On June 4, 2010, Judge Terrence R. Nealon of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas issued a decision in the case of Erie Insurance Exchange v. Wayne/Scott Fetzer Company, No. 06 CIV 1506 (Lacka. Co. June 4, 2010 Nealon, J.) allowing a negligent design products liability claim to proceed to trial even though the court had previously dismissed strict liability allegations in the Complaint.
In this matter, Erie commenced a subrogation lawsuit to recover fire loss damages that allegedly occurred at the Erie insured's residence as a result of a utility pump that had been manufactured by the Wayne/Scott Fetzer Company [Fetzer].
During the course of the litigation, the trial court granted Fetzer's motion for summary judgment on Erie's defective product claim under an argument by the manufacturer of a non-intended use of the product by the homeowner.
More specifically, it was established that the homeowner had admittedly altered the utility pump's design by installing an automatic switch that allowed the pump to run continuously while unattended and without the thermal protection required for continuous use. The manufacturer alleged that this non-intended use allowed the pump to overheat and start the fire.
The trial court had previously granted summary judgment in this case on the strict liability portion of the claim as, under the Pennsylvania rule of law set forth in Pennsylvania Dept. of General Services v. United States Mineral Products Co., 898 A.2d 590, 600 (Pa. 2006), "there is no strict liability in Pennsylvania relative to non-intended uses even where foreseeable by the manufacturer."
Based upon that rule of law, Judge Nealon previously held in the case that Fetzer could not be found liable for a design defect in the utility pump where the homeowner materially altered the product's design for an unintended use. The court did, however, allow the defective product claim to proceed based upon a failure-to-warn theory as there were issues of fact present on the issue of whether Fetzer provided adequate warnings that advised of the risks of continuous use of the product in terms of overheating.
This most recent decision being reported on here was issued by Judge Nealon to address Erie's stated intention to also advance a negligent product design theory at trial under an argument that such a claim survived the dismissal of the strict liability claim.
Fetzer contended that Erie was precluded from proceeding on this claim as the court had already determined during the motion for summary judgment proceedings that the utility pump could not be deemed to have been defectively designed as manufactured. Fetzer also argued that the claim should not be allowed because Erie allegedly could not make out a prima facie case of negligence in that it could not be shown that the product itself was defective.
In response, Erie pointed to expert evidence it intended to present at trial in support of its negligent product design theory. This evidence allegedly established a defect in the product as manufactured that allowed for overheating.
In his opinion, Judge Nealon reviewed a number of federal and state appellate decisions that abrogated the previous evidentiary requirement that a plaintiff pursuing a product liability negligence claim prove that the product was defective under strict liability principles in addition to establishing that the manufacturer failed to use reasonable care in designing the product.
Judge Nealon noted that those cases viewed strict liability and negligence as distinct legal theories. Strict liability looks at the product itself and does not concern itself with the reasonableness of the actions of the manufacturer. On the other hand, negligence claims against a manufacturer focuses on the conduct of the defendant. Thus, these cases reviewed by Judge Nealon stand for the proposition that it would be improper to dismiss a negligence claim against a manufacturer simply the basis that there was no defect in the product itself.
As such, Judge Nealon noted that the "decisional precedent has consistently recognized that a finding that a product is not defective does not foreclose a manufacturer's liability for negligence."
Judge Nealon therefore held that, although he previously granted summary judgment in favor of the defense on the strict liability claim, Erie was not precluded from pursuing its negligence claim that the defendant manufacturer negligently failed to exercise reasonable care by failing to provide thermal protection capabilities in the product. Accordingly, the plaintiff Erie was allowed to proceed to trial on its negligent design claim.
Anyone desiring a copy of Judge Nealon's Opinion in the case of Erie Ins. Exchange v. Wayne/Scott Fetzer Company may contact me at dancummins@comcast.net.
Friday, June 11, 2010
Recent Post-Koken Case Out of Delaware County In Favor of Severance of Claims
A recent decision to sever claims in a post-Koken automobile accident lawsuit was handed down in the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas by Judge George A. Pagano in the case of Bryant v. Graham and Allstate, No. 09-11736 (Del. Co. May 26, 2010 Pagano, J.).
This case was slightly different from the ordinary post-Koken case of a third party claim against the defendant driver combined with a UIM claim.
In Bryant, the plaintiff sued the third party tortfeasor for personal injuries arising out of a motor vehicle accident. Given that the tortfeasor was allegedly uninsured, the plaintiff also included a uninsured [UM] motorist benefits claim in the lawsuit. Also alleged was a breach of contract and Section 8371 bad faith claim against the UM carrier pertaining to that carrier's handling of the UM claim.
Allstate filed a Motion to Sever and Stay the breach of contract and bad faith claims from the separate UM claim and the negligence claim against the tortfeasor. Judge Pagano granted the Motion in an Order without Opinion on May 26, 2010. In addition to severing the claims as requested, the court also ruled that breach of contract and bad faith claims would be stayed until the third party liability and UM claims were resolved.
Note that, to date, no motion to sever the UM claim from the third negligence claim against the tortfeasor has been filed in this case.
The information is that the plaintiff has filed a Motion for Reconsideration in the Bryant case and that motion remains in the briefing phase.
I thank Attorney Marshall Walthew of the Philadelphia office of the law firm of Pepper Hamilton for bringing this decision to my attention.
Anyone desiring a copy of the Order from the Bryant case may contact me at dancummins@comcast.net.
I remind you that a synopsis of all of the post-Koken cases I have been able to uncover, or have been made aware of, can be viewed by clicking on the date below the "Post-Koken Scorecard" down on the right-hand column of this blog.
This case was slightly different from the ordinary post-Koken case of a third party claim against the defendant driver combined with a UIM claim.
