Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas Judge Allen L. Tereshko has issued yet another Post-Koken decision.
On July 14, 2010, Judge Tereshko issued an Order, without Opinion, in the case of Pippett v. Radu and State Farm, March Term 2010, No. 3305 (Phila. Co. July 14, 2010, Tereshko, J.), in which considered a motion for reconsideration of the court's prior overruling of the tortfeasor's preliminary objections on the issue of improper venue.
According to Attorney Philip A. Ryan of the Philadelphia law firm of German, Gallagher & Murtagh, defense counsel for the tortfeasor, this litigation arose out of a Delaware County motor vehicle accident and all of the individuals involved resided in Delaware County as well.
The Plaintiff joined State Farm in the litigation on a UIM claim (State Farm's policy language requires that the UIM lawsuit be pursued in the same suit as the claim against the tortfeasor). The Plaintiff filed in Philadelphia County presumably due to State Farm's presence in that county.
Generally speaking, under Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1006, proper venue for a lawsuit involving a motor vehicle accident is in the county where the accident happened or where the defendant resides.
After the Plaintiff filed suit in Philadelphia in the Pippett matter, Defense counsel for the tortfeasor filed preliminary objections asserting improper venue and argued that Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1006(c), pertaining to proper venue in cases involving multiple defendants, only allowed venue in the different counties for the different defendants if such defendants were potentially jointly and severally liable. which is not the case with a tortfeasor and a UIM carrier named as defendants in the same suit.
Defense counsel more specifically asserted that since State Farm was not potentially a joint tortfeasor with the defendant driver and could not be found by the jury to be jointly liable with the defendant for the full amount of the verdict. As such, even if State Farm did business in Philadelphia County, venue was still not proper in Philadelphia County for the defendant driver who resided in Delaware County and was involved in an accident that occurred in Delaware County.
Although Judge Tereshko originally denied the tortfeasor defendant's Preliminary Objections, upon revisiting the matter via the motion for reconsideration, the Judge issued this July 14, 2010 Order granting the Preliminary Objections and ordered the matter transferred to Delaware County.
Tort Talkers may recall that Judge Tereshko previously faced this issue in the case of Thomas v. Titan Auto Ins., Nationwide Ins, Jones, and Briel, March Term 2010, No. 03050 (Phila. Co. May 10, 2010, Tereshko, J.). In Thomas, the judge severed the third party liability claim filed against an owner and operator of a vehicle from the uninsured (UM) motorist claim against one of the carrier defendants and also transferred both claims out of Philadelphia County and to Montgomery County on an improper venue argument.
The Thomas case is on its way up to the Superior Court but I believe it is still in the stage whereby the trial court has to issue a Rule 1925 Opinion to explain how it came to its decision. Accordingly, we may get an Opinion on this issue in the near future after all.
I send a nod of thanks to Attorney Philip A. Ryan of the Philadelphia office of German, Gallagher & Murtagh for bringing this case to my attention.
Anyone desiring a copy of this Order may contact me at dancummins@comcast.net.
Friday, July 23, 2010
Thursday, July 22, 2010
Judge Terrence Nealon of Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas Issues Interesting Decision on Duty of Care
Judge Terrence R. Nealon issued an interesting decision on July 19, 2010 in the case of David J. Sedor, M.D. et al v. Community Medical Center et al, No. 05 CV 2143 (Lacka. Co. July 19, 2010, Nealon, J.). In this Opinion, Judge Nealon reviewed the relevant factors that governs every duty analysis in a thorough manner and with a writing style that I submit would have made Dean Prosser and Justice Cardozo proud.
This case arose out of an incident during which a noted local neurosurgeon was struck by a hospital bed as it was being pushed through the hallway of a hospital with the gratuitous assistance of an orthopedic implant sales representative. The Plaintiff, Dr. Sedor alleges that his injuries from this event and associated infections required him to eventually undergo a mid-thigh amputation of his right leg.
Judge Robert Mazzoni of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas previously granted the Defendant implants distributor partial summary judgment finding that it could not be found vicariously liable for the actions of the sales representative as a master-servant was not established in that regard.
The latest Opinion, from Judge Nealon, addressed the implants distributor's follow-up motion for summary judgment which asserted that the Plaintiff was also unable to establish the duty and causation elements of a negligence cause of action for direct liability.
Judge Nealon reviewed in great detail the five factors involved in the question of whether a duty exists in a particular case: (1) the relationship between the parties; (2) the social utility of the defendant's conduct; (3) the nature of the risk and the foreseeability of the harm incurred; (4) the consequences of imposing a duty upon the defendant; and (5) the overall public interest in the proposed solution.
