In the motor vehicle accident case of Jaurez v. Friess, No. 13-145 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 3, 2016 Conti, J.), the West
District Federal Court denied summary judgment in a chain reaction motor
vehicle accident case.
In so ruling, the
court reviewed the law pertaining to joint tortfeasors as well as the law of causation.
Applying the law to the case before it, the court in Jaurez stated that, in a multi-vehicle
collision, liability can still potentially be found on all involved, including with respect to vehicles that did not collide with
each other under their own power, but rather, were pushed into one another.
Stated otherwise, the court ruled that it cannot be said, as a matter of
law, that just because two vehicles did not collide with one another under their own power, that those operators were not liable. The court noted that
the causal negligence of those operators may be inferred from those motorists bringing their vehicles too close to one after which a third
party to smash them together.
Based upon these issues presented by the facts before the court, summary judgment in favor of certain defendants was denied.
Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK
I send thanks to Attorney James M. Beck of the Philadelphia
office of Reed Smith Law Firm. Please
be sure to check out Attorney Beck’s excellent blog, the Drug and Device Law
Blog (Click HERE to check out Attorney Beck's blog).
Wednesday, March 30, 2016
Tuesday, March 29, 2016
Eastern Federal District Court Addresses Addresses Motion to Stay/Discovery Issues in Post-Koken Bad Faith Context
In the case of the post-Koken case of Wagner v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
No. 5:14-cv-07326 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 19, 2016 Leeson, J.), Judge Joseph Leeson of
the Federal Eastern District Court of Pennsylvania refused the UIM carrier’s
effort to stay the Plaintiff’s bad faith claim but, in the end, rejected most
of the insured’s bad faith discovery requests.
According to the Opinion, the UIM carrier’s primary argument in favor of its request for a stay on bad faith discovery was that, to allow such bad faith discovery would require the UIM carrier to give up protection for work product that it prepared in anticipation of litigating the underlying breach of contract UIM claim. The court rejected this argument and asserted that a “mere claim of bad faith is not shattered the work-product privilege.”
Overall, the court found that a stay of bad faith discovery is not required to eliminate any prejudice or to promote economy. The court observed the different terms in granted or denying stays of bad faith discovery in Pennsylvania’s state in federal courts but attributed this split in authority, in part, to the fact that bad faith is tried by a judge in the state court but by a jury in the federal courts.
In reviewing the bad faith discovery issues as applied to work-product issues, the court found that an insurance company could not reasonably argue that the entirety of its claims file materials are accumulated in anticipation of litigation. However, the court also stated that this did not mean that the work-product doctrine was wholly in applicable to insurers’ claims files. The court stated that, at some point in its investigation, an insurance company’s activity shifts from mere claims evaluation to an anticipation of litigation.
Accordingly, the court rejected the Plaintiff’s assertion that all of the insurers’ claims and investigation files were created in the ordinary course of business. Rather, the court in Wagner found that “[w]hether Plaintiffs may be entitled to a subset of that information would hinge upon a fact-specific inquiry into the nature of the information that they seek, when [the insurer] reasonably anticipate litigation, Plaintiffs’ need for the particular information, and whether they can obtain the information through other means.”
The court further noted that this inquiry requires very specific arguments and typically the need for an in-camera review of the documents by the court. Here, the Plaintiffs were found to have made no such arguments as it was the Plaintiff’s primary position that there was no work-product privilege. Accordingly, the Motion was denied, but without prejudice.
Judge Leeson did go on to determine the date when the insured was deemed to have reasonably anticipated litigation. The court found that that date occurred after the insured’s first demand for the policy limits because the carrier had asked for certain information to be able to evaluate the claim and the demand. The court found that it was only after receiving that information that litigation could have reasonably been anticipated.
The court also noted that, even materials prepared after litigation was reasonably anticipated by the carrier might turn out to be discoverable if exceptions to the work-privilege could be established by the Plaintiff. In other words, if the Plaintiffs were able to show that they have a substantial need for the particular materials and cannot, without undue hardship, obtain those materials or their substantial equivalent by other means, Plaintiffs may be permitted to obtain the discovery they seek, provided that the discovery did not include mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of the carrier, its attorneys, or other representatives.
