Here is a LINK to a Pennsylvania Law Weekly article by Lizzy McLellan entitled "Defendant Must Receive Reservation of Rights Notice" summarizing the recent Pennsylvania Superior Court decision in the case of Erie Ins. v. Lobenthal.
If you cannot access the article, please let me know at dancummins@Comcast.com and I will email you a copy.
Here is a LINK to the Tort Talk post on the case (which also contains a Link to the Opinion online).
Friday, May 29, 2015
ARTICLE: Limitations on Cross-Examination of Lay and Expert Witnesses
Civil Litigation
By Daniel E. Cummins, Pennsylvania Law Weekly
Editor's note: The author served as defense counsel in Detrick v. Burrus.
It is well settled that "the purpose of ... civil trials is to discover the truth" of the claims and defenses presented by the parties, as the court held in Bailey v. Tucker, 621 A.2d 108, 113 (Pa. 1993). It is equally well settled that, in the search for the truth at trial, it is for the jury to determine the credibility of the witnesses, including expert witnesses, along with the weight to be given to the testimony of any witness presented, as in Ludmer v. Nernberg, 640 A.2d 939, 942 (Pa. Super. 1994).
The most important tool provided to a litigant to test the credibility of parties, witnesses and expert witnesses at trial, and thereby challenge the truth of the adversary's claims, is the right to conduct a thorough and cutting cross-examination.
Given the adversarial nature of trials, issues often arise pertaining to the extent to which a witness can be cross-examined. Recent cases reviewed below confirm that there are indeed some limits to efforts to attack the credibility of both lay and expert witnesses at trial.
Two recent court decisions illustrate the extent to which a court may limit the scope of a cross-examination of a lay witness or party, as well as the cross of an expert witness, at trial.
Given that Detrick had denied any marijuana use under oath at her deposition, the defense planned to cross-examine her with respect to a urine drug test that was positive for marijuana, to attack her credibility as part of the overall search for the truth of the claims and defenses asserted by the parties at trial.
Citing Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence 401 and 403, pertaining to relevancy, Detrick contended that any evidence of the drug test was inadmissible because it was irrelevant and unduly prejudicial.
In addition to being relevant to attack the credibility of Detrick, who denied marijuana use under oath at her deposition, the defendant, Deidre Burrus, separately asserted that the evidence of the urine drug screen tests ordered by Detrick's post-accident doctor was also relevant to show that her own post-accident treating providers had serious concerns as to her use of prescription narcotic medications, such that the doctor felt it necessary to order a drug screen before prescribing medications to her.
In his opinion, Nealon noted that questions concerning the admissibility of evidence lie within the sound discretion of the trial court. In granting Detrick's motion in limine to preclude this evidence, the court relied upon the law that a witness may not be impeached or contradicted on a "collateral" matter.
Nealon noted that it is a well-settled principle of Pennsylvania law that "the purpose of trial is not to determine the ratings of witnesses for general veracity." The court reasoned that the Pennsylvania appellate courts have repeatedly held that "no witness can be contradicted on everything he testifies to in order to 'test his credibility.'" The court in Detrick also more specifically cited to a criminal court case holding that "general questioning concerning the use of drugs does not bear on the witnesses' 'character for truth.'"
The court also found that, even if such evidence was somehow relevant, this evidence was inadmissible under Rule 403, since its probative value was outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to Detrick.
The case, which was not appealed, therefore supports the notion that the permissible scope of a cross-examination of a party or lay witness is not unlimited. As noted below, the same rule prohibiting the cross-examination of a witness on collateral matters was recently applied in the context of expert witnesses.
Over the years, since the handing down of appellate court decisions in Cooper v. Schoffstall, 905 A.2d 482 (Pa. 2006), and Feldman v. Ide, 915 A.2d 1208 (Pa. Super. 2007), allowing such discovery in limited circumstances, litigating attorneys gathered a treasure trove of such bias information pertaining to experts. Attorneys on both the defense and the plaintiffs side of the bar have amassed and shared such information on various experts, to the point that the information has become quite extensive with respect to certain experts.
