Tuesday, April 5, 2022

Plaintiff Driving Uninsured Vehicle Found To Be Full Tort Because Involved in Accident With a Vehicle Registered in Another State


In the case of Devoue v. American Sitework, LLC, No. 2:20-CV-06003-KSM (E.D. Pa. March 4, 2022 Marston, J.), the court addressed whether or not a Plaintiff should be considered to be a limited tort Plaintiff or a full tort Plaintiff under a given set of circumstances.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff was driving an uninsured vehicle when he was allegedly injured in an accident that occurred when pebbles allegedly fell from the back of the Defendant’s vehicle which was registered in New Jersey.

Ordinarily, under Pennsylvania law, the Plaintiff would be deemed to be a limited tort Plaintiff under §1705(a)(5) because he was the owner of a registered but uninsured vehicle.

However, in this case, the court held that, in the third party case, the Plaintiff would be considered a full tort Plaintiff under §1705(d) because the Plaintiff was allegedly injured as a result of the alleged negligence of a driver of a vehicle that was registered in another state. As such, the court ruled that the Plaintiff need not show that he sustained a serious injury in order to cover non-economic damages.

A review of the court’s detailed Order revealed that the court came to this conclusion through its construction of the statutory language.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney Scott B. Cooper of the Harrisburg, PA law firm of Schmidt Kramer P.C., for bringing this case to my attention.


Source of image:  Photo by Michael Fousert on www.unsplash.com.

Monday, April 4, 2022

Corrected Link for the Merrifield v. Bonacuse (Fair Scope of Expert Testimony) Case




The link for yesterday's Tort Talk post on the case of Merrifield v. Bonacuse, No. 16-CV-3420 (C.P. Lacka. Co. Dec. 8, 2021 Nealon, J.) did not work.  Sorry about that.

In that case, the court addressed the scope of expert testimony for trial as being beyond the fair scope of the pre-trial reports offered by the expert as compared to the fair scope of a treating doctor's trial testimony based upon office notes.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.



Speaking Objections At Depositions Addressed by Judge Terrence R. Nealon of Lackawanna County


In the case of The Fiduciary Trust Co. Int’l of Pa v. Geisinger-Community Medical Center, No. 20-CV-4775 (C.P. Lacka. Co. March 4, 2022 Nealon, J.), Judge Terrence R. Nealon tackled the issue of speaking objections during the course of depositions that were conducted in this medical malpractice action.

According to the Opinion, after a nurse who was being deposed had demonstrated an understanding of information on fetal monitoring strips and had defined certain medical terms in that regard during her testimony, a Plaintiff’s attorney displayed the fetal monitoring strips to the nurse and attempted to question her regarding the findings on the same.

The record before the court revealed that, following suggestive interjections by her counsel, the nurse, who had worked as a labor and delivery nurse for almost 40 years until her retirement in 2008, indicated that she did not know if she would be able interpret the fetal monitoring strips satisfactorily.

When the Plaintiff’s attorney then attempted to explore the nurse’s ability to review and comprehend the strips, the nurse’s attorney objected and instructed the nurse not to answer any questions regarding the fetal monitoring strips.

In response, the Plaintiff filed a discovery motion seeking to compel the nurse to answer the questions presented. Plaintiff’s counsel also sought monetary sanctions due for requiring the Plaintiff to file this Motion.

Judge Terrence R. Nealon
Lackawanna County


After reviewing Pennsylvania law on the issues presented, Judge Terrence R. Nealon of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas noted that the Plaintiff was entitled to adequately probe the legitimacy and extent of any claimed incompetency by the nurse deponent regarding her ability to read or understand the fetal monitoring strips. The court noted that the issue of whether the nurse’s claim that she had no such abilities should be left to the jury to determine.

In so ruling, the court noted that counsel for a deponent “may direct the witness not to answer a specific question only if that instruction is necessary to (a) protect a recognized privilege, (b) enforce an evidentiary limitation established by an earlier court ruling in the case, or (c) present a motion for a protective order based upon grounds identified in Pa. R.C.P. 4012(a).

The court found that the instruction issued in this case by the attorney to the witness not to answer the Plaintiff’s questions were not based on any of the above noted reasons and, as such, the court granted the Plaintiff counsel fees incurred in preparing and presenting the discovery motion. 

The court also directed the nurse to submit to an additional deposition within the next thirty (30) days to answer the questions regarding her interpretation of the fetal monitoring strips and her ability to do so.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney Scott B. Cooper of the Harrisburg, PA law firm of Schmidt Kramer P.C. for bringing this case to my attention.