Anyone wishing to read the Wagner v. Allstate case online may click this LINK.
Source: Pennsylvania and New Jersey Insurance Bad Faith Case Law Block (March 15, 2016) at www.pabadfaithlaw.com
According to the Opinion, the UIM carrier’s primary argument in favor of its request for a stay on bad faith discovery was that, to allow such bad faith discovery would require the UIM carrier to give up protection for work product that it prepared in anticipation of litigating the underlying breach of contract UIM claim. The court rejected this argument and asserted that a “mere claim of bad faith is not shattered the work-product privilege.”
Overall, the court found that a stay of bad faith discovery is not required to eliminate any prejudice or to promote economy. The court observed the different terms in granted or denying stays of bad faith discovery in Pennsylvania’s state in federal courts but attributed this split in authority, in part, to the fact that bad faith is tried by a judge in the state court but by a jury in the federal courts.
In reviewing the bad faith discovery issues as applied to work-product issues, the court found that an insurance company could not reasonably argue that the entirety of its claims file materials are accumulated in anticipation of litigation. However, the court also stated that this did not mean that the work-product doctrine was wholly in applicable to insurers’ claims files. The court stated that, at some point in its investigation, an insurance company’s activity shifts from mere claims evaluation to an anticipation of litigation.
Accordingly, the court rejected the Plaintiff’s assertion that all of the insurers’ claims and investigation files were created in the ordinary course of business. Rather, the court in Wagner found that “[w]hether Plaintiffs may be entitled to a subset of that information would hinge upon a fact-specific inquiry into the nature of the information that they seek, when [the insurer] reasonably anticipate litigation, Plaintiffs’ need for the particular information, and whether they can obtain the information through other means.”
The court further noted that this inquiry requires very specific arguments and typically the need for an in-camera review of the documents by the court. Here, the Plaintiffs were found to have made no such arguments as it was the Plaintiff’s primary position that there was no work-product privilege. Accordingly, the Motion was denied, but without prejudice.
Judge Leeson did go on to determine the date when the insured was deemed to have reasonably anticipated litigation. The court found that that date occurred after the insured’s first demand for the policy limits because the carrier had asked for certain information to be able to evaluate the claim and the demand. The court found that it was only after receiving that information that litigation could have reasonably been anticipated.
The court also noted that, even materials prepared after litigation was reasonably anticipated by the carrier might turn out to be discoverable if exceptions to the work-privilege could be established by the Plaintiff. In other words, if the Plaintiffs were able to show that they have a substantial need for the particular materials and cannot, without undue hardship, obtain those materials or their substantial equivalent by other means, Plaintiffs may be permitted to obtain the discovery they seek, provided that the discovery did not include mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of the carrier, its attorneys, or other representatives.
Source: Pennsylvania and New Jersey Insurance Bad Faith Case Law Block (March 15, 2016) at www.pabadfaithlaw.com
Labels:
Bad Faith,
Bad Faith Discovery,
Judge Leeson,
Post-Koken,
UIM,
UM,
Underinsured Motorists Claims,
Uninsured Motorists Claims
Latest Take on Sackett Analysis By Pennsylvania Superior Court
Another heady Sackett-type UIM stacking opinion has
been handed down by the Pennsylvania Superior Court in the form of Toner v. Travelers Home and Marine Insurance,
No. 53 WDA 2015, 2016 Pa. Super. 69 (Pa. Super. March 21, 2016 Ott, Stabile,
Shogan, J.J.)(Op. by Ott)(Shogan, Dissenting).
This case involved an automobile insurance policy that originally only had one vehicle on it and under which the insured had waived stacking. The insured later added two vehicles to the policy, one at a time. The insured was not provided with a waiver of stacking form either time a new vehicle was added.
After the insured's son was seriously injured in a motor vehicle accident, the carrier paid the UIM limits available for one vehicle. The Plaintiff filed a declaratory judgment action asserting that the UIM carrier should have provided the insured with new waiver of stacking forms to sign and that, by not doing so the carrier was required to provide stacked coverage for all three vehicles.
