I thank James Beck, Esquire of the Philadelphia office of the Dechert, LLP law firm for advising me of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's May 27, 2009 Order granting a Petition for Allowance of Appeal in the case of Schmidt v. Boardman Company, et al., 2009 WL 1471119 (Pa. 2009). I note that Attorney Beck is the co-writer of an excellent legal blog entitled Drug and Device Law found at http://www.druganddevicelaw.blogspot.com/. I invite you to check out his blog.
In the Schmidt case, various plaintiffs filed strict products liability claims against successor corporations that purchased the assets of the original manufacturer of an allegedly defective fire truck that was involved in an accident that injured a number of persons.
More specifically, as the fire truck was responding to a call, unbeknownst to the firemen, there was a fire hose dangling from the side of the truck. Along the way the nozzle of the fire hose ran under a parked car, became taut when it got caught. The force was so great that it lifted the parked car as the nozzle broke free. The nozzle then careened like a missile and struck three plaintiffs standing nearby, killing one of them. Some additional plaintiffs, who did not sustain any physical injuries from this accident, brought emotional distress claims under a theory that they were bystanders who witnessed injuries to their close relatives.
After a jury found the fire department 50 percent liable and the successor corporations (who purchased the assets of the original manufacturer of the fire truck) 50 percent liable under an approximately $4.5 million dollar verdict, the successor corporations filed an appeal to the Superior Court.
At the Superior Court level, the court acknowledged the general rule that, with respect to successor liability, when one company sells or transfers all of its assets to another company, the purchasing or receiving company is not responsible for the debts and liabilities of the selling company simply because it acquired the seller's property. See Schmidt v. Boardman Company, et al., 958 A.2d 498, 504 (Pa.Super. 2008).
However, the Superior Court upheld the trial court's application of the product line exception to the rule of successor non-liability under which exception the plaintiff may recover from the successor if a number of factors are proven that essentially work together to show that the successor corporation acquires all or substantially all of the assets of the original company and continues essentially the same manufacturing operation as the selling company that originally made the product. Id. at 504-505.
The Superior Court also rejected the successor corporation's appellate argument that the recoveries allowed on the claims for infliction of emotional distress at the trial level should not have been allowed because the underlying tort alleged was under a strict product liability theory and not a negligence theory. The corporation more specifically argued that the emotional distress plaintiffs had not alleged or established any physical injury and that, in the absence of any physical injury, Pennsylvania law does not permit a recovery for emotional distress damages under a theory of strict product liability.
The Superior Court found this argument to be devoid of merit. The Court noted that the courts of Pennsylvania have long abandoned the "impact rule" previously required for a plaintiff to recover under an emotional distress claim. Id. at 518. The Superior Court noted that the law has been extended to allow for a bystander to recover so long as there is a close personal relationship between the physically injured party and the bystander who witnessed the injury.
In rejecting the defendant's argument, the Superior Court emphasized that the law has always focused on the nature of the relationship between the victim of the injury and the bystander rather than the type of the underlying tort. In this case, both the trial court and the Superior Court felt that under the horrific facts of a mother struck by the same projectile that killed her daughter after which the mother watched "her daughter's life drain from her body," the emotional distress sustained "is the inescapable byproduct of any underlying tort which caused the injury and thus, should be compensated." Id. at 519 [emphasis added]. This same analysis was applied to the other emotional distress plaintiff who witnessed the severe physical injuries sustained by her sister.
As such, the Superior Court affirmed the rulings of the trial court in favor of the plaintiffs. Now the successor corporation defendants' appeal to Supreme Court has been granted. In its May 27, 2009 Order, the Supreme Court noted that the following issues would be considered:
(1) Whether the plaintiff must prove a physical injury in order to be entitled to recover under a strict product liability theory?
(2) Whether the product-line exception to the general rule against successor liability should be a part of Pennsylvania's strict product liability jurisprudence?
(3) If the product line exception is recognized as part of Pennsylvania's strict product liability jurisprudence, whether the exception should be formulated to strictly require proof of the following before successor liability can be imposed: (1) the successor corporation purchased all or substantially all of the assets of the manufacturer of the product at issue; (2) the successor undertook essentially the same manufacturing operation as the manufacturer of the product alleged to have caused the plaintiff's injuries and then continued to manufacture the same product line; and (3) the transaction between the successor and the manufacturer of the product at issue caused the destruction of the plaintiff's remedies against the manufacturer?
The parties were also ordered by the Supreme Court to address whether the second issue noted above has been waived.
Given the strong wording of the Superior Court's opinion and the compelling rationale that both the trial court and Superior Court offered in support of their respective decisions, it would appear likely that the Supreme Court will affirm the decisions of the lower courts on these issues (assuming they have not been deemed to have been waived).
Sunday, May 31, 2009
Thursday, May 28, 2009
Pennsylvania Association For Justice Puts On Excellent Seminar at the 27th Annual Pennsylvania Automobile Law Program in Philadelphia
Yesterday (May 27, 2009), I attended excellent presentations on the current status of Pennsylvania automobile law at the 27th Annual Pennsylvania Automobile Law Seminar put on by the Pennsylvania Association of Justice.
Attorney Leonard Sloane did a great job as the moderator, keeping the program moving and providing his own insight on the many topics covered.
The following is a recap of some of the highlights of the seminar.
Update of First Party, Third Party Liability, Limited Tort, and Coverage Issues
Attorney David Lutz's thorough recap of the case updates confirmed that there were not too many earth-shattering opinions handed down recently. Many of the cases reviewed were the ones that have been summarized in previous posts to this blog, such as the excess insurance case of Kropa v. Gateway Ford case and others.
1. Failure to clearly develop a powerful theme.
2. Failure to file appropriate motions in limine.
3. Failure to use a legal assistant during voir dire (to assist you in writing down juror's answers and info).
4. Failure to ask open-ended questions and follow-up questions during voir dire.
5. Failure to use demonstrative exhibits during opening statement.
6. Failure to properly prepare Plaintiff for cross-examination.
7. Failure to properly prepare treating doctor's testimony concerning causation and prognosis opinions.
8. Failure to use the internet for cross-examination of the Defendant witnesses, especially the defense expert witnesses.
9. Failure during closing argument to clearly convey that "the goal is money."
10. Failure to have a legal assistant properly conduct a jury debriefing after a verdict.
Update on Subrogation
Jason E. Matzus, Esquire from Pittsburgh presented his update on subrogation issues. If a passion is needed to become and expert on this topic and bring it to life during a seminar, this guy has it.
