Sunday, June 19, 2011

LOOK OUT!! - Claim by Injured Skier Against Reckless Fellow Skier Allowed to Proceed


While there have been a number of recent decisions limiting the rights of injured skiers to recover under Pennsylvania law, it appears that such claims will be allowed to proceed against a fellow skier where the injury results from the reckless acts of that other skier.

In a June 14, 2011 decision, Judge Richard P. Conaboy of the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania entered an Opinion and Order in the case of Smith v. Demetria, et al., No. 3:11-CV-773 (M.D.Pa. June 14, 2011, Conaboy, J.) denying the motion to dismiss and allowing the tort and punitive damages claims to go forward in a skiing accident case.

In this matter, the Plaintiff, who was injured while skiing, filed a claim against a snowboarder alleging that the snowboarder was acting recklessly at the time of the incident.  It was alleged that the snowboarder was coming down the hill at approximately 35 mph and made no effort to avoid the Plaintiff prior to the impact.  Punitive damages were claimed.  The snowboarder filed a Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss.

In his memorandum, Judge Conaboy held that, under the facts before the court of a skier having been injured by another reckless skier, while the the Skier Responsibility Act may preclude a claim involving a collision between skiers as a result of ordinary negligence, the Act did not preclude claims against someone who skiing abnormally, recklessly, or out of control.

The Court also ruled that the punitive damages claim would be allowed beyond the Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss stage as adequate facts had been alleged to support the filing of a claim for exemplary damages.

I thank the prevailing Plaintiff's Attorney, Stephen Seach, of Seach Law Offices in Drums, PA for bringing this case to my attention.

Anyone desiring a copy of this Opinion may contact me at dancummins@comcast.net.



Source of photo:   Image: Salvatore Vuono / FreeDigitalPhotos.net

Friday, June 17, 2011

This Week - June 23, 2011 - Pennsylvania Defense Institute CLE in Pittsburgh

PENNSYLVANIA DEFENSE INSTITUTE

Presents

"Insurance Law Developments 2011"
(3 Substantive CLE Credits)



Sheraton Station Square Hotel
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania


Thursday, June 23, 2011



1:00 – 1:30 PM Registration


1:30 - 1:50 PM “Tort Reform Update”

Timothy Bittle
Bigley & Blikle


 
1:50 – 2:30 PM “Auto Law Update”

Thomas McDonnell, Esq.
Summers, McDonnell, Hudock, Guthrie & Skeel



2:30 – 3:10 PM “Uninsured/Underinsured Motorist Law Update”

Craig Murphey, Esq.
MacDonald, Illig, Jones & Britton

 

3:10 – 3:25 PM Break



3:25 – 4:05 PM “Insurance Bad Faith Law: Update”

Robert Dapper, Esq.
Dapper, Baldasare, Benson, Behling & Kane

Daniel Rivetti, Esq.
Robb, Leonard & Mulvihill



4:05 – 4:45 PM “Civil Practice & Procedure”

Scott Millhouse, Esq.
Meyer, Darragh, Buckler, Bebenek & Eck

 

Costs for the event:

• CLE program for lawyers $125.00

• All others $25.00



For reservations, please complete the form below and return to PDI or e-mail us at coled01@padefense.org


Name(s)_____________________________________


___________________________________________



Firm/Company_________________________________


 
____________________________________________


Make checks payable to:

PENNSYLVANIA DEFENSE INSTITUTE
P.O. Box 697, Camp Hill, PA 17001-0697



For more information, contact PDI at 800-734-0737


Thursday, June 16, 2011

Pennsylvania Superior Court Affirms Denial of UIM Claim Based Upon Worker's Compensation Exclusivity Provision

You may recall that I previously reported on the decision of Judge Alan Hertzberg of the Allegheny Court of Common Pleas in the case of Erie Insurance Exchange v. Conley, No. G.D. 09-21471 (Alleg. Co. Aug. 27, 2010, Hertzberg, J.), in which the Court addressed the issue of the permissibility of filing a lawsuit for UIM benefits when the tortfeasor is the Plaintiff’s employer and worker’s compensation benefits were paid to the injured party. That case involved an injured party who was injured while the scope and course of his employment.