The Superior Court majority affirmed the trial court's decision that new waiver forms were not required under the Sackett analysis.
Anyone wishing to tackle the Superior Court's latest take on the Sackett analysis may click this LINK
Judge Shogan's Dissenting Opinion can be viewed HERE.
UPDATE: The Toner case refernced above settled just before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was set to address the stacking issues raised therein. As such, the Pennsylvania Superior Court's decision in the matter stands.
This case involved an automobile insurance policy that originally only had one vehicle on it and under which the insured had waived stacking. The insured later added two vehicles to the policy, one at a time. The insured was not provided with a waiver of stacking form either time a new vehicle was added.
After the insured's son was seriously injured in a motor vehicle accident, the carrier paid the UIM limits available for one vehicle. The Plaintiff filed a declaratory judgment action asserting that the UIM carrier should have provided the insured with new waiver of stacking forms to sign and that, by not doing so the carrier was required to provide stacked coverage for all three vehicles.
The Superior Court majority affirmed the trial court's decision that new waiver forms were not required under the Sackett analysis.
Anyone wishing to tackle the Superior Court's latest take on the Sackett analysis may click this LINK
UPDATE: The Toner case refernced above settled just before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was set to address the stacking issues raised therein. As such, the Pennsylvania Superior Court's decision in the matter stands.
Labels:
Sackett,
Stacking,
UIM,
Underinsured Motorists Claims,
Waiver Forms
Monday, March 28, 2016
ARTICLE: Brief Rewriting Tips for the Young (or Any) Lawyer
The below article of mine appeared in last week's March 17, 2016 edition of the Legal Intelligencer and is reprinted here with permission. All rights reserved.
Brief Rewriting Tips for the Young (or Any) Lawyer
by
The use of simple words, short sentences, and narrow paragraphs will render your work product clear and concise. Pointed sentences composed of tight words will keep a grasp on the reader, allowing their minds to flow continuously through your written argument in a focused fashion.
Brief Rewriting Tips for the Young (or Any) Lawyer
by
Daniel
E. Cummins, Esquire
The Legal Intelligencer
March
17, 2016
The use of simple words, short sentences, and narrow paragraphs will render your work product clear and concise. Pointed sentences composed of tight words will keep a grasp on the reader, allowing their minds to flow continuously through your written argument in a focused fashion.
A
long sentence that goes on and on and moves from idea to idea with words and
notions will surely lose the reader at midpoint and make that reader then have
to go back and re-read the sentence more than once in order to understand what
is being conveyed, thereby puzzling the reader and possibly making him or her
lose interest in reading the rest of what you have written because the reader
has forgotten what point the sentence is attempting to convey in the first
place about long sentences. See?
Whenever
possible, sentences should instead be limited to the conveyance of one idea.
Where two or more ideas are put forth in a single sentence, see if that
sentence can be broken into two.
With
paragraphs, every attempt should be made to keep your paragraphs limited to one
main idea. This main idea of the paragraph should be emphasized in a topic
sentence written in an active voice, (i.e., place the subject before the verb).
Also,
keeping paragraphs to five sentences or less will also make your brief more
pleasing to the reader's eye. Readers coming to a page in your brief that has
words broken down into only two paragraphs are likely going to sigh before
attempting to wade through such verbosity.
And
remember, there is no rule against utilizing a one-sentence paragraph to emphasize
an important point.
Avoid Redundant Use of Words
The
redundant use of the same words can be annoying to a reader. Wherever possible,
seek out and utilize a synonym of the repeated word, first making sure that the
meaning of the alternate word is appropriate.
The
exception to this rule in brief-writing is that the terms "plaintiff"
and "defendant" should be repeatedly used so as to keep clear to whom
the writer is referring in any given sentence. These terms should even be used
on appeal in the place of "appellant" or "appellee" for
clarity's sake.
In
fact, Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 2131 cautions the appellate
brief writer to keep the use of the terms "appellant" and
"appellee" to a minimum. When using such terms, perhaps the clearer
way would be to utilize "appellant-defendant" the first time that party
is identified and then sticking with "defendant" throughout the
remainder of the brief.