Of particular note, were his written materials and presentation on the impending Medicare Set-Aside issue. Attorney Lutz reviewed the Medicare, Medicaid and SCHIP Extension Act of 2007 which is to become effective on July 1, 2009. This Act, which is apparently directed at the liability industry and not plaintiff's attorneys, has the bar up in a tizzy about whether or not Medicare Set-Asides, common in worker's compensation cases, will be required in third party liability cases.
The purpose of the Medicare Set-Aside provision is to ensure that the primary payers (liability carriers) bear the cost of future medical expenses so that Medicare does not have to pay them down the road. The provision works by requiring that money be set aside from a settlement and be kept at the ready for the payment of future medical expenses. The Act also provides for hefty penalties if the provisions are not followed.
In his presentation and materials, Attorney Lutz explains while there is a growing movement to expand this program of Set-Asides from the worker's comp arena to the litigation arena, it is currently only a rare occurence in Pennsylvania that the issue is raised in the litigation context. However, if Medicare's budgetary problems continue, it is anticipated that the Set-Asides may become a mandatory requirement in third party matters.
Currently, it does not appear to Attorney Lutz that there are any express requirements that Plaintiff's attorneys create any Medicare Set-Aside plans (MSAs) to date. As long as a liability settlement does not specifically delineate some of the monies to future medical care, then no amount of the settlement would appear to be covered by Medicare's efforts to recover for future medical expenses.
Attorney Lutz cautiously concludes, however, that since we are proceeding in "unchartered waters" in the absence of any specific guidance from the applicable law, there is no "safe harbor" course of conduct currently established for litigants to avoid Medicare's reach on this issue.
Update on Bad Faith Law
The hot topic in the bad faith arena is the settlement of a class action lawsuit out of the Miller County trial court in Arkansas involving UM/UIM policies under Allstate and CNA auto policies. The case involved allegations that, between January 1, 1994 and February 19,2009, those companies underpaid claimants by using computer programs such as Colossus, Claims Outcome Advisor, and/or Injury IQ to evaluate cases. Despite settling the suit, the carriers denied that they underpaid claims and asserted that their use of these computer programs was proper.
More detailed information on this settlement, and whether a claim you previously concluded may be covered by it, can be found at http://www.cazaressettlement.com/.
James Ronca, Esquire on 18 Wheels and 2 Wheels--Some insights into non-automobile vehicle cases
The always energetic and entertaining Attorney James Ronca provided some nice, informative samples on conducting depositions in trucking accident cases. He also provided primers on how to handle and approach bicycle accident cases and motorcycle accident cases. Many great tips were gathered from his presentation.
Koken Update, UM/UIM Update
The case updates in the Koken area confirmed that there have not been any more recent significant cases handed down recently other than those cases reviewed in the blogs noted below, particularly with respect to the trial courts allowing UIM and third party cases to proceed in a consolidated fashion under one caption under the rationale of judicial economy.
During this portion of the program, noted Plaintiff's attorney Scott Cooper and noted defense attorney James Haggerty faced off with varying points on the important UM/UIM cases over the past year or two, such as the Sackett cases, the Generette case, and others. As these two attorneys were personally involved in the cases discussed, they were able to to an excellent job explaining the ins and outs of how these cases came to be as well as the implications of those decisions on future UM/UIM cases in a readily understandable way.
A highlight of the Koken portion of the program was a presentation by Judge Robert Colville of the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas and Plaintiff's attorney Sean Carmody who worked one of state's first post-Koken-like cases. The defense counsel was unable to make it to the discussion.
The UM claim that they tried before a jury involved an out-of-state State Farm policy that did not have an arbitration clause.
The judge noted that he viewed the case as a contract dispute between a carrier and its insured, with the case having many tort concepts to consider. With the agreement of counsel, the court openly and honestly explained to the jury the nature of the contract dispute between the claimant and State Farm Insurance Company as a defendant. The court advised the jury that the carrier had a duty to provide the coverage or benefits available under the insurance policy where warranted.
During voir dire, defense counsel was permitted to ask basis questions such as whether the jurors had ever had a claim against a carrier and whether their experience was good or bad.
Plaintiff's attorney was allowed to present a theory of the case during the opening statement of corporate vs. the little guy, insurance company vs. the little insured, etc., as well as argue the claimant's position that he had paid an premium for these UM benefits and that the claimant felt that he was entitled to an award under the circumstances presented in this case involving a DUI tortfeasor. Plaintiff's counsel noted that the defense counsel took pains to separate State Farm from the DUI tortfeasor (who was not present at the trial).
Plaintiff's counsel noted that the defense went through the trial with an empty chair and the claims rep in the back of the courtroom. Plaintiff's counsel only called the claims rep as a witness for a brief and limited purpose during trial.
The issue of the declarations page, or other information on the available limits, did not come into play given the plaintiff's counsel's strategy of not offering that info to the jury in order to avoid any potential preconceived notions as to the value based upon the coverage.
I believe it was indicated that the verdict came back in the high six figures range, but that would have to be confirmed.
All in all, it was a very informative day with six CLE credits in the bank, followed by a few innings of the Phillies at the Citizen's Bank Stadium under a perfect night for baseball.
Attorney Leonard Sloane did a great job as the moderator, keeping the program moving and providing his own insight on the many topics covered.
The following is a recap of some of the highlights of the seminar.
Update of First Party, Third Party Liability, Limited Tort, and Coverage Issues
Attorney David Lutz's thorough recap of the case updates confirmed that there were not too many earth-shattering opinions handed down recently. Many of the cases reviewed were the ones that have been summarized in previous posts to this blog, such as the excess insurance case of Kropa v. Gateway Ford case and others.
Attorney Lisa Woodburn provided some nice tips on the inter-play between workers comp law and the auto law arena. Also, Frank J. Wesner, Jr. Esquire took part in discussion of the updates in bad faith law.
Later in the seminar, Attorney Lutz also provided tips or reminders to improve one's trial performance and results, which are always good to hear. Here are the ten tips covered and suggested to keep in mind:1. Failure to clearly develop a powerful theme.
2. Failure to file appropriate motions in limine.
3. Failure to use a legal assistant during voir dire (to assist you in writing down juror's answers and info).
4. Failure to ask open-ended questions and follow-up questions during voir dire.
5. Failure to use demonstrative exhibits during opening statement.
6. Failure to properly prepare Plaintiff for cross-examination.
7. Failure to properly prepare treating doctor's testimony concerning causation and prognosis opinions.
8. Failure to use the internet for cross-examination of the Defendant witnesses, especially the defense expert witnesses.
