Followers of Tort Talk's Post-Koken Scorecard may recall that there is a split of authority within Lackawanna County on the issue of consolidation vs. severance of post-Koken claims.
Judge Carmen D. Minora, Judge Robert A. Mazzoni, and Senior Visiting Judge Harold A. Thomson, Jr. have all come down on the side of allowing for the consolidation of such claims in the past.
Then, in the case of Mehall v. Benedetto and Erie Ins. Exchange, 09-CV-744 (Lacka. Co. 2010 Thomson, S.J.), Judge Thomson ordered that third party claims should be severed from UIM claims into two separate lawsuits.
I was advised recently that Mehall case came back before Judge Thomson on a Motion for Reconsideration but he chose to issue another Order on July 8, 2010, without an explaining Opinion, reaffirming his prior decision in favor of severance.
As such, the split of authority remains within Lackawanna County on this issue.
I send thanks to Attorney Robert L. Goodman of the Scranton office of Forry Ullman for bringing this decision to my attention.
Anyone desiring a copy of this Order may contact me at dancummins@comcast.net.
Saturday, July 17, 2010
Saturday, July 10, 2010
Compelling Commercial In Favor of Seatbelt Use
It should be well known from my prior blog posts and articles that I am a proponent of the argument that the ban against seat belt defense in civil litigation matters should be repealed under Pennsylvania law as a possible means of getting the last small percentage of non-compliant drivers and passengers to obey the law and protect themselves from greater injury or death.
I came across this ad on seatbelt use from the U.K. that was forwarded to me by an old college roommate of mine at Villanova who is a fomer cop himself who used to write out tickets to people for failing to use a seatbelt.
Hopefully this ad, which is getting good play on YouTube, also makes its way to the U.S. airwaves as it is pretty compelling and may cause people to think twice about going without buckling up:
http://embracethis.co.uk/
I came across this ad on seatbelt use from the U.K. that was forwarded to me by an old college roommate of mine at Villanova who is a fomer cop himself who used to write out tickets to people for failing to use a seatbelt.
Hopefully this ad, which is getting good play on YouTube, also makes its way to the U.S. airwaves as it is pretty compelling and may cause people to think twice about going without buckling up:
http://embracethis.co.uk/
Friday, July 9, 2010
Another Decision Setting Parameters for Bad Faith Claim in First Party Medical Benefits Context
On June 25, 2010, Judge James M. Munley of the Federal District Court for the Middle District Court of Pennsylvania issued an Opinion in the case of Hickey v. Allstate Prop. and Cas. Ins. Co., No. 3:10cv00907 (M.D.Pa. June 25, 2010, Munley, J.) in which he granted the carrier's F.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss the Plaintiff's bad faith claim in a first party medical benefits case.
In Hickey, he Plaintiff was injured in a car accident and began to recieve first party medical benefits under his own policy with Allstate for the payment of his medical treatment. Allstate paid the benefits for about two years and then stopped the payments on the basis of an independent medical examination which led the examining doctor to conclude that the Plaintiff had reached maximum medical improvement.
In response, the Plaintiff sued Allstate in state court for breach of the insurance contract and bad faith under 42 Pa.C.S.A. Section 8371. Allstate removed the matter to Federal Court and filed a Motion to Dismiss primarily asserting that the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law, i.e. 75 Pa.C.S.A. Section 1797, provided for the exclusive remedies for the type of claim brought by the Plaintiff, thereby pre-empting any claim under the bad faith statute found at Section 8371. Judge Munley agreed with the carrier's position.
The Judge noted that, since there was no Pennsylvania Supreme Court precedent on the issue, he had to predict how that court would address this issue. Reviewing the case law from other Pennsylvania federal court decisions, Judge Munley held that "section 8371 is preempted by section 1797 where an insured alleges only that an insurer wrongly denied payment of first-party medical benefits based on a determination of the propriety of treatment and associated charges."
The Judge further explained that "[c]laims based on allegations outside this narrow scope, such as a claim involving contract interpretation, a claim of abuse of the PRO process, or a claim disputing the cause of the injury, go beyond the scope of section 1797 and may be pursued under section 8371." Citing Perkins v. State Farm, 589 F.Supp. 559 (M.D.Pa. 2008).
