a co-defendant.
In some cases, the insurance companies have objected to this new form of lawsuit, particularly when they were lumped in the same cases with a tortfeasor who was driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol and who, therefore, faced a claim for punitive damages.
As a result, one of the first issues that repeatedly came to the attention of the trial courts, typically by way of preliminary objections, was whether these new lawsuits should be allowed to proceed in a consolidated fashion.
Current Majority Rule
Presently, there are at least 34 trial court decisions from across the state in which the courts have ruled, or suggested they would rule, in favor of keeping these claims together under one caption and proceeding to a jury trial in a consolidated fashion. This is the majority rule so far among trial court decisions.
These initial decisions were handed down in Lackawanna, Luzerne, Pike, Lehigh, Northampton, Montgomery Dauphin, Clinton, Beaver, Erie, Lawrence, Allegheny, Philadelphia and Cambria counties.
The consistent rationale of these consolidation decisions is that the tort claims against the defendant motorist and the contractual claim for UIM benefits against the insurance company arise out of the same "transaction or occurrence," i.e., the same motor vehicle accident. Therefore, the courts have ruled, these claims should be tried together as a means of furthering the interests of judicial economy for the already overburdened trial court system.
Another factor noted is the avoidance of piecemeal litigation with the possibility of inconsistent verdicts.
Some of the trial court decisions in favor of consolidating post- Koken claims have referenced the permissive joinder of actions provision found in the Pa.R.C.P. 2229. Other courts have relied upon Pa.R.C.P. 213(a), which allows for the consolidation of actions arising out of the same occurrence.
Minority Rule
There are currently at least 20 trial court decisions from around Pennsylvania that have held post- Koken claims filed under a single caption should be severed into two separate lawsuits.
These decisions have come from Lackawanna, Butler, Washington, York, Adams, Lancaster, Schuylkill, Delaware, Montgomery, Mercer, Philadelphia and Allegheny counties.
A comparison of the lists of trial court decisions in favor of severance with the above list of those cases in favor of consolidation show some overlap, arguably revealing a split of authority on the issue even within certain counties, such as Lackawanna, Montgomery, Philadelphia and Allegheny.
The severance decisions have been primarily supported with the rationale that evidence of "insurance" is not admissible in personal injury civil litigation matters under Pa.R.E. 411. These courts have also referred Pa.R.E. 403, which allows a trial court to preclude relevant evidence "if its probative value is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury."
In light of these rules, the courts favoring severance have held that a third party tortfeasor defendant may be unduly prejudiced by having the insurance company as a co-defendant in front of a jury.
Some of the courts in favor of severance have also noted that the act of severing and staying the UM/UIM claim pending the resolution of the third party liability claim may further the interest of judicial economy. This is particularly so in the event that a jury comes back with a verdict that is below the tortfeasor's liability limits, which would negate any UIM claim. In such cases, there would have been no need to include the UIM carrier in the litigation in the first place.
To date, there have been no appellate decisions to alleviate this split of authority.
Some Guidance
Then, along comes Richner.
The Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas ruled in Richner that the third party claim against the defendant driver and the separate declaratory judgment action on a UIM coverage issue should be allowed to proceed in a consolidated fashion. The trial court did leave the door open to bifurcate the case at time of trial, if necessary.
The Richner decision was appealed and, on Jan. 6, 2010, the Superior Court issued a decision reversing the trial court's ruling and held, instead, that the injured party could not join his tort claim with a count in the complaint for a declaratory judgment raising the coverage question surrounding the applicability of an exclusion in the UIM carrier's policy.
Interestingly, the Superior Court applied Pa.R.C.P. 2229(b), which pertains to the permissible joinder of actions, and found that the requirements of that rule were not met to allow for a joinder of a tort claim with a declaratory judgment action on a coverage question.
More specifically, the court found that, although the tort allegations and the contractual question pertaining to coverage both essentially arose out of the same car accident, the liabilities of the respective defendants arose from different circumstances, i.e., one in tort and the other in contract law.
The court also found that the questions of law at issue on the questions presented were not common to both actions. As such, the second requirement of Pa.R.C.P. 2229(b), i.e., common questions of law or fact, was not met to allow for a joinder of a tort claim with a declaratory judgment request on a coverage issue.