9. Failure during closing argument to clearly convey that "the goal is money."
10. Failure to have a legal assistant properly conduct a jury debriefing after a verdict.
Update on Subrogation
Jason E. Matzus, Esquire from Pittsburgh presented his update on subrogation issues. If a passion is needed to become and expert on this topic and bring it to life during a seminar, this guy has it.
Of particular note, were his written materials and presentation on the impending Medicare Set-Aside issue. Attorney Lutz reviewed the Medicare, Medicaid and SCHIP Extension Act of 2007 which is to become effective on July 1, 2009. This Act, which is apparently directed at the liability industry and not plaintiff's attorneys, has the bar up in a tizzy about whether or not Medicare Set-Asides, common in worker's compensation cases, will be required in third party liability cases.
The purpose of the Medicare Set-Aside provision is to ensure that the primary payers (liability carriers) bear the cost of future medical expenses so that Medicare does not have to pay them down the road. The provision works by requiring that money be set aside from a settlement and be kept at the ready for the payment of future medical expenses. The Act also provides for hefty penalties if the provisions are not followed.
In his presentation and materials, Attorney Lutz explains while there is a growing movement to expand this program of Set-Asides from the worker's comp arena to the litigation arena, it is currently only a rare occurence in Pennsylvania that the issue is raised in the litigation context. However, if Medicare's budgetary problems continue, it is anticipated that the Set-Asides may become a mandatory requirement in third party matters.
Currently, it does not appear to Attorney Lutz that there are any express requirements that Plaintiff's attorneys create any Medicare Set-Aside plans (MSAs) to date. As long as a liability settlement does not specifically delineate some of the monies to future medical care, then no amount of the settlement would appear to be covered by Medicare's efforts to recover for future medical expenses.
Attorney Lutz cautiously concludes, however, that since we are proceeding in "unchartered waters" in the absence of any specific guidance from the applicable law, there is no "safe harbor" course of conduct currently established for litigants to avoid Medicare's reach on this issue.
Update on Bad Faith Law
The hot topic in the bad faith arena is the settlement of a class action lawsuit out of the Miller County trial court in Arkansas involving UM/UIM policies under Allstate and CNA auto policies. The case involved allegations that, between January 1, 1994 and February 19,2009, those companies underpaid claimants by using computer programs such as Colossus, Claims Outcome Advisor, and/or Injury IQ to evaluate cases. Despite settling the suit, the carriers denied that they underpaid claims and asserted that their use of these computer programs was proper.
More detailed information on this settlement, and whether a claim you previously concluded may be covered by it, can be found at http://www.cazaressettlement.com/.
James Ronca, Esquire on 18 Wheels and 2 Wheels--Some insights into non-automobile vehicle cases
The always energetic and entertaining Attorney James Ronca provided some nice, informative samples on conducting depositions in trucking accident cases. He also provided primers on how to handle and approach bicycle accident cases and motorcycle accident cases. Many great tips were gathered from his presentation.
Koken Update, UM/UIM Update
The case updates in the Koken area confirmed that there have not been any more recent significant cases handed down recently other than those cases reviewed in the blogs noted below, particularly with respect to the trial courts allowing UIM and third party cases to proceed in a consolidated fashion under one caption under the rationale of judicial economy.
During this portion of the program, noted Plaintiff's attorney Scott Cooper and noted defense attorney James Haggerty faced off with varying points on the important UM/UIM cases over the past year or two, such as the Sackett cases, the Generette case, and others. As these two attorneys were personally involved in the cases discussed, they were able to to an excellent job explaining the ins and outs of how these cases came to be as well as the implications of those decisions on future UM/UIM cases in a readily understandable way.
A highlight of the Koken portion of the program was a presentation by Judge Robert Colville of the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas and Plaintiff's attorney Sean Carmody who worked one of state's first post-Koken-like cases. The defense counsel was unable to make it to the discussion.
The UM claim that they tried before a jury involved an out-of-state State Farm policy that did not have an arbitration clause.
The judge noted that he viewed the case as a contract dispute between a carrier and its insured, with the case having many tort concepts to consider. With the agreement of counsel, the court openly and honestly explained to the jury the nature of the contract dispute between the claimant and State Farm Insurance Company as a defendant. The court advised the jury that the carrier had a duty to provide the coverage or benefits available under the insurance policy where warranted.
During voir dire, defense counsel was permitted to ask basis questions such as whether the jurors had ever had a claim against a carrier and whether their experience was good or bad.
Plaintiff's attorney was allowed to present a theory of the case during the opening statement of corporate vs. the little guy, insurance company vs. the little insured, etc., as well as argue the claimant's position that he had paid an premium for these UM benefits and that the claimant felt that he was entitled to an award under the circumstances presented in this case involving a DUI tortfeasor. Plaintiff's counsel noted that the defense counsel took pains to separate State Farm from the DUI tortfeasor (who was not present at the trial).
Plaintiff's counsel noted that the defense went through the trial with an empty chair and the claims rep in the back of the courtroom. Plaintiff's counsel only called the claims rep as a witness for a brief and limited purpose during trial.
The issue of the declarations page, or other information on the available limits, did not come into play given the plaintiff's counsel's strategy of not offering that info to the jury in order to avoid any potential preconceived notions as to the value based upon the coverage.
I believe it was indicated that the verdict came back in the high six figures range, but that would have to be confirmed.
All in all, it was a very informative day with six CLE credits in the bank, followed by a few innings of the Phillies at the Citizen's Bank Stadium under a perfect night for baseball.
Labels:
Automobile Insurance,
Automobile Law,
Bad Faith,
Koken,
Medicare Set-Asides,
Subrogation,
UIM,
UM
Monday, May 25, 2009
Recent Notable Civil Litigation Cases in the State and Federal Courts of Pennsylvania.
The following recent cases of note were highlighted in the Case Digests of the May 25, 2008 Pennsylvania Law Weekly. Copies of the cases summarized below may be secured from the Law Weekly for a small fee by calling 1-800-276-7427 and providing the PICS Nos. noted next to the case citations.
Venue-Forum Non Conveniens-Plaintiff's choice of forum given deference-State Court ruling
Walls v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 2009 WL 1383750 (Pa.Super. May 19,2009)(PICS Case No. 09-0845).
