Friday, August 7, 2020

Split of Authority Continues on Propriety of Allegations of Recklessness and Sparks Spirited Debate



In the case of Whitney v. Albert Einstein Medical Center Philadelphia, November Term 2019, No. 03233, Control No. 20060389 (C.P. Phila. Co. July 24, 2020 Tsai, J.), the court issued a detailed Order in which it, in part, allowed claims for recklessness and punitive damages to go beyond Preliminary Objections given that the court concluded that the references to “reckless” conduct or “recklessness” “satisfy the pleadings requirements under the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure” and that it would premature to dismiss the claims for punitive damages at the pleadings stage.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


A similar result was handed down in the Franklin County case of Ramirez v. Finn, No. 2020-439 (C.P. Franklin Co. July 30, 2020 Shank, J.).

In that motor vehicle accident case, the court likewise found that allegations of recklessness may be pled in any case whatsoever regardless of the facts as such allegations went to the Defendant's alleged state of mind and, under Rule 1019 allegations of the state of one's mind are allowed to be generally pled.

Anyone wishing to review this Ramirez decision may click this LINK.

I send thanks to Attorney Dale G. Larrimore, Esquire of the Philadelphia law firm of Larrimore and Farnish, LLP for bringing these cases to my attention.


To review all of the Tort Talk posts on this issue, please go to www.TortTalk.com, scroll down the right hand column to the "Labels" section and, alphabetically under that section, go to "Allegations of Recklessness" and click on that.


Commentary: The above cases show that the split of authority over whether allegations of recklessness require outrageous facts to be pled in a personal injury matter, or may be simply pled whenever as a condition of the mind, continues.

I outlined that split of authority in my recent July 14, 2020 Pennsylvania Law Weekly article which can be viewed HERE.  In that article, I noted the two theories followed by the courts in recent decisions, with one line of courts requiring allegations of recklessness to be supported by outrageous facts being pled in the Complaint the kind of which would support a claim for punitive damages, and the second line of cases allowing recklessness to be pled whenever as allegation of a defendant's state of mind.

Attorney Larrimore brought to my attention another line of cases that allowed for allegations of recklessness for a different reason.

Attorney Larrimore wrote:

There is still a bona fide purpose for allowing averments of "recklessness" in the Complaint. If the evidence reveals and the fact-finder finds that the Defendants acted with recklessness, then the defendants would be barred from raising the affirmative defense of contributory negligence at trial. Kasanovich v. George, 348 Pa. 199, 203, 34 A.2d 523, 525 (1943). "When willful or wanton misconduct is involved, comparative negligence should not be applied." Krivijanski v. Union R. Co., 515 A.2d 933, 936, 357 Pa. Super. 196, 203 (1986). Plaintiffs should not be barred from alleging that the Defendant acted with recklessness and thus avoid the potential affirmative defense of comparative negligence, simply based on whether or not a claim for punitive damages is allowed. Thus, an averment of recklessness is proper on its own, with or without a claim for punitive damages.

At the outset of a case, [a plaintiff's attorney] cannot know what was in the state of mind of the defendant driver just prior to a violent car crash. Did he recognize that the manner in which he was operating his vehicle (speeding, weaving in and out of traffic, tailgating etc) placed other drivers at risk of serious injury? Without taking his deposition and assessing his knowledge of the risks of aggressive driving, [a plaintiff's attorney] cannot know what [the defendant driver] was thinking, and Rule 1019(b) allows [the plaintiff's attorney] to allege that [the defendant driver] was acting with reckless indifference to the dangers [the defendant driver] was creating. [Emphasis and double emphasis in original; bracketed inserts inserted here].

Allegations of Recklessness Stricken in Federal Court Trucking Accident Case Where No Outrageous Facts Pled



In the trucking accident case of Carson v. Tucker, No. 5:20-CV-00399 (E.D. Pa. July 16, 2020 Leeson, J.), the Court granted the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Plaintiff’s claims of punitive damages and the defense's Motion to Strike the references to “gross,” “wanton,” and “reckless” throughout the Complaint where the Plaintiff could not factually justify the allegation of those terms. 