Reviewing the Plaintiff's allegations in this matter, Judge Munley determined that the bad faith allegations were preempted by section 1797 because the dispute over the findings of the IME doctor revolved around a dispute over whether the Plaintiff's treatment was reasonable or necesary. As such, the Plaintiff's claim was found to trigger the remedies and procedures found under section 1797 of the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law.
However, Judge Munley did allow a portion of the Plaintiff's section 8371 bad faith claim to stand. The court found that the Plaintiff's claims that the Defendant carrier "had and has a practice of attempting to terminate medical treatment by 'independent medical examination' without reasonable cause to do so," were claims that alleged an abuse of the PRO process. Judge Munley found that those types of claims stated a cause of action for bad faith under section 8371 that were not preempted by section 1797.
I note that Judge Munley decision in Hickey, i.e. that where a Complaint specifically alleges culpable misconduct both within and beyond the coverage of the specific statutes of the MVFRL, then the remedies under the general bad faith statute at §8371 (i.e., punitive damages, costs and interest) may additionally apply as well, is consistent with two recent decisions out of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas by Senior Judge Harold A. Thomson, Jr. and Judge Carmen D. Minora. See Skiro v. Erie Ins. Exchange, No. 09-CV-7077 (Lacka Co. May 19, 2010 Thomson, S.J.); Veltri v. Travelers Commercial Insurance Company, 08-CIVIL-8534 (Lacka. Co. September 2, 2009 Minora, J.)
Click on this link to go to my June 11, 2010 synopsis of those Lackawanna County decisions
on Tort Talk: http://www.torttalk.com/2010/06/bad-faith-claim-allowed-to-proceed-in.html.
In Hickey, he Plaintiff was injured in a car accident and began to recieve first party medical benefits under his own policy with Allstate for the payment of his medical treatment. Allstate paid the benefits for about two years and then stopped the payments on the basis of an independent medical examination which led the examining doctor to conclude that the Plaintiff had reached maximum medical improvement.
In response, the Plaintiff sued Allstate in state court for breach of the insurance contract and bad faith under 42 Pa.C.S.A. Section 8371. Allstate removed the matter to Federal Court and filed a Motion to Dismiss primarily asserting that the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law, i.e. 75 Pa.C.S.A. Section 1797, provided for the exclusive remedies for the type of claim brought by the Plaintiff, thereby pre-empting any claim under the bad faith statute found at Section 8371. Judge Munley agreed with the carrier's position.
The Judge noted that, since there was no Pennsylvania Supreme Court precedent on the issue, he had to predict how that court would address this issue. Reviewing the case law from other Pennsylvania federal court decisions, Judge Munley held that "section 8371 is preempted by section 1797 where an insured alleges only that an insurer wrongly denied payment of first-party medical benefits based on a determination of the propriety of treatment and associated charges."
The Judge further explained that "[c]laims based on allegations outside this narrow scope, such as a claim involving contract interpretation, a claim of abuse of the PRO process, or a claim disputing the cause of the injury, go beyond the scope of section 1797 and may be pursued under section 8371." Citing Perkins v. State Farm, 589 F.Supp. 559 (M.D.Pa. 2008).
Reviewing the Plaintiff's allegations in this matter, Judge Munley determined that the bad faith allegations were preempted by section 1797 because the dispute over the findings of the IME doctor revolved around a dispute over whether the Plaintiff's treatment was reasonable or necesary. As such, the Plaintiff's claim was found to trigger the remedies and procedures found under section 1797 of the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law.
However, Judge Munley did allow a portion of the Plaintiff's section 8371 bad faith claim to stand. The court found that the Plaintiff's claims that the Defendant carrier "had and has a practice of attempting to terminate medical treatment by 'independent medical examination' without reasonable cause to do so," were claims that alleged an abuse of the PRO process. Judge Munley found that those types of claims stated a cause of action for bad faith under section 8371 that were not preempted by section 1797.