Erie denied the claim for uninsured or underinsured motorist benefits and filed a declaratory judgment action. Judge Hertzberg had granted Erie’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and found that Erie had no obligation to provide the injured party with any uninsured or underinsured motorist benefits.

After reviewing the applicable case law, Judge Hertzberg concluded that, where an injured party is injured by his employer or a co-employee with the scope and course of the injured party’s employment, the exclusivity provision of the worker’s compensation law limited the injured party’s recovery to the worker’s compensation benefits and precluded any uninsured or underinsured motorist claims.


UPDATE: On June 9, 2011, the Pennsylvania Superior Court issued a non-precedential memorandum decision affirming Judge Hertzberg’s opinion.

The Superior Court emphasized, as did Judge Hertzberg in the Opinion below, that the UIM policy below provided that UIM coverage would be provided where the "law entitles" the injured party to a recovery. 

Under these facts and the applicability of the Worker's Compensation exclusivity provision, the injured party was not legally entitled to a recovery. 

As such, the carrier's decision to deny coverage was affirmed.


Anyone desiring a copy of the Superior Court’s opinion may contact me at dancummins@comcast.net.

Click here to view a post on Judge Nealon's same decision on the same issue, handed down on the same day as Judge Hertzberg's trial court decision: 

http://www.torttalk.com/2010/09/another-trial-court-decision-upholding.html

Allentown Cell Phone Ban Ruled Invalid by Lehigh County Court of Common Pleas

I am referencing a criminal court decision for the first time on Tort Talk since it could have an impact in automobile accident civil matters in which there are allegations that one of the drivers was using a cell phone at the time of the accident which is the subject of the litigation.

In the Lehigh County case of Commonwealth v. Steiner, PICS Case No. 11-1052 (Lehigh Co. May 4, 2011, Anthony, J.), Judge James T. Anthony ruled that an Allentown City ordinance prohibiting the use of a cell phone while operating a motor vehicle was invalid because the Pennsylvania Legislature intended that motor vehicle regulations be uniform throughout the state and this ordinance would subject motorists to unreasonable inconsistencies contrary to the purpose of the Vehicle Code. Defendant's motion to dismiss granted.

In this criminal matter, the defendant was charged with violating the ordinance for using a mobile phone while operating his vehicle. Defendant was found guilty and filed a summary appeal. Following the summary appeal hearing, defendant filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the ordinance was preempted by the Pennsylvania Vehicle Code.

After reviewing the law of preemption, Judge Anthony ruled that the Legislature intended that motor vehicle regulation be uniform throughout the state and that local municipalities need express authorization to enact any ordinances on matter covered by the Vehicle Code. Thus, for the ordinance at issue to be valid, there must be specific authorization in the Vehicle Code permitting the City of Allentown to enact such an ordinance.

The court noted that Section 6109 of the Vehicle Code provides that its provisions shall not be deemed to prevent local authorities from the reasonable exercise of their police powers. The section then follows with 23 specific examples of regulations that are presumed to be reasonable. None of the 23 examples authorized the action taken by the city in enacting the ordinance at issue.

The court also noted that the ordinance did not provide notice to motorists entering into Allentown that cell phone use was forbidden.  Judge Anthony stated that "[a] motorist could be utilizing a cell phone while driving in a municipality without a ban and, moments later, be unaware that he was violating the ordinance."

The court found that exposing drivers to such an inconsistency could not be considered reasonable and was contrary to the intended purpose of the Motor Vehicle Code. As such, the court found Ordinance 14782 invalid and defendant's motion to dismiss was granted.

As such, in civil matters in which there is an allegation of negligence on the part of any driver involved based upon that driver's alleged use of a cell phone at the time of an accident in violation of a local ordinance, or a claim for punitive damages based upon such facts, this case of Commonwealth v. Steiner may serve to defeat such allegations.

Anyone desiring a copy of any of the above cases may contact the Pennsylvania Law Weekly Instant Case Service at 1-800-276-7427 and provide the PICS Case Number noted and pay a small fee.

Source:  Case Digests in June 14, 2011 Pennsylvania Law Weekly


Anyone desiring a copy of this case may contact me at dancummins@comcast.net.


