Tuesday, May 22, 2018

Superior Court Gives a Primer on How To Preserve Request for JNOV

In the case of Corvin v. Tihansky, No. 2018 Pa. Super. 91 (Pa. Super. April 20, 2018 Bender, P.J.E., Shogan, J., Strassburger, J.) (Op. by Shogan, J.), the Superior Court affirmed a trial court’s denial of a Plaintiff’s request for a new trial or a judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) after the jury found that the defendant driver’s negligence in a rear-end accident was not a factual cause of any harm.  

According to the Opinion, the court ruled in this fashion after finding that the Plaintiff waived his JNOV issue where the Plaintiff’s counsel failed to move for a directed verdict, and where the Plaintiff’s counsel withdrew his request for a binding jury instruction. 

The court additionally noted that the jury's verdict may have been supported by the fact that the Plaintiff’s allegedly concealed of his pre-accident chiropractor visits from his own physicians which  presented the jury with an issue of credibility. 

The court also noted that one of the Defendant’s experts also offered an opinion that the Plaintiff had not been injured in the subject accident.  

The Superior Court found that there was no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s refusal to substitute its judgment for that of the jury with respect to the Plaintiff's request for a new trial.  


Source:  “Digest of Recent Cases.”  Pennsylvania Law Weekly (May 8, 2018).  


Monday, May 21, 2018

Recklessness Allegations Allowed To Stand in MVA Case Where Plaintiff Confirms No Punitive Sought



In the recent Northampton County Court of Common Pleas decision of Nolen v. Esken, No. C-48-CV-2018-0385 (C.P. North. Co. March 28, 2018 Beltrami, J.), the court overruled a Defendant’s Preliminary Objections to allegations of recklessness contained in a Plaintiff’s motor vehicle accident Complaint.  

According to the Opinion, in their Complaint, the Plaintiffs alleged recklessness on the grounds that the Defendant was speeding at the time of the accident, ran a red light, and collided with the Plaintiff’s vehicle.  

In Preliminary Objections, the Defendant moved to strike the allegations of recklessness and other related terms from the Plaintiffs’ Complaint, arguing that the Complaint failed to set forth facts to support such allegations.   The Defendant asserted this objection under Pa.R.C.P. 1028(a)(2), which allows for Preliminary Objections on the grounds of inclusion of impertinent matter in a Complaint.   

The court noted that, under Pennsylvania law, to be impertinent, the allegations must be immaterial to the proof of the cause of the action.  The court also noted that, only where an allegation is wholly irrelevant to the action and cannot influence the result will such allegations be deemed to be impertinent.   The court also noted that the right of a trial court to strike impertinent matters should be sparingly exercise under Pennsylvania law and utilized only when a party can show prejudice.   See Op. at 2. 

In response to the Preliminary Objections, Plaintiffs argued that they had not claimed punitive damages and have only alleged “recklessness” in their Complaint in order to attempt to preclude the Defendant from raising arguments of comparative negligence in the case.   The Plaintiff was relying upon the case of Krivijanski v. Union R. Co., 515 A.2d 933, 936 (Pa. Super. 1986), in which the Pennsylvania Superior Court held “that when willful or wanton misconduct is involved, comparative negligence should not be applied.”  

Judge Beltrami ruled that, given that the Plaintiffs were not seeking punitive damages, and given that the Plaintiffs stated reason for pleading “recklessness” and other related terms under the law of the Krivijanski holding, such allegations in this matter could indeed serve to influence the case and were, therefore, not impertinent.   

The court also felt that the Defendants would not be prejudice by the allegations given that the Plaintiff had not claimed punitive damages.  

I send thanks to Attorney Ed Shaughnessy of Shaughnessy Law Office in Easton, Pennsylvania for bringing this case to my attention.  

Anyone wishing to review this case may click this LINK.

Commentary:  Defense litigators should beware of allowing allegations of recklessness to stand without challenge, even where Plaintiff asserts that they are not claiming punitive damages, as such allegations may leave the door open for the Plaintiff to amend the Complaint later in the litigation to then include punitive damages.   Apparently, this potential prospect was not argued or considered in this particular case. 

Tuesday, May 15, 2018

Limited Tort Motion for Summary Judgment Denied in Lackawanna County

In his recent Opinion in the case of Borick v. Manley, No. 2013-CV-994 (C.P. Lacka. Co. April 4, 2018 Gibbons, J.), Judge James A. Gibbons of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas denied a Defendant’s Limited Tort Motion for Summary Judgment.  