I note that Judge Munley decision in Hickey, i.e. that where a Complaint specifically alleges culpable misconduct both within and beyond the coverage of the specific statutes of the MVFRL, then the remedies under the general bad faith statute at §8371 (i.e., punitive damages, costs and interest) may additionally apply as well, is consistent with two recent decisions out of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas by Senior Judge Harold A. Thomson, Jr. and Judge Carmen D. Minora. See Skiro v. Erie Ins. Exchange, No. 09-CV-7077 (Lacka Co. May 19, 2010 Thomson, S.J.); Veltri v. Travelers Commercial Insurance Company, 08-CIVIL-8534 (Lacka. Co. September 2, 2009 Minora, J.)
Click on this link to go to my June 11, 2010 synopsis of those Lackawanna County decisions
on Tort Talk: http://www.torttalk.com/2010/06/bad-faith-claim-allowed-to-proceed-in.html.
Superior Court Rejects Violations of Rental Car Agreement as Support for Carrier to Deny Coverage
In the recent case of Viking Insurance Company of Wisconsin v. Spells, No. 809 WDA 2009 (Pa.Super. May 28, 2010), marked by the court as a "non-precedential decision," the Superior Court rejected attempts by an insurance company to utilize violations of a rental car agreement to avoid coverage to its insured for liability arising out of a motor vehicle accident involving the rental car.
In the Viking case, the Viking Insurance Company insured a man by the name of Ned Spells and his vehicle. Mr. Spells rented another vehicle from Enterprise under a contract that stated "no other driver permitted."
Thereafter, Mr. Spells let another individual drive the Enterprise rental car and that person became involved in a high speed chase with the police and crashed into another vehicle, injuring the driver of that vehicle.
The injured party went on to sue Mr. Spells and the individual he let drive the rental car. Neither defendant reported the lawsuit to Viking Insurance until after a default judgment was entered against them.
When they were notified of the suit later, Viking Insurance defended the defendants under a reservation of rights and pursued a declaratory judgment action on the coverage issue, which gave rise to this decision.
The primary issue addressed by the Superior Court was Viking Insurance's position that, by allowing the other individual to drive the rental vehicle, Mr. Spells no longer had permission to use the rental vehicle and, therefore, could not be considered an "insured person" under his own policy with Viking. The insurance company relied upon its own policy language and the rental agreement with Enterprise in its position.
More specifically, the Viking insurance policy provided that "No person shall be considered an insured person if the person uses a car...without the permission of the owner."
The Enterprise rental agreement additionally provided that a person who violates any provision in the rental agreement causes an automatic termination of the renter's right to use the vehicle.
The court noted that Viking Insurance Company was basically arguing that Mr. Spells stole the rental vehicle by permitting the other person to operate the vehicle and, as a result, Viking should be excused from providing coverage.
The court rejected this argument as an impermissible attempt against public policy to utilize a rental agreement's terms to preclude insurance coverage under the driver's personal policy.
The Viking court also emphasized that, while the policy of insurance did not cover the rental vehicle it did cover Mr. Nells himself for his actions.
The court also found that public policy did not preclude a finding of coverage for liability imposed under 75 Pa.C.S.A. Section 1574, which mandates that the owner of a vehicle shall be jointly and severally liable with any unlicensed driver the owner lets drive the vehicle if that driver is involved in an accident.
Ultimately, this case is another example of a decision establishing that the courts will not be reluctant to let carriers avoid coverage to its insureds with respect to rental vehicles on the basis of violations of a rental car agreement.
I send thanks to fellow Pennsylvania Defense Institute Board Member, Attorney Tom McDonnell of the Pittsburgh law firm of Summers, McDonnell, Hudock, Guthrie & Skeel for bringing this case to my attention.
Anyone desiring a copy of this (non-precedential) Opinion may contact me at dancummins@comcast.net.
In the Viking case, the Viking Insurance Company insured a man by the name of Ned Spells and his vehicle. Mr. Spells rented another vehicle from Enterprise under a contract that stated "no other driver permitted."
Thereafter, Mr. Spells let another individual drive the Enterprise rental car and that person became involved in a high speed chase with the police and crashed into another vehicle, injuring the driver of that vehicle.
The injured party went on to sue Mr. Spells and the individual he let drive the rental car. Neither defendant reported the lawsuit to Viking Insurance until after a default judgment was entered against them.