Be Redundant in Your Position
While
redundancy in word use is to be avoided, every effort should be made to
repeatedly state the validity of your legal position supporting the relief
requested.
The
first and last sentence of each subsection of your brief should contain the
legal conclusion that supports your client's position. Brief writers will
often start with a statement of the applicable rule of law but never fully
apply the facts of the matter to that law. Or they will apply the facts to the
law but not write that next, most important, concluding sentence tying it all
together by stating that the law supports the client's position such that the relief
requested should be granted.
So
be sure to end each section of the brief with a sentence set forth in an active
voice stating that this part of your legal argument should be accepted as valid
by the court under the law provided. Repeatedly end each section of the brief
with a statement that the motion at issue should therefore be granted or
denied, whatever the case may be.
Be Conversational
Legal
writing courses in law school wrongfully kill creativity in brief writing in
favor of arid, brittle, crisp statements of the law as applied to colorless
adjective-free facts. The result is lifeless law review writing, and who seeks
out law review articles to read after they are written? No one.
So
be conversational in your writing and bring the story of your case to life within
your argument with descriptive but concise words and sentences. Let your
recitation of the facts flow as if you are relaying the story of the case to a
friend. Leave out slang words, but don't be overly formal either. Use your
natural speaking language in your writing.
Robert
Frost has been quoted as writing or saying, "No tears in the writer, no
tears in the reader. No surprise in the writer, no surprise in the
reader."
Similarly,
if there is no feeling conveyed in the writing of the brief in the form of
colorfully vigorous and compelling statements that the law and facts in support
of the position of your client, then there is going to be no similar feeling
born in the reader.
Being
conversational includes being polite. Know your place and never tell a judge
that he or she "shall" or "must" accept your position.
Rather, soften such statements by instead writing that "it is respectfully
submitted" that the rule of law requires or mandates the result requested.
Question Presented
A
lot of attorneys glaze over the "Question Presented" section of a
brief and, in doing so, miss another opportunity for the court to read their
client's argument as set forth in a concise and forceful format that
foreshadows the conclusion desired.
It
is a waste to simply state in the "Question Presented" that the
motion at issue should be granted or denied.
Always
begin your "Question Presented" with a phrasing that suggests your
position should carry the day. For example, for the movant, the "Question
Presented" should be positively phrased as, "Whether the motion of
the defendant, John Smith, to compel should be granted where..." and vice
versa.
Then,
as concisely as possible, include in the "Question Presented" the
pertinent facts of your case as applied to the rule of law in a manner that
favors your position. In the end, the "Question Presented" should be
a detailed statement of your legal position in a question format that asks
whether your position should be accepted by the court. As noted below, the
language in your "Question Presented" and conclusion sections should
mirror one another as concise, but not identical, affirmations of your client's
position.
Cite the Law
Whenever
you cite a legal principle of law, lend it credence by adding a citation to a
case rule or statute after the end of the sentence. Without citations, your
stated legal principles will appear to be your philosophy of the law and the
reader knows that you are no philosopher of the law.
Lawyers
are trained to cite everything. Judges are lawyers. For lawyers, a citation is
like whipped cream on an ice cream sundae—you don't really take notice of it
when it is there, but you sure do know and protest when it is missing.
The
absence of a citation for a stated position raises a belief in the reader that
there must be no citations supporting the position taken or that the lawyer was
too lazy to look one up. Either way, the instantaneous conclusion of the reader
is that they should therefore not accept the argument put forth as valid or
worth consideration. Avoid this by listing citations wherever possible.
Although
not required, it may be a good idea to identify in the citation the judge who
wrote the decision cited. Judges know each other from traveling in the same
circles and an opinion written by one judge may carry weight with your judge.
Use Conclusion Section for More than a
Conclusion
Some
attorneys may have a misperception that the final conclusion section of a
brief can only be utilized for a one-line statement of the relief requested,
i.e., "For the above-stated reasons, it is respectfully requested that the
plaintiff's motion to for summary judgment be granted."
Surely
the last sentence of the brief should be a respectful request for the granting
of the relief requested, but there is no rule stating that one is precluded
from utilizing the conclusion of a brief as one last great opportunity to
encapsulate your client's legal argument. An excellent way to accomplish is to
recast your "Question Presented" as a strong final statement that the
relief requested should be allowed by the court.