In so ruling, the Superior Court rejected the trial court's reliance on post- Koken cases ruling in favor of the consolidation of tort claims and claims for UIM benefits under Pa.R.C.P. 2229(b), as the analysis in those types of cases was "inapposite" to the issue in this case involving the separate and different question of the combination of a tort claim with a request for a declaratory judgment in response to a coverage question.
In that same footnote, the Superior Court also stated:
"We emphasize that we are not here deciding the propriety of the joinder of third party liability claims with post-Koken UIM benefit claims."
Despite this proviso by the Superior Court, this Richner decision is the closest the court has come to addressing the all-important consolidation vs. severance issue in post- Koken litigation and this opinion is sure to be referenced if that issue is ever squarely before the Superior Court.
As such, the Superior Court's decision in Richner appears to be a must-read for practitioners handling post- Koken automobile litigation matters.
On the Horizon
On a related note, while the Superior Court has not squarely addressed the consolidation vs. severance issue in a true post-Koken case to date, the court is poised to tackle another important post- Koken issue pertaining to the proper venue for these types of actions.
The Luzerne County Common Pleas Court case W issinger v. Brady and the Philadelphia Common Pleas Court case Sehl v. Neff are both in the briefing phase at the Superior Court. They are still awaiting argument dates.
The central issue in each of those cases involves proper venue for post- Koken litigation.
The trial courts in each case rejected the plaintiffs' contentions that such lawsuits can be filed in any county across Pennsylvania, regardless of where the accident happened or where the tortfeasor defendant resided, based on the fact that the insurance carriers in those cases conduct business in every county.
It remains to be seen whether the trial court decisions in these cases will be upheld. One thing is for sure — the venue issue is in a position to be finally clarified by the appellate courts. Unfortunately, the consolidation vs. severance question is not raised in either the Wissinger or the Sehl appeals.
Further guidance on that issue will have to await another day.
Daniel E. Cummins is a partner and civil litigator with the Scranton law firm of Foley Cognetti Comerford Cimini & Cummins. His civil litigation blog, "Tort Talk," may be viewed at www.torttalk.com.
Insurance Law
Are the Winds of Hurricane Koken Dying Down?
Superior Court touches on consolidation verse severance issue in post-Koken cases
by
Daniel E. Cummins
The Legal Intelligencer/Pennsylvania Law Weekly
January 25, 2011
As previously analyzed in this column, the new era of automobile accident litigation, dubbed "Hurricane Koken " due to the turbulent and uncertain path of the law and procedure in this regard, has continued to be guided by a split of authority among the various common pleas courts across Pennsylvania on how to properly handle such claims.
Now, with the Superior Court's Jan. 6 decision in Richner v. McCance , the sun appears to be peaking from behind the clouds.
The Superior Court specifically and emphatically stated in Richner that they were not in any way addressing the consolidation vs. severance issue found in the typical post- Koken case combining a tort claim and a UIM claim in a single lawsuit. Yet, the court's analysis of the issue in the context of a tort claim, combined with a request for declaratory judgment against the UIM carrier on a coverage question, sheds light on how the Superior Court may address the issue in the tort/UIM benefits claim scenarios in the future.
Origin of The Issue
A review of the history of post- Koken jurisprudence reveals that it has been about five years since the automobile accident litigation landscape was changed by a 2005 state Supreme Court case, Insurance Federation of Pennsylvania v. Commonwealth, Department of Insurance (Koken).
In Koken , the high court ruled for the first time that automobile insurance carriers were not required to include arbitration clauses in their policies for the resolution of disputed uninsured and underinsured motorist benefits claims. Accordingly, many carriers promptly rid their policies of the arbitration clauses, thereby requiring UM/UIM claims to instead be litigated as a typical automobile accident lawsuit in the common pleas court.
Following the basic rule that all matters arising out of a single occurrence, i.e., a motor vehicle accident, should be litigated in one matter, practitioners began to file lawsuits that combined the tort claim against the allegedly negligent driver with the contractual claim against the plaintiff's insurance carrier for UIM benefits in one lawsuit under a single caption.
The tortfeasor defendants in these matters found these new lawsuits objectionable, because it put them in the tough spot of having to go to a jury trial with an insurance company as a co-defendant.
In some cases, the insurance companies have objected to this new form of lawsuit, particularly when they were lumped in the same cases with a tortfeasor who was driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol and who, therefore, faced a claim for punitive damages.
As a result, one of the first issues that repeatedly came to the attention of the trial courts, typically by way of preliminary objections, was whether these new lawsuits should be allowed to proceed in a consolidated fashion.