When they were notified of the suit later, Viking Insurance defended the defendants under a reservation of rights and pursued a declaratory judgment action on the coverage issue, which gave rise to this decision.
The primary issue addressed by the Superior Court was Viking Insurance's position that, by allowing the other individual to drive the rental vehicle, Mr. Spells no longer had permission to use the rental vehicle and, therefore, could not be considered an "insured person" under his own policy with Viking. The insurance company relied upon its own policy language and the rental agreement with Enterprise in its position.
More specifically, the Viking insurance policy provided that "No person shall be considered an insured person if the person uses a car...without the permission of the owner."
The Enterprise rental agreement additionally provided that a person who violates any provision in the rental agreement causes an automatic termination of the renter's right to use the vehicle.
The court noted that Viking Insurance Company was basically arguing that Mr. Spells stole the rental vehicle by permitting the other person to operate the vehicle and, as a result, Viking should be excused from providing coverage.
The court rejected this argument as an impermissible attempt against public policy to utilize a rental agreement's terms to preclude insurance coverage under the driver's personal policy.
The Viking court also emphasized that, while the policy of insurance did not cover the rental vehicle it did cover Mr. Nells himself for his actions.
The court also found that public policy did not preclude a finding of coverage for liability imposed under 75 Pa.C.S.A. Section 1574, which mandates that the owner of a vehicle shall be jointly and severally liable with any unlicensed driver the owner lets drive the vehicle if that driver is involved in an accident.
Ultimately, this case is another example of a decision establishing that the courts will not be reluctant to let carriers avoid coverage to its insureds with respect to rental vehicles on the basis of violations of a rental car agreement.
I send thanks to fellow Pennsylvania Defense Institute Board Member, Attorney Tom McDonnell of the Pittsburgh law firm of Summers, McDonnell, Hudock, Guthrie & Skeel for bringing this case to my attention.
Anyone desiring a copy of this (non-precedential) Opinion may contact me at dancummins@comcast.net.
Labels:
Automobile Insurance,
Coverage Questions
Another Post-Koken Decision Out of Luzerne County In Favor of Consolidation
On June 25, 2010, Judge Thomas F. Burke, Jr. of the Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas entered an Order overruling a tortfeasor's Preliminary Objections in the post-Koken case of Rinker v. Kellar and State Farm, No. 11036 of 2009 (Luz. Co. June 25, 2010, Burke, J.) thereby allowing the third party liability claims and the UIM claim to proceed in a consolidated fashion.
The Post-Koken Scorecard has been updated with this case. To view the Post-Koken Scorecard, scroll down the right-hand column and click on the link.
I thank the prevailing Plaintiff's attorney, Neil O'Donnell of the O'Donnell Law Offices in Kingston, Pennsylvania for bringing this case to my attention.
Anyone desiring a copy of this Order without Opinion may contact me at dancummins@comcast.net.
The Post-Koken Scorecard has been updated with this case. To view the Post-Koken Scorecard, scroll down the right-hand column and click on the link.
I thank the prevailing Plaintiff's attorney, Neil O'Donnell of the O'Donnell Law Offices in Kingston, Pennsylvania for bringing this case to my attention.
Anyone desiring a copy of this Order without Opinion may contact me at dancummins@comcast.net.
Effort at Offensive Collateral Estoppel Rebuffed Again In UIM Case
In a recent June 21, 2010 Opinion and Order in the case of Metallo v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., No. 2009-Civil-1329 (Lacka. Co. June 21, 2010, Minora, J.), Judge Carmen D. Minora of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas denied a Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment against a UIM carrier asserting that the carrier could not contest liability in the UIM claim because liability had been admitted by the Defendant/driver in the separate third party negligence action by virtue of the absent tortfeasor Defendant’s failure to answer Requests for Admissions.
This matter involved two separate lawsuits arising out of an incident during which the Plaintiff, who was on a bicycle, was struck by a motor vehicle being driven by the tortfeasor Defendant. The Plaintiff filed a separate lawsuit against the Defendant/driver who, according to the police report, was an illegal immigrant with a Mexico driver’s license. Also filed was a separate UIM lawsuit against the UIM carrier, USAA Casualty Insurance Company.
