Tuesday, April 12, 2022

PA Superior Court Rules that a Worker's Compensation Carrier Does Not Have a Right To Force a Plaintiff To Take Action Against a Third Party Tortfeasor To Recover a Lien


In the case of Loftus v. Decker, No. 611 WDA 2021 (Pa. Super. March 10, 2022 Olson, J., Murray, J., and Pellegrini, J.) (Op. by Pellegrini, J.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court quashed an appeal by a worker’s compensation carrier who had appealed the trial court’s denial of its Motion to Intervene in a personal injury case.

The record before the Court indicated that the injured party was a school bus driver who was injured during a motor vehicle accident.  During the course of the underlying matter, the injured party incurred a worker's compensation lien in excess of $196,000. 

According to the Opinion, the worker’s compensation carrier attempted to intervene after the Plaintiff-employee filed a Writ of Summons against an alleged tortfeasor.

The appellate court found that §319 of the Worker’s Compensation Act did not give a party any right, directly or indirectly, to take any action against a third-party tortfeasor. As such, the appellate court found that a worker’s compensation carrier could not force a Plaintiff employee to seek a recovery to satisfy a worker’s compensation statutory lien.

The Superior Court also noted that the Order from which the worker’s compensation carrier had appealed was not an appealable collateral Order.  Notably, the Pennsylvania Superior Court stated that it was addressing the issue of whether the Order at issue was an appealable collateral Order within its decision on the merits.  As such, the Court in this decision addressed the merits of the issues presented in this case relative to the ability of the worker's compensation carrier to intervene in the action.

As noted, this appeal was quashed.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.  The Dissenting Opinion written by Judge Murray can be viewed HERE.


Source: “Digest of Recent Opinions.” Pennsylvania Law Weekly (March 29, 2022).


Photo by cottonbro on www.pexels.com.

Monday, April 11, 2022

Court Shutdowns Due to COVID-19 Pandemic Did Not Stop The Time For Delay Damages



In the case of Getting v. Mark Sales & Leasing, Inc., No. 348 MDA 2021 (Pa. Super. April 7, 2022 Olson, J., Kunselman, J., and Stevens, P.J.E.) (Op. by Kunselman, J.), the court addressed issues raised by a Defendant following a trial at which a jury awarded the Plaintiff over $2 million dollars in damages for personal injuries and in which the Defendant claimed that it should not owe the Plaintiff delay damages for the length of time that the COVID-19 pandemic shuttered the Pennsylvania courts.

After reviewing the case before it and the applicable law, the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the trial court’s decision that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had not suspended the right of Plaintiff to collect delay damages during the 2020 judicial emergency.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

I send thanks to Attorney John K. Shaffer from the Law Office of Lester G. Weinraub in Plymouth Meeting, PA for bringing this case to my attention.

Commonwealth Court Weighs In on Redaction of Claims Log Notes [Unpublished Decision]


In the case of Mwambu v. Volunteer, No. 1128 C.D. 2020 (Pa. Cmwlth. March 14, 2022 Covey, J., Wallace, J., Ceisler, J.)(Op. by Ceisler, J.) (unpublished), the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania addressed the proper redaction of claims log notes in discovery.

This matter arose out of a case in which a pedestrian Plaintiff was alleged injured when he was struck by an ambulance being driven by an employee of a municipal governmental agency.

During the course of discovery, the Defendant provided to the Plaintiff copies of notes written by employees of the Defendant’s insurance carrier regarding the claim along with an accompanying privilege log pertaining to the notes.

Within the production were redactions of information identified by the Defendant as being protected by the attorney client privilege or pertaining to mental impressions, work product, evaluations, theories, and litigation strategy of a defense representative.

The Plaintiff challenged these redactions and asserted that only opinions as to the merit or value of the claim should be redacted under the Rules of Civil Procedure.

In its Opinion, the Commonwealth Court provided its analysis on what can and cannot be redacted from claims log notes. The court seemed to follow the general rule that notations regarding any mental impressions, conclusions, or opinions by a representative of a Defendant regarding the merit or value of a claim or defense may be redacted as set forth in Pa.R.C.P. 4003.3.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this unpublished Opinion from the Commonwealth Court may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney Gerald Connor of the Scranton office of the Margolis Edelstein law firm for bringing this case to my attention.

