Wednesday, November 6, 2013
Tort Talk Presentation at Philadelphia Bar Association
On November 6, 2013, I presented a Civil Litigation Update and a discussion of "Tort Talk as a Legal Research Tool" to members of the Rules and Procedure Committee of the Philadelphia Bar Association.
I send thanks to Attorney Jeff Dashevsky of the Philadelphia/South Jersey law firm of Dashevsky, Horwitz, Kuhn, and Novello, P.C., for the invitation to speak.
I also thank Joe Cardoni of Exhibit A for sharing his time and expertise for the creation of the multi-media powerpoint presentation. I highly recommend the services of Exhibit A for all your trial presentation and video deposition needs whether you are on the plaintiff's side or the defense side. Exhibit A's website can be viewed HERE.
Pennsylvania Superior Court's Latest Take on the Limited Tort Question
In its most recent take on the limited tort question, the
Pennsylvania Superior Court reversed a trial court’s granting of
summary judgment in favor of a Defendant on the grounds that there was a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether or not the Plaintiff sustained
serious injuries as a result of the accident in the case of Cadena v. Latch, 2013 Pa. Super. 266, No. 1891 MDA 2012 (Pa. Super. Oct. 4, 2013 )(Gantman, Allen, Mundy, JJ) (Opinion by
Mundy, J.).
In this matter, the Plaintiff alleged that she was diagnosed with eight (8) injuries which her treating doctor related to the subject motor vehicle accident. The records were also found by the Superior Court to be replete with testimony by the Plaintiff with regards to how her daily life was altered due to her pain and limitations. Although the Plaintiff had stopped medical treatment in 2008, she offered testimony that she, as of that time, did not have the financial means to continue to treat.
The Pennsylvania Superior Court noted that the Motor Vehicle Code defines “serious injury” as “[a] personal injury resulting in death, serious impairment of body function, or permanent serious disfigurement.” The court reiterated that the test focuses not in the injuries themselves, but on how the injuries affect a particular body function.
It appears that the defense in this matter primarily relied upon the fact that not only had the appellant had ceased medical treatment but that she was declared to have been recovered from all injuries by 2011, which was about 3 ½ years after the subject accident.
In reversing the entry of summary judgment on the limited tort question, the Pennsylvania Superior Court emphasized that an impairment need not be permanent in order to be serious. The Court noted that, where questions of fact and testimony remain, the question of whether a Plaintiff suffered a serious injury should be left for the jury. As such, the trial court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of the Defendant was reversed.
Anyone desiring a copy of this Opinion may click this LINK.
In this matter, the Plaintiff alleged that she was diagnosed with eight (8) injuries which her treating doctor related to the subject motor vehicle accident. The records were also found by the Superior Court to be replete with testimony by the Plaintiff with regards to how her daily life was altered due to her pain and limitations. Although the Plaintiff had stopped medical treatment in 2008, she offered testimony that she, as of that time, did not have the financial means to continue to treat.
The Pennsylvania Superior Court noted that the Motor Vehicle Code defines “serious injury” as “[a] personal injury resulting in death, serious impairment of body function, or permanent serious disfigurement.” The court reiterated that the test focuses not in the injuries themselves, but on how the injuries affect a particular body function.
It appears that the defense in this matter primarily relied upon the fact that not only had the appellant had ceased medical treatment but that she was declared to have been recovered from all injuries by 2011, which was about 3 ½ years after the subject accident.
In reversing the entry of summary judgment on the limited tort question, the Pennsylvania Superior Court emphasized that an impairment need not be permanent in order to be serious. The Court noted that, where questions of fact and testimony remain, the question of whether a Plaintiff suffered a serious injury should be left for the jury. As such, the trial court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of the Defendant was reversed.
Anyone desiring a copy of this Opinion may click this LINK.
Tuesday, November 5, 2013
Pennsylvania Superior Court's Latest Take on Insurance Bad Faith Statute (42 Pa.C.S.A. Section 8731)
In its recent November 1, 2013 Opinion and Order in the case of Grossi v. Travelers Personal Insurance
Company, 2013 Pa. Super. 284, No. 769 WDA 2012 (Pa. Super. Nov. 1, 2013 Bowes, Donohue, and Mundy, JJ)
(Opinion by Mundy, J.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed in part,
vacated in part, and remanded the case for entry of a corrected verdict in
accordance with its Opinion in this bad faith litigation.
Among the issues reviewed by the Pennsylvania Superior Court were whether or not the Plaintiffs have met their burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that Travelers had allegedly acted in bad faith under 42 Pa. C.S.A. §8371 in its handling of this underinsured motorist claim. The Court also addressed the validity of the entry of punitive damages against the carrier as well as the award of expert witness fees and costs of litigation under the bad faith statute.