During the course of the third party matter, the Defendant driver was served with Requests for Admissions on the liability issues and failed to respond. As such, those Admissions were deemed admitted.
After the third party claim was concluded, the Plaintiff proceeded with the UIM claim and filed a Motion for Summary Judgment arguing that USAA could not contest liability because that issue had already been admitted by the Defendant-driver in the separate third party action.
In denying the Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Judge Minora emphasized that, under Pa. R.C.P. 4014 pertaining to Requests for Admissions, it is provided that such requests and admissions are intended to apply only for “purposes of the pending action only.” The rule also provides that such admissions by a party are not to be considered admissions by the party “for any other purpose nor may [they] be used against the party in any proceedings.”
Judge Minora initially noted that, under Pennsylvania law, conclusions of law, as opposed to admissions of fact, are not within the permissible legal scope of a Request for Admission. See Christian v. Pennsylvania Financial Responsibility Assigned Claim Plan, 686 A.2d 1 (Pa. Super. 1986) re-argument denied, appeal denied, 699 A.2d 733 (Pa. 1996); Brindley v. Woodward Village Restaurant, Inc., 652 A.2d 865 (Pa. 1995).
In his Opinion, Judge Minora additionally noted that the deposition testimony of other witnesses in the claim created genuine issues of material fact with regard to the liability issues.
As such, the Motion for Summary Judgment was denied.
I thank defense attorney, Robert Smith, Esquire of the Moosic office of Marshall, Dennehey, Warner, Coleman & Goggin for forwarding this case to my attention.
Anyone desiring a copy of this Opinion may contact me at dancummins@comcast.net.
This matter involved two separate lawsuits arising out of an incident during which the Plaintiff, who was on a bicycle, was struck by a motor vehicle being driven by the tortfeasor Defendant. The Plaintiff filed a separate lawsuit against the Defendant/driver who, according to the police report, was an illegal immigrant with a Mexico driver’s license. Also filed was a separate UIM lawsuit against the UIM carrier, USAA Casualty Insurance Company.
During the course of the third party matter, the Defendant driver was served with Requests for Admissions on the liability issues and failed to respond. As such, those Admissions were deemed admitted.
After the third party claim was concluded, the Plaintiff proceeded with the UIM claim and filed a Motion for Summary Judgment arguing that USAA could not contest liability because that issue had already been admitted by the Defendant-driver in the separate third party action.
In denying the Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Judge Minora emphasized that, under Pa. R.C.P. 4014 pertaining to Requests for Admissions, it is provided that such requests and admissions are intended to apply only for “purposes of the pending action only.” The rule also provides that such admissions by a party are not to be considered admissions by the party “for any other purpose nor may [they] be used against the party in any proceedings.”
Judge Minora initially noted that, under Pennsylvania law, conclusions of law, as opposed to admissions of fact, are not within the permissible legal scope of a Request for Admission. See Christian v. Pennsylvania Financial Responsibility Assigned Claim Plan, 686 A.2d 1 (Pa. Super. 1986) re-argument denied, appeal denied, 699 A.2d 733 (Pa. 1996); Brindley v. Woodward Village Restaurant, Inc., 652 A.2d 865 (Pa. 1995).
In his Opinion, Judge Minora additionally noted that the deposition testimony of other witnesses in the claim created genuine issues of material fact with regard to the liability issues.
As such, the Motion for Summary Judgment was denied.
I thank defense attorney, Robert Smith, Esquire of the Moosic office of Marshall, Dennehey, Warner, Coleman & Goggin for forwarding this case to my attention.
Anyone desiring a copy of this Opinion may contact me at dancummins@comcast.net.
Labels:
Judge Minora,
UIM,
Underinsured Motorists Claims
Thursday, July 8, 2010
A Few More Post-Koken Cases Brought to My Attention
Clinton County: Consolidation of Post-Koken claims favored
On June 3, 2010, Judge J. Michael Williamson, President Judge of the Clinton County Court of Common Pleas issued an Order, without opinion, in the post-Koken case of Wentzel v. Swinehart and State Farm, No. 375-10 CV (June 3, 2010, Williamson, P.J.) in which he denied both the UIM carrier’s Motion to Sever the Plaintiff’s bad faith claim and the request that the bad faith claim be stayed pending the resolution of the underinsured motorist action. In so ruling, Judge Williamson cited the Gunn v. Hartford, 2008 W.L. 6653070, GD 07-Civil-002888 (Alleg. Co. July 25, 2008, Wettick, J.).