Photo by Andrea Piacquadio from www.pexels.com.

Fair Scope of the Expert Report Rule Does Not Apply to Treating Doctors


In the case of Merrifield v. Bonacuse, No. 16-CV-3420 (C.P. Lacka. Co. Dec. 8, 2021 Nealon, J.), the court addressed the scope of expert testimony for trial as being beyond the fair scope of the pre-trial reports offered by the expert.

After referring to Pa. R.C.P. 4003.5(c), which limits the direct testimony of any expert to the “fair scope” of the pre-trial reports authored by the experts, the court limited the defense IME doctor from referencing the Plaintiff’s medical billings or Medicare’s lien given that the expert did not identify in his report that he had reviewed any such records and where that expert did not make any reference to the reasonableness of the medical providers’ charges for the amounts actually paid by Medicare.

The court found that, in light of the discrepancy between the defense expert’s pre-trial reports and his proffered testimony, the Plaintiff is found to be unable to prepare a meaningful cross-examination to challenge any opinions with regards to the reasonableness of the medical expenses or Medicare’s Conditional Payments. As such, the Plaintiff’s Motion In Limine was granted.

Relative to the defense objections to the Plaintiff’s treating doctor’s testimony as being beyond the fair scope of any reports, Judge Nealon found that the “fair scope” of the report limitation set forth in Rule 4003.5(c) only applies to expert witnesses whose opinions were acquired or developed in anticipation of litigation or for trial.

Given that the Plaintiff’s expert formulated his opinions in his capacity of a treating doctor, rather than as an expert hired by a party in anticipation of litigation or trial, the court found that that expert was not obligated to author a pre-trial report and that his trial testimony was not subject to the “fair scope” rule. As such, the Defendant’s Motion In Limine seeking to strike the Plaintiff’s expert’s direct testimony was denied.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Photo from www.pexels.com.

Friday, April 1, 2022

Business Interruption Coverage Claim Denied Relative to a Restaurant

In the case of KWB Enter. Inc., v. Nationwide Gen. Ins. Co., 2:20-CV-05195-MSG (E.D. Pa. Jan. 31, 2022 Goldberg, J.), the court granted a Defendant insurance company’s Motion to Dismiss a restaurant’s claims for alleged losses allegedly arising from COVID-19 closure, as well as the alleged public perception of restaurants as dangerous due to COVID-19.

In so ruling, the Court found that the Plaintiff’s “business income,” claim failed because the Plaintiff’s claims were inconsistent with the modifiers “direct,” “physical,” and “of Covered Property” as listed in the insurance policy.

The court additionally found that the Plaintiff’s “civil authority” and “reasonable expectation” arguments failed to support any finding of coverage as well.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.  The Order can be viewed HERE

Source: “Digest of Recent Opinions.” Pennsylvania Law Weekly (Feb. 24, 2022).

Thursday, March 31, 2022

Injured Party Found To Be a Resident Under Policy for UIM Coverage Purposes (Non-Precedential)


In the non-precedential case of Erie Insurance Exchange v. Montesano, No. 262 E.D.A. 2021 (Pa. Super. Feb. 24, 2022 Lazarus, J., Dubow, J., and Pellegrini, J.) (Op. by Lazarus, J.) (Dubow, J, dissenting), the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed a trial court’s decision that a Plaintiff insured met the definition of a “resident” as defined by the insurance company’s policy in this UIM coverage litigation.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff’s parents had divorced when the Plaintiff was 2 years of age. It was reported that the Plaintiff resided with her father and her stepmother in their Montgomery County home through the Plaintiff’s birth through her graduation from high school in 2013. At times, the Plaintiff would visit her mother in Florida for one (1) month over the summer and for one (1) week every other Christmas.

At the time of the accident, the Plaintiff’s father and stepmother owned three (3) vehicles, all of which were insured under an Erie Insurance policy. Under that policy, the term “resident” was defined as “a person who physically lives with ‘you’ in ‘your’ household on a regular basis.”

The court also noted that, on August 3, 2013, following an argument with her father and stepmother and without the knowledge of her father and stepmother, the Plaintiff left her father’s home and flew to Florida to stay with her mother. The Plaintiff took some clothing, a couple of shoes, deodorant, a toothbrush, toothpaste and underwear with her on the trip to Florida. It was noted that the Plaintiff did not take her computer or any jewelry and did not make any arrangements to have those items shipped to Florida. The court noted that the Plaintiff retained her key to her stepfather’s home and continued to receive mail there.