In this case, the insurance company denied a claim by the Plaintiff under her homeowner's policy relative to her home in Monroe County, Pennsylvania. The Plaintiff filed a breach of contract and bad faith action in Philadelphia County, obviously seeking out the more liberal venue. The trial court in Philadelphia transferred the case to Monroe County under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. The Superior Court reveresed in this opinion.
The Superior Court ruled that if a plaintiff chooses a certain forum, the court should not, under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, consider any argument that the forum choice is also allegedly inconvenient for the plaintiff as well. Rather, the Court noted that the plaintiff's choice deserved respect, if not deference.
Ruling that the defendant carrier must show more than inconvenience and further finding that the defendant failed to show that the chosen forum of Philadelphia county was vexatious, the Superior Court reversed the trial court and allowed the case to stay in Philadelphia.
Venue-Transfer-Federal (E.D.Pa.) Court Ruling
Barbera v. Lowe's Home Centers, Inc., 2009 WL 1362608 (E.D.Pa. May 15, 2009)(slip copy, memorandum opinion)(PICS Case No. 09-0830).
Plaintiff sued defendant for negligence in state court. The defendant removed the matter to the Eastern District Federal Court and then filed a Motion to Transfer the case to the Middle District Court under 28 U.S.C. Section 1404(a). This section allows a federal court to transfer the case to another district where the action may have been brought for the convenience of the parties and witnesses.
The Eastern District Court ruled that the defendant clearly demonstrated that venue was proper in the Middle District where the incident happened in the Middle District, the witnesses and evidence would be located in the Middle District, and given that the citizens residing in the area covered by the Middle District Federal Court of Pennsylvania would have more of an interest in the outcome of the litigation. As such, the Motion To Transfer was granted.
Medical Malpractice
Theirfelder v. Wolfert, 2009 WL 1383790 (Pa.Super. May 19, 2009)(PICS Case No. 09-0843).
A Plaintiff-wife, while being treated by a family doctor for anxiety and depression, became involved in a sexual relationship with the doctor. She and her husband later brought a medical malpractice claim alleging negligence on the part of the doctor for allowing the relations to occur. It was emphasized in the Superior Court's opinion that the the family doctor was treating the Plaintiff-wife for emotional problems and that it was alleged in the Plaintiff's Complaint that the sexual activity had allegedly caused the worsening of the Plaintiff-wife's emotional problems.
The Superior Court overruled the trial court's granting of the defendant's preliminary objections asserting a failure to state a cause of action upon which relief may be granted. The trial court based its decision on Long v. Ostroff, 854 A.2d 524 (Pa.Super.2004). Specifically, the trial court granted the preliminary objections based on Long's holding that “a general practitioner's duty of care does not prohibit an extramarital affair with a patient's spouse.”
In this matter, the trial court also believed that although Wolfert's sexual relationship with Wife may have been unethical, it did not violate the law or represent a breach of any professional duty. Accordingly, the trial court held that “the law is clear: it is not a breach of the duty of care when a general practitioner engages in a sexual relationship with a patient.” Id
The Superior Court reversed and held "that a patient does have a cause of action against either a psychiatrist or a general practitioner rendering psychological care, when during the course of treatment the physician has a sexual relationship with the patient that causes the patient's emotional or psychological symptoms to worsen." Therefore, it was found to be error for the trial court to dismiss the Thierfelders' complaint at the preliminary objection phase where all allegations of the Plaintiffs' Complaint had to be accepted as true under the standard of review.
In footnote 6 of its opinion, the Superior Court expressly "declined to extend [its] holding today to encompass a cause of action for spouses, such as Mr. Thierfelder, whether or not they are patients or not of defendant doctors." The Court's decision was noted to speak "only to the actual patients being treated by a defendant doctor with whom he or she is also having a sexual relationship."
The Court also noted, in coming to its conclusion, "that this situation may be different from a case where a general practitioner is rendering only medical care and is not treating the patient for anxiety or other psychological problems." The Superior Court confirmed that it "express[ed] no opinion as to whether there is or is not a cause of action when none of the treatment of the general practitioner is for emotional problems."
Automobile Insurance Cases
Kropa v. Gateway Ford, 2009 WL 1362357 (Pa.Super. May 15, 2009)(PICS Case No. 09-0810).
Gateway Ford had provided loaner vehicle to a Richard Adams. Adams signed a loaner agreement under which Gateway provided the vehicle with Pennsylvania mandated minimum insurance coverage. Adams was involved in motor vehicle accident with a plaintiff. Plaintiff sued Adams. The carrier that issued the policy tendered the $15,000 liability limit but refused to consider Adams to also be covered under Gateway Ford's much larger excess policy. The plaintiff brought a declaratory judgment action on the applicability of the excess coverage.
The Court held that the defendant driver was only entitled to liability coverage under the primary policy and not the excess policy because the "authorized driver" exclusion in the excess policy precluded coverage to any authorized drivers who were operating a covered automobile in accordance with the terms and conditions of a rental agreement with Ford, such as was the case in this matter. As such, the Plaintiff's request for a declaratory judgment in the Plaintiff's favor was denied.
Fleeger v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins., 2009 WL 690681 (W.D.Pa. March 16, 2009)(slip copy, memorandum opinion)(PICS Case No. 09-515).
The "regularly used exclusion" was upheld--again. The court found that this exclusion was not in conflict with the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (MVFRL). The court noted that although the MVFRL requires carriers to offer UM and UIM coverage, it does not define the precise content or extent of such coverage.
It was noted that voiding this exclusion would only serve to frustrate the public policy concern of the increasing costs of automobile insurance as the carriers would be forced to underwrite unknown risks that the carriers had not received premiums for in that, without this exclusion, insureds would be permitted to drive any number of other non-owned vehicles not covered under the carrier's policy and receive gratis UIM coverage on all of those other vehicles by virtue of the fact that the insured had purchased such coverage on his or her own vehicle.
In the end, the court granted summary judgment in favor of State Farm on the coverage issue.
Venue-Forum Non Conveniens-Plaintiff's choice of forum given deference-State Court ruling
Walls v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 2009 WL 1383750 (Pa.Super. May 19,2009)(PICS Case No. 09-0845).
In this case, the insurance company denied a claim by the Plaintiff under her homeowner's policy relative to her home in Monroe County, Pennsylvania. The Plaintiff filed a breach of contract and bad faith action in Philadelphia County, obviously seeking out the more liberal venue. The trial court in Philadelphia transferred the case to Monroe County under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. The Superior Court reveresed in this opinion.