Now that such voluminous discovery of litigation-related activity and compensation has been gathered on certain experts, the question has become to what extent all that information can be fairly utilized to cross-examine an expert at trial.
In its recent decision in Flenke v. Huntington, 2015 Pa. Super. 50, 467 MDA 2014 (March 17, 2015), the Superior Court ruled on the extent to which an expert may be cross-examined at trial with such large quantities of bias information discovered on that expert.
The Flenke case arose out of a motor vehicle accident. The question presented centered around the plaintiff's cross-examination of the defense's independent medical expert.
The Superior Court ruled that, while expert witnesses may generally be impeached for bias, including frequent work for the same side in litigation, there are limits to such cross-examination imposed by the law.
Under the well-established rule of law that holds that a witness cannot be cross-examined on collateral matters, the court in Flenke noted that even bias evidence can become too intrusive and so collateral, such that it should be limited, or even barred, at trial.
In Flenke, the plaintiff was permitted to cross-examine the defense expert as to the compensation earned by the expert in the case at hand, as well as other cases, within a reasonable limitation.
Yet, the Superior Court found that the plaintiff's effort to conduct a detailed review of the defense expert's 50 most recent reports involving other persons would have introduced collateral issues into the case. As such, this evidence was found to have been properly excluded by the trial court.
The court in Flenke also ruled that cross-examination pertaining to the expert's work for the defendant's insurance company was properly excluded, as it would have introduced the impermissible topic of insurance into the case.
Based upon the above cases, the extent to which the veracity of lay and expert witnesses can be tested at trial has some limitations. It appears that, under Pennsylvania law, while a witness can be exposed as a liar, liar, one cannot go so far as to symbolically light that witness' pants on fire.
Daniel E. Cummins is a partner and civil litigator with the Scranton law firm of Foley Comerford & Cummins. His civil litigation blog, Tort Talk, can be viewed at www.TortTalk.com.
Limitations on Cross-Examination of Lay and Expert Witnesses
Editor's note: The author served as defense counsel in Detrick v. Burrus.
It is well settled that "the purpose of ... civil trials is to discover the truth" of the claims and defenses presented by the parties, as the court held in Bailey v. Tucker, 621 A.2d 108, 113 (Pa. 1993). It is equally well settled that, in the search for the truth at trial, it is for the jury to determine the credibility of the witnesses, including expert witnesses, along with the weight to be given to the testimony of any witness presented, as in Ludmer v. Nernberg, 640 A.2d 939, 942 (Pa. Super. 1994).
The most important tool provided to a litigant to test the credibility of parties, witnesses and expert witnesses at trial, and thereby challenge the truth of the adversary's claims, is the right to conduct a thorough and cutting cross-examination.
Given the adversarial nature of trials, issues often arise pertaining to the extent to which a witness can be cross-examined. Recent cases reviewed below confirm that there are indeed some limits to efforts to attack the credibility of both lay and expert witnesses at trial.
Scope of Cross-Examination Not Unlimited
Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 607(b) provides the general rule that "the credibility of a witness may be impeached by any evidence relevant to that issue, except as otherwise provided by statute or these rules."Two recent court decisions illustrate the extent to which a court may limit the scope of a cross-examination of a lay witness or party, as well as the cross of an expert witness, at trial.
Limitations on Cross
In his recent detailed order issued in the case of Detrick v. Burrus, No. 2011 CV 1333 (C.P. Lacka. Co. Feb. 23), Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas Judge Terrence R. Nealon addressed a motion in limine filed by the plaintiff, Lori Detrick, in an automobile accident suit seeking to preclude evidence of a post-accident drug screen ordered by Detrick's treating doctor which contained a positive result for marijuana use.Given that Detrick had denied any marijuana use under oath at her deposition, the defense planned to cross-examine her with respect to a urine drug test that was positive for marijuana, to attack her credibility as part of the overall search for the truth of the claims and defenses asserted by the parties at trial.