Focused Edits
One
can become sick of looking at a written product after a few edits and thereby
lose focus. One way to counter this phenomenon is to conduct focused edits of
the document.
Do
a focused edit of only looking at the citations for proper format and
punctuation. Do an edit focused on keeping sentences short and tight. Do
another edit focused only on making sure you have good transitions from one
paragraph to the next and from one section of the brief to the next. Another
edit of your brief can be completed with an eye centered on ensuring that each
section of your brief begins and ends with a concise statement of the legal
relief requested.
At
another run-through, start by editing a section near the end of the brief and
then going back to the beginning in order to have fresh eyes on the latter
sections of a lengthy brief.
It
can be safely said that no great brief was ever written on a first draft. And
so as you work on crafting the best-written product you can produce to which
your paying client is entitled, keep in mind the words of former U.S. Supreme
Court Justice Louis Brandeis: "There is no great writing, only great
rewriting."
Daniel
E. Cummins is a partner and civil litigator with the Scranton law firm of Foley
Comerford & Cummins. His civil litigation blog, Tort Talk, can be viewed at
www.TortTalk.com.
Labels:
Brief Writing,
Cummins,
Legal Research,
Legal Writing
Wednesday, March 23, 2016
ONE TO WATCH: Pennsylvania Supreme Court Agrees to Hear Important Voir Dire Issue
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has agreed to review an important voir dire issue in the case of Shinal v. Toms, No. 897 MAL 2015 (Pa. March 23, 2016).
The Tort Talk blog post on the Superior Court's decision in Shinal can be viewed HERE.
In Shinal, a 2-1 majority of a three-judge Superior Court panel declined to follow the plurality opinions authored by now Justice Wecht and now Justice Donohue in Cordes which had held that "indirect" relationships (e.g., defendant physician treated juror's spouse or parent) constituted grounds for per se prejudice and disqualification of jurors regardless of their voir dire responses asserting that they could be fair and impartial.
The Tort Talk blog post on the Superior Court's decision in Cordes can be viewed HERE.
Anyone wishing to review the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's Order in Shinal outlining the specific issues to be reviewed may click this LINK.
Recent Post-Tincher Decision of Note Out of the Western District
In
the Western Federal District Court case of Rapchak
v. Haldex Brake Products Corp., No. 2:13-CV-1307 2016 WL 1019534 (W.D. Pa. March 15, 2016
McVerry, J.), the court denied a defendant’s summary judgment motion in a
Post-Tincher products liability case.
This matter arose out of a fatal incident involving a Plaintiff who was performing maintenance under his motorhome when the vehicle descended upon him.
The court concluded that the central question of whether adding a filter to an air flow system would have made the product harder to use because the filter would have to be changed too often was a question for the jury to determine.
The court in Rapchak referred to the Wade factors for risk/utility and an “ordinary consumer” test for consumer expectation.
Also, in a footnote, the court in Rapchack described one of Tincher’s “principal impacts” as being the elimination of the Azzarello negligence/strict liability dichotomy and the other being that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court declined to adopt the Restatement (Third) of Torts relative to Pennsylvania Products Liability claims. See n. 15.
Anyone wishing to review this case may click this LINK.
I send thanks to Attorney James Beck of the Philadelphia office of Reed Smith, and the main blogger for the Drug and Device Law Blog for bringing this case to my attention.
This matter arose out of a fatal incident involving a Plaintiff who was performing maintenance under his motorhome when the vehicle descended upon him.
The court concluded that the central question of whether adding a filter to an air flow system would have made the product harder to use because the filter would have to be changed too often was a question for the jury to determine.
The court in Rapchak referred to the Wade factors for risk/utility and an “ordinary consumer” test for consumer expectation.
Also, in a footnote, the court in Rapchack described one of Tincher’s “principal impacts” as being the elimination of the Azzarello negligence/strict liability dichotomy and the other being that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court declined to adopt the Restatement (Third) of Torts relative to Pennsylvania Products Liability claims. See n. 15.
Anyone wishing to review this case may click this LINK.