I thank Attorney Stuart Hall, from Lock Haven, Pennsylvania for forwarding the case to my attention.
Anyone desiring a copy of the Wentzel Order may contact me at dancummins@comcast.net.
Philadelphia County: Another decision by Judge Tereshko in favor of severance
In another post-Koken decision I have been made aware of, Judge Allan L. Tereshko issued an Order back on May 10, 2010 in the case of Thomas v. Titan Auto Ins., Nationwide Ins. Co., Jones, and Briel, March Term 2010 No. 03050 (May 10, 2010, Tereshko, J.). Consistent with his prior rulings in the same context (see Post-Koken Scorecard), Judge Tereshko granted the Petition to Sever filed by Titan/Nationwide the third party claims from the UIM claims and also granted the request that the case be therefore transferred to Montgomery County.
The case was transferred under Pa. R.C.P. 1006 (pertaining to proper venue) as the place of the accident was in Montgomery County and the Plaintiffs and the individual Defendants all resided in Montgomery County at the time of the motor vehicle accident. The decision to transfer was not based upon any forum selection clause as I have been informed that the Nationwide policy does not contain any form selection clause.
I have also been informed that the Plaintiff has filed an appeal from this decision. Currently, the case is still at a stage where the Plaintiff is required to file their concise statement of matters complained of on appeal.
I thank Attorney Victor Verbeke of the Conshohocken law firm of Snyder & Verbeke, in-house counsel for Nationwide, for forwarding this case to my attention.
Anyone desiring a copy of the Court Order issued in the Thomas case may contact me at dancummins@comcast.net.
Montgomery County: forum selection clause upheld
On June 30, 2010, Judge Bernard A. Moore of the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas issued an Order without Opinion granting the Preliminary Objections of Progressive Direct Insurance Company in the case of Dunne v. Closs, Progressive, et al., No. 09-38446 (Montg. Co. June 39, 2010, Moore, J.), which involved both a post-Koken severance issue and a claim of improper venue.
In Dunne, the Plaintiffs were allegedly injured in an accident that occurred in Northampton County. The Plaintiffs, who were residents of Monroe County, filed a lawsuit in Montgomery County, where the owner and operator tortfeasor defendants resided.
The lawsuit included negligence claims against the alleged tortfeasors and a claim for underinsured motorist (UIM) benefits against Plaintiffs' carrier, Progressive.
Both the alleged tortfeasors and the UIM carrier filed motions to sever the tort claims from the contract claims against the UIM carrier. Progressive also moved for enforcement of the forum selection clause contained in its policy. The Progressive forum selection clause required that any legal action brought against the carrier on behalf of an insured person must be brought in the state or federal court serving the county of residence of the insured (in this case, Monroe County).
In pursuing the forum selection clause argument, Progressive relied primarily on the case of O’Hara v. The First Liberty Insurance Corp., 984 A.2d 938 (Pa.Super. 2009), appeal denied, 995 A.2d 354 (Pa. May 3, 2010), for its position that its forum selection clause supercedes the venue rules.
Judge Moore granted Progressive's Preliminary Objections and dismissed all claims against Progressive without prejudice to the Plaintiffs' right to re-file in Monroe County or the Middle District.
A tip of the hat to the prevailing defense attorney, Chuck Stokes, Esquire of the Bethlehem/Scranton office of the Forry Ullman law firm for bringing this case to my attention.
Anyone desiring a copy of this Order may contact me at dancummins@comcast.net.
With the addition of these two decisions to the Post-Koken Scorecard, there are now at least 24 decisions in favor of the consolidation of post-Koken claims and 18 in favor of severance. The Post-Koken Scorecard may be viewed by scrolling down the right-hand column of the blog and clicking on the date under the "Post-Koken Scorecard" link.