Current Majority Rule
Presently, there are at least 34 trial court decisions from across the state in which the courts have ruled, or suggested they would rule, in favor of keeping these claims together under one caption and proceeding to a jury trial in a consolidated fashion. This is the majority rule so far among trial court decisions.
These initial decisions were handed down in Lackawanna, Luzerne, Pike, Lehigh, Northampton, Montgomery Dauphin, Clinton, Beaver, Erie, Lawrence, Allegheny, Philadelphia and Cambria counties.
The consistent rationale of these consolidation decisions is that the tort claims against the defendant motorist and the contractual claim for UIM benefits against the insurance company arise out of the same "transaction or occurrence," i.e., the same motor vehicle accident. Therefore, the courts have ruled, these claims should be tried together as a means of furthering the interests of judicial economy for the already overburdened trial court system.
Another factor noted is the avoidance of piecemeal litigation with the possibility of inconsistent verdicts.
Some of the trial court decisions in favor of consolidating post- Koken claims have referenced the permissive joinder of actions provision found in the Pa.R.C.P. 2229. Other courts have relied upon Pa.R.C.P. 213(a), which allows for the consolidation of actions arising out of the same occurrence.
Minority Rule
There are currently at least 20 trial court decisions from around Pennsylvania that have held post- Koken claims filed under a single caption should be severed into two separate lawsuits.
These decisions have come from Lackawanna, Butler, Washington, York, Adams, Lancaster, Schuylkill, Delaware, Montgomery, Mercer, Philadelphia and Allegheny counties.
A comparison of the lists of trial court decisions in favor of severance with the above list of those cases in favor of consolidation show some overlap, arguably revealing a split of authority on the issue even within certain counties, such as Lackawanna, Montgomery, Philadelphia and Allegheny.
The severance decisions have been primarily supported with the rationale that evidence of "insurance" is not admissible in personal injury civil litigation matters under Pa.R.E. 411. These courts have also referred Pa.R.E. 403, which allows a trial court to preclude relevant evidence "if its probative value is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury."
In light of these rules, the courts favoring severance have held that a third party tortfeasor defendant may be unduly prejudiced by having the insurance company as a co-defendant in front of a jury.
Some of the courts in favor of severance have also noted that the act of severing and staying the UM/UIM claim pending the resolution of the third party liability claim may further the interest of judicial economy. This is particularly so in the event that a jury comes back with a verdict that is below the tortfeasor's liability limits, which would negate any UIM claim. In such cases, there would have been no need to include the UIM carrier in the litigation in the first place.
To date, there have been no appellate decisions to alleviate this split of authority.
Some Guidance
Then, along comes Richner.
The Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas ruled in Richner that the third party claim against the defendant driver and the separate declaratory judgment action on a UIM coverage issue should be allowed to proceed in a consolidated fashion. The trial court did leave the door open to bifurcate the case at time of trial, if necessary.
The Richner decision was appealed and, on Jan. 6, 2010, the Superior Court issued a decision reversing the trial court's ruling and held, instead, that the injured party could not join his tort claim with a count in the complaint for a declaratory judgment raising the coverage question surrounding the applicability of an exclusion in the UIM carrier's policy.
Interestingly, the Superior Court applied Pa.R.C.P. 2229(b), which pertains to the permissible joinder of actions, and found that the requirements of that rule were not met to allow for a joinder of a tort claim with a declaratory judgment action on a coverage question.
More specifically, the court found that, although the tort allegations and the contractual question pertaining to coverage both essentially arose out of the same car accident, the liabilities of the respective defendants arose from different circumstances, i.e., one in tort and the other in contract law.
The court also found that the questions of law at issue on the questions presented were not common to both actions. As such, the second requirement of Pa.R.C.P. 2229(b), i.e., common questions of law or fact, was not met to allow for a joinder of a tort claim with a declaratory judgment request on a coverage issue.
In so ruling, the Superior Court rejected the trial court's reliance on post- Koken cases ruling in favor of the consolidation of tort claims and claims for UIM benefits under Pa.R.C.P. 2229(b), as the analysis in those types of cases was "inapposite" to the issue in this case involving the separate and different question of the combination of a tort claim with a request for a declaratory judgment in response to a coverage question.
In that same footnote, the Superior Court also stated:
"We emphasize that we are not here deciding the propriety of the joinder of third party liability claims with post-Koken UIM benefit claims."