Click here to view my other posts on the issue of cell phone use in auto accident matters: 

http://www.torttalk.com/search/label/Cell%20Phone%20Use

Latest Post-Koken Decision Out of Lackawanna County

On June 10, 2011, Judge Robert A. Mazzoni issued the latest Lackawanna County post-Koken decision on the issue of severance versus consolidation in the case of Richards v. McPhillips and Progressive Insurance Company, 2010-CIV-7020 (Lacka. Co. June 10, 2011, Mazzoni, J.).

A wrinkle in this case separating the facts from previous post-Koken cases on this issue is that there were punitive damages allegations asserted against the third party tortfeasor on the basis that the tortfeasor was operating his vehicle allegedly under the influence of heroin and/or as otherwise impaired.

As defense counsel for Progressive, I asserted the various reasons supporting a finding of a misjoinder of actions and a need for severance as set forth in the various post-Koken cases that have come down before. It was additionally emphasized that Progressive, as the UIM carrier in this matter, would be prejudiced at trial by the danger of an increased verdict from a jury inflamed by the tortfeasor’s allegedly driving under the influence of heroin and/or other substances. Nevertheless, being aware that the majority rule in Lackawanna County was in favor of consolidation, we advised the court that we were not opposed to the case remaining consolidated for discovery purposes and that our focus was primarily on securing a severance of the claims for trial purposes.

In his decision in Richards, Judge Mazzoni provided a nice summary of the case law to date and additionally relied upon Judge Terrence R. Nealon’s recent and thorough decision in this regard in the case of Bingham v. Poswistilo and Erie Insurance, 2010-CIV-6026 (Lacka. Co. April 8, 2011, Nealon, J.), to come to a ruling that this case will remain consolidated for purposes of discovery.

Judge Mazzoni noted in his opinion that the fact that the Plaintiff has alleged a claim for punitive damages against the third party tortfeasor did not require a change the result. The court felt that the claims against the tortfeasor and the UIM carrier are separate and distinct and, “[i]n in carefully managed trial, the Trial Judge can minimize and/or eliminate the potential for prejudice or confusion.”

However, Judge Mazzoni did agree to leave the door open for a bifurcation of the third party negligence claims and the UIM claims at the time of trial. Judge Mazzoni concluded his opinion with the following paragraph:

“It is important to note that this Court shares Judge Nealon’s concern over the scope of decisions in the post Koken cases.  It is important to note that the intent of this Court’s Memorandum and Order is simply to direct and guide the parties through the Pre-Trial stage. This opinion is not intended to strip the trial
judge of his or her discretion. Accordingly, for purposes of trial, this opinion should only be instructive and not binding upon the Trial Judge. This Court will defer to the judgment of the Trial Judge who may avail himself/herself to a variety of options including severance as comprehensively discussed in Judge Nealon’s decision in Bingham.”


Anyone desiring a copy of this opinion my contact me at dancummins@comcast.net.

Tuesday, June 14, 2011

It Is Still Possible to Have a Case Dismissed for Inactivity (Judgment Non Pros)

In the 11 year old case of Pagnotti v. Louis Pagnotti, Inc., 2000 - CV - 566 (Lacka. Co. June 1, 2011 Minora, J.), Judge Carmen D. Minora of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas applied the factors set forth in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court case of Jacobs v. Halloran, 710 A.2d 1098 (Pa. 1998), to grant a defendant's motion for entry of a judgment of non pros due to inactivity in the claim.

This 11-year-old case was filed in February 2000.  According Judge Minora's Opinion, after some docket activity through August of 2001, there was a three year gap in docket activity through June of 2004. 

A second period of docket activity lasted only three months.  Thereafter, from August 2004 through December 2009, there was no activity in the case.

Later, in March of 2010, the court permitted counsel for plaintiff to withdraw based on plaintiff's lack of payment for legal bills.

In April 2010, defendants filed this motion to dismiss for inactivity and for entry of judgment of non pros. An attorney entered his appearance for plaintiff and filed objections to the request for a dismissal.

The defendants asserted that the plaintiff had failed to diligently prosecute this case, which resulted in prejudice. The defendants argued that for over seven years of the life of the file, there had been no activity of any kind.  It was additionally asserted that the Complaint was based upon events that had occurred between 14 and 21 years ago.