According to the Opinion, the accident involved one (1) tractor trailer rear-ending another tractor trailer, resulting in alleged injuries to the Plaintiff-tractor trailer driver. 

It is noted that the court previously granted the defense motion with respect to the Plaintiff’s original Complaint and allowed the Plaintiff the opportunity to amend. The case then came back to the court on similar objections to the Amended Complaint. 

The Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss under 12(b)(6). While the court agreed to review their Motion to Dismiss the punitive damages claims under this standard, the court noted that the more proper standard to review the Defendant’s request to dismiss the allegations of gross, wanton, and reckless conduct throughout the Complaint would be under a Rule 12(f) Motion to Strike rather than a Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). 

After applying those applicable standard of review and after reviewing the requirements to pursue a punitive damages claim under Pennsylvania law, the court granted the Motions at issue. 

Judge Leeson reviewed the facts of numerous cases in which punitive damages were permitted to proceed against a tractor trailer defendant engaging in outrageous conduct or conduct confirming reckless indifference to the safety of others.  The court noted that, in this matter, simple allegations limited only to the Defendant allegedly failing to comply with traffic laws were not sufficient to support a claim for punitive damages. 

The court dismissed a claim for punitive damages in this case after finding that the Plaintiff did not plead facts sufficient to show that the Defendant tractor trailer driver’s actions were “outrageous enough to warrant punitive damages.” The court also found that the Plaintiff’s claims or conclusory and did not satisfy the requirement of asserting something more than mere negligence to support the claims.

The court also noted that the Plaintiff did not pled any facts to sufficiently illustrate that the Defendant driver had the necessary mental state of either intent or reckless indifference to justify the claim for punitive damages. 

With regards to the claims of gross, wanton, and reckless conduct, the court ruled that, since the punitive damages claims were dismissed, such terms became immaterial and had no essential or important relationship to other claims for the relief alleged. As such, the Motion to Strike was granted. 

With this ruling, it appears that this Eastern Federal District Court follows the line of those decisions that require sufficient facts to be pled in order to assert a claim for recklessness in a Complaint and not under that line of cases that allows recklessness to be pled in any case whatsoever regardless of the facts alleged.

Anyone wishing to review this decision  may click this LINK.
 

I send thanks to Attorney James DeCinti, Esquire of the Harrisburg, PA office of the Pion, Nerone, Girman, Winslow & Smith, P.C. law firm for bringing this case to my attention.


For more cases on outlining the issue regarding allegations of recklessness in a tort Complaint, please go to www.torttalk.com, scroll down the right hand column until you get to the “Labels” section, and then scroll down alphabetically to the label for “Allegations of Recklessness” and click on that to get to all of the Tort Talk posts on this issue.

Wednesday, August 5, 2020

Gallagher v. GEICO Limited To Its Facts By Another Court



In the case of Erie Insurance Exchange v. Mione, No. 2019-CV-2395 (C.P. Lehigh Co. June 26, 2020 Varricchio, J.), Judge Michele A. Varrichio of the Lehigh County Court of Common Pleas granted summary judgment in favor of the carrier and denied the Plaintiff’s judgment on the pleadings in a declaratory judgment action regarding the household exclusion such that the court ruled that Erie Insurance did not need to provide underinsured motorist coverage to the Plaintiff under the case presented.

In this matter, at the time of the accident, the Plaintiff owned two (2) policies issued by Erie Insurance. On the date of the accident, the Plaintiff was operating a motorcycle that was covered under a Progressive Insurance policy.

The Plaintiff recovered the applicable policy from the tortfeasor and then sought to recover benefits from the Erie auto insurance policy. Neither of the Erie Insurance policies listed the motorcycle as a covered vehicle.

Rather, as noted, the motorcycle was covered under a separate policy issued by Progressive. Moreover, it was confirmed that the Plaintiff had not purchased stacked UIM coverage on his motorcycle policy.

The Erie Insurance policies contained a household exclusion.

This decision represents another decision in which a court has limited the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision in Gallagher v. Geico to its facts even though the judicially activist Pennsylvania Supreme Court expressed that its decision eradicated the household exclusion across the board. Rather, the court in this Erie Ins. Exch v. Mione case took a more measured approach and analogized the facts before it to be more consistent with the facts in issue in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision in Eichelman v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 711 A.2d 1006 (Pa. 1999).