Citing Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence 401 and 403, pertaining to relevancy, Detrick contended that any evidence of the drug test was inadmissible because it was irrelevant and unduly prejudicial.
In addition to being relevant to attack the credibility of Detrick, who denied marijuana use under oath at her deposition, the defendant, Deidre Burrus, separately asserted that the evidence of the urine drug screen tests ordered by Detrick's post-accident doctor was also relevant to show that her own post-accident treating providers had serious concerns as to her use of prescription narcotic medications, such that the doctor felt it necessary to order a drug screen before prescribing medications to her.
In his opinion, Nealon noted that questions concerning the admissibility of evidence lie within the sound discretion of the trial court. In granting Detrick's motion in limine to preclude this evidence, the court relied upon the law that a witness may not be impeached or contradicted on a "collateral" matter.
Nealon noted that it is a well-settled principle of Pennsylvania law that "the purpose of trial is not to determine the ratings of witnesses for general veracity." The court reasoned that the Pennsylvania appellate courts have repeatedly held that "no witness can be contradicted on everything he testifies to in order to 'test his credibility.'" The court in Detrick also more specifically cited to a criminal court case holding that "general questioning concerning the use of drugs does not bear on the witnesses' 'character for truth.'"
The court also found that, even if such evidence was somehow relevant, this evidence was inadmissible under Rule 403, since its probative value was outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to Detrick.
The case, which was not appealed, therefore supports the notion that the permissible scope of a cross-examination of a party or lay witness is not unlimited. As noted below, the same rule prohibiting the cross-examination of a witness on collateral matters was recently applied in the context of expert witnesses.
Cross of an Expert Witness Also Has Limitations
By way of background, a few years back, a hot trend in Pennsylvania civil litigation matters involved the extent to which parties could discover information as to the extent of litigation-related activity by, and compensation for, opposing expert witnesses. Such discovery was gathered to be utilized at trial to expose experts as biased witnesses, or "hired guns," for the opposing side.Over the years, since the handing down of appellate court decisions in Cooper v. Schoffstall, 905 A.2d 482 (Pa. 2006), and Feldman v. Ide, 915 A.2d 1208 (Pa. Super. 2007), allowing such discovery in limited circumstances, litigating attorneys gathered a treasure trove of such bias information pertaining to experts. Attorneys on both the defense and the plaintiffs side of the bar have amassed and shared such information on various experts, to the point that the information has become quite extensive with respect to certain experts.
Now that such voluminous discovery of litigation-related activity and compensation has been gathered on certain experts, the question has become to what extent all that information can be fairly utilized to cross-examine an expert at trial.
In its recent decision in Flenke v. Huntington, 2015 Pa. Super. 50, 467 MDA 2014 (March 17, 2015), the Superior Court ruled on the extent to which an expert may be cross-examined at trial with such large quantities of bias information discovered on that expert.
The Flenke case arose out of a motor vehicle accident. The question presented centered around the plaintiff's cross-examination of the defense's independent medical expert.
The Superior Court ruled that, while expert witnesses may generally be impeached for bias, including frequent work for the same side in litigation, there are limits to such cross-examination imposed by the law.
Under the well-established rule of law that holds that a witness cannot be cross-examined on collateral matters, the court in Flenke noted that even bias evidence can become too intrusive and so collateral, such that it should be limited, or even barred, at trial.
In Flenke, the plaintiff was permitted to cross-examine the defense expert as to the compensation earned by the expert in the case at hand, as well as other cases, within a reasonable limitation.
Yet, the Superior Court found that the plaintiff's effort to conduct a detailed review of the defense expert's 50 most recent reports involving other persons would have introduced collateral issues into the case. As such, this evidence was found to have been properly excluded by the trial court.
The court in Flenke also ruled that cross-examination pertaining to the expert's work for the defendant's insurance company was properly excluded, as it would have introduced the impermissible topic of insurance into the case.