Source of Image:  Photo by Marcus Urbenz on Unsplash.com.


Discovery of Excess Insurance Limits Allowed


In the case of Butler v. Scranton Manufacturing Co., Inc., No. 18-CV-5167 (C.P. Lacka. Co. Feb. 18, 2022 Nealon, J.), the court addressed issues regarding discovery of excess insurance information.

This case arose out of an incident during which a Dunmore, PA borough garbage collector was injured when he was riding a garbage truck on its rear riding step and that step allegedly snapped and detached from the truck while the truck was moving, resulting in injuries to the Plaintiff.

At issue in this particular decision was the Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel the Defendant to disclose excess carrier’s insurance information.

Judge Nealon noted that, “[a]lmost 50 years ago,” the Pennsylvania Supreme Court declared that the Plaintiff is entitled to pre-trial discovery of the identity of a Defendant’s liability carrier and the maximum coverage limits for any such liability coverage. 

That rule was more recently codified by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court under Pa. R.C.P. 4003.2, which became effective back in 1979 and provides, in pertinent part, that a “party may obtain discovery of the existence in terms of any insurance agreement under which any person carrying on an insurance business may be liable to satisfy part or all of a judgment....”

The court noted that, based upon this law, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that full and complete information regarding insurance coverage is essential to the settlement process and has long been held to be discoverable.

Judge Terrence R. Nealon
Lackawanna County


Judge Nealon found that the law was so well-established that “no Defendant or attorney can seriously argue in a court filing, without running a fowl of Pa. R.C.P. 1023.1, or the pertinent rules of professional conduct, that the existence, terms, and coverage limits of any liability insurance policy affording primary, excess or umbrella coverage to a named Defendant is not clearly discoverable.” See Op. at 3.

Based upon this law, the court granted Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel the Defendant to disclosure the excess carrier’s insurance information.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

SAVE THE DATE: Lackawanna Pro Bono Golf Tournament


 

Friday, April 8, 2022

Montgomery County Auto Accident Case Driven Out of Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas

All in all, [they'd] rather be in Philadelphia.

In the case of Hausmann v. Bernd, 2022 Pa. Super. 27 (Pa. Super. Feb. 17, 2022 Stabile, J., Dubow, J., and McCaffery, J.) (Op. by McCaffery, J.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed a Philadelphia County trial court decision that sustained Preliminary Objections by a Defendant based upon improper venue regarding a motor vehicle accident that occurred in Montgomery County.

The court found that venue in Philadelphia County was improper against the Defendant driver given that the Defendant driver lived in Montgomery County and given that the accident occurred in Montgomery County. 

However, the court acknowledged that, if venue was proper for the business Defendants in Philadelphia County, then the Plaintiffs could file suit against all three (3) Defendants in Philadelphia.

Yet, the court affirmed the trial court’s determination that the Defendant company did not “regularly conduct business” in Philadelphia County sufficient to support venue.

The court found that, generally speaking, the percentage of revenue derived from work in a county was not necessarily determinative of whether a business regularly conducted business operations in that county.

The court pointed to other evidence that supported the trial court’s decision that the company Defendant did not regularly conduct business in Philadelphia.

In so ruling, the Pennsylvania Superior Court also held that the Plaintiffs had an obligation to conduct discovery for any additional evidence that would have supported their claim to venue.

As noted, the decision by the trial court to sustain the Preliminary Objections to venue were affirmed on appeal.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: “Digest of Recent Opinions.” Pennsylvania Law Weekly (March 8, 2022).


Photo by Kelly L on www.pexels.com.

Wednesday, April 6, 2022

ARTICLE: The Regular Use Exclusion May Not be So Regular Anymore

 

This article was published in the March 31, 2022 edition of the Pennyslvania Law Weekly  and is republished here with permission.

The Regular Use Exclusion May Not be So Regular Anymore

By Daniel E. Cummins | March 31, 2022

 

Daniel Cummins



Recent state and federal decisions have confirmed that there has developed a split of authority in the state and federal trial and appellate courts over the validity and enforceability of the regular use exclusion. 