The Plaintiff then lived in Florida and slept on her mother’s couch for approximately one (1) month. While the Plaintiff was in Florida, she obtained state-issued driver’s license and registered to vote.

Seeking another change of scenery, the Plaintiff then left her mother’s home in September of 2013 to visit her maternal grandparents in Alabama. While in Alabama, the Plaintiff obtained an Alabama-state-issued driver’s license, transferred her voter’s registration, and purchased a new month-to-month cell phone plan through an Alabama service provider. The Plaintiff also obtained a job obtained a job and had her own bedroom in her grandmother’s house.

In December of 2013, the Plaintiff returned to her father’s house in Pennsylvania but stayed at a hotel. However, the Plaintiff did visit her father’s house for dinner and, at that dinner, reconciled with her dad and her stepmother and told them that she “wanted to come back home.” The Plaintiff decided to take her scheduled flight back to Alabama to retrieve her personal items and then return to her father’s home in Pennsylvania sometime in January.

The Plaintiff then returned to Alabama after her short visit to Pennsylvania. She decided to drive back to Florida with her mother after her mother had visited the grandmother in Alabama for the Christmas holidays.

The Plaintiff then planned to fly home to Pennsylvania from Florida on January 8, 2014. However, on the drive to Florida on January 2, 2014, the Plaintiff sustained injuries in a motor vehicle accident in Florida while a passenger in her mother’s minivan.

Following the accident, the Plaintiff presented a claim for UIM benefits under the Erie Insurance policy that was issued to her father in Pennsylvania.

Erie investigated the claim and ultimately concluded that the Plaintiff did not qualify as a “resident” of her father’s Pennsylvania home because she had not been physically living there on a regular basis at the time of the accident.

After a bench trial held at the trial court level, that court found that, “for all intents and purposes [the Plaintiff’s] true and permanent residence” was her father’s home in Pennsylvania. On appeal, the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed in this decision.

After reviewing the law of residency in this context, and applying the particular language of the policy at issue in terms of the definition of a resident, the court focused on the fact that the definition in the Erie policy define resident, in part, as involving a person who resided in the insured’s residence “on a regular basis.”

The appellate court agreed with the trial court’s finding that such a phrase indicates a broader coverage for individuals who, with some regularity, have lived and will live with the insured, even though they may have physically dwelled somewhere else at the time of the accident. As such, the court found that the law does not require that the insured be physically living at the residence of the insured at the time of an accident in order to be covered under an insurance policy.

Here, where at the time of the accident, the Plaintiff was found to have lived with her father and stepmother in Pennsylvania on a regular basis, the Plaintiff qualified as a “resident” as defined under the policy and was, therefore, found to be entitled to the benefit of UIM coverage under the policy at issue.

The Court's Non-Precedential majority Opinion can be viewed at this LINK.

Source of image:  Photo by Alex on Unsplash

Wednesday, March 30, 2022

ABINGTON HEIGHTS MOCK TRIAL TEAM FROM LACKAWANNA COUNTY REPEATS AS STATE CHAMPIONS

 


CONGRATULATIONS to the reigning State Champion Abington Heights High School Mock Trial Team from Clarks Summit, Lackawanna County, Pennsylvania for going undefeated in the Pennsylvania Bar Association Young Lawyer's Division's statewide Mock Trial Competition this year and for winning the STATE CHAMPIONSHIP last night FOR THE SECOND YEAR IN A ROW!!

REPEAT STATE CHAMPIONS!!!

So proud of these amazing students!!

The Team now moves on to prepare a new Mock Trial case for the Nationals Competition in May.  Although situated in Kalamazoo, Michigan this year, the Nationals will be held virtually.

Congratulations also to our State Finals opponent St. Joseph's Preparatory School from Philadelphia for a great year as well.

Sending THANKS to Jennifer Menichini Drahus, Esq., Jonathan Koltash, Esq., Jonathan Grode, Esq., and Paul Kaufman, Esq., for their hard work and time on the Mock Trial Competition at the PBA level and to Katie Nealon, Esq., Lee Ann Munley, and Kaitlin McDonough for all of their time and hard work with the Competition at the Lackawanna County level.

Thanks also to all of those individuals across the Commonwealth who served as Jurors and Judges for the competition.  The program cannot work without your generous involvement.

I will continue to work to try to get the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to help this great competition by reversing their CLE Committee's previous rejection of a proposed CLE Rule change to allow for minimal CLE credits for Mock Trial juror and judicial volunteers, like many other states already allow.  Allowing such credits may entice more attorneys and judges to participate in the program for the benefit of high school students all across the state.