Pro Se Prisoner's Civil Rights Claims Related to COVID-19 Vaccine Dismissed

In the case of Jones v. Employees of the DOC of Pa at SCI-Phoenix, No. 2:22-CV-02386-CMR (E.D. Pa. March 22, 2024 Rufe, J.), the Eastern District Federal Court dismissed a prisoner pro se Plaintiff’s §1983 Civil Rights litigation based on allegations related to medical treatment that the Plaintiff received while in prison.

The Plaintiff asserted that he suffered from adverse side effects after he was injected with a COVID-19 vaccine and the needle was allegedly injected too deep and struck a nerve, allegedly resulting in nerve damage. The Plaintiff alleged Eighth Amendment violations.

The Defendants moved to dismiss, which motion was granted.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff filed an administrative grievance within the prison prior to pursuing this litigation. In that grievance, he asserted deliberate indifference to the Plaintiff’s medical needs and violation of the Eighth Amendment. The grievance was denied. Thereafter, the Plaintiff filed suit.

The court granted the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss after finding that the Plaintiff was provided treatment for his alleged symptoms. The court additionally noted that the record did not reveal any indication that the Defendants had intentionally inflicted pain or insisted on treatment that the Defendants allegedly knew would be painful, in effective, or risky.

The court additionally confirmed the well-settled law that disagreements over medical treatment provided to prisoners in prison could not rise to the level of a constitutional violation under the Eighth Amendment.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.  The Court's companion Order can be viewed HERE.


Source: “The Legal Intelligencer Federal Case Alert” Law.com (April 18, 2024).

Source of image:  Photo by Hakan Nural on www.unsplash.com.

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Western Federal District Court Addresses Viability of Recklessness and Punitive Damages Claims in a Products Case

In the case of C.M. v. American Honda Motor Co., No. 3:23-CV-00119 (W.D. Pa. April 1, 2024 Gibson, J.), the court denied a Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss in a products liability case arising out of a motor vehicle accident.

In so ruling, the court held that allegations of recklessness go to the degree of negligence and do not state claims separate from claims of ordinary negligence under Pennsylvania law.  As such, the court found that these types of recklessness claims are not separate claims that can be separately dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12 where the Plaintiff has pled a valid negligence claim.

The court also separately held that, because the issue of whether punitive damages are appropriate involves factual determinations that are best made with the benefit of completed discovery, the request for a dismissal of punitive damages claims on a Rule 12 Motion to Dismiss is premature.

In any event, the court also found that the Complaint at issue contained sufficient allegations of fact to support the claims of recklessness.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


I thank Attorney James M. Beck of the Philadelphia office of the Reed Smith law firm for bringing this case to my attention.

Summary Judgment Denied in Slip and Fall Case

In the case of Sanner v. Airbnb, Inc., No. 3:22-CV-00274 (M.D. Pa. March 29, 2024 Mehalchick, J.), the court denied a Motion for Summary Judgment in a wintry slip and fall case.

The court found that the hills and ridges doctrine does not apply to a localized patch of ice or to circumstances when the icy condition is allegedly created by human intervention.

In this case, the court found that whether the conditions at issue were due solely to a natural snow accumulation was a disputed fact.

Judge Karoline Mehalchick
M.D. Pa.

The court also found that allegations regarding Plaintiff’s assumption of the risk were also disputed. As such, summary judgment was denied and the case was allowed to proceed.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


I thank Attorney James M. Beck of the Philadelphia office of the Reed Smith law firm for bringing this case to my attention.

Judge Mannion of Federal Middle District Court Addresses Continuing Validity of the Regular Use Exclusion and Makes Predictions

In the case of Dayton v. The Automobile Insurance Co. of Hartford, CT, No. 3:20-CV-01833-MEM (M.D. Pa. April 23, 2024 Mannion, J.), the court addressed the issue of whether “regular use” exclusion provision in a motor vehicle insurance policy is unenforceable as contrary to Pennsylvania law under a 75 Pa. C.S.A. §1738 analysis.

Judge Mannion predicted that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would find that the regular use exclusion does not violate §1738 of Pennsylvania’s Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law.

According to the Opinion, this lawsuit arose out of a motor vehicle accident during which the Plaintiff was injured while driving his employer’s truck. 