The application of the above factors to the case at hand led Judge Nealon to conclude that the record did not support any finding that the implants distributor had any duty to instruct an independent contractor's sales representative who was involved in the incident to refrain from handling another party's equipment. More specifically, the Court found that the Plaintiff neurosurgeon had not established that the distributor owed a duty to train a non-employee not to handle or transport beds in a hospital as alleged in the Complaint.
As such, the motion for summary judgment filed by the implants manufacturer and distributor was granted.
Anyone desiring to read a copy of this interesting Opinion may contact me at dancummins@comcast.net
This case arose out of an incident during which a noted local neurosurgeon was struck by a hospital bed as it was being pushed through the hallway of a hospital with the gratuitous assistance of an orthopedic implant sales representative. The Plaintiff, Dr. Sedor alleges that his injuries from this event and associated infections required him to eventually undergo a mid-thigh amputation of his right leg.
Judge Robert Mazzoni of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas previously granted the Defendant implants distributor partial summary judgment finding that it could not be found vicariously liable for the actions of the sales representative as a master-servant was not established in that regard.
The latest Opinion, from Judge Nealon, addressed the implants distributor's follow-up motion for summary judgment which asserted that the Plaintiff was also unable to establish the duty and causation elements of a negligence cause of action for direct liability.
Judge Nealon reviewed in great detail the five factors involved in the question of whether a duty exists in a particular case: (1) the relationship between the parties; (2) the social utility of the defendant's conduct; (3) the nature of the risk and the foreseeability of the harm incurred; (4) the consequences of imposing a duty upon the defendant; and (5) the overall public interest in the proposed solution.
The application of the above factors to the case at hand led Judge Nealon to conclude that the record did not support any finding that the implants distributor had any duty to instruct an independent contractor's sales representative who was involved in the incident to refrain from handling another party's equipment. More specifically, the Court found that the Plaintiff neurosurgeon had not established that the distributor owed a duty to train a non-employee not to handle or transport beds in a hospital as alleged in the Complaint.
As such, the motion for summary judgment filed by the implants manufacturer and distributor was granted.
Anyone desiring to read a copy of this interesting Opinion may contact me at dancummins@comcast.net
Labels:
Civil Litigation,
Judge Nealon,
Proximate Causation
Sackett III Decision Handed Down by Superior Court Yesterday
Yesterday, the Superior Court handed down its opinion in Sackett v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company, 2010 WL 2837867, 943 WDA 2009 (Pa.Super. July 21, 2010 Allen, J., Colville, S.J., Cleland, S.J.), which will likely become to be known as Sackett III.
In the opinion written by Judge Cheryl Lynn Allen, the Superior Court held that the trial court correctly decided on remand that a vehicle was not added under a newly/after acquired vehicle clause in an insurance policy and the insurer should have therefore had the insured sign a new rejection of stacking form, in order for non-stacking to apply. According to the opinion the insured should have received a new stacking rejection waiver when adding a single car to a two car policy. Since the insured was not required by the carrier to sign such a rejection form, the Superior Court agreed that Mr. Sackett should be considered to have stacked UIM coverage.
By way of background, Mr. Sackett was injured as a passenger while occupying another person's vehicle. He secured the tortfeasor's liability limits as well as the underinsured motorist (UIM) benefits limits on the vehicle he was occupying at the time of the accident.
Mr. Sackett then sought to recover the additional UIM benefits available under his own policy with Nationwide.
Mr. Sackett's originally purchased Nationwide policy had two vehicles under it but no stacking because Mr. Sackett had executed a valid waiver declining to stack coverage on these two vehicles. Prior to the subject accident, Mr. Sackett added a third vehicle to the policy at which point no new forms were signed regarding UIM or UM coverage or stacking.
Throughout the process of going up and now back down the appellate ladder, it was asserted by Mr. Sackett's attorneys that he should be deemed to have had stacked limits because no forms in this regard were executed when the third car was added, i.e. he never rejected stacking.
In Sackett I, i.e. Sackett v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 919 A.2d 194 (Pa. 2007), the Superior Court, as did the trial court, held that the Supreme Court precedent required that a new rejection form was required whenever a new vehicle is added to a policy.
In Sackett II, i.e. Sackett v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 940 A.2d 329 (Pa. 2007), the Supreme Court modified the Superior Court's decision and held that requirement of a new stacking rejection form does not apply if a vehicle is added under a newly acquired vehicle clause and such a clause is present under the facts of the case.