I send thanks to Attorney James Beck of the Philadelphia office of Reed Smith, and the main blogger for the Drug and Device Law Blog for bringing this case to my attention.
Proper Parameters for Neuropsychological IME Addressed by Pennsylvania Superior Court
In its recent decision in the case of Shearer v. Hafer, No. 665
MDA 2015 (Pa. Super. March 9, 2016 Panella, J. Ott, J., and Jenkins, J.) (Op.
by Panella, J.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed a trial court’s
granting of a Defendant’s Motion for a Protective Order prohibiting the
presence of third party observers during the standardized test portion of a
neuropsychological evaluation.
According to the Opinion, this matter arose out of a motor vehicle accident. Among the injuries claimed by the Plaintiff was cognitive harm allegedly triggered by the accident. The Plaintiff treated with a neuropsychologist and, during that treatment, the Plaintiff’s treating neuropsychologist employed standardized testing procedures that were conducted without the presence of the Plaintiff’s attorney or any other third party.
During the course of the litigation, the defense hired a doctor to complete an independent neuropsychological examination. Plaintiff’s counsel demanded to be present during all components of the neuropsychological examination. The IME doctor objected to this request, including the Plaintiff’s counsel’s request to audio tape the testing evaluation. The IME doctor pointed to an official statement of the National Academy of Neuropsychology as indicating that third party presence and/or audio taping during testing may represent a threat to the validity and reliability of the test data. The IME doctor indicated that he would allow the Plaintiff’s attorney to be present during the interview portion of the examination. However, the IME doctor would not permit either the presence of the Plaintiff’s counsel and the audio taping during the standardize test phase of the neuropsychological evaluation.
This proposed compromise by the IME doctor was not acceptable to Plaintiff’s counsel.
The issue then came before the trial court, which entered an Order granting the Defendant’s request for protective order. That order stated that, although Plaintiff’s counsel could be present during the preliminary interview phase of the neuropsychological examination, no individual was allowed in the evaluation room with the Plaintiff and the IME doctor during the phase of the evaluation that involves standardize testing. The order further provided that no recording device would be permitted in the evaluation room.
The Superior Court noted that there was no Pennsylvania appellate court decision directly on point that addressed a litigant’s right to counsel during a psychological examination. As noted, on appeal, the Pennsylvania Superior Court ruled that, pursuant to Pa. R.C.P. 4012, the trial court had the discretion to enter the order at issue. The court also found support for the trial court’s decision under Pa. R.C.P. 4010, pertaining to Physical and Mental Examination of Person.
The Superior Court also noted that, although there was “no case law [that] address of the application of Rule 4012 to Rule 4010,” the court noted that an explanatory commenting 1978 amendment to Rule 4012 stressed that the amendment provides a comprehensive Rule which covers all depositions and all discovery. Accordingly, the court ruled that it appeared that the legislature intended that Rule 4012 would empower the trial court with discretion to issue protective orders in various discovery procedures, including, specifically, the power to limit the number of individuals present at an independent medical or psychological examination.
The Superior Court went on to note that Rule 4012 did not empower the trial court to issue protective orders carte blanche. Rather, the moving party still had the burden of showing “good cause” for the issuance of a protective order. The court noted that the good cause standard “strikes an appropriate balance between competing interests, including a litigant’s privacy interest (however they be defined)…. and the court’s obligation to administer justice efficiently and prevent abuse of the discovery process.” See Op. at 11 [citation omitted].
Here, the Superior Court found that the Defendants had established good cause for the trial court’s issuance of the protective order. In the end, the Superior Court found that the trial court’s decision represented a fair and thoughtful balance of both the patient’s interests and the presence of counsel during a neuropsychological examination and the court’s obligation to administer justice efficiently and to prevent abuse of the discovery process. See Op. 12. As such, the trial court’s order was affirmed as the Superior Court found no abuse of the trial court’s discretion in this regard.
According to the Opinion, this matter arose out of a motor vehicle accident. Among the injuries claimed by the Plaintiff was cognitive harm allegedly triggered by the accident. The Plaintiff treated with a neuropsychologist and, during that treatment, the Plaintiff’s treating neuropsychologist employed standardized testing procedures that were conducted without the presence of the Plaintiff’s attorney or any other third party.
