Wednesday, March 16, 2016

Crawford County Post-Koken Decision In Favor of Consolidaton of Negligence/UIM Claims, But Severance and Stay of Bad Faith Claim

In the case of Lamagna v. Keffer, No. A.D. 2015-630 (C.P. Crawford Co. March 1, 2016 Stevens, J.), Judge Mark D. Stevens of the Crawford County Court of Common Pleas addressed Preliminary Objections filed by all Defendants to a Plaintiff’s Complaint along with a Motion to Sever the negligence claim from UIM claims and a companion Motion to Stay and Sever the Bad Faith Claims.  

In this case, the Plaintiff sued the third party tortfeasor along with his own UIM carrier and asserted bad faith claims against the UIM carrier with respect to their handling of the UIM claim.  

Judge Stevens noted that he was faced with two (2) issues. First, whether the breach of contract action (UIM action) should be severed from the negligence claim.  

The second issue was whether the breach of contract action (UIM action) and/or the third party negligence claim should be severed from the bad faith claim and whether the bad faith claims should then be stayed.  

The court reviewed the first issue, i.e., whether the UIM claim should be severed from the negligence claim, under Pa. R.C.P. 2229(b) which pertains to joinder of actions that arise out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences.   If any common questions or law or fact affecting the liabilities of all such persons would arise in the action.  

Judge Stevens noted that the Pennsylvania Courts of Common Pleas are split on this issue and that he was unaware of any binding authority within the Crawford County Court of Common Pleas that matched the facts of this case.  

To date, there have been no appellate court decision on this issue.  

After comparing and contrasting the Plaintiff’s UIM claim against the third party negligence claims against the alleged tortfeasor, the court declined to sever the UIM claims from the negligence claims during the course of discovery.   The court found no meritorious basis that the Defendants would be prejudice by the claims proceeding together.  

Judge Stevens noted that, should the UIM carrier raise additional defenses in the UIM claim that were contractual in nature and unrelated to the negligence issues against the Defendant driver, the court would reconsider the possibility of a future severance at a later time.  

Judge Stevens also noted that, with this decision in favor of a consolidation of claims, “[t]he question becomes whether the Court can effectively manage the insurance issue before the jury by appropriately grafting the instructions and a verdict slip and controlling the proceedings in a way that does not prejudice any of the parties but allows the fact finder to make the appropriate, fundamental decisions necessary to dispose of the common questions of liability and damages.”  

The court found that, at this early stage of the matter, it appeared that discovery could be effectively managed by allowing the third party and contract claims to proceed together as no prejudice existed on the service with respect to the discovery phase of the matter.   Judge Stevens was careful to note in his Opinion that he would address the issue of how to proceed at trial, including whether or not the case should be tried in a consolidated fashion, at a later time, if necessary.  

On the separate issue of whether the bad faith claims should be severed from the UIM claim in the underlying negligence claims, Judge Stevens granted the defense Motion to Sever and Stay.   In so ruling, Judge Stevens pointed to his prior decision in the case of Rucci v. Erie Insurance Exchange, No. 2014-803 (C.P. Crawford Co. Feb. 5, 2015, Stevens, J.).   In Rucci, Judge Stevens had severed the Plaintiffs’ bad faith claim from their breach of contract claim and stayed discovery on the bad faith claim.  

Judge Stevens felt that the logic of the Rucci decision applied in a more compelling fashion in this matter where the Plaintiff was additionally asserting negligence claim along with the bad faith claim.   In this regard, the court reasoned, as follows:
 

“Here, the Plaintiff alleges negligence along with the bad
faith claim.   [The UIM carrier] owes the Plaintiff a
fiduciary duty of good faith and fair dealing pursuant to
its insurance contract.    However, provided that a factual
basis exists, [the UIM carrier] has the right to argue that
it is not contractually obligated to pay the claim.  In this
case, that contractual obligation seems to turn, at least at
this stage, on the question of who was the responsible
driver at the time of the motor vehicle accident.   In the
event that the Plaintiff was in fact the responsible driver,
which is a defense that [the UIM carrier] suggests that it
has a legitimate basis to assert, and [the UIM carrier] would
not be contractually obligated to provide UIM benefits
under most typical policies of automobile insurance.  To
require [the UIM carrier] to simultaneously attempt to
balance a pending bad faith claim subject to discovery
while asserting that no contractual obligation exists creates
an unfair and prejudicial circumstance.  This circumstance
is compounded even more by the fact that there exists at
third party claim where the decedent Defendant appears
prepared to defend on grounds that the Plaintiff was the
driver.   While arguably the applicable standard for the
Defendant in the third party claim to assert that the
Plaintiff was the driver is different than [the UIM
carrier’s] standard for asserting such under the breach
contract claim, the reality is that the factual question is
still the same.
 
