Thursday, June 24, 2010

More Post-Koken Cases Uncovered

I attended an CLE seminar put on Wednesday, June 23rd by the Pennsylvania Defense Institute at the Hollywood Casino complex in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. During an excellent session on a Post-Koken Update presented by Attorney Phillip R. Earnest of the Pittsburgh law firm of Robb Leonard Mulvihill I learned of a few more post-Koken cases out there:

Jenkins v. State Farm, G.D. 07-020234 (Alleh. Co. Sept. 9, 2009 Wettick, J.)(Motion to stay and sever granted in UIM/Bad Faith case).

Marburger v. Erie Ins. Exchange, 2009-Civil-10927 (Butler Co. June 19, 2009, Horan, J.)(Motion to Sever and Stay on behalf of Erie granted; court precluded plaintiffs from conducting any bad faith discovery until further Order of court and permitted severance and stay of plaintiff's bad faith action pending resolution of UIM claim).


I secured a copy of the Jenkins decision from Attorney Earnest and am waiting to see if he can locate a copy of the Marburger decision. Anyone desiring a copy of the Jenkins decision may contact me at dancummins@comcast.net.

I send thanks to Attorney Phillip R. Earnest for putting on an excellent seminar, making me aware of these other post-Koken cases successfully handled by his office, and for providing me copies of the decisions.

Tuesday, June 22, 2010

Post-Koken Decision Out of Northampton County in Favor of Consolidated Claims

In a June 21, 2010 Order and well-written Opinion, Judge Anthony S. Beltrami of the Northampton County Court of Common Pleas denied a third party tortfeasor defendant's motion to sever the third party liability claims from the UIM and UM claims asserted in the post-Koken case of Firoozifard v. Krome and State Farm, No. C-48-Civil-2009-14369 (Northampton Co. June 21, 2010 Beltrami, J.).

In Firoozifard, the court treated the tortfeasor defendant's Preliminary Objections as a Motion to Sever under Pa.R.C.P. 213(b) since it did not appear that the defendant was arguing that the Complaint violated the applicable permissive joinder rules under Pa.R.C.P. 2229(b).

Rather, the tortfeasor defendant was solely arguing that, by virtue of the joining of the negligence claim against him with the UM and UIM claims against the insurance company, evidence concerning the tortfeasor's automobile insurance would be introduced into the case at trial in violation of Pa.R.E. 411 (prohibiting evidence of insurance in negligence matters). The tortfeasor defendant argued that this scenario required that the claims be severed. Judge Beltrami disagreed.

Judge Beltrami wrote that while Pa.R.E. 411 states that evidence that a person did or did not have liability insurance is not admissible on the issue of whether that person acted negligently, the same rule also states that evidence of liability insurance is not required to be excluded when such evidence is "offered for another purpose, such as proof of agency, ownership, or control, or bias or prejudice of a witness." See Pa.R.E. 411.

The court in Firoozifard noted that, in this context, evidence of the tortfeasor defendant's insurance coverage would not be offered in any way to establish his negligence, but rather "to establish State Farm's contractual duty to provide UIM benefits to Plaintiff, as State Farm is entitled to a credit in the amount of [the tortfeasor's] coverage before it is required to pay damages to Plaintiff under its policy." Accordingly, the court ruled that severance was not required by an application of Pa.R.E. 411.

Judge Beltrami also rejected the tortfeasor's argument that the introduction of evidence pertaining to the tortfeasor's liability insurance would be prejudicial and would fail the balancing test required by Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 403, pertaining to the relevancy of evidence. Rule 403 states that evidence may be excluded if its probative value is outweighed by "the danger of unfair prejudice."

The court stated that evidence of the tortfeasor's liability insurance was "clearly probative" or relevant to determining State Farm's contractual duty to pay UIM benefits to the Plaintiff.

The tortfeasor argued that the admission of evidence pertaining to his liability coverage was "prejudicial in that it may cause the jury to shirk their responsibility as finders of fact and instead recklessly award damages they presume will be paid by an insurance company."

Judge Beltrami noted that severance was still not required as the danger of any potential prejudice to the tortfeasor could be "eliminated" by steps taken by the court at trial.