The Plaintiff sued after he was not allowed to stack his personal automobile coverage limits on top of the separate insurance policy issued by a different insurance company that his employer had for the truck that the Plaintiff had been driving at the time of the accident.

The carrier in this case had denied the Plaintiff’s claim for additional UIM benefits based upon a regular use exclusion which precluded any coverage when injuries were sustained by an insured while occupying a non-insured vehicle that was available for the insured’s regular use.

The court rejected the Plaintiff’s arguments under the Gallagher v. Geico line of cases under which the Plaintiff attempted to argue that the regular use exclusion, like the household exclusion, operates as a impermissible de facto waiver of stacking under certain circumstances.

In addition to noting that the scope of the Gallagher decision had been limited by recent decisions by Pennsylvania Supreme Court, including in the case of Erie Insurance Exchange v. Mione, Judge Mannion also noted that, earlier this year, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had upheld the regular use exclusion as enforceable in the case of Rush v. Erie Insurance Exchange under a 75 Pa. C.S.A. §1731 analysis.

Judge Malachy E. Mannion
M.D. Pa.

The court noted that the separate §1738 analysis was not addressed in the Rush case. In this regard, Judge Mannion found that the Erie Insurance Exchange v. Mione by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was instructive and “dictates the prediction that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would conclude that a regular use exclusion which does not deprive an insured of stacked UIM coverage does not violate §1738.” 

In this case, the court found that the Plaintiff did not have any insurance policy under which §1738 would require stacking of the UIM coverage provided in his personal policy with the insurance company at issue in this case and that, therefore, that policy’s regular use exclusion does not deprive the Plaintiff of stacked coverage and, therefore, did not violate §1738.

Accordingly, the Plaintiff’s arguments that the regular use exclusion violated the MVFRL were rejected by the Court, the regular use exclusion was enforced, and the Defendant carrier was granted summary judgment in this case.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: Article – “Federal Court Predicts How Pa. Supreme Court will Address Unanswered Question About Regular Use Exclusion.” By Riley Brennan, the Legal Intelligencer (April 26, 2024).

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Pennsylvania Supreme Court's Latest Pronouncement on Service of Process Issues (And Another Great Dissenting Opinion by Justice Wecht)

In the case of Ferraro v. Patterson-Erie, No. 1 WAP 2023 (Pa. April 25, 2024) (Op. by Donohue, J.), the court addressed a statute of limitations argument related to service of process issues in a slip and fall case.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff slipped and fell at a Burger King and, thereafter, filed a negligence lawsuit against the operators of the restaurant.

The Plaintiff filed her Complaint within the two (2) year statute of limitations.

However, the Plaintiff encountered difficulties with serving the Complaint on the Defendants due to issues with the Sheriff’s service and the COVID-19 pandemic.

The Plaintiff eventually served the Complaint through a private process server. She later reinstated the Complaint and then served it through the Sheriff.  However, this service by the Sheriff occurred after the statute of limitations had elapsed.

The Defendants argued that the action was barred by the statute of limitations because the Plaintiff did not make a good faith effort to serve them in a timely manner.

The trial court had denied the Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings in this regard. The Superior Court affirmed the trial court’s decision.

On appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, the decision of the Superior Court was reversed.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the Plaintiff failed to meet her burden of demonstrating that she made a good faith effort in diligently and timely serving process on the Defendants.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court found that the Defendants’ informal receipt of actual notice was irrelevant.

The court emphasized that the Plaintiffs are not permitted to opt out of the Rules of Civil Procedure regarding service in order to give notice of the commencement of a lawsuit by way of informal means. The court noted that, if attempts at service of process were viewed as optional for giving such notice of the filing of a lawsuit, then no Plaintiff would be required to rely upon the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure to complete service of process in a proper manner.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.  

The Dissenting Opinion by Justice Wecht, in which Justice Mundy joined, can be viewed HERE.  Justice Wecht's Dissenting Opinion provides an excellent and thorough overview of the jurisprudence in Pennsylvania on the service of process law.  Justice Wecht also proposes ways to provide clarity on this area of law going forward.


Source: Justia.com Daily Opinions Summaries (April 26, 2024).