Despite this proviso by the Superior Court, this Richner decision is the closest the court has come to addressing the all-important consolidation vs. severance issue in post- Koken litigation and this opinion is sure to be referenced if that issue is ever squarely before the Superior Court.
As such, the Superior Court's decision in Richner appears to be a must-read for practitioners handling post- Koken automobile litigation matters.
On the Horizon
On a related note, while the Superior Court has not squarely addressed the consolidation vs. severance issue in a true post-Koken case to date, the court is poised to tackle another important post- Koken issue pertaining to the proper venue for these types of actions.
The Luzerne County Common Pleas Court case W issinger v. Brady and the Philadelphia Common Pleas Court case Sehl v. Neff are both in the briefing phase at the Superior Court. They are still awaiting argument dates.
The central issue in each of those cases involves proper venue for post- Koken litigation.
The trial courts in each case rejected the plaintiffs' contentions that such lawsuits can be filed in any county across Pennsylvania, regardless of where the accident happened or where the tortfeasor defendant resided, based on the fact that the insurance carriers in those cases conduct business in every county.
It remains to be seen whether the trial court decisions in these cases will be upheld. One thing is for sure — the venue issue is in a position to be finally clarified by the appellate courts. Unfortunately, the consolidation vs. severance question is not raised in either the Wissinger or the Sehl appeals.
Further guidance on that issue will have to await another day.
Daniel E. Cummins is a partner and civil litigator with the Scranton law firm of Foley Cognetti Comerford Cimini & Cummins. His civil litigation blog, "Tort Talk," may be viewed at www.torttalk.com.
Pennsylvania Supreme Court: Heart and Lung Benefits Not Subrogable
On January 28, 2011, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court issued a unanimous decision in the case of Oliver v. City of Pittsburgh, 2011 WL 255614 (Pa. 2011), in which it concluded that Heart and Lung Benefits are not subrogable in motor vehicle accident matters under Pennsylvania law.
The case involved a police officer who was injured in a car accident in 1996. The City of Pittsburgh argued that it was entitled to subrogation because the repeal of 75 Pa.C.S.A. 1720 in 1994 by Act 44 Section 25(b) allowed for subrogation in workers compensation matters. The City asserted that Heart and Lung benefits were a form of workers compensation.
In rejecting the City's argument, the Supreme Court opinion by Justice Saylor relied upon the plain language of Section 25(b) of Act 44, which repealed the anti-subrogation provision as it relates to "workers' compensation payment or other benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act."
Given the lack of any ambiguity in the language of the statute, the Court held that "Section 25(b) repealed Sections 1720 of the MVFRL 'insofar as [it] relate[d] to workers' compensation payments or other benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act .... By its plain terms, such provision does not impact any anti-subrogation mandates pertaining to HLA benefits."
Here is a link to the Opinion: http://www.pacourts.us/OpPosting/Supreme/out/J-73-2010mo.pdf
The case involved a police officer who was injured in a car accident in 1996. The City of Pittsburgh argued that it was entitled to subrogation because the repeal of 75 Pa.C.S.A. 1720 in 1994 by Act 44 Section 25(b) allowed for subrogation in workers compensation matters. The City asserted that Heart and Lung benefits were a form of workers compensation.
In rejecting the City's argument, the Supreme Court opinion by Justice Saylor relied upon the plain language of Section 25(b) of Act 44, which repealed the anti-subrogation provision as it relates to "workers' compensation payment or other benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act."
Given the lack of any ambiguity in the language of the statute, the Court held that "Section 25(b) repealed Sections 1720 of the MVFRL 'insofar as [it] relate[d] to workers' compensation payments or other benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act .... By its plain terms, such provision does not impact any anti-subrogation mandates pertaining to HLA benefits."
Here is a link to the Opinion: http://www.pacourts.us/OpPosting/Supreme/out/J-73-2010mo.pdf
Labels:
Automobile Insurance,
Civil Litigation,
Damages,
Subrogation
Judge Terrence Nealon of Lackawanna County Weighs in on Zero Verdict Issue
In his Opinion handed down on January 28, 2011, in the case of Bulger v. Pennsylvania American Water Company, No. 07 CV 236 (Lacka. Co. 2011, Nealon, J.), Judge Terrence R. Nealon of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas weighed in on the somewhat recurring issue of the propriety of a jury entering a zero defense verdicts in negligence cases where both the defense expert and the plaintiff's expert agree that the plaintiff sustained some form of injury.