Regardless of the pendency of the bad faith claim,
[the UIM carrier] must always conduct itself in
conformity with its obligations to act appropriately
towards its insured.  However, the posture of that
situation changes dramatically if there is ongoing,
active bad faith litigation.”


The court went on to note that, if a jury ultimately concluded that the Plaintiff was the operator of the motor vehicle at the time of the accident, a successful bad faith claim would obviously be difficult, if not impossible.  
 
Judge Stevens also stated that, even if the court determined that the Defendant was the driver of the vehicle, the Plaintiff’s bad faith claim would not be established by the mere fact that the carrier contested the issue of who was driving during the subject accident.   The court noted that typically, when a bad faith claim is filed, the allegations of bad faith have already substantially occurred.   In the case before the court, Judge Stevens felt that it appeared almost certain that, as the underlying UIM claim progressed, the allegations of bad faith the theories of and facts upon which the bad faith claim would be asserted, would likely develop and change.  
 
Accordingly, the court ruled that, even assuming for arguments sake that bad faith conduct had occurred at this early stage of the litigation, severing and/or staying the bad faith action would not in any way harm the Plaintiff nor would it serve to excuse any bad faith conduct of the carrier.   Judge Stevens felt that, as this UIM claim developed, especially where it appeared that the UIM carrier was prepared to vigorously defend under the contract as to who the responsible driver was, it was almost certain that the bad faith claims would become more complex as the case proceeded.  
 
Accordingly, Judge Stevens held that “[t]o force [the UIM carrier] to assert its contractual defenses pursuant to the policy while simultaneously defending itself on a bad faith claim appears to create an obvious and immediate prejudice.”
 
Judge Stevens also noted that “[c]onversely, assuming arguendo that the cases proceeded simultaneously, the only benefit to the insured, besides some minor, if not illusory, efficiencies, is the leverage the Plaintiff could use to attempt to prevent [the UIM carrier] from vigorously asserting its contractual defenses for fear of the open, pending bad faith claim.” 
 
As such, the court granted the Defendant’s Motion to Sever and Stay the Bad Faith Claim.   The court stated that the bad faith claim would be allowed to proceed only upon further Order of the Court.  

Anyone desiring a copy of this Lamagna  decision by Judge Stevens of Crawford County may contact me at dancummins@comcast.net.
 
I send thanks to Attorney Joseph Hudock of the Pittsburgh, PA law office of Summers, McDonnell, Hudock & Guthrie for bringing this decision to my attention.

                         


Monday, March 14, 2016

Superior Court Reviews Law of Duty in Cheerleading Injury Case

In the case of Kennedy v. Robert Morris University, No. 1844 EDA 2014, 2016 Pa. Super. 16 (Pa. Super. Jan. 29, 2016 Bowes, Olson, Stabile, J.J.) (Opinion by Bowes, J.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of the Defendants in a negligence claim arising out of injuries sustained by the Plaintiff at a cheerleading camp.

The court reasoned that a college did not have any duty under the law of negligence with respect to activities that were conducted off-campus and operated by an independent contractor.   The court rejected the Plaintiff’s argument that, since the camp was a mandatory extra-curricular activity required by the college, a duty must have been created.  

The court also rejected the Plaintiff’s claims of liability given that there was no allegations that the operator of the camp was negligently selected.  

The court additionally emphasized that no employee of the Defendant college was supervising the Plaintiff at the time of the accident.   Rather, the record revealed that all of the supervision was provided by the independent contractor event operator.  

Anyone wishing to review this Opinion, may click this LINK.

I send thanks to Attorney James M. Beck of the Philadelphia office of Reed Smith Law Firm.   Please be sure to check out Attorney Beck’s excellent blog, the Drug and Device Law Blog (click HERE).  


 

Friday, March 11, 2016

Pennsylvania Superior Court Decision on Sufficiency of Evidence To Corroborate and Render BAC Evidence Admissible [Non-Precedential]

In its recent non-precedential decision in the case of Coughlin v. Massaquoi, No. 3367 WDA 2014 (Pa. Super. 2016 Ford Elliot, P.J.E., Stapile, and Strassburger, J.J.) (Strassburger, J., concurring) (Mem. Op. by Ford Elliot, P.J.E.) the majority of the Superior Court concluded that the expert testimony presented at the trial below in this matter was sufficient corroborating evidence to permit the admission of the decedent’s BAC in a civil litigation matter.   