In the Sackett III decision handed down yesterday, the Superior Court agreed with the latest trial court decision on the matter and found that Mr. Sackett did not add any vehicles under the newly-acquired vehicle clause contained in the insurance policy. As such, additional rejection stacking forms were required and this requirement was not met in the case presented because Nationwide never had Mr. Sackett sign off on any new rejection of stacking forms when the vehicle was added to the policy.
Accordingly, the ultimate holding of the Superior Court in the latest decision on this matter was that Mr. Sackett was entitled to stacking.
The Sackett III decision can be viewed online at http://www.aopc.org/OpPosting/Superior/out/a14005_10.pdf.
I send thanks to Attorney Scott Cooper of the Harrisburg, PA law firm of Schmidt Kramer for publicizing this Opinion and to Attorney Paul Oven of the Moosic, PA office of Dougherty, Leventhal & Price for bringing this case to my attention.
In the opinion written by Judge Cheryl Lynn Allen, the Superior Court held that the trial court correctly decided on remand that a vehicle was not added under a newly/after acquired vehicle clause in an insurance policy and the insurer should have therefore had the insured sign a new rejection of stacking form, in order for non-stacking to apply. According to the opinion the insured should have received a new stacking rejection waiver when adding a single car to a two car policy. Since the insured was not required by the carrier to sign such a rejection form, the Superior Court agreed that Mr. Sackett should be considered to have stacked UIM coverage.
By way of background, Mr. Sackett was injured as a passenger while occupying another person's vehicle. He secured the tortfeasor's liability limits as well as the underinsured motorist (UIM) benefits limits on the vehicle he was occupying at the time of the accident.
Mr. Sackett then sought to recover the additional UIM benefits available under his own policy with Nationwide.
Mr. Sackett's originally purchased Nationwide policy had two vehicles under it but no stacking because Mr. Sackett had executed a valid waiver declining to stack coverage on these two vehicles. Prior to the subject accident, Mr. Sackett added a third vehicle to the policy at which point no new forms were signed regarding UIM or UM coverage or stacking.
Throughout the process of going up and now back down the appellate ladder, it was asserted by Mr. Sackett's attorneys that he should be deemed to have had stacked limits because no forms in this regard were executed when the third car was added, i.e. he never rejected stacking.
In Sackett I, i.e. Sackett v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 919 A.2d 194 (Pa. 2007), the Superior Court, as did the trial court, held that the Supreme Court precedent required that a new rejection form was required whenever a new vehicle is added to a policy.
In Sackett II, i.e. Sackett v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 940 A.2d 329 (Pa. 2007), the Supreme Court modified the Superior Court's decision and held that requirement of a new stacking rejection form does not apply if a vehicle is added under a newly acquired vehicle clause and such a clause is present under the facts of the case.
In the Sackett III decision handed down yesterday, the Superior Court agreed with the latest trial court decision on the matter and found that Mr. Sackett did not add any vehicles under the newly-acquired vehicle clause contained in the insurance policy. As such, additional rejection stacking forms were required and this requirement was not met in the case presented because Nationwide never had Mr. Sackett sign off on any new rejection of stacking forms when the vehicle was added to the policy.
Accordingly, the ultimate holding of the Superior Court in the latest decision on this matter was that Mr. Sackett was entitled to stacking.
The Sackett III decision can be viewed online at http://www.aopc.org/OpPosting/Superior/out/a14005_10.pdf.
I send thanks to Attorney Scott Cooper of the Harrisburg, PA law firm of Schmidt Kramer for publicizing this Opinion and to Attorney Paul Oven of the Moosic, PA office of Dougherty, Leventhal & Price for bringing this case to my attention.
Wednesday, July 21, 2010
Group Page for Pennsylvania Defense Institute Created on LinkedIn.com
A Group page for the Pennsylvania Defense Institute has been created on LinkedIn.com. The Group is open to all members of the Pennsylvania Defense Institute (PDI) and members are encouraged to join.
With good involvement, it is hoped that the Group page for the PDI may be come a good place to network, share information on new cases or expert witnesses, etc., and to engage in helpful online Discussions.
Check it out at: http://www.linkedin.com/groups?mostPopular=&gid=3183344.
With good involvement, it is hoped that the Group page for the PDI may be come a good place to network, share information on new cases or expert witnesses, etc., and to engage in helpful online Discussions.