Some attorneys out there (like myself) may have previously been under the misconception that once a defense IME doctor agrees that the plaintiff has indeed sustained some form of injury, the jury must give some award in favor of the injured party. Not so fast.
By way of background, the Standard Jury Instructions were revised a few years ago to change the causation inquiry on verdict slips to now read whether the defendant's negligence was "a factual cause of the plaintiff's harm" (rather than the factual cause of the "accident" or "fall").
Since that time, in cases where the defense medical expert acknowledges some form of injury, plaintiff's counsel would routinely object to a factual cause inquiry or finding even though the cause of the accident or fall was hotly contested by the defense at trial.
In Bulger, Judge Nealon was faced with this very issue as presented by the plaintiff in in post-trial motions.
In Bulger, Defendant Pennsylvania American Water Company denied that it was liable for the plaintiff's trip and fall event on a residential street. On the liability issues, evidence was offered that not only called the plaintiff's credibility into question but which also showed that the plaintiff had pre-existing medical conditions that left him with blurred vision and even balance issues. It was also established that the plaintiff's incident happened under dark conditions. The Defendant additionally disputed the allegation that it had actual or constructive notice of the the allegedly dangerous condition at issue.
At the conclusion of the presentation of the evidence, the plaintiff's request for a directed verdict on the grounds that the medical experts agreed on an injury or injuries as well as the plaintiff's objections to the verdict slip were all overruled.
The jury went on to enter a defense verdict despite the agreement of the medical experts that the plaintiff sustained some form of injury.
In addressing the plaintiff's post-trial motions, Judge Nealon held that notwithstanding the "harm" wording of the Standard Jury Instructions' causation question, under the current status of Pennsylvania law, the jury was still required decide whether or not the defendant's negligence was the factual cause of the accident/fall as part of its causation analysis and determination. The court ultimately denied the plaintiff's motion for a new trial on this issue.
Judge Nealon's opinion in Bulger provides a nice analysis on the issue and confirms that, where the liability question remains in dispute at trial, the defense can still pursue a defense verdict even where the defense medical expert confirms all or part of the plaintiff's claims of injury.
Anyone desiring a copy of this decision may contact me at dancummins@comcast.net.
Some attorneys out there (like myself) may have previously been under the misconception that once a defense IME doctor agrees that the plaintiff has indeed sustained some form of injury, the jury must give some award in favor of the injured party. Not so fast.
By way of background, the Standard Jury Instructions were revised a few years ago to change the causation inquiry on verdict slips to now read whether the defendant's negligence was "a factual cause of the plaintiff's harm" (rather than the factual cause of the "accident" or "fall").
Since that time, in cases where the defense medical expert acknowledges some form of injury, plaintiff's counsel would routinely object to a factual cause inquiry or finding even though the cause of the accident or fall was hotly contested by the defense at trial.
In Bulger, Judge Nealon was faced with this very issue as presented by the plaintiff in in post-trial motions.
In Bulger, Defendant Pennsylvania American Water Company denied that it was liable for the plaintiff's trip and fall event on a residential street. On the liability issues, evidence was offered that not only called the plaintiff's credibility into question but which also showed that the plaintiff had pre-existing medical conditions that left him with blurred vision and even balance issues. It was also established that the plaintiff's incident happened under dark conditions. The Defendant additionally disputed the allegation that it had actual or constructive notice of the the allegedly dangerous condition at issue.
At the conclusion of the presentation of the evidence, the plaintiff's request for a directed verdict on the grounds that the medical experts agreed on an injury or injuries as well as the plaintiff's objections to the verdict slip were all overruled.
The jury went on to enter a defense verdict despite the agreement of the medical experts that the plaintiff sustained some form of injury.
In addressing the plaintiff's post-trial motions, Judge Nealon held that notwithstanding the "harm" wording of the Standard Jury Instructions' causation question, under the current status of Pennsylvania law, the jury was still required decide whether or not the defendant's negligence was the factual cause of the accident/fall as part of its causation analysis and determination. The court ultimately denied the plaintiff's motion for a new trial on this issue.
Judge Nealon's opinion in Bulger provides a nice analysis on the issue and confirms that, where the liability question remains in dispute at trial, the defense can still pursue a defense verdict even where the defense medical expert confirms all or part of the plaintiff's claims of injury.
Anyone desiring a copy of this decision may contact me at dancummins@comcast.net.
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