Thursday, May 27, 2021

Factually Unsupported Allegations Asserted in a New Matter in a Med Mal Case Stricken



In the case of Arens v. Remick, No. 20-CV-21 (C.P. Lacka. Co. April 30, 2021, Nealon, J.), Judge Terrence R. Nealon of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas issued a detailed Order addressing Preliminary Objections filed by Plaintiffs seeking to strike numerous paragraphs in the Defendants’ New Matter under an argument that the affirmative defenses asserted by the medical malpractice Defendants are legally insufficient and/or without the requisite factual specificity or support.

In his Order, Judge Nealon emphasized that Pennsylvania is a fact-pleading state and that pleadings must advise the opposing party of the claims or defenses being asserted and summarize the essential facts supporting those claims and/or defenses.

After reviewing the standard or review in addressing a claim that a pleading lacks the requisite factual support, the court found that certain allegations in the Defendants’ New Matter did not provide the Plaintiffs with adequate notice of the defenses being raised. The court also noted that the Complaint was devoid of any allegations that made some of the defenses raised in the New Matter even applicable to the case presented.

As such, the court struck certain paragraphs of the New Matter as being in violation of Pa. R.C.P. 1019(a), which governs the required contents of all pleadings. However, the court did allow the Defendants the opportunity to file an Amended New Matter with respect to the affirmative defenses at issue.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Boilerplate Affirmative Defenses Stricken



In the case of Greenspan v. Platinum Healthcare Group, LLC., No. 2: CV-05874-JDW (E.D. Pa. March 16, 2021 Wolson, J.) the court struck Affirmative Defenses from a Federal Court Answer filed by a Defendant in a case where the defendant failed to assert any allegations or cite to any facts or evidence that would give rise to a good faith basis to plead the defenses that were asserted.

The court found that the Defendant's Affirmative Defenses violated Rule 11 as they were pled with conditional language that indicated that the Defendant did not have evidence to support the assertion of the defenses at the time. Rather, the court seem to indicate that it felt that boilerplate defenses had been pled in the case.

While the court acknowledge that defense counsel only had a short time to investigate the case before the pleading deadlines, the court found that this did not excuse counsel from the requirement of having a good faith basis to assert Affirmative Defenses in an Answer. 

The court pointed out that defense counsel with limited time to investigate possible Affirmative Defenses could request an extension of time to file that Answer. The court stated that such request are routinely granted by Plaintiff’s attorneys and the courts as matter of courtesy.

The court additionally noted that the defendants have twenty-one (21) days for filing their Answer to file an amended Answer as of right under Rule F.R.C. P. 15.

The court also noted that defendants could thereafter request leave to file an amended Answer beyond the twenty-one (21) day period, which leave the court was required by the Rules to allow “when justice is so requires.”

In the Opinion, the court grandly stated that “its opinion will now be public record for counsel in this case and in future cases to use as a guide and pleading affirmative defenses.”

Given the court’s finding that the Defendant had violated Rule 11, the court issued the sanction of striking the Affirmative Defenses but did so without prejudice. The court noted that if the Defendant had a good faith basis to assert any Affirmative Defense, it could seek to assert them by filing an appropriate motion to amend its Answer.

The court ended the opinion by noting that “Pleadings are not an opportunity for lawyers to throw things against the wall and see what sticks.” The court noted that Rule 11 requires lawyers to give some thought to the assertions included in pleading before they are filed.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.  The companion Order of Court may be viewed HERE.


Source: “Digest of Recent Opinions.” Pennsylvania Law Weekly (Jan. 5, 2021).

Tuesday, May 25, 2021

Summary Judgment Denied in Football Sidelines Injury Case



In the case of Cantafio v. Valley View School District, No. 2018-CV-2991 (C.P. Lacka. Co. May 13, 2021 Gibbons, J.), Judge James A. Gibbons of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas addressed a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by the Defendant, Valley View School District, in a case in which the Plaintiff's decedent was standing along the sidelines of a high school football game and was hit by players who spilled onto the sidelines during a play, which caused the decedent to be propelled backwards, as a result of which he ultimately fell backwards and struck his head on an asphalt surface which bordered the playing field. 
The decedent unfortunately suffered injuries which ultimately resulted in his death approximately ten (10) days later. The decedent’s son was on the stand with the decedent’s grandson and witnessed the incident.

The Defendant, Valley View School District, offered several reasons in support of its Motion for Summary Judgment. The school district argued that, as a political subdivision, it was entitled to immunity under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act. 

The school district Defendant also asserted that it was entitled to judgment under the law of the no-duty doctrine. 

The Defendant additionally asserted that it was entitled to summary judgment under assumption of risk doctrine and/or that the Plaintiff had failed to establish that the Defendant was negligent as a matter of law. 