For example, the judge noted that the caption could be presented to the jury in a fashion that prevents State Farm from being identified. He also noted that "the trial judge can also require evidence of [the tortfeasor's] insurance to be presented outside the presence of the jury to be used solely for the purpose of molding the jury's verdict."

The court concluded its analysis by also acknowledging that keeping all of the claims of this post-Koken case together in a consolidated fashion "will save judicial resources, avoid unnecessary delay and expense, and guard against inconsistent verdicts."

For these reasons, Judge Beltrami held that the tortfeasor defendant's motion to sever should be denied.

I will add this case to the Post-Koken Scorecard in short order. This synopsis of the post-Koken cases may be accessed at any time by clicking on the link to it down on the right hand column of this blog. Please be reminded that this compilation of post-Koken cases, while thorough, may not be an exhaustive listing of all of the decisions that may be out there. I can state that I am still unaware of any appellate decision addressing this issue.

Also, keep an eye out for my next two articles in the Pennsylvania Law Weekly which will review the cases handed down on this issue around the Commonwealth. The first article, set to appear next week will review the "ordinary" post-Koken cases involving third party claims and UIM claims. The second article will appear next month and will cover this issue in post-Koken cases involving bad faith claims.

If you are a "Tort Talker" who has been following Tort Talk all along, these articles will probably sound like old news to you and will hopefully give you a sense and good feeling that you are on top of the law in this context.


Anyone desiring a copy of the Firoozifard Opinion and Order summarized above may contact me at dancummins@comcast.net.

I thank Attorney Ed Shaughnessy of the Law Office of Edward P. Shaughnessy in Easton, Northampton County, Pennsylvania for forwarding this case to my attention.

Friday, June 18, 2010

Recent Bad Faith Post-Koken Decision out of Montgomery County

In a June 16, 2010 Order entered by the Honorable Arthur R. Tilson of the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas in the post-Koken case of Dininni v. Encompass Insurance Company, No. 2010 - Civil - 04615 (Montg. Co. June 16, 2010 Tilson, J.), the court stayed discovery as to claims of bad faith and unfair trade practices until underlying UIM claims were tried or otherwise resolved. While ruling in favor of the defense in that regard, the court did also deny the defense request that the Bad Faith Claim and Unfair Trade Practices Claim be severed from the UIM claim.

The Plaintiff in this matter was a passenger in a car with three other claimants. She had previously settled her claim against the tortfeasor and, in this matter, was pursuing a UIM claim against the UIM carrier along with bad faith claims concerning the carrier's handling of the file and failure to pay.

The underlying issue that was involved with this Court Order pertained to the Plaintiff's desire to secure the insurer’s entire investigative file for the Plaintiff’s claim and for the three other passengers’ claims, as well as the deposition of the adjuster assigned to all four claims.

Encompass, which was the UIM carrier, objected to the requests in their entirety, citing Judge Wettick’s decisions in 2009 in Gunn v. Nationwide and Wutz v. Smith. The Plaintiff moved to compel production of the files and the deposition of the claims rep. Encompass responded and cross-moved for a protective order staying discovery as to the bad faith and consumer fraud claims and/or severing the UIM claim from the bad faith and consumer fraud claims.

According to defense counsel, Encompass argued that the court should follow the decisions from Judge Wettick holding that requiring the early production of the bad faith claims would essentially provide the defense’s playbook for negotiation and trial of the companion UIM claim.

The discovery master agreed and the trial court entered our requested an Order that precluded the deposition of the Encompass claims representative.

The Court's order also struck the Plaintiff's written discovery requests to the extent "they request[ed] information and documents concerning the valuation and handling of plaintiff's claim and claims other than plaintiff's, and the procedures, strategy, and tactics for handling plaintiff's claim and claims other than the claim of plaintiff Dininni, which are not to be discoverable until the underlying UIM claims are settled, tried or otherwise resolved."

The Court order additionally provided that discovery concerning the Bad Faith Claim and the Unfair Trade Practices Claim were stayed pending the resolution of the UIM claim.

However, the Court denied the request of Defendant Encompass that the Bad Faith Claim and the Unfair Trade Practices Claim be severed and dismissed from the UIM claim without prejudice to the right of the Plaintiff to refile those claims in a separate action.