In this Grossi opinion, the Superior Court again reviewed the principals of law pertaining to its review of a verdict in an insurance bad faith claim under 42Pa. C.S.A. §8371. As such, this case represents this appellate
court’s latest pronouncement of the standard of review for a recovery in an
insurance bad faith claim.
Applying the applicable standard of review to the case before it, the Pennsylvania Superior Court agreed with the trial court’s findings that the carrier’s establishment of a reserved amount of only $1,000.00 under the case presented was without any basis, thereby supporting the bad faith claims presented.
The Superior Court also faulted the carrier in its rejection of the Claimant’s loss of future earnings claim given the record presented. The carrier is also faulted for delaying or postponing an independent medical evaluation of the Claimant while the carrier monitored the Claimant’s third party claims. It is also noted that the carrier never secured a report from an economist even after noting a need to do so.
Overall, the Superior Court noted that, while the length of time the carrier took to investigate the claims presented was not per se bad faith, it was indeed a factor to be considered by the trial court in considering all of the circumstances of the bad faith claim. The Superior Court found that the factors reviewed by the trial court supported the trial court’s conclusion that the Plaintiff had met their burden of proof of bad faith.
The court also found that the punitive damages award under 42Pa. C.S.A.
§8371 was not only permissible but was within the discretion of the trial court
upon a showing of bad faith. The
Superior Court found that the trial court’s entry of punitive damages award was
sufficiently supported by the record and the trial court’s findings of
fact. No abusive discretion of
constitutional impropriety was found in this regard. In this matter, the award of punitive
damages by the trial court approximated to a ratio of punitive damages to
compensatory damages of 4:1 or 5:1, depending upon the measure of compensatory
damages utilized.
With regard to the final issue raised by the defendant carrier, the Superior Court agreed with the carrier’s position that expert witness fees should not have been awarded under the allowance of an award for "costs" under the bad faith statute.
The Superior Court also noted that, under the language of the bad faith statute, 42Pa.
C.S.A. §8371, a trial court is permitted (“may”) calculate interest upon an
entire verdict as opposed to only the policy limits, but if it is not required
to do so. Ultimately, the Superior Court
found that the Plaintiff had not demonstrated that the trial court’s award of
interest in this matter on only the $300,000.00 UIM coverage limits constituted
an abusive discretion under the case presented.
Among the issues reviewed by the Pennsylvania Superior Court were whether or not the Plaintiffs have met their burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that Travelers had allegedly acted in bad faith under 42 Pa. C.S.A. §8371 in its handling of this underinsured motorist claim. The Court also addressed the validity of the entry of punitive damages against the carrier as well as the award of expert witness fees and costs of litigation under the bad faith statute.
In this Grossi opinion, the Superior Court again reviewed the principals of law pertaining to its review of a verdict in an insurance bad faith claim under 42
Applying the applicable standard of review to the case before it, the Pennsylvania Superior Court agreed with the trial court’s findings that the carrier’s establishment of a reserved amount of only $1,000.00 under the case presented was without any basis, thereby supporting the bad faith claims presented.
The Superior Court also faulted the carrier in its rejection of the Claimant’s loss of future earnings claim given the record presented. The carrier is also faulted for delaying or postponing an independent medical evaluation of the Claimant while the carrier monitored the Claimant’s third party claims. It is also noted that the carrier never secured a report from an economist even after noting a need to do so.
Overall, the Superior Court noted that, while the length of time the carrier took to investigate the claims presented was not per se bad faith, it was indeed a factor to be considered by the trial court in considering all of the circumstances of the bad faith claim. The Superior Court found that the factors reviewed by the trial court supported the trial court’s conclusion that the Plaintiff had met their burden of proof of bad faith.
The court also found that the punitive damages award under 42
With regard to the final issue raised by the defendant carrier, the Superior Court agreed with the carrier’s position that expert witness fees should not have been awarded under the allowance of an award for "costs" under the bad faith statute.
With regards to the issues raised by the Plaintiff on appeal, the Pennsylvania Superior Court in Grossi also revisited the issue
previously raised in the case of Marlette v. State Farm [click on case name to go to that Tort Talk post and LINK to Marlette decision], as to whether the trial court erred or abused it discretion
in calculating interest, or delay damages, based upon the $300,000 underlying
UIM policy limits, rather than the $4 million dollar arbitration award entered.
The Superior Court followed the Marlette decision in this regard and
determined that, in accordance with Marlette,
the Plaintiff’s recovery of delay damages under Pa. R.C.P. 238 is limited to the amount of the legally
recoverable molded verdict as reflected by the amount insurance policy limits.