The Superior Court ruled that if a plaintiff chooses a certain forum, the court should not, under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, consider any argument that the forum choice is also allegedly inconvenient for the plaintiff as well. Rather, the Court noted that the plaintiff's choice deserved respect, if not deference.
Ruling that the defendant carrier must show more than inconvenience and further finding that the defendant failed to show that the chosen forum of Philadelphia county was vexatious, the Superior Court reversed the trial court and allowed the case to stay in Philadelphia.
Venue-Transfer-Federal (E.D.Pa.) Court Ruling
Barbera v. Lowe's Home Centers, Inc., 2009 WL 1362608 (E.D.Pa. May 15, 2009)(slip copy, memorandum opinion)(PICS Case No. 09-0830).
Plaintiff sued defendant for negligence in state court. The defendant removed the matter to the Eastern District Federal Court and then filed a Motion to Transfer the case to the Middle District Court under 28 U.S.C. Section 1404(a). This section allows a federal court to transfer the case to another district where the action may have been brought for the convenience of the parties and witnesses.
The Eastern District Court ruled that the defendant clearly demonstrated that venue was proper in the Middle District where the incident happened in the Middle District, the witnesses and evidence would be located in the Middle District, and given that the citizens residing in the area covered by the Middle District Federal Court of Pennsylvania would have more of an interest in the outcome of the litigation. As such, the Motion To Transfer was granted.
Medical Malpractice
Theirfelder v. Wolfert, 2009 WL 1383790 (Pa.Super. May 19, 2009)(PICS Case No. 09-0843).
A Plaintiff-wife, while being treated by a family doctor for anxiety and depression, became involved in a sexual relationship with the doctor. She and her husband later brought a medical malpractice claim alleging negligence on the part of the doctor for allowing the relations to occur. It was emphasized in the Superior Court's opinion that the the family doctor was treating the Plaintiff-wife for emotional problems and that it was alleged in the Plaintiff's Complaint that the sexual activity had allegedly caused the worsening of the Plaintiff-wife's emotional problems.
The Superior Court overruled the trial court's granting of the defendant's preliminary objections asserting a failure to state a cause of action upon which relief may be granted. The trial court based its decision on Long v. Ostroff, 854 A.2d 524 (Pa.Super.2004). Specifically, the trial court granted the preliminary objections based on Long's holding that “a general practitioner's duty of care does not prohibit an extramarital affair with a patient's spouse.”
In this matter, the trial court also believed that although Wolfert's sexual relationship with Wife may have been unethical, it did not violate the law or represent a breach of any professional duty. Accordingly, the trial court held that “the law is clear: it is not a breach of the duty of care when a general practitioner engages in a sexual relationship with a patient.” Id
The Superior Court reversed and held "that a patient does have a cause of action against either a psychiatrist or a general practitioner rendering psychological care, when during the course of treatment the physician has a sexual relationship with the patient that causes the patient's emotional or psychological symptoms to worsen." Therefore, it was found to be error for the trial court to dismiss the Thierfelders' complaint at the preliminary objection phase where all allegations of the Plaintiffs' Complaint had to be accepted as true under the standard of review.
In footnote 6 of its opinion, the Superior Court expressly "declined to extend [its] holding today to encompass a cause of action for spouses, such as Mr. Thierfelder, whether or not they are patients or not of defendant doctors." The Court's decision was noted to speak "only to the actual patients being treated by a defendant doctor with whom he or she is also having a sexual relationship."
The Court also noted, in coming to its conclusion, "that this situation may be different from a case where a general practitioner is rendering only medical care and is not treating the patient for anxiety or other psychological problems." The Superior Court confirmed that it "express[ed] no opinion as to whether there is or is not a cause of action when none of the treatment of the general practitioner is for emotional problems."
Automobile Insurance Cases
Kropa v. Gateway Ford, 2009 WL 1362357 (Pa.Super. May 15, 2009)(PICS Case No. 09-0810).
Gateway Ford had provided loaner vehicle to a Richard Adams. Adams signed a loaner agreement under which Gateway provided the vehicle with Pennsylvania mandated minimum insurance coverage. Adams was involved in motor vehicle accident with a plaintiff. Plaintiff sued Adams. The carrier that issued the policy tendered the $15,000 liability limit but refused to consider Adams to also be covered under Gateway Ford's much larger excess policy. The plaintiff brought a declaratory judgment action on the applicability of the excess coverage.
The Court held that the defendant driver was only entitled to liability coverage under the primary policy and not the excess policy because the "authorized driver" exclusion in the excess policy precluded coverage to any authorized drivers who were operating a covered automobile in accordance with the terms and conditions of a rental agreement with Ford, such as was the case in this matter. As such, the Plaintiff's request for a declaratory judgment in the Plaintiff's favor was denied.
Fleeger v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins., 2009 WL 690681 (W.D.Pa. March 16, 2009)(slip copy, memorandum opinion)(PICS Case No. 09-515).
The "regularly used exclusion" was upheld--again. The court found that this exclusion was not in conflict with the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (MVFRL). The court noted that although the MVFRL requires carriers to offer UM and UIM coverage, it does not define the precise content or extent of such coverage.
It was noted that voiding this exclusion would only serve to frustrate the public policy concern of the increasing costs of automobile insurance as the carriers would be forced to underwrite unknown risks that the carriers had not received premiums for in that, without this exclusion, insureds would be permitted to drive any number of other non-owned vehicles not covered under the carrier's policy and receive gratis UIM coverage on all of those other vehicles by virtue of the fact that the insured had purchased such coverage on his or her own vehicle.
In the end, the court granted summary judgment in favor of State Farm on the coverage issue.
Wednesday, May 20, 2009
Unofficial 2009 Judicial Primary Election Results
Lackawanna County
After the primary vote on one judicial seat, Margaret Bisignani-Moyle took the Democratic nomination and Frank Castellano took the Republican spot. Both are long-time assistant district attorneys with little civil litigation experience during their careers of fighting crime. President Judge Harhut has not indicated what types of cases the new Lackawanna County Judge will focus on, but it is clear that another civil court judge is needed as the trial date backlog is up to a year to 18 months to get a trial date in this county.
Luzerne County
In Luzerne County 17 candidates were running for two spots. District Magistrate William Amesbury took the top spot on the Democratic side with Tina Polachek-Gartley coming in second. On the Republican side, Richard Hughes took the top spot and the cross-filed William Amesbury came in second. One local news article has indicated that Judge Amesbury's dual nomination effectively matches Attorney Hughes against Attorney Gartley in the November 3 general election.
