Tuesday, July 30, 2019

Federal Western District Court of Pennsylvania Finds Punitive Damages Awarded by Jury at a 100:1 Ratio to Be Unconstitutionally Excessive




In the case of Hyman v. Devlin, No. 3:17-89 (W.D. Pa. June 10, 2019 Gibson, J.), the court ruled that a 100:1 ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages in a jury award was unconstitutional.   

This case arose out of a Pennsylvania State Police Trooper’s intervention in the civil repossession of an automobile. The case proceeded to a jury trial and the jury returned the verdict in the Plaintiff’s favor, awarding her $5,000.00 in compensatory damages and $500,000.00 in punitive damages.

Following the verdict, the Defendant filed a Post-Trial Motion under Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure arguing, in part, that the jury’s punitive damages award was unconstitutionally excessive.   

In this case, the court ruled that, based upon a compensatory damages award of $5,000.00, the maximum allowable punitive damages award would be $30,000.00.

This decision is also notable for its review of the law surrounding Motions for Reconsideration in federal courts.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney James M. Beck of the Philadelphia office of the Reed Smith law firm for bringing this case to my attention.   Please check out Attorney Beck’s excellent Drug and Device Law blog HERE.




Thursday, July 25, 2019

Allegations of Liability of Unnamed Agents, Recklessness, and Punitive Damages Allowed to Proceed in a Podiatric Malpractice Action



In the case of Latka v. Rieder, No. 2019-CV-2078 (C.P. Lacka. Co. July 22, 2019 Nealon, J.), the court addressed Preliminary Objections filed in a podiatric malpractice case.  The Defendant sought to strike the agency allegations for failing to identify the actual or ostensible agents by name along with other details.  The Preliminary Objections were also asserted against the Plaintiff’s allegations of recklessness and reckless indifference along with the claim for punitive damages.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff developed an infection after a foot surgery performed by the Defendant.   Treatment of the infection included a partial amputation.  

The Plaintiff sued the podiatrist in a malpractice action and also asserted claims against “the agents, ostensible agents, servants, workers and/or employees” of the podiatrist.   Additionally, in her prayer for relief, the Plaintiff sought to recover punitive damages based upon allegations of recklessness.  

The Defendant podiatrist filed Preliminary Objections seeking to strike the Plaintiff’s agency allegations, recklessness allegations and punitive damages claims as lacking sufficient factual specificity.

Judge Terrence R. Nealon
Lackawanna County
In his Opinion, Judge Nealon reviewed the law establishing Pennsylvania as a fact-pleadings state but not requiring that all evidence in support of a claim be set forth in the Complaint.

The court noted that , in the context of Preliminary Objections asserting the lack of sufficient specificity, the test is whether the Defendant has been provided with adequate notice of the claim against which it must defend.  

With regards to the Plaintiff’s general agency complaints against unnamed agents and employees of the named Defendant, the court noted that, under current Pennsylvania appellate law, the failure to identify a Defendant’s agent by name, or the designation of those individuals as a unit, does not justify striking agency allegations in a Complaint.  Judge Nealon also noted that the Defendant’s efforts to strike agency claims for failing to identify the actual or ostensible agents by name in medical malpractice actions has been consistently rejected in Lackawanna County (citing numerous cases).  

In the end, the court noted that the names and responsibilities of the Defendant’s alleged agents can be ascertained during discovery. As such, the Preliminary Objections in this regard were denied.

Relative to the Plaintiff’s allegations of recklessness and the Plaintiff’s punitive damages claims, the court emphasized that punitive damages are only appropriate when an individual’s actions are of such outrageous nature as to demonstrate intentional, willful, wanton, or reckless conduct.   

The court noted that wanton or reckless conduct covers instances where the actor has intentionally done an act or an unreasonable character in disregard of a risk known to him or her or so obvious that he or she must be taken to have been aware of it, and so great as to make it highly probable that harm would result.   The court otherwise noted that allegations of merely negligence or even gross negligence, do not suffice to support a punitive damages claim.   

Judge Nealon turned to Pa. R.C.P. 1019(b), along with case law construing that Rule, to support a conclusion that recklessness is a condition of the mind that may be averred generally in pleadings in appropriate circumstances.