The plaintiff's new attorney argued that any docket inactivity was caused by prior counsel and also made an unsupported allegation that defendants were not prejudiced by the delay.

In May 2010, the court allowed limited discovery on the non pros issue. The court then determined that this "ancient case" had been delayed yet another year and was overly ripe for disposition.

Judge Minora noted that the case of Jacobs v. Halloran , 710 A.2d 1098 (Pa. 1998), established three elements that must be met for a judgment of non pros to be properly entered to terminate an inactive case. First, plaintiff failed to proceed with reasonable diligence.  Second, there was no compelling reason for the delay. Third, plaintiff's delay caused actual prejudice to defendants.

Finding that the defendants met the elements of this test, the court granted defendants' motion for entry of judgment non pros due to inactivity.

Source: Case Digests in June 14, 2011 Pennsylvania Law Weekly


Anyone desiring a copy of this case may contact me at dancummins@comcast.net.

Judge Terrence R. Nealon of Lackawanna County Addresses Lay Witness Testimony on Speed, Delay Damages, and An Issue I Bet You've Never Seen Before

In his recent decision in the case of Hodin v. Frekey, No. 2007 - CV - 1504 (Lacka. Co. June 9, 2011 Nealon, J.), Judge Terrence R. Nealon addressed three issues--a standard auto law issue, a second issue so unique John Grisham probably couldn't have come up with it, and a third issue pertaining to a claim for delay damages after a verdict.

The auto law issue concerned the question of whether a plaintiff who introduced lay testimony regarding the defendant's speeding was required to also introduce expert testimony to establish a causal connection between the speed of the defendant's vehicle and the accident. 

On this issue, the defense filed a Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict on the causation question.  Judge Nealon denied this post-trial motion and ruled that Plaintiff introduced sufficient lay testimony and circumstantial evidence establishing that defendant’s speeding was a factual cause of the accident.  

The court found that it was therefore unnecessary for the Plaintiff to present expert testimony to establish that causal connection since that causation determination involved a matter within the jurors’ common understanding and experience. 

Therefore, the defendant’s request for JNOV was denied.  This case supports the proposition that properly presented lay witness testimony on the speed of vehicles involved in a motor vehicle accident can be admissible at trial in the absence of related expert testimony.

The other issue involved an issue related to the jury selection process in the case.  According to Judge Nealon's Opinion, after a prospective juror was dismissed from the matter after not having been selected, she thereafter contacted the office of defense counsel in the case near the end of the first day of trial to advise that her daughter was an acquaintance to the Defendant.  The dismissed juror also noted that she herself was actually a witness to the subject accident and could offer information beneficial to the defense on the liability issues.  This information was never disclosed by the prospective juror during the voir dire proceedings.

Accordingly, the defense made a request to add the new witness to the defense's witness list.  Plaintiff's counsel objected on the grounds of late notice and given that the Plaintiff's witnesses had already testified and had been released from their subpoenas to attend trial. The court also noted that Plaintiff's attorney had emphasized information on the liability witnesses known during his opening statement that stated that there were no other witnesses that could speak to the facts of the accident.

At trial, Judge Nealon ruled that the prejudice to the Plaintiff would be insurmountable  if the prospective juror were allowed to testify as a witness.  The court reasoned:

"I can’t think of any greater prejudice for your adversary in this case than to have already opened and told the jury who all the witnesses were and told the jury what those people would say, and then be in a position where we’re down to the final witness in the case and have to suddenly say to the jury “I was wrong,…this other witness surfaced yesterday, and oh, by the way, you might recognize her, she was a member of the jury panel.”

As such, Judge Nealon denied the defense request to call the dismissed juror as a witness and, in this Opinion on the post-trial motions, offered further support for this decision.

Judge Nealon's Opinion is also notable for his pointing out that the Plaintiff's request for Rule 238 Delay Damages would be granted, in part, because the defense never made a written settlement offer prior to trial.  A reading of Rule 238 reveals that a Plaintiff's request for delay damages could be impacted where the defense has made a written offer that comports with the language required in such a written offer by the Rule.


Anyone desiring a copy of this decision may contact me at dancummins@comcast.net.