This matter involves a Plaintiff’s decedent, who was struck and killed by a motor vehicle while the decedent was crossing the street.   Evidence was presented in the  matter that the decedent was heavily intoxicated at the time of the accident.  

The trial court had denied the Plaintiff’s Pre-Trial Motion In Limine to exclude evidence of the decedent’s intoxication, including the toxicology report and the expert testimony of a toxicologist.   Ultimately, the jury determined that the Defendant’s negligence was not a factual cause of the Plaintiff’s decedent’s fatal injuries.  

On appeal, the Plaintiff argued, in part, that the trial court had erred in denying its Motion In Limine seeking to preclude evidence of the Plaintiff’s decedent’s post-mortem BAC of .313 when there was allegedly no additional independent cooperative evidence of intoxication.  The Plaintiff also asserted that the trial court erred in allowing the testimony of the Defendant’s toxicologist expert.  

The Pennsylvania Superior Court noted that the Plaintiff was arguing that the decedent’s BAC was inadmissible as a matter of law where there is no independent corroborated evidence of intoxication such as slurred speech, odor of alcohol, unsteady gait, etc.   Moreover, the Plaintiff asserted that there was no evidence as to the decedent’s whereabouts prior to the accident or any independent eyewitness testimony to support any inference that the decedent had been drinking and/or was heavily intoxicated prior to the accident.   The Plaintiff further asserted that the decedent’s BAC, in and of itself, was insufficient for the issue of intoxication to go to the jury.  In response to these contentions by the Plaintiff, the Pennsylvania Superior Court wrote, “We disagree.”   See Coughlin at p. 6.  

The Pennsylvania Superior Court stated its analysis by noting that the trial court judges enjoy a broad discretion regarding the admissibility of evidence.   The court also noted that it is well-settled law of this Commonwealth since 1927, under the case of Critzer v. Donovan, 289 Pa. 381, 137 A. 655 (1927), that, where recklessness or carelessness is at issue, proof of intoxication is relevant, but the mere fact of consuming alcohol is inadmissible as unfairly prejudicial, unless it reasonably establishes intoxication.  [Other citations omitted].  

The court noted that Pennsylvania law also provides that evidence of intoxication must reasonably establish a degree of intoxication with producing unfitness to drive or reckless or careless driving is the matter at issue in a case.  This rule was extended under Pennsylvania law regarding the admissibility of evidence tending to establish intoxication on the part of a pedestrian.  

With regard to pedestrians, evidence of intoxication is inadmissible unless it proves unfitness to be crossing the street.   Furthermore, the rule of law is that no reference should be made to a pedestrian’s use of alcohol unless there is evidence of excessive or copious drinking.  

The court also noted that, under Pennsylvania law, the theory behind allowing a blood alcohol level to be admitted into evidence of a civil case is that it is relevant circumstantial evidence relating to intoxication.   However, blood alcohol level alone may not be admitted for the purpose of proving intoxication.   Generally, there must be other evidence showing the actor’s conduct which suggests intoxication.  In such instance, and if other safe guards are present, the courts would allow the admission of blood alcohol level evidence.  See Coughlin at p. 8-9.  

In this matter, the defense toxicologist expert testified that an individual with a BAC greater than .31 would be unfit to cross the street safely.   The expert therefore testified that, with a BAC of .313, the decedent would have been unable to safely cross the street.   The court noted that, although there was no eyewitness testimony to corroborate the fact of the decedent’s intoxication, no evidence of slurred speech, staggered gait, etc., no witness who saw the decedent consume alcohol prior to the accident, and no witness who saw the decedent attempt to cross the street, the court stated that it has been held, under Pennsylvania law that the “other” evidence of intoxication necessary to render admissible the results of a blood alcohol test do not have to consist of third-party eyewitness testimony, but may consist of expert testimony describing the effects of a particular BAC level on a person.   See Coughlin at p. 11. [citations omitted].  

In the matter before it, the Pennsylvania Superior Court found that the Defendant’s toxicologist’s expert testimony was sufficient corroborating evidence for the admission of the decedent’s BAC result.   As such, the Superior Court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Plaintiff’s Motion In Limine or Post-Trial Motion for a New Trial.  

Anyone wishing to review this currently non-precedential Majority Opinion may click this LINK.
The non-precedential Concurring Opinion by Judge Strassburger can be viewed HERE 

I note that the handling defense attorney, Joseph Hudock of the Pittsburgh office of Summers McDonnell, Hudock & Guthrie noted his intention to petition the court to make this decision a published Opinion (and therefore precedential). 