Monroe County
Dickinson Law School grad, Jennifer Harlacher Sibum, secured both the Democratic and Republican spots in the primary for Monroe County Judge.
Wyoming/Sullivan County
Attorney Russell Shurtlef secured both the Democratic and Republican top spots in the primary for common pleas court judge in Wyoming/Sullivan County, taking over the spot long and held by retiring from the bench Judge Brendan Vanston.
After the primary vote on one judicial seat, Margaret Bisignani-Moyle took the Democratic nomination and Frank Castellano took the Republican spot. Both are long-time assistant district attorneys with little civil litigation experience during their careers of fighting crime. President Judge Harhut has not indicated what types of cases the new Lackawanna County Judge will focus on, but it is clear that another civil court judge is needed as the trial date backlog is up to a year to 18 months to get a trial date in this county.
Luzerne County
In Luzerne County 17 candidates were running for two spots. District Magistrate William Amesbury took the top spot on the Democratic side with Tina Polachek-Gartley coming in second. On the Republican side, Richard Hughes took the top spot and the cross-filed William Amesbury came in second. One local news article has indicated that Judge Amesbury's dual nomination effectively matches Attorney Hughes against Attorney Gartley in the November 3 general election.
Monroe County
Dickinson Law School grad, Jennifer Harlacher Sibum, secured both the Democratic and Republican spots in the primary for Monroe County Judge.
Wyoming/Sullivan County
Attorney Russell Shurtlef secured both the Democratic and Republican top spots in the primary for common pleas court judge in Wyoming/Sullivan County, taking over the spot long and held by retiring from the bench Judge Brendan Vanston.
Labels:
Judge Sibum,
Judicial Candidates,
Lackawanna County,
Luzerne County,
Monroe County,
Wyoming County
Tuesday, May 19, 2009
In Case of First Impression, Superior Court Holds Plaintiff May Withdraw Rule 1311.1 Stipulated Cap on Damages
Dolan v. Fissell, 2009 WL 1165394 (Pa.Super. May 1, 2009)
In a case of first impression, the Pennsylvania Superior Court ruled that a stipulation entered into by the parties under Pa.R.C.P. 1311.1 limiting a plaintiff's maximum damages to $25,000 can be withdrawn by the plaintiff at the discretion of the court in certain circumstances.
Rule 1311.1 provides that, in a trial on appeal from an arbitration award, the plaintiff may enter into a stipulation to cap his or her damages at $25,000 in exchange for an agreement that the plaintiff may proceed to trial on expert reports in lieu of their testimony. The purpose of the Rule is to allow the plaintiff to avoid high expert witness fees in smaller cases. The Rule does not state whether or when such a stipulation can be withdrawn.
In the Dolan case, the plaintiff was injured in a car accident and eventually received an arbitration award in the amount of $28,220.00, from which the defendant filed an appeal. The plaintiff then filed a Rule 1311.1 stipulation to the court limiting her jury trial damages to $25,000 thereby allowing her to proceed on expert reports as opposed to testimony, thereby saving the plaintiff substantial costs at trial.
Plaintiff's counsel thereafter sought to withdraw the stipulation on the grounds that he was unaware that an approximately $8,200.00 property damage claim would have to be considered to be within the $25,000 cap. The trial court allowed the stipulation to be withdrawn over the defendants objection. The jury eventually whacked the defendant with a verdict in favor of the plaintiff in the amount of $434,757.25. The defendant appealed on the primary grounds that the trial court erred in allowing the withdrawal of the stipulation.
On appeal, the Superior Court unanimously held that the trial court had the discretion to allow the plaintiff to withdraw the Rule 1311.1 stipulated cap on damages for good cause and provided that there was no substantial prejudice to the defendant. In this case, there was no prejudice to the defendant present as the trial court had continued the trial twice, in part, to provide the defense with an opportunity to fully prepare its case in light of the changed circumstances.
In a case of first impression, the Pennsylvania Superior Court ruled that a stipulation entered into by the parties under Pa.R.C.P. 1311.1 limiting a plaintiff's maximum damages to $25,000 can be withdrawn by the plaintiff at the discretion of the court in certain circumstances.
Rule 1311.1 provides that, in a trial on appeal from an arbitration award, the plaintiff may enter into a stipulation to cap his or her damages at $25,000 in exchange for an agreement that the plaintiff may proceed to trial on expert reports in lieu of their testimony. The purpose of the Rule is to allow the plaintiff to avoid high expert witness fees in smaller cases. The Rule does not state whether or when such a stipulation can be withdrawn.
In the Dolan case, the plaintiff was injured in a car accident and eventually received an arbitration award in the amount of $28,220.00, from which the defendant filed an appeal. The plaintiff then filed a Rule 1311.1 stipulation to the court limiting her jury trial damages to $25,000 thereby allowing her to proceed on expert reports as opposed to testimony, thereby saving the plaintiff substantial costs at trial.
Plaintiff's counsel thereafter sought to withdraw the stipulation on the grounds that he was unaware that an approximately $8,200.00 property damage claim would have to be considered to be within the $25,000 cap. The trial court allowed the stipulation to be withdrawn over the defendants objection. The jury eventually whacked the defendant with a verdict in favor of the plaintiff in the amount of $434,757.25. The defendant appealed on the primary grounds that the trial court erred in allowing the withdrawal of the stipulation.
On appeal, the Superior Court unanimously held that the trial court had the discretion to allow the plaintiff to withdraw the Rule 1311.1 stipulated cap on damages for good cause and provided that there was no substantial prejudice to the defendant. In this case, there was no prejudice to the defendant present as the trial court had continued the trial twice, in part, to provide the defense with an opportunity to fully prepare its case in light of the changed circumstances.
Monday, May 18, 2009
A Look Ahead: President Obama Expresses Thoughts on Selection Criteria for Next United States Supreme Court Justice
The article below, by Charles Babington of the Associated Press and copied from the May 18, 2009 Times Leader newspaper from Wilkes-Barre, outlines President Obama's philosophy in terms of choosing the next United States Supreme Court Justice to replace Justice Souter. It looks like, after years of a rightward direction, the pendulum of the Court's decisions may start swaying more to the left someday down the line.
May 18
‘Empathy’ in judge divisive:
GOP senators interpret Obama’s comments on high court nominee as code for activist, partisan jurist.
by CHARLES BABINGTON Associated Press Writer
WASHINGTON — As a senator, Barack Obama said President George W. Bush’s Supreme Court nominees John Roberts and Sam Alito were clearly qualified. He voted against them anyway.
