Wednesday, May 30, 2018

Pennsylvania Trial Court Dismisses Suit For Auto Accident That Occurred in New York

In her recent decision in the case of Ford v. Leal, No. 3471-CV-2016 (C.P. Monroe Co. Mar. 15, 2018 Harlacher Sibum, J.), Judge Jennifer Harlacher Sibum of the Monroe County Court of Common Pleas sustained the Defendants’ Preliminary Objections and dismissed a Plaintiff’s Complaint in an automobile accident case due to lack of In Personam jurisdiction over the Defendants.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiffs were involved in a motor vehicle accident on the New York Thruway in Rockland County, New York.  

The Plaintiff filed suit in Monroe County, Pennsylvania and the Defendants filed Preliminary Objections under Pa.R.C.P. 1028(a)(1) asserting lack of jurisdiction of the Defendants.  

More specifically, the Defendants asserted that the court did not have any personal jurisdiction over the Defendants.   The Defendants asserted that they did not reside or own real property in Pennsylvania, that the subject accident did not occur in Pennsylvania, that the Defendants were not served in Pennsylvania, and that the courts of Pennsylvania lack general jurisdiction and specific personal jurisdiction under the Pennsylvania Long Arm Statute over the Defendants.  

Judge Jennifer Harlacher-Sibum
Monroe County
Judge Harlacher Sibum noted that, according to well-established Pennsylvania case law, an alleged out-of-state automobile accident alone is not enough for a Pennsylvania court to establish personal jurisdiction over a Defendant under the Long Arm Statute, even when the Plaintiff alleges a lasting injury that continues while the Plaintiff resides in Pennsylvania.   See Op. 4 citing with “See” signal DeFay v. McMeekin, 508 A.2d 324 (Pa. Super. 1986) [other citations omitted].  

On the basis of this law, the court found that the Monroe County Court of Common Pleas did not specific personal jurisdiction over the Defendants under Pennsylvania’s Long Arm Statute and, as such, the Complaint was dismissed.  


Anyone wishing to review this decision online may click this LINK.

Monday, May 28, 2018

Eastern District Court Dismisses UIM Bad Faith Claim Due to Conclusory Allegations in Complaint

In the case of Kosmalski v. Progressive Preferred Ins., No. 17-5726 (E.D. Pa. May 2, 2018 Pappert, J.), the court dismissed a Plaintiff’s bad faith claim in a UIM action with leave to amend. 

According to the Opinion, the insured was apparently dissatisfied with the carrier’s claim evaluation and alleged that the insured had failed to evaluate the claim fairly and objectively, failed to complete a prompt and thorough investigation, failed to remit benefits promptly, failed to reasonably evaluate medical documentation, and failed to keep the insured fairly advised as to the status of the claim.

The court noted that the Plaintiff offered no further detailed facts to support these conclusory allegations.  

As such, the Eastern District Court granted the carrier’s Motion to Dismiss and held that “bare-bones” conclusory allegations that are not accompanied by factual allegations are insufficient to raise the claims to a level of plausibility required to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss.   The court further noted that a Plaintiff must provide additional facts to show how the insured’s conduct was allegedly unreasonable and reckless.

Despite granting the Motion to Dismissed filed by the Defendants, the court did grant the Plaintiff leave to file an Amended Complaint to correct the errors noted.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.  The companion Order can be viewed HERE.

I send thanks to Attorney Lee Applebaum, the writer of the excellent Pennsylvania and New Jersey Insurance Bad Faith Case Law Blog and member of the Philadelphia Law Firm of Fineman, Krekstein & Harris for bringing this case to my attention.

Check out Attorney Applebaum's excellent Bad Faith Case Law Blog HERE.  It is my go-to resource for the latest Pennsylvania and New Jersey Bad Faith cases of note.

Thursday, May 24, 2018

HOPING TO BRING YOUR CASE TO A CLOSE?



I welcome the opportunity to assist you in settling your case through CUMMINS MEDIATION SERVICES.

To schedule a Mediation, please contact me at dancummins@comcast.net or at 570-346-0745.