Most automobile insurance policies contain a regular use exclusion. That provision provides that coverage under that particular policy is excluded whenever the injured party was injured while in a vehicle that was regularly available for the use of the injured party but that was not covered by the insurance policy at issue. The basic rationale behind this exclusion is that a carrier should not have to provide coverage to an injured party where, unbeknownst to the carrier, the injured party regularly used another vehicle that was not covered under the carrier’s policy because the carrier was not paid a premium by the injured party to cover that risk.


Research reveals that the regular use exclusion has been upheld in Pennsylvania state trial court decisions dating back 65 years, see Burger v. Indemnity Insurance Company of North America, 7 Pa. D. & C. 2d 683 (C.P. Lyc. Co. 1956), and in Pennsylvania appellate state court decisions dating back to at least 34 years ago in the case of Wolgemuth v. Harleysville Mutual Insurance, 535 A.2d 1145 (Pa. Super. 1988).  


With the plaintiffs bar being emboldened by a slew of recent Pennsylvania Supreme Court decisions overturning decades of precedent on a wide variety of personal injury civil litigation issues for the benefit of plaintiffs, the plaintiffs bar recently turned their sights on attacking the continuing validity of the regular use exclusion. In fact, as noted below the plaintiffs bar has had recent success in this regard and is currently attempting to push this issue up to the Supreme Court.

The ‘Rush’ Case


In a case that history may come to call the case that marked the beginning of the end of the regular use exclusion, plaintiffs attorney Mark Altemose of the Bethlehem, Pennsylvania office of Cohen, Feeley, Altemose & Rambo was able to convince Northampton County Common Pleas Court Judge Stephen G. Baratta to find that the regular use exclusion violated Pennsylvania’s motor vehicle financial responsibility Law [MVFRL] in the case of Rush v. Erie Insurance Exchange, No. C-48-CV–2919-01979 (C.P. Northampt. Co. June 29, 2020 Baratta, J.).


In Rush, Baratta of the Northampton County Common Pleas Court granted partial summary judgment to the injured party plaintiffs after finding that Erie’s regular use exclusion violated the MVFRL.


According to the opinion, the plaintiff was a police officer who was injured while driving a police vehicle that was regularly available for his use at work.  With regards to this matter, the plaintiff was seeking UIM coverage under his personal automobile insurance policy.  


The trial court found that the regular use exclusion at issue violated the MVFRL in two respects.  First, the court in Rush referred to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s household exclusion decision in Gallagher v. Geico and found that the regular use exclusion in this case was invalid as a “disguised waiver” of UIM coverage when the MVFRL requires the carrier to secure written waivers of such coverage from the insured during the application process or otherwise.


Secondly, under a rationale previously set forth in Slupski v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance, 801 Fed. Appx. 850 (3d Cir. 2002), the trial court in Rush found that, because the plaintiff was entitled to liability/medical coverage of $250,000 for his injuries from the accident, the regular use exclusion was also found to violate 75 Pa.C.S.A. Section 1734, which mandated the carrier to provide UIM coverage equal to the bodily injury coverage available absent a written waiver secured from the insured.


Thereafter, in a case appellate first impression in the same matter of Rush v. Erie Insurance Exchange, 265 A.3d 794 (Pa. Super. Oct. 22, 2021 Bender, P.J.E., Dubow, J., and Stevens, P.J.E.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court held that the regular use exclusion found in motor vehicle policies is unenforceable because it violates the MVFRL. However, the Pennsylvania Superior Court utilized a different rationale than that voiced by the trial court in Rush to invalidate the regular use exclusion.


The Superior Court in Rush noted that the plaintiff was injured in a car accident, he was legally entitled to recover from the underinsured tortfeasors, and Erie had never obtained a 75 Pa.C.S.A. Section 1731 written waiver or rejection of UIM coverage from the plaintiff (rather, the plaintiff had chosen to purchase stacked UIM coverage). In ruling that the regular use exclusion was unenforceable, the Superior Court found that the regular use exclusion impermissibly limits the scope of UIM coverage required by Section 1731 by precluding coverage if an insured is injured while using a motor vehicle that the insured regularly uses but does not own.  