The Superior Court also noted that, under the language of the bad faith statute, 42
Anyone wishing to review of copy of this decision by the
Pennsylvania Superior Court in the case of Grossi
v. Travelers may click on this LINK.
I send thanks to Stuart J. Setcavage of Setcavage Consultant
& Mediation in Pittsburgh ,
Pennsylvania for forwarding this
interesting case to my attention.
Facebook Discovery Decision Out of Washington County
In her Opinion and Order from back on March 26, 2013 in the case of Prescott v. Willis, No. 2012-Civil-2207 (C.P. Wash. Co.
After reviewing the pertinent law available at that time, the court granted the motion in part and denied it in part.
In the Opinion, the court noted that, in support of its motion, the Defendant supplied five (5) photographs from the public portion of the Plaintiff’s profile showing the Plaintiff engaging in activities which were inconsistent with the injuries alleged. The Defendants asserted that the private portions of the Facebook account were likely to contain other such photographs.
The Court ruled that there was no privileged protecting the Plaintiff from the production of such photos and, in the case presented, the photos in the private area of the Plaintiff’s Facebook profile were deemed to be “reasonably calculated” to produce relevant evidence based upon what was revealed in the public portions of the profile.
As such, the Plaintiffs were ordered to produce their username and password and the Defendants were granted seven (7) days to review the private pages of that Facebook page but were strictly prohibited from adding, creating, removing, modifying, or sending any contents from that page.
The court also ruled that, after seven (7) days, the Plaintiff was permitted to change her username and password to preclude further access.
Anyone desiring a copy of this Opinion may click this LINK.
I send thanks to Attorney Kenneth T. Newman of the Pittsburgh office of the Thomas, Thomas & Hafer law firm for bringing this case to my attention.
Monday, November 4, 2013
Pennsylvania Supreme Court Revisits Notice Requirement in UM Cases
In an uninsured motorist benefits case that has gone all the way up the appellate ladder, back down again, and, now, all the way back up, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in the matter of Vanderhoff v. Harleysville, No. 98 MAP 2012 (Pa. October 30, 2013)(Opinion by Eakin, J.), the court addressed the following issues:
(1) What constitutes "actual prejudice" to relieve and insurance company of its obligation to pay insurance benefits to an insured?
(2) Should "actual prejudice" involve proof by an insurance carrier that it suffered a real material impairment of its ability to investigation and defend an uninsured claim?
(3) What constitutes a reasonable basis for a trial court finding that prejudice exists in a late report of a phantom vehicle?
In its majority Opinion, the Court essentially held that all three issues are really part of the same test.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Vanderhoff ruled that these types of matters "must be addressed on a case-by-case basis wherein the court balances the extent and success of the insurer's investigation with the insured's reasons for the delay.
The Court noted that the Legislature mandated a 30-day notice requirement for a reason. It is reasonable that insureds must alert the insurer of the subject accident within a month's time.
The Court went on to rule that while an insurer will not be permitted to deny coverage absent prejudice caused by an insured's delay in notice, showing such prejudice does not require proof of what the insurer would have found had timely notice been provided.
While the insurer is always obligated to investigate the case such as it can, where an insured's delay results in an inability to thoroughly investigate the claim and thereby uncover relevant facts, prejudice is established. Handling these cases in this manner promotes prompt notice and advances MVFRL goals while encouraging insurers to investigate phantom vehicle claims.
Accordingly, the Superior Court decision was affirmed. Anyone wishing to review this Opinion may click this LINK. Justice Baer's concurring opinion can be viewed HERE.
I send thanks Scott Cooper of theHarrisburg , PA law firm of Schmidt Kramer for bringing this case to my attention (along with his excellent synopsis of the case), and I send thanks to Attorney Paul Oven of the Moosic, PA law firm of Dougherty, Leventhal & Price for bringing this case to my attention.
(1) What constitutes "actual prejudice" to relieve and insurance company of its obligation to pay insurance benefits to an insured?
(2) Should "actual prejudice" involve proof by an insurance carrier that it suffered a real material impairment of its ability to investigation and defend an uninsured claim?
(3) What constitutes a reasonable basis for a trial court finding that prejudice exists in a late report of a phantom vehicle?
In its majority Opinion, the Court essentially held that all three issues are really part of the same test.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Vanderhoff ruled that these types of matters "must be addressed on a case-by-case basis wherein the court balances the extent and success of the insurer's investigation with the insured's reasons for the delay.
The Court noted that the Legislature mandated a 30-day notice requirement for a reason. It is reasonable that insureds must alert the insurer of the subject accident within a month's time.