On the claims asserted by the decedent's son, the Defendant argued that the Plaintiff had failed to put forth facts sufficient to support a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress.

The court addressed each of these arguments in term and denied all of them.  In the end, the school district’s Motion for Summary Judgment was denied.

In his Opinion, Judge Gibbons provides a thorough update on the current status of the law surrounding the no-duty doctrine and the immunity provided under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act.

Judge Gibbons also confirmed that the assumption of risk doctrine remains a valid defense under Pennsylvania law. After outlining the elements of that defense, the court found that the Defendant had not offered sufficient proof to compel the application of that doctrine. The court emphasized that there remains a “reluctance under Pennsylvania law to find that the assumption of the risk applicable unless it is quite clear that the specific risk that occasioned injury was both fully appreciated and voluntarily accepted.” [citation omitted] [emphasis in original citation deleted here]

With regard to the claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress asserted on behalf of the decedent’s son, the court outlined the current elements of that law and found that issues of act prevented the entry of summary judgment.


Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Eastern District Court Holds That the Long Arm of the Law Can Only Go So Far in Terms of Personal Jurisdiction


In the case of Ruffing v. Wipro Ltd., No. 20-5545 (E.D. Pa. March 29, 2021 Bartle, J.), the Eastern District Federal Court granted a Partial Motion to Dismiss on jurisdictional grounds.   

In this employment action matter, the court found that non-Pennsylvania Plaintiffs lacked personal jurisdiction over a Defendant, which was a non-Pennsylvania company because the action involved only the non-Pennsylvania conduct of the Defendant. 


Notably, the court ruled that Pennsylvania cannot constitutionally subject an out-of-state Defendant to general jurisdiction in Pennsylvania simply based upon the fact that the company may have registered to do business in Pennsylvania.   


The Eastern District Court noted that the U.S. Supreme Court in Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 125 (2014) prohibited such an expansive scope of general jurisdiction rules.   


The court in this Ruffing case noted that the United States Supreme Court decision in Bauman would become virtually meaningless if a state could mandate the exercise of general personal jurisdiction over every entity that did business within its border simply because that company had registered to do business in the state.   The Eastern District Court stated that Third Circuit precedent to the contrary was no longer valid since the United States Supreme Court handed down its decision in Bauman.   


Rather, a corporation must be “at home” in a jurisdiction to be subject to general jurisdiction in that state.   


Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK. The companion Order can be reviewed HERE.


I send thanks to Attorney James M. Beck of the Philadelphia law office of the Reed Smith law firm for bringing this case to my attention.   

Monday, May 24, 2021

Pennsylvania Superior Court Upholds Preclusion of Evidence of Industry Standards in Products Liability Case



In the products liability case of Sullivan v. Werner Company, No. 3086-EDA-2019 (Pa. Super. April 15, 2021 Stabile, J., King, J., and Pellegrini, J.) (Op. by Pellegrini, J.), the court upheld a trial court’s decision to preclude evidence of industry standards and the Plaintiff’s negligence.

According to the Opinion, this case involved a strict products liability action that was filed by the Plaintiff after he fell through his scaffold made by Werner Company and sold by Lowe’s companies. A jury determined that a design defect caused the accident and awarded the Plaintiff $2.5 million dollars.

On appeal, the manufacturer asserted that the trial court erred in precluding industry standards evidence. The manufacturer also asserted that it should have been allowed to argue that the Plaintiff’s negligence was the sole cause of the accident. The manufacturer additionally challenged the Plaintiff’s mechanical engineering expert’s opinion as lacking proper factual foundation.

On appeal, the court affirmed the jury’s verdict.

On the industry standards evidence, the Plaintiff filed a Pre-Trial Motion In Limine to bar the admission of any government of industry standard evidence at trial under an argument that the Pennsylvania courts have generally barred such evidence in strict liability cases and that that rule of law was unaffected by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in Tincher v. Omega Flex, Inc., 104 A.3d 328 (Pa. 2014), which erased the distinction between negligence and strict liability and products liability cases.

The Defendant manufacturer asserted the opposite view, arguing that, after Tincher, governmental and industry standards evidence was admissible in strict liability cases.

The trial court agreed with the Plaintiff’s position and granted the Motion In Limine.  As noted, the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed on appeal.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

I send thanks to Attorney Kenneth T. Newman of the Pittsburgh, PA law office of the Thomas, Thomas & Hafer for bringing this case to my attention.

Friday, May 21, 2021

Judge Julia K. Munley of Lackawanna County Addresses Service of Process Issues


In the case of Kadtka v. 81 Keystone, LLC, No. 2019-CV-7109 (C.P. Lacka. Co. May 6, 2021 Munley, J.), Judge Julia K. Munley of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas addressed Preliminary Objections that raised the primary issue of whether or not the Plaintiff had made a good faith effort to notify the Defendant of the commencement of the litigation with the service of the Complaint.