Following Eichelman the court in this matter ruled that, in the absence of a clearly expressed public policy, the clear and unambiguous language of the valid household exclusion in the Erie auto insurance policy must be given its plain meaning.

The court also noted that, giving effect to the household exclusion would further legislative policy behind the MVFRL in holding the Plaintiff to his voluntary choice of not purchasing UIM coverage under this separate motorcycle policy for the motorcycle involved in the accident.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Addresses Liability of Mental Healthcare Providers To Warn Others Regarding Patient



In the case of Maas v. UPMC Presbyterian Shadyside, No. 7 WAP 2019 (Pa. July 21, 2020) (Op. by Dougherty, J.)(Baer, J., Dissenting), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court addressed the duty of a mental health treatment provider to warn individuals who may be the subject of their patient’s threats.

According to the Opinion, a mental health patient lived in an apartment building and repeatedly told his doctors and therapist that he would kill an unnamed “neighbor.”

Unfortunately, the mental health patient ultimately carried out his threat, killing an individual who lived in his building, a few doors away from his own apartment.

In a subsequent wrongful death litigation filed by the victim’s family, the Defendant medical providers argued that they had no duty to warn anyone about the patient’s threats because he never expressly identified a specific victim.

The trial court rejected this argument and denied the medical providers’ Motion for Summary Judgment.

The case went up on appeal and the Superior Court affirmed the trial court’s finding.

With this decision, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court also affirmed and found no reversible error.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of the Majority Opinion in this decision may click this LINK.

The Dissenting Opinion by Justice Baer may be viewed HERE.

Motion to Compel Discovery Denied After Party States They Cannot Produce What They Do Not Have



In the case of Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Eastern Mushroom Marketing Co-op, No. 15-6480 (E.D. Pa. June 29, 2020 Schiller, J.), the court addressed a Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel the Defendants to produce additional documents in this anti-trust litigation after the Defendant advised that they had made a thorough search and could not find any additional discoverable documents.

The court denied the Motion to Compel after finding that the court had been provided with additional information by the defense with regards to the search methodology completed by the Defendants to look for the information, which included research from their IT and sales department to seek out electronically stored information. The Defendants also advised that they requested former salespersons to search their historic files.

The Plaintiffs argued under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that the Defendants had failed to meet their obligations under Rule 34 and, as such, the Plaintiffs sought an Order compelling additional discovery.

In this matter, Judge Schiller stated that the burden was upon the Plaintiff to prove that the Defendant’s search was not reasonable. Significantly, the court held that the Plaintiff could not carry that burden by merely pointing to an absence of information. The Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel was therefore denied.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Source: “Digest of Recent Opinions.” Pennsylvania Law Weekly (July 14, 2020).




Monday, August 3, 2020

Need an Ethics CLE Credit?



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Latest Decision From Pennsylvania Superior Court On Stacking Waiver Forms



In the case of Franks v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2020 Pa. Super 181 (Pa. Super. July 31, 2020  Lazarus, J., Kunselman, J., McCaffrey, J.)(Op. by McCaffrey, J.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court held that, under Sackett I, 75 Pa.C.S.A. Section 1738(c) requires a new stacking waiver whenever the stacked amount of UIM coverage changes — regardless of whether the change is an increase or decrease in the amount of stacked coverage. 

In so ruling the Court, noted that its interpretation of the issue was consistent with the recognized policy of construing the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law “liberally in favor of the insured” so as to “afford[ ] the injured claimant the greatest possible coverage.”

Anyone wishing to review this decision may click this LINK. (This Link has been disabled by the Superior Court due to the Update noted below).

I send thanks to Attorney Scott Cooper of the Schmidt Kramer law firm in Harrisburg, PA for bringing this case to my attention.

UPDATE:

As an update it is noted that the Pennsylvania Superior Court has withdrawned this decision in favor of a re-argument en banc on the issues presented.  Here is a LINK  to the relevant Order.

Stay tuned for more updates in the future on this latest stacking case.