In a series of votes and speeches more than three years ago, Obama strongly defended a senator’s right to oppose high court nominees because of their philosophical and political views, not just on the narrower grounds of character and temperament.
Republican senators might cite Obama’s actions if they decide to make a serious stand against the current president’s eventual choice to replace retiring Justice David Souter.
But conservatives will find less comfort in the more important details of Obama’s comments from 2005 to 2007 about the Supreme Court. That’s when he outlined the type of justice he wants: someone with a heart as well as brains, who empathizes with the downtrodden and is wary of the establishment’s power.
Obama used almost exactly the same language this month. “I will seek someone who understands that justice isn’t about some abstract legal theory,” he said. He wants someone with “that quality of empathy, of understanding and identifying with people’s hopes and struggles.”
Such language worries many conservatives.
If a justice relies on empathy, then “politics, preferences, personal preferences and feelings might take the place of being impartial and deciding cases based upon the law,” GOP Sen. Orrin Hatch of Utah said recently on ABC’s “This Week.”
The key question for nominees is will they be “fair to the rich, the poor, the weak, the strong, the sick, the disabled?” asked Hatch, a longtime member of the Senate Judiciary Committee, which reviews Supreme Court nominations.
As a senator, Obama said he felt Bush’s nominees were too quick to side with the rich and powerful.
Roberts, now chief justice, was qualified and talented enough for the court, then-Illinois. Sen. Obama said in a September 2005 speech. But Roberts, he said, “has far more often used his formidable skills on behalf of the strong in opposition to the weak.”
The young senator said he probably would have no trouble with Roberts’ rulings in 95 percent of the high court’s cases. But “what matters on the Supreme Court is those 5 percent of cases that are truly difficult,” when “legal process alone” will not suffice, Obama added.
“That last mile can only be determined on the basis of one’s deepest values, one’s core concerns, one’s broader perspectives on how the world works, and the depth and breadth of one’s empathy,” he said. “In those difficult cases, the critical ingredient is supplied by what is in the judge’s heart.”
Hatch said that emphasis on a nominee’s “politics, feelings and preferences” raises red flags. “Those are all code words for an activist judge, who is going to, you know, be partisan on the bench,” Hatch said.
Obama and his fellow Senate Democrats were in the minority in 2005, and some liberal groups implored them to try to block Roberts with a delaying tactic known as a filibuster. Obama called the idea “a quixotic fight” that he would not support.
Four months later, however, he joined a futile Democratic effort to block Alito’s confirmation with a filibuster.
“I have no doubt that Judge Alito has the training and qualifications necessary to serve,” Obama said in a January 2006 speech in the Senate chamber. But he said he was “deeply troubled” because Alito as a federal judge “consistently sides on behalf of the powerful against the powerless; on behalf of a strong government or corporation against upholding American’s individual rights.”
As a presidential candidate, Obama continued to stress the plight of people who lacked advantages when dealing with powerful people and institutions.
In November 2007, he said the Supreme Court should “protect people who may be vulnerable in the political process: the outsider, the minority, those who are vulnerable, those who don’t have a lot of clout.”
“If we can find people who have life experience, and they understand what it means to be on the outside, what it means to have the system not work for them, that’s the kind of person I want on the Supreme Court,” he said.
At a different campaign appearance that year, Obama said: “We need somebody who’s got the heart to recognize, the empathy to recognize what it’s like to be a young teenage mom. The empathy to understand what it’s like to be poor or African-American or gay or disabled or old.”
Because there are only 40 GOP senators today, Republicans have little chance of blocking Obama’s eventual nominee. That hasn’t stopped conservative groups from urging senators to sharply question the judicial philosophies of the president and his nominee.
For example, the Committee for Justice says on its Web site: “The next Supreme Court nominee must be asked whether they share the president’s decidedly activist view that judges should consider, not just the law and facts, but also empathy for certain classes of people, including African-Americans, the poor, gays, and the disabled.”
The commentary in other articles on the topic of the next selection mainly predict that the nominee will be a woman, particularly since President Bush replaced Sandra Day O'Connor with a man, Justice Alito. It is also anticipated that the nominee will be relatively young so that they could spend a decent amount of time on the Court in the hopes that they would counter the decisions of the relatively youthful Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito.
May 18
‘Empathy’ in judge divisive:
GOP senators interpret Obama’s comments on high court nominee as code for activist, partisan jurist.
by CHARLES BABINGTON Associated Press Writer
WASHINGTON — As a senator, Barack Obama said President George W. Bush’s Supreme Court nominees John Roberts and Sam Alito were clearly qualified. He voted against them anyway.
In a series of votes and speeches more than three years ago, Obama strongly defended a senator’s right to oppose high court nominees because of their philosophical and political views, not just on the narrower grounds of character and temperament.
Republican senators might cite Obama’s actions if they decide to make a serious stand against the current president’s eventual choice to replace retiring Justice David Souter.
But conservatives will find less comfort in the more important details of Obama’s comments from 2005 to 2007 about the Supreme Court. That’s when he outlined the type of justice he wants: someone with a heart as well as brains, who empathizes with the downtrodden and is wary of the establishment’s power.
Obama used almost exactly the same language this month. “I will seek someone who understands that justice isn’t about some abstract legal theory,” he said. He wants someone with “that quality of empathy, of understanding and identifying with people’s hopes and struggles.”
Such language worries many conservatives.
If a justice relies on empathy, then “politics, preferences, personal preferences and feelings might take the place of being impartial and deciding cases based upon the law,” GOP Sen. Orrin Hatch of Utah said recently on ABC’s “This Week.”
The key question for nominees is will they be “fair to the rich, the poor, the weak, the strong, the sick, the disabled?” asked Hatch, a longtime member of the Senate Judiciary Committee, which reviews Supreme Court nominations.
As a senator, Obama said he felt Bush’s nominees were too quick to side with the rich and powerful.
Roberts, now chief justice, was qualified and talented enough for the court, then-Illinois. Sen. Obama said in a September 2005 speech. But Roberts, he said, “has far more often used his formidable skills on behalf of the strong in opposition to the weak.”
The young senator said he probably would have no trouble with Roberts’ rulings in 95 percent of the high court’s cases. But “what matters on the Supreme Court is those 5 percent of cases that are truly difficult,” when “legal process alone” will not suffice, Obama added.