According to the Opinion, the defense argued that the Plaintiff did not sustain any serious injury as a result of the accident.  In support of this argument, the defense asserted that the Plaintiff did not lose consciousness as a result of the accident and that no airbag deployed.   It was also asserted that the Plaintiff refused an ambulance at the scene of the accident.  The defense additionally noted that the Plaintiff left the scene of the accident and proceeded to drive to work, after which she subsequently had her mother drive her to the emergency room.  

The defense also asserted that the Plaintiff was diagnosed in the emergency room with only cervical and thoracic strain injuries.   Thereafter, the Plaintiff underwent diagnostic studies, including x-rays, MRIs, and an EMG test, all of which returned normal results.  

Although the defense conceded that the Plaintiff continued to assert ongoing and chronic neck and back pain, it was the defense position that the Plaintiff’s allegations alone coupled with a lack of long-term diagnosis confirmed by any medical record, rendered the Plaintiff’s case barred by her Limited Tort selection.   As additional support for its argument, the defense also pointed to its IME report.  

In opposition, the Plaintiff emphasized the injuries and treatment alleged and also asserted that the injuries sustained were serious injuries as allegedly demonstrated by the impact of the accident upon the Plaintiff’s life.   In particular, the Plaintiff asserted that, following the accident, she was unable to work in her position as a pharmacy technician and/or as a bartender, given that she was allegedly no longer able to remain on her feet for extended periods of time due to her injuries.   The Plaintiff additionally noted difficulties in driving, lifting, exercising, performing household activities, walking her dog, and other activities of daily living.  

Judge James A. Gibbons
Lackawanna County
Based upon the record before it, and viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the non-moving party as required by the Motion for Summary Judgment standard of review, Judge Gibbons found that genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether the Plaintiff sustained a serious injury.   As such, the court denied the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment and allowed the case to proceed to trial.  

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


    

Monday, May 14, 2018

Default Judgment Opened in Monroe County Where Elements for Relief Met


In his recent decision in the case of Brozzetti v. Liz, No. 3621-Civil-2017 (C.P. Monroe Co. Mar. 9, 2018 Williamson, J.), Judge David J. Williamson of the Monroe County Court of Common Pleas granted certain Defendants’ Petition to Open a Default Judgment. 

According to the Opinion, this case arose out of a motor vehicle accident.   The Plaintiff filed suit against an alleged DUI Defendant driver and various entities under a Dram Shop Act action.

The Opinion notes that the Complaint was served on the Dram Shop Defendants and, due to their failure to respond, a default judgment was eventually entered against those Defendants.  

In ruling on the Petition to Open the Default Judgment, the court noted that such a judgment may be opened by the court when the petitioning party can show that they have (1) promptly filed a Petition to Open a Default Judgment, (2) provided a reasonable excuse or explanation for failing to file a responsive pleading, and (3) pleaded a meritorious defense to the allegations contained in the Complaint.   See Op. at p. 4 [citations omitted].  

In this matter, the issue of prompt filing and the excuse for not having filed a responsive pleading were noted by the court to be closely intertwined. 

The Dram Shop Defendants asserted that, when they were served with the Complaint, the documents were provided to their long time insurance agent, and the Dram Shop Defendants were assured that the matter was being handled.   

However, it appears that the agent never provided the information to the insurance carrier and other evidence was provided to show that the insurance agent had sold his business, and may have spent time in hospital during the time in question, and may have otherwise lost his ability to operate as a licensed insurance agent.   

The court confirmed that the record indicated that once the problems were discovered, prompt steps were taken by the Defendant to secure counsel and to have a Petition to Open the Default Judgment filed.  

Judge Williamson compared the facts before him as being similar to those cases where the courts have excused the neglect of counsel that results in the entry of default judgment through no fault of the defendants themselves.   Judge Williamson felt that the same could be said in terms of reliance upon a representation by the insurance agent that the claim and the matter were being handled.   

Overall, Judge Williamson felt that the Dram Shop Defendants had acted in a timely manner once they became aware that no insurance claim had been transmitted by their insurance agent.   The court noted that, thereafter, in a span of approximately only 17 days, a claim was then opened, an attorney was assigned, that attorney reviewed the file and entered his appearance, and filed the Petition to Open and an Answer to the Complaint.  