The prevailing defense counsel in this matter was Attorney Frank Guarrieri of the Morrisville, Pennsylvania law firm of Curtin & Heefner, LLP. I send thanks to Attorney Joseph F. Kampherstein, III of the same firm for bringing this case to my attention.


Anyone desiring a copy of this Order without Opinion may contact me at dancummins@comcast.net.

Thursday, June 17, 2010

Upcoming CLE Seminars of Note

Here are a few upcoming CLE Seminars of note that are also open to Claims Professionals at a nominal rate of $25.00 (rates for attorneys are higher due to availability of CLE credits).

Each seminar is expected to provide excellent updates on the law, great opportunities to network, and refreshing Happy Hour receptions at which members of the judiciary from the region are expected to attend.

I will be presenting the Auto Law/Post-Koken Update at both the Philadelphia and the Scranton/Wilkes-Barre events. I will also be attending the Harrisburg/Grantville, PA seminar. Hope to see you there!

Anyone wishing to attend any of these seminars may contact me for more information or a registration form at dancummins@comcast.net.


(HARRISBURG - JUNE 23, 2010)
THE PENNSYLVANIA DEFENSE INSTITUTE
Proudly Presents
“Another Day at the Races: Key Insurance Law Issues
for Claim Representatives and Defense Counsel"

HOLLYWOOD CASINO at PENN NATIONAL RACE COURSE
HARRISBURG/GRANTVILLE, PENNSYLVANIA
NEXT Wednesday, June 23, 2010
1:00 pm - 5:00 pm
Followed by Cocktail Reception

2 Substantive and 1 Ethics CLE Credit
Attorney-Client Privilege in Pennsylvania after Fleming and Gillard
Post-Koken Issues
Medicare Secondary Payer Act and DPW Liens Compliance
Ethical Considerations in the Insurance Relationship: 10 Relationship Issues

________________________________________

(PITTSBURGH - JULY 15, 2010)
THE PENNSYLVANIA DEFENSE INSTITUTE
Proudly Presents Our Fourth Annual
“Key Insurance Law Developments 2010"

SHERATON STATION SQUARE HOTEL
PITTSBURGH, PENNSYLVANIA
Thursday, July 15, 2010
1 pm - 4:45 pm
Followed by Cocktail Reception

3 Substantive CLE Credits

Compliance with Medicare and DPW Liens
Auto UIM/UM Law
Insurance bad faith Law
Federal and State ADR

___________________________________________

(PHILADELPHIA - AUGUST 5, 2010)
THE PENNSYLVANIA DEFENSE INSTITUTE
proudly presents a Continuing Legal Education Seminar

A League of Extraordinary Speakers:
Critical and Developmental Topics in Litigation

at the

THE UNION LEAGUE
PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA
AUGUST 5, 2010
1 pm - 5 pm
Followed by Cocktail Reception

2 Substantive and 1 Ethics CLE Credit

Car Accident Medical Conditions and Radiological Issues (Dr. Brooks)
Medicare Issues
Auto Law/Post-Koken Update
Economic Issues in Personal Injury Actions
Attorney-Client Privilege Issues
______________________________________

(WILKES-BARRE/SCRANTON - AUGUST 18, 2010)
THE PENNSYLVANIA DEFENSE INSTITUTE and
THE NORTHEAST PENNSYLVANIA TRIAL LAWYERS ASSOCIATION

Proudly Present a Continuing Legal Education Program On
“CIVIL LITIGATION DEVELOPMENTS 2010”
at the
MOHEGAN SUN CASINO at POCONO DOWNS
WILKES-BARRE, PENNSYLVANIA

Wednesday August 18, 2010
1 p.m. to 5 p.m.
Cocktail Hour (5-7 p.m.) at Breakers in the Mohegan Sun

2 Substantive and 1 Ethics CLE Credit

Auto Law Update
Bad Faith Update
Panel Discussion with Members of the Federal and State Judiciary

Discretionary Duty to Defend Clause in Liability Policy Upheld

In the recent case of apparent first impression of Genaeya Corp. v. Harco National Insurance Company, 991 A.2d 342 (Pa.Super. March 15, 2010 Ford Elliott, J.), the Superior Court upheld a discretionary duty to defend contained in a liability insurer's policy.