“That last mile can only be determined on the basis of one’s deepest values, one’s core concerns, one’s broader perspectives on how the world works, and the depth and breadth of one’s empathy,” he said. “In those difficult cases, the critical ingredient is supplied by what is in the judge’s heart.”
Hatch said that emphasis on a nominee’s “politics, feelings and preferences” raises red flags. “Those are all code words for an activist judge, who is going to, you know, be partisan on the bench,” Hatch said.
Obama and his fellow Senate Democrats were in the minority in 2005, and some liberal groups implored them to try to block Roberts with a delaying tactic known as a filibuster. Obama called the idea “a quixotic fight” that he would not support.
Four months later, however, he joined a futile Democratic effort to block Alito’s confirmation with a filibuster.
“I have no doubt that Judge Alito has the training and qualifications necessary to serve,” Obama said in a January 2006 speech in the Senate chamber. But he said he was “deeply troubled” because Alito as a federal judge “consistently sides on behalf of the powerful against the powerless; on behalf of a strong government or corporation against upholding American’s individual rights.”
As a presidential candidate, Obama continued to stress the plight of people who lacked advantages when dealing with powerful people and institutions.
In November 2007, he said the Supreme Court should “protect people who may be vulnerable in the political process: the outsider, the minority, those who are vulnerable, those who don’t have a lot of clout.”
“If we can find people who have life experience, and they understand what it means to be on the outside, what it means to have the system not work for them, that’s the kind of person I want on the Supreme Court,” he said.
At a different campaign appearance that year, Obama said: “We need somebody who’s got the heart to recognize, the empathy to recognize what it’s like to be a young teenage mom. The empathy to understand what it’s like to be poor or African-American or gay or disabled or old.”
Because there are only 40 GOP senators today, Republicans have little chance of blocking Obama’s eventual nominee. That hasn’t stopped conservative groups from urging senators to sharply question the judicial philosophies of the president and his nominee.
For example, the Committee for Justice says on its Web site: “The next Supreme Court nominee must be asked whether they share the president’s decidedly activist view that judges should consider, not just the law and facts, but also empathy for certain classes of people, including African-Americans, the poor, gays, and the disabled.”
The commentary in other articles on the topic of the next selection mainly predict that the nominee will be a woman, particularly since President Bush replaced Sandra Day O'Connor with a man, Justice Alito. It is also anticipated that the nominee will be relatively young so that they could spend a decent amount of time on the Court in the hopes that they would counter the decisions of the relatively youthful Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito.
Thursday, May 14, 2009
Recent Cases of Note From Around the Commonwealth
According to the May 11, 2009 Pennsylvania Law Weekly, the following cases were the most frequently requested from the Law Weekly's Pennsylvania Instant Case Service (PICS) last week. See 32 PLW 521 (May 11, 2009). Copies of the opinions can be secured from the Law Weekly by calling 1-800-276-PICS and providing the PICS numbers indicated.
Minto v. J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc., PICS Case No. 09-0650(Pa. Super. April 17, 2009)
Klein, J.; Gantman, J. concurring (10 pages).
Superior Court held that the rule pertaining to the exclusivity of a workers' compensation recovery for an employee's injuries, did not bar an employee’s claims that his employer's destruction of evidence impeded his products liability claims against the manufacturer of a truck he was driving.
Schaub v. Trainer’s Inn, PICS Case No. 09-0598 (C.P. Carbon Feb. 17, 2009)
Nanovic, J. (19 pages).
An excellent analysis of the proximate causation/foreseeability issue in negligence cases. A bar’s serving of liquor to a visibly intoxicated underage patron was found not to be the proximate cause of that patron’s excessive violence in a fight outside the bar in which the patron beat another to death with a baseball bat.
Wilmington Steel Processing Co. v. Citisteel USA, Inc., PICS Case No. 09-0456 (C.P. Philadelphia, Commerce Program (Jan. 27, 2009)
Abramson, J. (15 pages).
Analysis of claim for tortious interference with existing and prospective contracts.
Berrier v. Simplicity Manufacturing, Inc., PICS Case No. 09-0692 (3d Cir. April 21, 2009)
McKee, J. (73 pages).
The Third Circuit predicted that, under certain circumstances, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would adopt Restatement (Third) of Torts, §§ 1 and 2 and thereby allow bystanders to pursue a cause of action in strict liability.
Medallis v. Northeast Land Development, LLC, PICS Case No. 09-0494 (C.P. Lackawanna Dec. 4, 2008)
Minora, J. (14 pages).
Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas Judge Carmen Minora held that a developer can be found liable for storm water runoff even where his water runoff system met minimal regulatory requirements.
Minto v. J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc., PICS Case No. 09-0650(Pa. Super. April 17, 2009)
Klein, J.; Gantman, J. concurring (10 pages).
Superior Court held that the rule pertaining to the exclusivity of a workers' compensation recovery for an employee's injuries, did not bar an employee’s claims that his employer's destruction of evidence impeded his products liability claims against the manufacturer of a truck he was driving.
Schaub v. Trainer’s Inn, PICS Case No. 09-0598 (C.P. Carbon Feb. 17, 2009)
Nanovic, J. (19 pages).
An excellent analysis of the proximate causation/foreseeability issue in negligence cases. A bar’s serving of liquor to a visibly intoxicated underage patron was found not to be the proximate cause of that patron’s excessive violence in a fight outside the bar in which the patron beat another to death with a baseball bat.
Wilmington Steel Processing Co. v. Citisteel USA, Inc., PICS Case No. 09-0456 (C.P. Philadelphia, Commerce Program (Jan. 27, 2009)
Abramson, J. (15 pages).
Analysis of claim for tortious interference with existing and prospective contracts.
Berrier v. Simplicity Manufacturing, Inc., PICS Case No. 09-0692 (3d Cir. April 21, 2009)
McKee, J. (73 pages).
The Third Circuit predicted that, under certain circumstances, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would adopt Restatement (Third) of Torts, §§ 1 and 2 and thereby allow bystanders to pursue a cause of action in strict liability.
Medallis v. Northeast Land Development, LLC, PICS Case No. 09-0494 (C.P. Lackawanna Dec. 4, 2008)
Minora, J. (14 pages).
Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas Judge Carmen Minora held that a developer can be found liable for storm water runoff even where his water runoff system met minimal regulatory requirements.
Labels:
Judge Minora,
Products Liability,
Proximate Causation,
Strict Liability,
Tortious Interference with Contracts,
Workers' Compensation
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