Under these circumstances, the court felt that the Dram Shop Defendants had provided a reasonable excuse for their failure to file a responsive pleading, i.e., that they were unaware that their insurance agent had failed to transmit the claim to the carrier for a defense in light of the agent's assurances otherwise.  

On the final element, the court found that the Dram Shop Defendants had presented meritorious defenses to the claims provided.  

Based upon the above, the court found that the Defendants had met their burden in support of their Petition to Open the Default Judgment.

Anyone wishing to review this Opinion online may click this LINK.

Friday, May 11, 2018

Parameters of Neuropsychological IME Reviewed in Dauphin County Case

Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas
In an Order only issued by the Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas in the case of Eberhard v. Pettis, No. 2014-CV-78180-CV (Jan. 31, 2018 McNally, J.), the court compelled a Plaintiff to attend an independent neuropsychological evaluation. 

In the Order, the court permitted Plaintiff’s counsel, or another representative of the Plaintiff, to attend the interview phase of the evaluation only.   The Order further prohibited the Plaintiff from recording the standardized testing portion of the evaluation.  

In its Order, the court cited to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court case of Shearer v. Hafer, No. 93 MAP 2016 (Pa. 2018) as supporting the trial court’s decision in this regard.  

Anyone wishing to review this Order only, may click this LINK.

For other Tort Talk posts on cases addressing the permissible parameters of neuropsychological examinations, please click HERE

Wednesday, May 9, 2018

Assumption of Risk Found to Bar Trip and Fall Plaintiff's Recovery

In the case of Sycalik v. Hoover, No. 2016-1227-CD (C.P. Clearfield Co. April 16, 2018 Ammerman, P.J.), the court granted summary judgments filed by the Defendants in a trip and fall case after finding that the Plaintiff had voluntarily assumed the risk of her own injuries.  

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff tripped and fell near the bottom of the steps to the outside portion of the property.   There was no dispute in the record that the bottom portion of the steps to the property, along with the berm at the bottom and adjacent to the road, were damaged.  

However, the record also established that the Plaintiff was very familiar with the premises having lived there for many years in the past and given that her father currently resided in the home for the past ten (10) years such that the Plaintiff visited the home “thousands” of times since her childhood. The court noted that this meant that she had ascended and descended the front steps thousands of times as well as the steps were the only entrance/exit from the home.  

As such, the record confirmed that the Plaintiff knew that the bottom step was damaged and problematic and that the Plaintiff had discussed the damaged step with the persons who lived on the premises.  It was also noted that the Plaintiff confirmed at her deposition that she had a habit of stepping to the left of the last damaged step, onto a grassy slope, in order to avoid the step.  

According to the Opinion, on the date of the Plaintiff’s injury, the Plaintiff had stepped to the left as usual, but missed the spot where she would usually step and instead caught her left foot on the corner of the last step, as a result of which she was caused to fall.  

Turning to the law, the court referred to the §342 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts which covers the liability of a possessor of land towards a licensee and confirms that liability applies if the possessor of land knew of the condition and realized that it involved an unreasonable risk of harm that is likely to be undiscoverable and fails to make the condition safe or provide adequate warning. 

The Restatement also indicates that, in order for liability to apply, it must be established that the licensee did not know or have reason to know of the condition and the risk involved.  

Relying on the case of Carrender v. Fitterer, 469 A.2d 120, 126 (Pa. 1983), the court in Sycalik applied the assumption of risk doctrine to bar the Plaintiff’s recovery.  

The court also rejected the Plaintiff’s assertion that the assumption of risk cases were distinguishable because the Plaintiff had no alternative route.  

The Sycalik court additionally noted that Pennsylvania law also establishes that, when a Plaintiff voluntarily chooses to walk upon an area not intended to be traversed, such as a grassy slope, the Plaintiff has not stated a valid cause of action.   By way of an example, the court cited to the case of Gilligan v. Villanova University, 584 A.2d 1005, 1008 (Pa. Super. 1991), in which judgment was entered against a Plaintiff who fell when the Plaintiff chose to walk over a grassy area instead of the nearby sidewalk..   

Given that there were no genuine issues of material fact and given that the court found that the Plaintiff had assumed the risk of her injury, summary judgment was granted. in this Sycalik case. 

 
Anyone wishing to read this decision, may click this LINK.

I send thanks to Attorney Thomas McDonnell of the Pittsburgh law firm of Summers, McDonnell, Hudock, Guthrie & Rauch for bringing this case to my attention.