Based upon the above cases, the extent to which the veracity of lay and expert witnesses can be tested at trial has some limitations. It appears that, under Pennsylvania law, while a witness can be exposed as a liar, liar, one cannot go so far as to symbolically light that witness' pants on fire.
Daniel E. Cummins is a partner and civil litigator with the Scranton law firm of Foley Comerford & Cummins. His civil litigation blog, Tort Talk, can be viewed at www.TortTalk.com.
Labels:
Cross-Examination of Experts,
Judge Nealon,
Lay Witness Testimony,
Scope of Examination of Witness at Trial
Thursday, May 28, 2015
Judge Mariani of Middle District of PA Explores Parameters of Discovery of Claims Files in Auto Bad Faith Claim
Judge Robert D. Mariani of the Federal Middle
District Court of Pennsylvania ruled in Lane v. State Farm, No. 3-14-CV-01045 (M.D. Pa. May 18, 2015
Mariani, J.), that the mental impressions of the carrier’s claims professionals
recorded after the Plaintiff’s Complaint was filed, as well as notes of the
carrier's auto evaluation which referenced the carrier's defense attorneys' mental
impressions, were considered privileged information and were, therefore, not discoverable. Plaintiff's motion to compel was denied.
In this matter, the carrier produced redacted documents from the claims file along with a privilege log. The Plaintiff filed a motion seeking an Order requiring that certain redacted portions of State Farm's privilege log to be revealed. The Plaintiff claimed, in part, that could not confirm whether the portions redacted by the carrier did constitute privileged information.
The court ruled that the redacted portions
did not have to be produced because the privileged nature of the documents were
adequately described in the privilege log by defense counsel as an officer of
the court. For example, the redacted
pages were marked as billing invoices for legal services or letters between the
carrier and its defense counsel.
In ruling that the redacted portions need not be disclosed, the court noted that a hypothetical suggestion that representations made by a duly licensed attorney and officer of this court could be found to be utter fabrications is insufficient to carry plaintiff's burden in overcoming the privilege,.
The court also rejected the Plaintiff’s request for an in camera review of the redacted portions by the court to confirm the propriety of the redactions by defense counsel.
Judge Mariani otherwise provided instruction in his decision on the extent to which the post-Complaint mental impressions of a claims representative may be discoverable in a bad faith claim. Concisely, Judge Mariani held that the mere existence of a bad faith claim in a Complaint “does not make otherwise privileged information per se discoverable.”
Rather, a party seeking such discovery must meet its burden of persuading the court that such documents are not protected from discovery under the particular facts of the case.
Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.
In this matter, the carrier produced redacted documents from the claims file along with a privilege log. The Plaintiff filed a motion seeking an Order requiring that certain redacted portions of State Farm's privilege log to be revealed. The Plaintiff claimed, in part, that could not confirm whether the portions redacted by the carrier did constitute privileged information.
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| Judge Robert D. Mariani M.D. Pa. |
In ruling that the redacted portions need not be disclosed, the court noted that a hypothetical suggestion that representations made by a duly licensed attorney and officer of this court could be found to be utter fabrications is insufficient to carry plaintiff's burden in overcoming the privilege,.
The court also rejected the Plaintiff’s request for an in camera review of the redacted portions by the court to confirm the propriety of the redactions by defense counsel.
Judge Mariani otherwise provided instruction in his decision on the extent to which the post-Complaint mental impressions of a claims representative may be discoverable in a bad faith claim. Concisely, Judge Mariani held that the mere existence of a bad faith claim in a Complaint “does not make otherwise privileged information per se discoverable.”
Rather, a party seeking such discovery must meet its burden of persuading the court that such documents are not protected from discovery under the particular facts of the case.
Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK
Judge Mark of Monroe County Grants Summary Judgment in Slip and Fall Case
In a recent Monroe County decision in the case of Smith v. Chelsea Pocono Fin. LLC, PICS Case No. 15-0602 (C.P. Monroe Dec. 29, 2015 Mark, J.), Judge Jonathan Mark of the Monroe County Court of Common Pleas granted summary judgment in favor of a landowner Defendant on the basis that the Plaintiff had failed to establish any evidence of actual or constructive notice of that Defendant of any defective condition on the stairway where the Plaintiff allegedly fell and was injured.
According to a summary of the Opinion, the Plaintiff was injured while at The Crossings Premium Outlets in the Poconos. The Plaintiff was walking down a stairwell and slipped and fell, allegedly sustaining injuries.
While the Plaintiff did not know what caused her to fall, her eyewitness husband testified that the Plaintiff slipped on a french fry or a hamburger bun fragment on the steps.
Although the court found that the Plaintiff had presented evidence to establish a jury question as to the existence of a defective or dangerous condition of the stairwell, the court granted summary judgment after finding that the Plaintiff had not established that the Defendant had any actual or constructive notice of the condition that caused the fall.
More specifically, the court found nothing in the record to suggest that the condition on the steps was traceable to the Defendants or their agents, or that the Defendant otherwise had any actual or constructive notice of the condition.
The Plaintiff attempted to argue that the Defendant’s had actual notice because this type of defect occurred frequently on the premises.
This argument was rejected under the Restatement (Second) of Torts §344 as that Section, and cases related thereto, inferring actual notice under a recurring situation scenario. Judge Mark noted that those decisions came to such a finding on the basis of recurring events or conditions that had caused harm to invitees in the past in an obvious fashion.
In this Smith case, Judge Mark found that there was only an argument that the specific condition which allegedly caused the injury at issue had allegedly occurred generally in the past. Here, while there was evidence presented to show that food and other debris had been generally found on the property in the past, there was no allegation or proof that patrons slipping on food had become an epidemic on the premises.
The court also rejected the Plaintiff’s claim that the absence of any cleaning or maintenance records was sufficient to deny and otherwise properly supported Motion for Summary Judgment. The court rejected this argument as an effort by the Plaintiff to improperly reverse the burden of proof and place it upon the Defendant.
Lastly, the court also found that the Plaintiff had failed to offer any evidence as to how long the debris had been located on the steps, or that anyone had observed it prior to the Plaintiff’s incident so as to support an argument of constructive notice. The court also rejected the Plaintiff’s constructive notice argument on the basis that the debris/food on the step was crushed.
The court otherwise found that the Defendant had exercised reasonable precautionary steps to prevent accidents, including the placement of a trash can within ten (10) feet of the stairway and repeated checking of the area, specifically around restaurants.
Copies of this case are available by calling the Pennsylvania Instant Case Service of the Pennsylvania Law Weekly at 800-276-PICS and giving the above PICS Case Number and paying a small fee.
According to a summary of the Opinion, the Plaintiff was injured while at The Crossings Premium Outlets in the Poconos. The Plaintiff was walking down a stairwell and slipped and fell, allegedly sustaining injuries.
While the Plaintiff did not know what caused her to fall, her eyewitness husband testified that the Plaintiff slipped on a french fry or a hamburger bun fragment on the steps.
Although the court found that the Plaintiff had presented evidence to establish a jury question as to the existence of a defective or dangerous condition of the stairwell, the court granted summary judgment after finding that the Plaintiff had not established that the Defendant had any actual or constructive notice of the condition that caused the fall.
More specifically, the court found nothing in the record to suggest that the condition on the steps was traceable to the Defendants or their agents, or that the Defendant otherwise had any actual or constructive notice of the condition.
The Plaintiff attempted to argue that the Defendant’s had actual notice because this type of defect occurred frequently on the premises.
This argument was rejected under the Restatement (Second) of Torts §344 as that Section, and cases related thereto, inferring actual notice under a recurring situation scenario. Judge Mark noted that those decisions came to such a finding on the basis of recurring events or conditions that had caused harm to invitees in the past in an obvious fashion.