Quick Fallout From the ‘Rush’ Case


The impact of the Rush decision is beginning to be felt by carriers through recent federal court decisions.


In the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania case of Johnson v. Progressive Advanced Insurance, No. 2:21-CV-01916-AJS (W.D. Pa. Feb. 23, 2022 Schwab, J.), the court denied a carrier’s motion to dismiss a plaintiff’s UIM claim in which the carrier was attempting to rely upon the regular use exclusion.


In its Feb. 23 decision in this Johnson case, the federal court noted that the Rush decision had been appealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court but that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had not yet indicated if it would be accepting that appeal for review.


The carrier in this Johnson case attempted to argue that the regular use exclusion was still valid even though the Superior Court invalidated it in Rush. The insurance company attempted to cite to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court Opinion in Williams v. Geico Government Employees Insurance, 32 A.3d 1195 (Pa. 2011) as support for the continuing validity of the exclusion.


In Johnson, Schwab decided not to follow the Williams decision based upon a reasoning that the Supreme Court Williams decision was only a public policy-based decision and not statutorily-based decision as the more recent Superior Court decision in Rush was relative to the MVFRL.


The court in Johnson accepted the plaintiff’s argument that the regular use exclusion runs afoul of Section 1731 of the MVFRL, 75 Pa.C.S.A. Section 1731. As such, the district court denied the carrier’s motion to dismiss without prejudice to the carrier’s right to re-raise the matter should the Pennsylvania Supreme Court take up the issue and reverse the Superior Court decision in Rush.


On the heels of the Western District Court decision in Johnson, came the decision of U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania Judge Malachy E. Mannion’s decision in the case of Evanina v. The First Liberty Insurance, No. 3:20-CV-00751-MEM (M.D. Pa. Feb. 25, 2022 Mannion, J.). Mannion likewise found the regular use exclusion to be invalid under the same rationale as put forth by Schwab three days earlier in the Johnson decision. In the Evanina case, Mannion denied a carrier’s motion for summary judgment on a plaintiff’s UIM claim in which the carrier was attempting to rely upon the regular use exclusion.


Similar to Schwab’s decision in district court case of Johnson v. Progressive Advanced Insurance, Mannion in this Middle District Court case of Evanina decided not to follow the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in Williams and found that the Williams decision was only a public policy-based decision and not statutorily based decision as the more recent Rush decision by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was relative to the MVFRL.


In his decision, Mannion also confirmed that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had not yet addressed the validity of the regular use exclusion in the context of whether that exclusion runs afoul of Pennsylvania’s MVFRL. As such, Mannion stated that he was required to attempt to predict how the Pennsylvania Supreme Court might rule on this issue if faced with this issue.


Mannion reviewed certain recent Pennsylvania Supreme Court decisions such as the Gallagher v. GEICO decision and the Donovan v. State Farm decision in both of which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had ruled that the household exclusion was invalid and, therefore, unenforceable. The court in this Evanina case noted that the household exclusion was “a substantially similar exclusion [as compared] to the regular use exclusion.”  


As such, Mannion, in a prediction that is likely to be as accurate at predicting that the sun will rise in the East tomorrow, predicted that, “considering the trend of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in its rulings,” if faced with the issue of the validity of the regular use exclusion, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would likely find this exclusion to be invalid and, therefore, unenforceable. Accordingly, Mannion ruled in the same fashion and denied the UIM carrier’s motion for summary judgment as a result.

A Split of Authority


As noted, until the Rush decision, the regular use exclusion had been repeatedly upheld as valid through decades of decisions up through the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in Williams in 2011 and more recent unpublished Pennsylvania Superior Court decisions. See Rawl v. GEICO, No. 1086 WDA 2019, 237 A.3d 1042 (Pa. Super. 2020)[unpublished]; see also Eckert v. Unitrin Auto Home Insurance, No. 1013 EDA 2019 (Pa. Super. 2020)[unpublished].  


As noted below, as the Rush decision was making its way up the appellate ladder, a number of other decisions came down in the state and federal courts upholding the continuing validity of the regular use exclusion and the notion that an injured party could not secure coverage that they did not pay for by way of any premium payments.