Judge Nealon went on to cite numerous Lackawanna County cases in which Preliminary Objections seeking to dismiss punitive damages claims on the basis of factual insufficiency have been uniformly rejected except in cases where the Complaint generally alleged willfulness, wantonness, or recklessness without supporting facts.   

After a review of the allegations in the Complaint in this matter, the court overruled the Defendant’s Preliminary Objections to the Plaintiff’s allegations of reckless conduct and the Plaintiff’s related claim for punitive damages. 

The court noted that the Defendant retained the right to challenge the validity of these claims by way of a Motion for Summary Judgment.   

The court additionally emphasized that the Plaintiff may not obtain any financial worth discovery from the Defendant doctor under Pa. R.C.P. 4003.7 unless and until the Plaintiff demonstrated a prima facie right to recover punitive damages.  


Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.



Deadline to Remove Case to Federal Court Tied to Filing of Complaint, Not Writ of Summons


In the case of McLaughlin v. Bayer Essure, Inc., No. 14-7315 (E.D. Pa. May 24, 2019 Padova, J.), the court denied a Motion to Remand a federal court case back to state court.  

In denying this Motion to Remand, the federal court noted that, although Pennsylvania state law allows for the service of a Writ of Summons without an accompanying Complaint, service of a mere Writ of Summons in the state court does not affect any deadline for removal to federal court.

The federal court emphasized that the only document that that counts with regards to the deadline for the removal of a case to federal court is the Complaint.  

The Court's Opinion can be viewed at this LINK. The court's Order can be viewed HERE.


I send thanks to Attorney James M. Beck of the Philadelphia office of the Reed Smith law firm for bringing this case to my attention.   Attorney Beck writes the excellent Drug and Device Law blog.   




Wednesday, July 24, 2019

Have You Heard of Any Recent Post-Koken Decisions or Facebook Discovery Decisions?



Should you hear about or generate any Post-Koken decisions or any Facebook Discovery decisions, I hope and ask that you please email me a copy of the same in order that I may publicize those decisions here on Tort Talk for the benefit of all.

These areas of law continue to have a dearth of appellate decisions to provide any guidance and, as a result, it is important that the common law being created state and federal trial courts across the Commonwealth on these topics be compiled and publicized.

I will be sure to give you credit for sending cases for publication here on Tort Talk.  Also, if you wish to remain anonymous, I will honor that as well.

Thanks very much.

The Post-Koken Scorecard and the Facebook Discovery Scorecard have both just been updated and can always be freely accessed on www.TortTalk.com by scrolling down the right hand column and clicking on the date noted under the title of each Scorecard.


Tuesday, July 23, 2019

Binding Arbitration Award Less Than Tortfeasor's Limits Collaterally Estops UIM Claim



In the federal Post-Koken case of Shiffer v. Liberty Mutual Fire Ins. Co., No. 3:17-CV-978 (M.D. Pa. July 22, 2019 Mariani, J.), Judge Robert D. Mariani of the Federal Middle District Court of Pennsylvania applied the collateral estoppel doctrine to support the entry of summary judgment in favor of an automobile insurance carrier on a UIM claim where the Plaintiff had previously concluded the third party claim by way of a binding high/low arbitration at which an award was entered below the amount of the tortfeasor's liability limits.

According to the Opinion, during the course of the prior third party litigation, the parties in that matter agreed to proceed to a binding high/low arbitration at which the high parameter was set at the tortfeasor's liability limits. 

In the Binding Arbitration Agreement to relative to the third party claim, the Plaintiff expressly reserved the right to pursue a UIM claim.  The UIM carrier was not a party to that Arbitration Agreement.

As noted, the arbitrator in the third party claim entered an award in favor of the Plaintiff that was less than the tortfeasor's liability limits.

After the Arbitration, the Plaintiff signed a Release requested by the tortfeasor's carrier which confirmed a settlement of the third party liability case in the same amount as the Arbitration Award.