Check it out at: http://www.linkedin.com/groups?mostPopular=&gid=3183344.
JDSupra Hooks Up with LinkedIn
In other LinkedIn news, JDSupra, a website that allows attorneys to upload their written product (articles, briefs, etc.) to create an online portfolio open for others to review when looking up an attorney online, has teamed up with the professional networking site, LinkedIn, to allow for the portfolio to be displayed on one's LinkedIn profile page.
I use both sites and have found them to be excellent ways to market my services. To view my JDSupra profile and documents posted, go to: http://www.jdsupra.com/profile/danielcummins_docs/.
To view my LinkedIn profile and see how the JDSupra portfolio is highlighted on that profile, go to: http://www.linkedin.com/in/danielcummins and click on the yellow box that says, "View Full Profile."
Also, here is a link to a July 16, 2010 Amercian Bar Association article by Rachel M. Zahorsky regarding the union of JDSupra and LinkedIn:
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/jd_supra_and_linkedin_create_words_largest_legal_social_network
I use both sites and have found them to be excellent ways to market my services. To view my JDSupra profile and documents posted, go to: http://www.jdsupra.com/profile/danielcummins_docs/.
To view my LinkedIn profile and see how the JDSupra portfolio is highlighted on that profile, go to: http://www.linkedin.com/in/danielcummins and click on the yellow box that says, "View Full Profile."
Also, here is a link to a July 16, 2010 Amercian Bar Association article by Rachel M. Zahorsky regarding the union of JDSupra and LinkedIn:
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/jd_supra_and_linkedin_create_words_largest_legal_social_network
Saturday, July 17, 2010
UPCOMING CLE SEMINARS/ NETWORKING EVENTS OF NOTE
Here are a few upcoming CLE Seminars of note that are also open to Claims Professionals at a nominal rate of $25.00 (rates for attorneys are higher due to availability of CLE credits).
Each seminar is expected to provide excellent updates on the law, great opportunities to network, and refreshing cocktail receptions at which members of the judiciary from the region are expected to attend.
I will be presenting the Auto Law/Post-Koken Update at both the Philadelphia and the Scranton/Wilkes-Barre events. Hope to see you there!
Anyone wishing to attend any of these seminars may contact me for more information or a registration form at dancummins@comcast.net.
Each seminar is expected to provide excellent updates on the law, great opportunities to network, and refreshing cocktail receptions at which members of the judiciary from the region are expected to attend.
I will be presenting the Auto Law/Post-Koken Update at both the Philadelphia and the Scranton/Wilkes-Barre events. Hope to see you there!
Anyone wishing to attend any of these seminars may contact me for more information or a registration form at dancummins@comcast.net.
(PHILADELPHIA - AUGUST 5, 2010)
THE PENNSYLVANIA DEFENSE INSTITUTE
proudly presents a Continuing Legal Education Seminar
A League of Extraordinary Speakers:
Critical and Developmental Topics in Litigation
at the
THE UNION LEAGUE
PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA
AUGUST 5, 2010
1 pm - 5 pm
Followed by Cocktail Reception
2 Substantive and 1 Ethics CLE Credit
TOPICS:
Car Accident Medical Conditions and Radiological Issues (Dr. Brooks)
Medicare Issues
Auto Law/Post-Koken Update
Economic Issues in Personal Injury Actions
Attorney-Client Privilege Issues
_________________________________________________
(WILKES-BARRE/SCRANTON - AUGUST 18, 2010)
THE PENNSYLVANIA DEFENSE INSTITUTE
and
THE NORTHEAST PENNSYLVANIA TRIAL LAWYERS ASSOCIATION
Proudly Present
“CIVIL LITIGATION DEVELOPMENTS 2010”
at the
MOHEGAN SUN CASINO at POCONO DOWNS
WILKES-BARRE, PENNSYLVANIA
Wednesday August 18, 2010
1 p.m. to 5 p.m.
Cocktail Hour (5-7 p.m.) at Breakers in the Mohegan Sun
(Claims professionals and at least 15 Judges from the Federal and State Courts all across Northeastern Pennsylvania are expected to attend the Cocktail Hour)
2 Substantive and 1 Ethics CLE Credit
TOPICS:
Auto Law/Post-Koken Update
Bad Faith Update
Panel Discussion on Ethics with Members of the Federal and State Judiciary
Again, anyone desiring more information or a registration form may contact me at dancummins@comcast.net.