According to the Opinion, the Defendant was asserting that the Plaintiff unduly delayed in completing service and engaged in non-compliance with the Rules of Civil Procedure. The Plaintiff countered that a good faith effort was made and that the Defendant allegedly evaded service.

After reviewing the current status of Pennsylvania law relative to the Lamp v. Heyman standard of review for the completion of service of process, including the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s most recent pronouncement on the issues in the Gussom case, Judge Munley found that the Plaintiff had indeed made a good faith effort to complete service. [Click HERE to see the Tort Talk post on the Gussom case along with a link to that Pennsylvania Supreme Court Opinion].

In this Kadtka case, Judge Munley took into account that some of the delays with respect to the completion of service may have been attributable to the COVID-19 pandemic which the court acknowledged had had a significant impact upon lawyers, litigants, and the court system.

The court additionally encouraged the utilization of evidentiary hearings with regards to service of process issues as the court believed that the credibility of the claims and defenses with regard to service could be more fully addressed at an evidentiary hearing as opposed to the reliance upon submitted paperwork in the form of pleadings, affidavits or deposition testimony.

The court was also influenced to deny the Preliminary Objections on the basis of its findings that a technical non-compliance with the rules of service was excusable, particularly where the record confirmed that the Defendant received actual notice of the lawsuit and was not prejudiced by the delay in service.

The decision by Judge Munley is also notable in that the court rejected a Defendant’s Preliminary Objections in which it was asserted that, in this trip and fall case, the allegations by the Plaintiff that the exterior steps upon which the Plaintiff allegedly fell were “dangerous” and “unreasonably unsafe” were not sufficiently specific to allow the claims to go forward.  The court instead found that the Complaint as a whole put the defense on notice of the claims presented.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Wednesday, May 19, 2021

Pennsylvania Superior Court Upholds Application of Household Exclusion

The Pennsylvania Superior Court recently upheld a household exclusion in the case of Erie Insurance Exchange v. Mione, No. 1450 EDA 2020 (Pa. Super. 2021).  

According to the Opinion by the court in Mione, the Pennsylvania was involved in a motor vehicle accident while driving his motorcycle.  The motorcycle was insured by Progressive Insurance.  Under that policy, UIM coverage had been rejected by the Plaintiff.   


After this accident, the Plaintiff sought to recover UIM benefits from two (2) Erie Insurance policies, one of which was issued to the Plaintiff on another of his personal vehicles. The other Erie policy was issued to a family member who resided in the Plaintiff’s household relative to another personal vehicle.   


In this matter, the Plaintiff asserted that the Gallagher v. Geico decision rendered the household exclusion void and also asserted that the rejection of UIM coverage on the motorcycle was irrelevant to the question of whether the UIM coverage under the Erie Insurance polices applied.   


Notably, even acknowledging the Gallagher v. Geico decision, the Pennsylvania Superior Court in this Mione case acknowledged that “this area of the law is not particularly clear and straightforward.”   


After reviewing numerous household exclusion decisions, the Pennsylvania Superior Court in Mione stated that “Gallagher does not seem to invalidate household exclusions in all cases, despite Appellants’ suggestion to the contrary…. Instead, Gallagher…hold[s] that a household exclusion cannot be used to evade §1738’s explicit requirements for waving stacking.”   See Op. at p. 19.


The Pennsylvania Superior Court went on to note that the case before it did not involve a stacking issue given that the motorcycle in which the Plaintiff was injured did not have any UIM coverage upon which to stack the coverage from the personal automobile insurance policies that had been issued by Erie Insurance.  As noted above, the Plaintiff had rejected UIM coverage on his motorcycle policy with Progressive Insurance. 


In this case, the court ruled that the Plaintiff was attempting to use the Erie automobile insurance policies to “procure” UIM coverage in the first place.   


The court ruled that, because this case did not involve stacking issues, the Gallagher case did not apply.  Because the Gallagher case was found to be inapplicable, the court in this Mione case held that the household exclusion remained enforceable.   


Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


In a humorous irony, in its Opinion, the Pennsylvania Superior Court scolded the trial court for utilizing lengthy single-spaced footnotes in its Opinion because doing so made the trial court's Opinion difficult to read. The Superior Court then goes on to utilize 14 lengthy single-spaced footnotes in its own appellate Opinion.


I send thanks to Attorney Scott Cooper of the Harrisburg, PA law firm of Schmidt Kramer for bringing this case to my attention.  I also send thanks to Attorney Benjamin P. Novak of the Lancaster, Pennsylvania law firm of Fowler, Hirtzel, McNulty & Spaulding, LLP, for bringing this case to my attention.