UPDATE:  This decision has since been published by the Pennsylvania Superior Court and is, therefore, precedential.

Commentary:  It is believed that this may be the first time that a Pennsylvania appellate court has ruled that the “other” evidence necessary to secure the admission of a blood alcohol content (BAC) reading before a jury can consist of merely testimony from an expert toxicologist.  
 

Punitive Damages Claim Allowed to Proceed in DUI and Dram Shop Civil Actions

A punitive damages claims were allowed to proceed in a Dram Shop Act action in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas case of Robertson v. Valley Forge Beef & Ale, Inc., PICS Case No. 16-0225 (C.P. Montg. Co. Jan. 19, 2016 Smith, J.).  

This matter arose out of a motor vehicle accident allegedly caused by a driver who had been allegedly served alcohol while visibly intoxicated at the Defendant’s bar.   The Defendant driver was later convicted of a DUI and reckless and careless driving. 

In their civil action Complaint, the Plaintiff alleged that each of the Defendants’ conduct was separately outrageous, willful, intentional, and done with conscious indifference.  The Plaintiff sought punitive damages.  

The court applied the well-settled law that punitive damages could be sought in a case involving a DUI Defendant driver and with respect to a Dram Shop action against a tavern.

In its overruling of the Defendant’s Preliminary Objections to the Plaintiff’s Complaint, the court did state that, if discovery confirmed that the Plaintiff was unable to establish outrageous conduct and/or reckless indifference, the defense retained the right to proceed on a Motion for Summary Judgment.

 Anyone desiring a copy of any of the above cases may contact the Pennsylvania Law Weekly Instant Case Service at 1-800-276-7427 and provide the PICS Case Number noted and pay a small fee.


Source:  "Case Digests," Pennsylvania Law Weekly (March 1, 2016).

 

Wednesday, March 9, 2016

Liability of Employer for Negligent Supervision of Employee Who Engaged in Criminal Conduct Off Employer Premises

In his recent February 19, 2016 decision in the case of Doe v. Cruciani, No. 2012-CV-5920 (C.P. Lacka.  Co. Feb. 19, 2016 Nealon, J.), Terrence R. Nealon of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas addressed a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by a Defendant employer to a Plaintiff’s tort action seeking compensatory and punitive damages against a plumbing supply business for negligent supervision of its employee who allegedly lured the Plaintiff’s minor daughter into his company-leased vehicle and allegedly entrapped the minor in that vehicle and allegedly had indecent contact with the minor.  

The employer filed a Motion for Summary Judgment asserting that it could not be vicariously liable under Pennsylvania law for its employee’s intentional and criminal acts that were outside the scope and course of the employee’s employment.  

Judge Nealon noted that the law required that, in order to succeed with the negligent supervision claim against an employer for injuries caused by the intentional or criminal conduct of an employee committed off of the employer’s premises and outside the employee’s scope of employment, a Plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) the employee was using movable property of the employer at the time of the conduct and, (2) the employer knew or in the exercise of ordinary care had reason to know, of the necessity and opportunity to exercise control over that employee.  

Judge Nealon denied the employer Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment with respect to the compensatory damages claims finding that evidence in the record confirm that the employee used the employer’s vehicle during the alleged assault.   Judge Nealon also noted that the record established that the employer knew that the employee, who previously owned the plumbing supply business, had been previously convicted ten (10) years earlier of indecent assault of a minor girl in his company vehicle and had been required to register as a sexual offender for ten (10) years.  

Accordingly, Judge Nealon ruled that, although the employer contended that they did not know if the need to move closely regulate or restrict the employee’s use of the company vehicle while not on the employee’s premises, issues of fact precluded the entry of summary judgment on the compensatory damages claim where reasonably prudent employer should have known of the necessity for exercises such control due to the potential for recidivism by a sexual offender.  

Judge Nealon also noted that, while there was ample evidence to sustain the Plaintiff’s punitive damages claim against the individual employee, summary judgment was granted in favor of the employer on the punitive damages claim as the record did not contain sufficient evidence that the employer had engaged in intentional, willful, wanton, or reckless conduct based upon its subjective appreciation and conscious disregard of the risk of arm to others.  Accordingly, the employer’s Motion for Summary Judgment on the punitive damages claim was granted.  

 

Anyone desiring a copy of this Opinion by Judgment Nealon may contact me at dancummins@comcast.net.