One plaintiff’s effort to rely upon the Gallagher v. Geico rationale to defeat a regular use exclusion was rebuffed by the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania in the case of Barnhart v. Travelers, 417 F. Supp. 3d 653 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 28, 2019 Horan, J.). The court in Barnhart specifically held that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s holding in Gallagher “does not extend to invalidate the ‘regular use exclusion’ or to overturn Williams as the controlling precedent” in support of the continued validity of the regular use exclusion.  


Also, in the separate case of Nationwide Affinity Insurance Company of America v. Fong, No. 2:19-cv-02119-CFK (E.D. Pa. April 28, 2020 Kenney, J.)[not published], Judge Chad F. Kenney of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania upheld Nationwide’s reliance upon the regular use exclusion. 


The court in the Fong case noted that the claimants did not present any argument that the regular use exclusion was unenforceable on policy grounds. Regardless, the court noted that the regular use exclusion had been previously upheld by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s holding in the case of Williams v. Geico, 32 A.3d 1195, 1209 (Pa. 2011), in which it was held that the regular use exclusion was not void as against public policy. Notably, the court in this case also stated that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s separate decision with respect to the household exclusion in the case of Gallagher v. Geico “does not affect Williams’s precedent, as the facts of Gallagher are wholly distinguishable to the facts in the instant matter, as conceded by the defendants.” 


In addition to writing the Fong decision, Kenney also wrote the decision in the case of Shepherd v. Talotta, 535 F. Supp. 3d 341 (E.D. Pa. April 22, 2021 Kenney, J.), in which the court upheld a regular use exclusion and, in the process, again rejected the plaintiff’s arguments under Gallagher v. Geico, as well as any public policy arguments.


It is also noted that, in the state court system, prior to the Superior Court’s decision in Rush, other trial courts are still ruling that the regular use exclusion was still valid. In the case of Conti v. Castillo-Rodriquez, No. S-269-19 (C.P. Schuylkill Co. Sept. 25, 2020 Russell, J.), the court granted summary judgment in favor of Erie Insurance based upon an application of the regular use exclusion. 


During these motions for summary judgment proceedings, the carrier asserted that the regular use exclusion remained enforceable. The plaintiff argued that the provisions of Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law, in conjunction with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in the case of Gallagher v. Geico, 201 A.3d 131 (Pa. 2019), in which the Supreme Court ruled that the household exclusion was invalid as a de facto waiver of stacked UM/UIM coverages, rendered the regular use exclusion invalid as well. 


Relying, in part, on the case of Williams v. Geico, 32 A.3d 1195 (Pa. 2011), the court in this Conti case held that the regular use exclusion remained valid and enforceable under Pennsylvania law. 


The court in Conti also noted that the majority in the Gallagher v. Geico case indicated that its decision was “narrow.” The judge in Conti also pointed out that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Gallagher “offered no opinion or comment on the enforceability of any other exclusion to UM or UIM coverage or to coverage in general,” citing Gallagher v. Geico at p. 138, n. 8. 


As such, the court in this Conti case stated that, since the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had not abrogated the reasoning set forth in the Williams case, the decision and law of the Williams case was found to be controlling in that case matter. Given that there were no issues of fact to preclude the entry of summary judgment, the court in Conti applied the regular use exclusion and entered summary judgment in favor of the carrier and against the plaintiff. 

Up the Ladder We Go


As noted, those in the motor vehicle accident law industry are awaiting a decision from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court as to whether that court will accept the appeal in the Rush decision and take on the task of deciding whether the regular use exclusion is valid and enforceable. Should the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decide to take the appeal, it will remain to be seen whether that court will choose to uphold decades of past precedent, including from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court itself, repeatedly upholding the validity of the regular use exclusion or whether the court will instead continue its more recent trend of overturning such established precedent in a manner that favors plaintiffs in personal injury litigations. 


Daniel E. Cummins is the managing partner of the Clarks Summit law firm of Cummins Law, a civil litigation practice. He also conducts mediations of civil litigation matters through Cummins Mediation Services. Cummins is also the sole creator and writer of the Tort Talk Blog (www.TortTalk.com), which is designed to provide continuing updates on important cases and trends in Pennsylvania civil litigation law. He can be reached at dancummins@CumminsLaw.net.