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New Jersey Automobile Reparation Reform Act Applied To Preclude Damages in Pennsylvania Auto Accident Case

 
In the case of Williams v. Reczynski, No. C-0048-CV-2016-3019 (C.P. Northampton Co. Dec. 14, 2017 Dally, J.), the court granted the Defendant’s Motion In Limine to preclude evidence of medical expenses and non-economic damages in a motor vehicle accident case.  

This matter arose out of a motor vehicle accident that occurred in Pennsylvania.  The Defendants were Pennsylvania residents.  According the allegations in the Complaint, the Plaintiff alleged that she was a resident of New Jersey at the time of the accident.  

During the course of discovery, it was confirmed that the Plaintiff had no insurance on her automobile at the time of the accident.  

The Defendants asserted that New Jersey law should be applied in the matter and that, under New Jersey law, the Plaintiffs should be precluded from seeking economic and non-economic damages pursuant to the New Jersey Automobile Reparation Reform Act.  

According to the Opinion, although Pennsylvania’s Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law does not preclude an uninsured motorist from claiming economic damages, under New Jersey law, an uninsured motorist is precluded from seeking any damages for economic or non-economic losses.  

After completing a conflicts of law analysis, the Northampton County of Court of Common Pleas ruled that New Jersey law should indeed apply on this issue.   Applying that New Jersey law, the court granted the Defendant’s motion to preclude the Plaintiff's damages claims.  

Anyone wishing to review this case may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney John A. Statler and Jason Statler of the Lemoyne, Pa law firm of Johnson & Duffy for bringing this case to my attention.   

The Days of Judges Not Being In Courtroom for Voir Dire May Be Coming to An End



In the case of Trigg v. Children’s Hospital of Pittsburgh, No. 2018 Pa. Super. 129 (Pa. Super. May 14, 2018 Kunselmen, Olson, J.J.; Bowes, J., concurring) (Op. by Kunselmen, J.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court reversed a trial court’s denial of post-trial motions in a medical malpractice case regarding, in part, jury selection issues.  

According to the Opinion, in certain trials in Allegheny County, only a court clerk presides over voir dire.  As such the trial court judge did not have any first hand perception of the juror’s demeanor.  

Accordingly, given that firsthand perception of a juror’s demeanor is the basis for a palpable error deference standard of review, decisions on jury strikes made by judges who do not attend voir dire are not accorded this palpable error deference by the Superior Court.  

The appellate court ruled in this fashion after noting that the alleged demeanor of a perceptive juror cannot be reconstructed after the fact by attorneys attempting to relay the same to the formerly absent trial judge.  

The Superior Court ruled that "[a] judge personally witnessing the original voir dire is essential, because it justifies our -- and the losing party's -- faith in the trial court's rulings on challenges for cause."

In her Concurring Opinion, Judge Bowes also emphasized the need for trial court judges to be in the courtroom to assess a juror's demeanor in responding to voir dire questions as part of the process of properly determining whether a juror should be stricken or not.

The Superior Court also ruled that a juror with relatives who were physicians, and who allegedly showed bias as a result, should have been excused for cause.  

Overall, the Superior Court found reversible error where a party is forced to use a peremptory challenge to exclude a juror who should have been excused for cause.  


Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.  Judge Bowes's Concurring Opinion can be viewed HERE.  

I send thanks to Attorney James M. Beck of the Philadelphia office of the Reed Smith law firm for bringing this case to my attention.  

UPDATE: In an Order handed down on January 23, 2019, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted allocatur to hear the appeal in this case.
 


Wednesday, May 23, 2018

Summary Judgment Granted in Med Mal Case Due to Lack of Expert Testimony


In the case of Gintoff v. Thomas, No. 2016-CV-2155 (C.P. Lacka. Co. May 4, 2018 Nealon, J.), Judge Terrence R. Nealon of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas granted a Defendant hospital’s Motion for Summary Judgment in a medical malpractice case given the Plaintiff’s failure to support the claims against that Defendant with expert opinion testimony on those particular claims.  

Judge Terrence R. Nealon
Lackawanna County
According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff filed a medical malpractice action alleging negligent prescription and monitoring of anti-coagulation therapy that allegedly caused a right occipital hemorrhage which required emergency treatment and allegedly resulted in permanent harm.  