UIM Carrier Permitted To Join Third Party Tortfeasor Into Post-Koken Lawsuit
Addressing an apparently novel scenario in the post-Koken context, Federal Middle District Court Judge A. Richard Caputo allowed a UIM carrier to join the third party tortfeasor into a Federal post-Koken lawsuit as a third party defendant in the case of Oswald v. State Farm, No. 3:09-CV-2578.
By way of background, this case arose out of a motor vehicle accident that happened on June 30, 2007, in New Jersey. The Plaintiffs, who were residents of Pennsylvania, brought a third party suit against the tortfeasor in New Jersey.
The Plaintiffs also filed a Federal lawsuit in the Middle District of Pennsylvania asserting a contractual UIM claim, together with a bad faith claim, against defendant State Farm, the Plaintiffs' UIM carrier.
State Farm sought to join the tortfeasor as a third party defendant in the Federal UIM and bad faith claim in order to seek subrogation for any payment that State Farm might be contractually bound to pay.
The Plaintiff objected to State Farm's Motion to Join the tortfeasor as a third party defendant on the basis that an insurance company may not intervene in an action between the insured and the tortfeasor.
Judge Caputo rejected that argument on the ground that State Farm was not seeking to intervene in an action between the insured and a third party. Rather, State Farm was already a party to this suit and is seeking to join a non-party, the tortfeasor, into the UIM-bad faith action.
The Plaintiff also argued that allowing State Farm to join the tortfeasor would lead to confusion of issues for the jury. This argument was rejected by the Court.
The Plaintiff also argued the danger of potentially inconsistent verdicts in light of the separate New Jersey action claimed against the tortfeasor. The Oswald Court also rejected this argument on the ground that collateral estoppel or the claim preclusion doctrine would protect against any attempt to re-litigate any issue previously decided in whichever forum was litigated first.
Accordingly, the Court granted the UIM carrier's motion to join the tortfeasor as a third party defendant.
My partner, Attorney Timothy E. Foley is the defense counsel on the UIM portion of the claim. Attorney Jordan Koko of Bennett, Bricklin & Saltzburg, LLC, of Philadelphia, was retained to represent State Farm in the bad faith action. The Motion to Join the tortfeasor was prepared and filed by Attorney Koko.
I thank my partner, Attorney Tim Foley of Foley, Cognetti, Comerford, Cimini & Cummins, for bringing this decision to my attention and providing the explanatory background noted above.
Anyone desiring a copy of this Opinion may contact me at dancummins@comcast.net.
By way of background, this case arose out of a motor vehicle accident that happened on June 30, 2007, in New Jersey. The Plaintiffs, who were residents of Pennsylvania, brought a third party suit against the tortfeasor in New Jersey.
The Plaintiffs also filed a Federal lawsuit in the Middle District of Pennsylvania asserting a contractual UIM claim, together with a bad faith claim, against defendant State Farm, the Plaintiffs' UIM carrier.
State Farm sought to join the tortfeasor as a third party defendant in the Federal UIM and bad faith claim in order to seek subrogation for any payment that State Farm might be contractually bound to pay.
The Plaintiff objected to State Farm's Motion to Join the tortfeasor as a third party defendant on the basis that an insurance company may not intervene in an action between the insured and the tortfeasor.
Judge Caputo rejected that argument on the ground that State Farm was not seeking to intervene in an action between the insured and a third party. Rather, State Farm was already a party to this suit and is seeking to join a non-party, the tortfeasor, into the UIM-bad faith action.
The Plaintiff also argued that allowing State Farm to join the tortfeasor would lead to confusion of issues for the jury. This argument was rejected by the Court.
The Plaintiff also argued the danger of potentially inconsistent verdicts in light of the separate New Jersey action claimed against the tortfeasor. The Oswald Court also rejected this argument on the ground that collateral estoppel or the claim preclusion doctrine would protect against any attempt to re-litigate any issue previously decided in whichever forum was litigated first.
Accordingly, the Court granted the UIM carrier's motion to join the tortfeasor as a third party defendant.
My partner, Attorney Timothy E. Foley is the defense counsel on the UIM portion of the claim. Attorney Jordan Koko of Bennett, Bricklin & Saltzburg, LLC, of Philadelphia, was retained to represent State Farm in the bad faith action. The Motion to Join the tortfeasor was prepared and filed by Attorney Koko.
I thank my partner, Attorney Tim Foley of Foley, Cognetti, Comerford, Cimini & Cummins, for bringing this decision to my attention and providing the explanatory background noted above.
Anyone desiring a copy of this Opinion may contact me at dancummins@comcast.net.
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