During the course of the litigation, the defense hired a doctor to complete an independent neuropsychological examination. Plaintiff’s counsel demanded to be present during all components of the neuropsychological examination. The IME doctor objected to this request, including the Plaintiff’s counsel’s request to audio tape the testing evaluation. The IME doctor pointed to an official statement of the National Academy of Neuropsychology as indicating that third party presence and/or audio taping during testing may represent a threat to the validity and reliability of the test data. The IME doctor indicated that he would allow the Plaintiff’s attorney to be present during the interview portion of the examination. However, the IME doctor would not permit either the presence of the Plaintiff’s counsel and the audio taping during the standardize test phase of the neuropsychological evaluation.
This proposed compromise by the IME doctor was not acceptable to Plaintiff’s counsel.
The issue then came before the trial court, which entered an Order granting the Defendant’s request for protective order. That order stated that, although Plaintiff’s counsel could be present during the preliminary interview phase of the neuropsychological examination, no individual was allowed in the evaluation room with the Plaintiff and the IME doctor during the phase of the evaluation that involves standardize testing. The order further provided that no recording device would be permitted in the evaluation room.
The Superior Court noted that there was no Pennsylvania appellate court decision directly on point that addressed a litigant’s right to counsel during a psychological examination. As noted, on appeal, the Pennsylvania Superior Court ruled that, pursuant to Pa. R.C.P. 4012, the trial court had the discretion to enter the order at issue. The court also found support for the trial court’s decision under Pa. R.C.P. 4010, pertaining to Physical and Mental Examination of Person.
The Superior Court also noted that, although there was “no case law [that] address of the application of Rule 4012 to Rule 4010,” the court noted that an explanatory commenting 1978 amendment to Rule 4012 stressed that the amendment provides a comprehensive Rule which covers all depositions and all discovery. Accordingly, the court ruled that it appeared that the legislature intended that Rule 4012 would empower the trial court with discretion to issue protective orders in various discovery procedures, including, specifically, the power to limit the number of individuals present at an independent medical or psychological examination.
The Superior Court went on to note that Rule 4012 did not empower the trial court to issue protective orders carte blanche. Rather, the moving party still had the burden of showing “good cause” for the issuance of a protective order. The court noted that the good cause standard “strikes an appropriate balance between competing interests, including a litigant’s privacy interest (however they be defined)…. and the court’s obligation to administer justice efficiently and prevent abuse of the discovery process.” See Op. at 11 [citation omitted].
Here, the Superior Court found that the Defendants had established good cause for the trial court’s issuance of the protective order. In the end, the Superior Court found that the trial court’s decision represented a fair and thoughtful balance of both the patient’s interests and the presence of counsel during a neuropsychological examination and the court’s obligation to administer justice efficiently and to prevent abuse of the discovery process. See Op. 12. As such, the trial court’s order was affirmed as the Superior Court found no abuse of the trial court’s discretion in this regard.
Anyone desiring a copy of this decision may click this LINK.
Additional Commentary: For one of the first decisions on this same issue with the same result
(which decision actually predates and is cited by the trial court in its
decision in Shearer), see Lackwanna
County Judge Carmen D. Minora’s Opinion in the case of Marion v. Lukaitis in this Tort Talk post HERE.
UPDATE: This decision was later vacated by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court who ruled that the Superior Court erred in considering the appeal in the first place as the trial court's order was not an appealable order as of right under Pa.R.A.P. 313 where the trial court's order only met one of the three prongs of the collateral order doctrine.
To view this decision by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, click HERE. The Concurring Opinion by Justice Wecht, and the Dissenting Opinion by Justice Mundy are not Linked here.
UPDATE: This decision was later vacated by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court who ruled that the Superior Court erred in considering the appeal in the first place as the trial court's order was not an appealable order as of right under Pa.R.A.P. 313 where the trial court's order only met one of the three prongs of the collateral order doctrine.
To view this decision by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, click HERE. The Concurring Opinion by Justice Wecht, and the Dissenting Opinion by Justice Mundy are not Linked here.
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