Monday, March 7, 2016

Judge Nealon Tackles Assertion of Privilege Against Self-incrimination at Depositions

In a decision handed down a few months back in the case of Rogers v. Thomas, No. 2012-CV1464 (C.P. Lacka. Co. Nov. 25, 2015 Nealon, J.), Judge Terrence R. Nealon of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas addressed the right of a Defendant to assert a Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in a case brought by the estate of a shooting victim against the adult shooter and his father.  

In this matter, the estate of the shooting victim filed a wrongful death suit against the adult shooter and the shooter's father, alleging that the gun used during the shooting was owned by the father, that the father was present at the time of the shooting, that the father knew that his son had a mental disability which rendered his unfit to use a gun, and that the father allegedly knew that the son had previously harmed or threatened another person with the gun.   The father filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on the liability issues presented. 

The court noted that, during his discovery deposition, the son asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and declined to answer any questions concerning the facts at issue.  

However, Judge Nealon noted that the son later testified about the same facts during his criminal trial and was convicted of voluntary manslaughter.  The court also noted that the Plaintiff had exhausted his direct appeal in the criminal proceedings and, as a result, the son’s criminal prosecution had been concluded.  

The father filed a Motion for Summary Judgment based, in part, upon the son’s criminal trial testimony.   The estate opposed the Motion for Summary Judgment on the ground that it was entitled to adverse inference based upon the son’s assertion of his Fifth Amendment privilege and that, therefore, the Defendant's Motion should be denied and the case be allowed to proceed to a civil jury trial.

Judge Nealon reasoned in his Opinion that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has held that a Plaintiff cannot satisfy its burden of proof in a civil case solely in reliance upon a Defendant’s failure to testify based upon the assertion of a Fifth Amendment privilege.  

However, the court in this matter went on to rule that, since the son’s criminal prosecution had concluded such that the son was no longer facing the threat of further criminal prosecution or self-incrimination, the son was found to no longer possess the right to refuse to answer the Plaintiff’s deposition questions.  

Accordingly, Judge Nealon ordered the parties to conduct a second deposition of the son and to thereafter submit the deposition transcript along with their supplemental briefs so that the summary judgment motion could be decided at that later point in time.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision by Judge Nealon may click this LINK.

 

 

Thursday, March 3, 2016

'Transient Rub of Life' Doctrine Upheld Again by Pennsylvania Superior Court

In its recent decision in the case of Gold v. Rosen, No. 3303 EDA 2014, 2016 Pa. Super. 44, (Pa. Super. Feb. 19, 2016 Stevens, Lazarus, Ott)(Op. by Stevens, J.), Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the trial court’s denial of post-trial motions following the entry of a defense verdict.  

This matter arose out of a motor vehicle accident.  The evidence showed that the Plaintiff had also sustained similar injuries in a prior motor vehicle accident about a year before the subject accident. 

The parties in this matter proceeded to a jury trial after an appeal from an arbitration in the court system.  The case was tried on reports alone and the parties stipulated that the defendant was negligent and that the plaintiff sustained a cervical sprain as a result.  The defense contested the amount of the alleged harm from the cervical spine injury and also challenged whether the plaintiff's other injuries were related.  As noted, the jury returned a defense verdict.

The Plaintiff appealed and asserted, in part, that the jury's verdict was against the weight of the evidence as negligence, causation, and an injury had been conceded by the defense.

In Gold, the Pennsylvania Superior Court held that an award of no damages following a verdict of negligence is within a jury’s discretion where the injuries claimed by the Plaintiff were speculative and subjective.   The court reiterated well-settled rule that a jury need not believe the Plaintiff’s damages evidence and may believe in the evidence presented of pre-existing conditions.  

The court also reaffirmed the well-settled rule of Pennsylvania law that not all alleged injuries warrant compensation, even where a plaintiff voices some subjective pain complaints.  The Pennsylvania Superior Court in Gold stated, "This Court recognizes that not all injuries are serious enough to warrant compensation, even though there may be some pain."  Gold at p. 9.  

The Court went on to again recognized the well-settled principle that some injuries alleged by plaintiffs may be so minor as to amount to a "transient rub of life" that may not compensable under Pennsylvania law if so determined by a jury.

The test before the Court was whether the jury's finding that the injuries were so minor that they did not warrant compensation was a decision that defied common sense and logic.

Finding that the jury's decision did not defy logic or common sense, the Superior Court in Gold affirmed the trial court's denial of the plaintiff's post-trial motions.

This Opinion can viewed HERE.
 
I send thanks to Attorney James M. Beck of the Philadelphia office of Reed Smith Law Firm.   Please be sure to check out Attorney Beck’s excellent blog, the Drug and Device Law Blog.