In Genaeya, a declaratory judgment action was brought by a liability carrier over the duty to defend and indemnify issue in a case involving an underlying claim for damages arising when a cargo delivered by a trucking company went missing after it was dropped off overnight at a destination.

The truck motor carrier sought a judicial declaration from the court that it did not have to defend its insured trucking company or indemnify the injured party since the policy provided that the carrier "may elect to defend you" against suits arising from claims of owners of property. [Emphasis added].

The Superior Court noted that it was the settled law of Pennsylvania that there was no duty to defend in the absence of any express duty to defend clause in an insurance policy. It was also noted that no Pennsylvania caselaw could be found construing policy language similar to that at issue in this matter.

The Genaeya court reasoned that, since the duty of a liability carrier to provide a defense is contractual, and since the plain language of the policy or contract is the best evidence of the parties' intent, a carrier has no duty to defend an action unless the obligation is expressly set forth in the policy.

The Superior went on to find that the policy language at issue, i.e. that the carrier "may elect to defend" its insured, was not ambiguous and clearly conveyed that the carrier retained the discretion over the decision to defend its insured or not in any potential lawsuit.

The Genaeya court went on to also find that, under the stipulated facts presented, the carrier's duty to indemnify would not have been implicated in any event as the facts did not bring the underlying claims within the coverage terms provided in the policy.



I thank David Schweitzer, Vice President and Chief Claims Officer at Tuscarora Wayne Mutual Insurance Company, for bringing this case to my attention.

Monday, June 14, 2010

Excellent Article by Howard J. Bashman, Esq. on Preparing to Argue in the Appellate Courts

Below is a reprint of an excellent article on preparing for argument in the appellate courts by Attorney Howard J. Bashman in the June 14, 2010 edition of The Legal Intelligencer:



Preparing Effective Oral Arguments for Appellate Courts

by
Howard J. Bashman
The Legal Intelligencer
June 14, 2010

Upon Further Review


The Legal Intelligencer recently hosted a Continuing Legal Education course titled "Winning Litigation Strategies" at which I was fortunate to have been one of the speakers in that program's appellate litigation segment. The subject of my remarks was preparing for an appellate oral argument.


Typically, at the outset of my preparations to argue an appeal, I will re-read the parties' appellate briefs and the trial court's opinion. I will also again familiarize myself with the relevant case law and update my legal research to find any newly issued cases that were not cited in the briefs.


If the case involves more than one or two issues, it is usually a good idea to consider what issues should be the main focus of the oral argument and what issues can be omitted. Of course, the judges can ask questions about any issues in the case, and opposing counsel may decide to focus on additional issues, so a well-prepared advocate will be ready to address any of the issues involved, even those that were not going to be the central focus of his or her presentation.


One of the most important aspects of preparing for oral argument involves thinking about what are the weaknesses and vulnerabilities in your client's case, what sort of challenging questions the appellate judges could ask on those topics, and how best to respond directly to those questions. In addition, it is important to anticipate hypothetical questions from the judges, who are seeking to understand the scope or limits to the legal principles that you are asking the court to adopt or apply.


Appellate courts are in the business of announcing legal principles and deciding the limits of when and how those principles will apply. In other words, if the appellate court is considering whether to announce a rule of law in your case, the judges will legitimately be interested in anticipating if and how that rule of law would apply to other cases involving different facts. This is why appellate advocates must be prepared to respond to hypothetical questions at oral argument instead of simply seeking to evade them as not involving the facts of this particular case.


In reviewing the relevant case law, it is important to focus on whether those decisions are directly binding on the judges who will decide the appeal or are merely persuasive. For example, three-judge 3rd Circuit panels are bound by the rulings of other three-judge 3rd Circuit panels, but they will not be bound by the decisions of other federal appellate courts. Similarly, while a ruling of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania will bind both the Commonwealth Court and the Superior Court, a ruling of the Commonwealth Court will not bind the Superior Court, nor will a Superior Court ruling bind the Commonwealth Court.


If you are arguing your appeal before a court where the identity of the judges who will be hearing the oral argument is disclosed in advance, it is useful to research those judges' backgrounds and also to see whether any of them wrote the key cases on which the parties are relying. In addition, if you are intending to invoke the names of any of the judges at oral argument, it is useful to make sure in advance that you know the correct pronunciation.