In this Smith case, Judge Mark found that there was only an argument that the specific condition which allegedly caused the injury at issue had allegedly occurred generally in the past. Here, while there was evidence presented to show that food and other debris had been generally found on the property in the past, there was no allegation or proof that patrons slipping on food had become an epidemic on the premises.
The court also rejected the Plaintiff’s claim that the absence of any cleaning or maintenance records was sufficient to deny and otherwise properly supported Motion for Summary Judgment. The court rejected this argument as an effort by the Plaintiff to improperly reverse the burden of proof and place it upon the Defendant.
Lastly, the court also found that the Plaintiff had failed to offer any evidence as to how long the debris had been located on the steps, or that anyone had observed it prior to the Plaintiff’s incident so as to support an argument of constructive notice. The court also rejected the Plaintiff’s constructive notice argument on the basis that the debris/food on the step was crushed.
The court otherwise found that the Defendant had exercised reasonable precautionary steps to prevent accidents, including the placement of a trash can within ten (10) feet of the stairway and repeated checking of the area, specifically around restaurants.
Copies of this case are available by calling the Pennsylvania Instant Case Service of the Pennsylvania Law Weekly at 800-276-PICS and giving the above PICS Case Number and paying a small fee.
Labels:
Judge Mark,
Premises Liability,
Slip and Fall
Tuesday, May 26, 2015
Preliminary Objections Against Allegations of Recklessness in Negligence Auto Accident Suit Sustained
In the recent decision in the case of Roma v. Finney, PICS Case No. 15-0641
(C.P. Northampton Co. Feb. 23, 2015 Beltrami, J.), the trial court sustained a
Defendant’s Preliminary Objections in an automobile accident matter and ordered
that the words “reckless,” “recklessness,” and “recklessly” be stricken from
the Complaint.
The court noted that this matter involved a negligence cause of action arising out of a rear-end motor vehicle accident. In her Complaint, the Plaintiff alleged negligence and/or recklessness on the part of the Defendant caused the accident and injuries. Notably, the Plaintiff did not request punitive damages in the Complaint.
The Defendant filed Preliminary Objections in the nature of a Motion to Strike impertinent matter pursuant to Pa. R.C.P. 1028(a)(2).
As there were no facts plead in the Complaint to support the objected to language, and given that no claim for punitive damages was pled, the court granted the Preliminary Objections as allegations of recklessness were deemed to be immaterial to proving a negligence cause of action.
Anyone desiring a copy of this Opinion may click this LINK.
Source: "Case Digests," Pennsylvania Law Weekly (April 28, 2015).
The court noted that this matter involved a negligence cause of action arising out of a rear-end motor vehicle accident. In her Complaint, the Plaintiff alleged negligence and/or recklessness on the part of the Defendant caused the accident and injuries. Notably, the Plaintiff did not request punitive damages in the Complaint.
The Defendant filed Preliminary Objections in the nature of a Motion to Strike impertinent matter pursuant to Pa. R.C.P. 1028(a)(2).
As there were no facts plead in the Complaint to support the objected to language, and given that no claim for punitive damages was pled, the court granted the Preliminary Objections as allegations of recklessness were deemed to be immaterial to proving a negligence cause of action.
Anyone desiring a copy of this Opinion may click this LINK.
Source: "Case Digests," Pennsylvania Law Weekly (April 28, 2015).
Friday, May 22, 2015
Wednesday, May 20, 2015
IME Expert May Rely Upon Another IME Report
The court denied a Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine in this regard reasoning that, even if such IME reports may be arguably biased, IME reports are the kind of records that a medical expert would legitimately rely upon, i.e, the records of other doctors.
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| Judge Matthew W. Brann |
A copy of this decision by Judge Brann can be viewed online HERE.
I send thanks to Attorney James Beck of the Philadelphia office of the Reed Smith law firm for bringing this case to my attention. Please be sure to check out Attorney Beck’s excellent blog, The Drug and Device Law Blog HERE.
Labels:
Fair Scope of Expert Report,
IME,
Judge Brann
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