The Plaintiff sued, among others, a Defendant hospital on claims for vicarious liability and corporate negligence.

The Defendant hospital filed a Motion for Summary Judgment seeking to dismiss these claims on the grounds that the Plaintiff did not produce expert opinion testimony on the issues pertinent to those claims.  

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff did produce an expert report containing opinions from a hematology expert only as to the alleged negligence of the Co-Defendant hematologist.   The court also noted that the Plaintiff’s expert did not criticize the care provided by any hospital personnel. It was further indicated that the Plaintiff’s previously stipulated that the Co-Defendant hematologist was not an actual or ostensible agent for whom the hospital could be found vicariously liable.   Nor was there any opinion in the hematologist’s expert report asserting any institutional negligence against the hospital.

Consequently, based upon the record before it, the court found that the Plaintiff’s case lacked sufficient expert opinion evidence to establish a prima facie claim for vicarious liability or corporate negligence on the part of the Defendant hospital.   As such, the hospital’s Motion for Summary Judgment was granted.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision by Judge Nealon may click this LINK.

Tuesday, May 22, 2018

Request for New Trial Denied Where Defendant Driver Found Negligent But Jury Found Causation Element Not Met in Fatal MVA Case

In the case of Steudler v. Keating, No. 8795 - CV - 2013 (C.P. Monroe Co. March 20, 2018 Williamson, J.), Judge David J. Williamson ruled that Plaintiffs were not entitled to a new trial based upon the jury’s failure to find causation even though it found the Defendant driver negligent in an auto accident case. 

The court ruled in this fashion after finding that it was possible for the jury to determine that the Defendant was negligent but that his negligence was not the factual cause of a fatal accident.  

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiffs, Erika Steudler and Victor Resto, were walking along a road in Monroe County when Resto was struck by a motor vehicle driven by the Defendant.  

The court noted that the accident occurred at night on a country back road with no street lighting.   Neither Plaintiff was carrying a flashlight at the time of the accident.  

Plaintiff Steudler did not see the accident but felt Resto brush against her the darkness when he was thrown in the air.  

Steudler filed a lawsuit against the Defendant seeking emotional damages due to witnessing the accident while Resto’s estate filed a wrongful death claim.

As noted, the matters proceeded to trial where the jury found the Defendant negligent but also found that his actions were not the factual cause of the Plaintiffs’ injuries.  

In the post-trial motions, the Plaintiffs asserted that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence and shocking to one’s sense of justice.   The Plaintiffs argued that, because the jury found that the Defendant was negligent, the jury should have found that he was also the factual cause of their injuries since it was undisputed that Resto died from the accident.  

The court ruled that a verdict is not against the weight of the evidence simply because the evidence at trial was conflicting or that a reasonable fact-finder could have decided the case in favor of either party.  

The trial court distinguished this case from the line of cases which suggest that when a Defendant is found negligent and both parties admit that there was some injury, then the Defendant must be found to have caused at least some portion of the injuries alleged.   Here, the court noted that the most distinguishable factor between that line of cases and this case was the issue of the Plaintiffs’ contributory negligence.   The court noted that, in the line of cases cited the Plaintiffs, the Defendants had admitted negligence and there was no difference in opinion that the Defendants’ negligence had caused those accidents, which cause some personal injury.  

In the Steudler matter, the Defendant never admitted negligence and there were claims of contributory negligence pursued.   The defense argued that the sole cause of the accident was the Plaintiffs’ own acts or omissions.   It was the Defendant’s defense that he operated his vehicle within the posted speed limit, stayed within his lane of travel, and never saw the Plaintiffs prior to the impact.  

The court also noted that the parties presented experts with different opinions on the theory of the cause of the accident in this matter.

In the end, the court found that the jury’s verdict in this matter could have been based upon the jury’s belief that Resto was in the roadway, together with Steudler, and that, if he was not, he may not have been struck and killed. 

As such, the court denied the Plaintiff’s request for a new trial under the case presented.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK. 

Source:  “Digest of Recent Opinions” Pennsylvania Law Weekly (April 10, 2018).