On June 3, 2010, Judge J. Michael Williamson, President Judge of the Clinton County Court of Common Pleas issued an Order, without opinion, in the post-Koken case of Wentzel v. Swinehart and State Farm, No. 375-10 CV (June 3, 2010, Williamson, P.J.) in which he denied both the UIM carrier’s Motion to Sever the Plaintiff’s bad faith claim and the request that the bad faith claim be stayed pending the resolution of the underinsured motorist action. In so ruling, Judge Williamson cited the Gunn v. Hartford, 2008 W.L. 6653070, GD 07-Civil-002888 (Alleg. Co. July 25, 2008, Wettick, J.).
I thank Attorney Stuart Hall, from Lock Haven, Pennsylvania for forwarding the case to my attention.
Anyone desiring a copy of the Wentzel Order may contact me at dancummins@comcast.net.
Philadelphia County: Another decision by Judge Tereshko in favor of severance
In another post-Koken decision I have been made aware of, Judge Allan L. Tereshko issued an Order back on May 10, 2010 in the case of Thomas v. Titan Auto Ins., Nationwide Ins. Co., Jones, and Briel, March Term 2010 No. 03050 (May 10, 2010, Tereshko, J.). Consistent with his prior rulings in the same context (see Post-Koken Scorecard), Judge Tereshko granted the Petition to Sever filed by Titan/Nationwide the third party claims from the UIM claims and also granted the request that the case be therefore transferred to Montgomery County.
The case was transferred under Pa. R.C.P. 1006 (pertaining to proper venue) as the place of the accident was in Montgomery County and the Plaintiffs and the individual Defendants all resided in Montgomery County at the time of the motor vehicle accident. The decision to transfer was not based upon any forum selection clause as I have been informed that the Nationwide policy does not contain any form selection clause.
I have also been informed that the Plaintiff has filed an appeal from this decision. Currently, the case is still at a stage where the Plaintiff is required to file their concise statement of matters complained of on appeal.
I thank Attorney Victor Verbeke of the Conshohocken law firm of Snyder & Verbeke, in-house counsel for Nationwide, for forwarding this case to my attention.
Anyone desiring a copy of the Court Order issued in the Thomas case may contact me at dancummins@comcast.net.
Montgomery County: forum selection clause upheld
On June 30, 2010, Judge Bernard A. Moore of the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas issued an Order without Opinion granting the Preliminary Objections of Progressive Direct Insurance Company in the case of Dunne v. Closs, Progressive, et al., No. 09-38446 (Montg. Co. June 39, 2010, Moore, J.), which involved both a post-Koken severance issue and a claim of improper venue.
In Dunne, the Plaintiffs were allegedly injured in an accident that occurred in Northampton County. The Plaintiffs, who were residents of Monroe County, filed a lawsuit in Montgomery County, where the owner and operator tortfeasor defendants resided.
The lawsuit included negligence claims against the alleged tortfeasors and a claim for underinsured motorist (UIM) benefits against Plaintiffs' carrier, Progressive.
Both the alleged tortfeasors and the UIM carrier filed motions to sever the tort claims from the contract claims against the UIM carrier. Progressive also moved for enforcement of the forum selection clause contained in its policy. The Progressive forum selection clause required that any legal action brought against the carrier on behalf of an insured person must be brought in the state or federal court serving the county of residence of the insured (in this case, Monroe County).
In pursuing the forum selection clause argument, Progressive relied primarily on the case of O’Hara v. The First Liberty Insurance Corp., 984 A.2d 938 (Pa.Super. 2009), appeal denied, 995 A.2d 354 (Pa. May 3, 2010), for its position that its forum selection clause supercedes the venue rules.
Judge Moore granted Progressive's Preliminary Objections and dismissed all claims against Progressive without prejudice to the Plaintiffs' right to re-file in Monroe County or the Middle District.
A tip of the hat to the prevailing defense attorney, Chuck Stokes, Esquire of the Bethlehem/Scranton office of the Forry Ullman law firm for bringing this case to my attention.
Anyone desiring a copy of this Order may contact me at dancummins@comcast.net.
With the addition of these two decisions to the Post-Koken Scorecard, there are now at least 24 decisions in favor of the consolidation of post-Koken claims and 18 in favor of severance. The Post-Koken Scorecard may be viewed by scrolling down the right-hand column of the blog and clicking on the date under the "Post-Koken Scorecard" link.
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