If you have never argued before the particular court in which your appeal is pending, it is useful to attend an earlier argument session or listen to the court's oral arguments that are available over the Internet. The 3rd U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals posts its oral argument recordings online, but Pennsylvania's state appellate courts do not. Indeed, in Pennsylvania's state appellate courts, the oral arguments are not officially recorded or transcribed, so whatever happens at oral argument exists thereafter only in the memories of the participants and observers.


Another thing that is useful to know in advance is whether and how the time remaining at oral argument is displayed to the advocate. At the 3rd Circuit, color-coded lights along with a digital clock allow the advocate to see precisely how much argument time remains. By contrast, at the Pennsylvania Superior Court, the presiding judge maintains a device that will beep when the time for argument has expired, but the advocate cannot see from the podium exactly how much time remains. In that latter situation, the advocate should be prepared to monitor his or her own argument time simply to ensure that the points that need to be made at argument are emphasized before all time has expired.


Inexperienced appellate advocates might view appellate oral argument as the perfect opportunity to deliver prepared remarks to the appellate judges, perhaps in the impassioned nature of a closing argument to the jury at trial, and thereby attempt to evade or ignore the questions posed from the bench. But, in actuality, there is no surer way to incur the wrath of the appellate court.


Questions from the bench should and indeed must be answered directly and promptly, instead of seeking to evade them or postpone them until later. Not every question is a hand-grenade; sometimes, appellate judges toss a lifeline. Be prepared to succinctly state the precise holding that you are asking the appellate court to reach. I do not mean that you should merely be able to state the outcome that you are seeking. Rather, you must be capable of stating the principle of law that will allow the court to reach that outcome.


From time to time judges will ask, "What's your best case for that proposition?" or, "Where can we find that in the record on appeal?" so you should also know at least a case or two that supports what you are arguing and where in the appellate record the key documents or testimony can be found. If you receive a question whose answer you simply do not know, it is better to honestly report that you don't know instead of giving a response that could inflict far greater harm on your case.


The best appellate oral arguments are the ones that are, in essence, a conversation between the judges and the lawyer. It is better to elicit and attempt to address whatever concerns the judges may have about the merits of your case while you still have the opportunity to do so than to cut off all questioning because you are speaking too quickly, too loudly, or too softly. It is also possible to convince the appellate court that the trial judge made a mistake or that the opposing party acted badly without having to be impolite at oral argument toward the trial judge or opposing counsel.


My final thought, for now, on the subject of delivering oral argument on appeal is that lawyers will become better at, and more confident in, delivering oral argument on appeal through experience. Lawyers who are well-prepared for appellate oral arguments, and who have thought about how to advance their client's case while dealing with any weaknesses and vulnerabilities in the case, will not only obtain the best results possible, but they may even actually enjoy their time at the lectern. •


Howard J. Bashman operates his own appellate litigation boutique in Willow Grove, Pa., and can be reached by telephone at 215-830-1458 and via e-mail at hjb@hjbashman.com. You can access his appellate Web log at http://howappealing.law.com/.

Sunday, June 13, 2010

Copy of Opinion Secured on First Party Benefits/Bad Faith Issue

I recently posted a summary of recent decisions on the validity of joining First Party Benefit Claims and a Bad Faith Claim against a carrier under one caption. See "Bad Faith Claim Allowed to Proceed in First Party Benefits IME Case" (6/11/2010): http://www.torttalk.com/2010/06/bad-faith-claim-allowed-to-proceed-in.html.

In that post, I noted that I did not have a copy of the referenced opinion by Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas Judge Carmen D. Minora on the issue in the case of Veltri v. Travelers Commercial Insurance Company, 08-CIVIL-8534 (Lacka. Co. September 2, 2009 Minora, J.).

I wanted to update that post by confirming that I have just received a copy of the Veltri Opinion should anyone need it. If so, please contact me at dancummins@comcast.net.

I send thanks to the prevailing Plaintiff's attorney in Veltri, Thomas Helbig, Esquire of Scranton for forwarding a copy of the Opinion to my attention.