Thereafter, the Plaintiff commenced this UIM Post-Koken lawsuit.  After discovery, the UIM carrier filed a Motion for Summary Judgment asserting the collateral estoppel doctrine and asserted that the Plaintiff was collaterally estopped from pursuing the UIM claim as the matter had been previously fully litigated and the tortfeasor had essentially been determined not to have been underinsured.

The Plaintiff responded with the argument that the criteria for the application of the collateral estoppel doctrine had not been met by the defense.  The Plaintiff additionally asserted that the Court should honor the language in the Arbitration Agreement under which the Plaintiff preserved the right to pursue a UIM claim following the Arbitration.

Judge Robert D. Mariani
M.D. Pa.
After providing a thorough and detailed analysis of the collateral estoppel doctrine in general as well as in this particular context of the impact of a third party award less than the tortfeasor's limits on a UIM claim, the Court granted summary judgment in favor of the carrier on the UIM claim.

The Court found that the Plaintif had been provided with a full and fair opportunity to litigate the claim at the Arbitration and that a final determination had been made at the Arbitration relative to the amount of damages that the Plaintiff was entitled to as a result of the accident.  Given that the Arbitration Award was less than the tortfeasor's liability limits, the Plaintiff was found to be collaterally estopped from pursuing an underinsured motorist claim against the Plaintiff's own automobile insurance policy.

The Court additionally held that the language in the Binding Arbitration Agreement under which the Plaintiff had attempted to preserve the right to pursue a UIM claim did not serve to alter the result.

Anyone wishing to review Judge Mariani's Opinion in Shiffer may click this LINK

The Court's companion Order can be viewed HERE.


For other Tort Talk Blog posts on the effect of the collateral estoppel doctrine in UIM cases, click HERE (be sure to continue scrolling down to additional posts below the long Post-Koken Scorecard post in order to see more write-ups on cases in this context).

Judge Brann of Federal Middle District Court Addresses Proper Pleading of Bad Faith Claim


In the case of City of Williamsport v. CNA, Ins. Cos., No. 4:19-cv-00170 (M.D. Pa. May 16, 2019 Brann, J.), the court ruled that a Plaintiff must plead all of the elements of a bad faith claim in order to proceed on the same.

This case involved a coverage dispute and a bad faith claim.   The insured municipality sought repayment for a $1 million settlement over a death arising out of a motor vehicle accident involving one of the city’s police officers.  

Judge Matthew W. Brann
M.D. Pa.
The court dismissed the bad faith claim without prejudice given that, although the insured alleged that the carrier lacked a reasonable basis for denying benefits under the policies at issue, the insured did not allege that the carrier “knew or recklessly disregarded [the] lack of reasonable basis [when] denying the…claim[s],” as is required by law to support a finding of bad faith.  

The Plaintiff was granted the right to amend the Complaint.  

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK

I send thanks to Attorney Lee Applebaum of the Philadelphia law firm of Fineman, Krekstein & Harris for bringing this case to my attention.   

Check out Attorney Applebaum’s excellent Pennsylvania and New Jersey Insurance Bad Faith Case Law blog HERE


Carrier Need Not Show Prejudice to Enforce Limitations of Action Provision



In the case of Mail Quip v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 19-223 (E.D. Pa. May 23, 2019 Kenney, J.)(Mem. Op.), the court held that a carrier was not required to show prejudice to enforce a suit limitations provision of the policy.

In this case, the Plaintiff sued the carrier for breach of the insurance contract and for bad faith.  Allstate filed a motion to dismissed based upon its two year limitation of actions provision in the policy.  The Plaintiff had filed suit almost four years after the loss.

The federal district court noted that there was no Pennsylvania Supreme Court precedent on point but that the Third Circuit had issued decisions predicting that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would rule that a showing of prejudice was not required for a carrier to enforce its limitation of actions provision.  As such, this court followed that precedent and dismissed the claims.

The court additionally held that the Plaintiff's bad faith claims were also barred by the two year statute of limitations applicable to those types of claims.

Anyone wishing to review this decision may click this LINK.

Source: Article:  "Court:  Insurer May Enforce Policy's Suit Limitations Provision" by Steven A. Meyerowitz in the Pennsylvania Law Weekly (June 18, 2019).