The Court went on to rule that while an insurer will not be permitted to deny coverage absent prejudice caused by an insured's delay in notice, showing such prejudice does not require proof of what the insurer would have found had timely notice been provided.
While the insurer is always obligated to investigate the case such as it can, where an insured's delay results in an inability to thoroughly investigate the claim and thereby uncover relevant facts, prejudice is established. Handling these cases in this manner promotes prompt notice and advances MVFRL goals while encouraging insurers to investigate phantom vehicle claims.
Accordingly, the Superior Court decision was affirmed. Anyone wishing to review this Opinion may click this LINK. Justice Baer's concurring opinion can be viewed HERE.
I send thanks Scott Cooper of the
Friday, November 1, 2013
UPCOMING PDI CLE SEMINARS
Do you need CLE credits before the end of the year?
Below is a general listing of upcoming CLE seminars open to all being sponsored in whole or in part by the Pennsylvania Defense Institute across the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
The PDI will hold a CLE seminar in Philadelphia on November 11, 2013 at the DoubleTree Hotel from 10:30 am to 1:30 pm.
The NEPATLA and the PDI have announced a CLE program and Holiday Happy Hour set to take place on November 13, 2013 at the Mohegan Sun Casino at Pocono Downs in Wilkes-Barre.
Below is a general listing of upcoming CLE seminars open to all being sponsored in whole or in part by the Pennsylvania Defense Institute across the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
The PDI will hold a CLE seminar in Philadelphia on November 11, 2013 at the DoubleTree Hotel from 10:30 am to 1:30 pm.
The NEPATLA and the PDI have announced a CLE program and Holiday Happy Hour set to take place on November 13, 2013 at the Mohegan Sun Casino at Pocono Downs in Wilkes-Barre.
The PDI's final program is in Pittsburgh on December 5, 2013 with more details to follow.
Contact David Cole, Executive Director of the PDI for information on the cost to attend, the agenda, and to register:
P: 800-734-0737
E: coled01@padefense.org
Note: For full disclosure purposes, I note that I am a member of both the PDI and the NEPATLA. Also, neither I nor Tort Talk are in any way involved with these events. Rather, I have simply posted this information in response to a request from the PDI to advertise the events here on Tort Talk. In exchange for the advertisements, I have requested a waiver of the attendance fee(s) that would be assessed to me should I attend any of these events.
Contact David Cole, Executive Director of the PDI for information on the cost to attend, the agenda, and to register:
P: 800-734-0737
E: coled01@padefense.org
Note: For full disclosure purposes, I note that I am a member of both the PDI and the NEPATLA. Also, neither I nor Tort Talk are in any way involved with these events. Rather, I have simply posted this information in response to a request from the PDI to advertise the events here on Tort Talk. In exchange for the advertisements, I have requested a waiver of the attendance fee(s) that would be assessed to me should I attend any of these events.
Thursday, October 31, 2013
HAPPY HALLOWEEN
HAPPY HALLOWEEN GREETINGS
FROM
TORT TALK
I invite Defense attorneys to "dress up" as Plaintiff's attorneys in their mindset just for a moment on this Halloween day and picture the difficulties and pressures faced by attorneys on that side of the bar.
I also invite Plaintiff's attorneys to don the costume of a defense attorney's mindset, if only for a brief moment, and think of the burdens and stress faced by defense attorneys.
I also invite Plaintiff's attorneys to don the costume of a defense attorney's mindset, if only for a brief moment, and think of the burdens and stress faced by defense attorneys.
I then also invite all attorneys on both sides of the civil litigation bar "to be" claims professionals for Halloween for a moment in their minds today and realize the pressures and stresses faced by those individuals in their livelihood.
Similarly, all claims professionals are invited "to be" attorneys for a few moments as a Halloween costume and think of the responsibilities and strains that each profession imposes upon its participants day in and day out.
Similarly, all claims professionals are invited "to be" attorneys for a few moments as a Halloween costume and think of the responsibilities and strains that each profession imposes upon its participants day in and day out.
By being considerate of the position of others and by viewing the world from the perspective of the opposite side, we may all be reminded our way is not the only way and that we are all willing participants in the noble pursuit of the fair administration of justice and compensation in the civil litigation world.
By working together in a reasonable and professional fashion, we can all strive to further this noble and honorable pursuit, uplift the reputation of the respective professions, and continue to ward off the scary thought of the alternative--the resolution of compensatory disputes in the absence of law and order.
Whew!.......enough of that heady stuff. Now go raid your kid's Halloween bag for the good stuff.
******************************
Whew!.......enough of that heady stuff. Now go raid your kid's Halloween bag for the good stuff.
Source of image: www.dtntech.com
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