In Bryant, the plaintiff sued the third party tortfeasor for personal injuries arising out of a motor vehicle accident. Given that the tortfeasor was allegedly uninsured, the plaintiff also included a uninsured [UM] motorist benefits claim in the lawsuit. Also alleged was a breach of contract and Section 8371 bad faith claim against the UM carrier pertaining to that carrier's handling of the UM claim.
Allstate filed a Motion to Sever and Stay the breach of contract and bad faith claims from the separate UM claim and the negligence claim against the tortfeasor. Judge Pagano granted the Motion in an Order without Opinion on May 26, 2010. In addition to severing the claims as requested, the court also ruled that breach of contract and bad faith claims would be stayed until the third party liability and UM claims were resolved.
Note that, to date, no motion to sever the UM claim from the third negligence claim against the tortfeasor has been filed in this case.
The information is that the plaintiff has filed a Motion for Reconsideration in the Bryant case and that motion remains in the briefing phase.
I thank Attorney Marshall Walthew of the Philadelphia office of the law firm of Pepper Hamilton for bringing this decision to my attention.
Anyone desiring a copy of the Order from the Bryant case may contact me at dancummins@comcast.net.
I remind you that a synopsis of all of the post-Koken cases I have been able to uncover, or have been made aware of, can be viewed by clicking on the date below the "Post-Koken Scorecard" down on the right-hand column of this blog.
Labels:
Automobile Insurance,
Koken,
UM,
Uninsured Motorists Claims
Bad Faith Claim Allowed To Proceed in First Party Benefits IME Case
In a recent decision, Judge Harold A. Thomson, Jr., senior judge specially presiding in Lackawanna County, denied a carrier's preliminary objections seeking to preclude a bad faith claim in the automobile insurance first party benefits case of Skiro v. Erie Ins. Exchange, No. 09-CV-7077 (Lacka Co. May 19, 2010 Thomson, S.J.).
In Skiro, Erie had paid first party medical benefits over the first five years following a motor vehicle accident to its insured. The insured exhausted his $100,000 in PIP medical benefits and then began to receive additional benefits under his extra ordinary medical benefits where he had a $1 million dollar policy limit available.
Erie referred its insured for an independent medical examination [IME] pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S. Section 1796 (as opposed to engaging in a peer review under 75 Pa.C.S. Section 1797). The IME doctor found that the insured had reached maximum medical improvement and that the ongoing treatment was not medically reasonable or necessary for the alleged injuries from the subject motor vehicle accident.
Accordingly, Erie stopped the medical benefits payments. The insured responded by suing Erie for breach of contract and bad faith. Erie responded to the Complaint by filing preliminary objections to the Complaint asserting that the bad faith claims brought under the bad faith statute (Section 8371) must be dismissed because the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law [MVFRL] provided, under 75 Pa.C.S. Section 1798, for the sole remedies available for the denial of benefits pursuant to the mental and physical evaluation process.
Under Section 1798, if it is determined that the carrier acted unreasonably in refusing to pay benefits, the carrier would be compelled to pay the medical expenses, any interest, and a reasonable attorneys fee to the injured party for having to fight the issue [but punitive damages are not provided for]. The Plaintiff apparently pursued a bad faith claim under Section 8371 in part because that statute provides for the additional remedies of additional interest, costs, and punitive damages.
While Erie attempted to analogize the issues presented in this matter involving an IME in the first party context to those peer review cases where it has been held that MVFRL provides the exclusive remedies for first party disputes, the insured countered with the argument that the issue presented under the first party benefits IME scenario had not been definitively decided by the appellate courts.
Judge Thomson issued a one line Order, without an Opinion, on May 19, 2010 overruling Erie's preliminary objections and allowing the bad faith claim to proceed in this context.
I note that Judge Thomson's decision is consistent with a prior decision issued by Judge Carmen Minora also out of Lackawanna County in the case of Veltri v. Travelers Commercial Insurance Company, 08-CIVIL-8534 (Lacka. Co. September 2, 2009 Minora, J.) [I do not have a copy of this decision--UPDATE (6/13/10) I have now secured a copy of this opinion should anyone need a copy--contact me at dancummins@comcast.net].
In Veltri, Travelers’ decided to terminate first party benefits after a favorable IME pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S. Section 1796. This led to the filing of a breach of contract and bad faith Complaint by the Plaintiff.
Travelers responded with Preliminary Objections to the bad faith count of the Complaint alleging that the general tenants of the bad faith statute at 42 Pa. C.S.A. §8371 are essentially trumped by the specific remedies of the MVFRL found at 75 Pa. C.S.A. §1716 and §1798.
Judge Minora denied Travelers’ Preliminary Objections and rejected the carrier's contention that the rules of statutory construction mandate that the provisions for the nonpayment of first party benefits found under the MVFRL negate or trump the general bad faith statute.
The court in Veltri essentially ruled that where the Complaint specifically alleges culpable misconduct both within and beyond the coverage of the specific statutes of the MVFRL, then the remedies under the general bad faith statute at §8371 (i.e., punitive damages, costs and interest) may additionally apply as well.
For more info on Judge Minora's decision in the Veltri case, click on this link to the Tort Talk post on that case:
http://www.torttalk.com/2009/11/lackawanna-county-judge-carmen-minora.html
Also of note on this issue is the fact that Judge Zulick of the Monroe County Court of Common Pleas reached the opposite decision in the case of O'Connor v. Erie Ins. Exchange, No. 8654 CV 2009 (Monroe Co. Feb. 9, 2010 Zulick, J.).
In O'Connor, Judge Zulick struck a bad faith claim against the carrier in a matter pertaining to a denial of PIP medical benefits after an IME. The Monroe County Court of Common Pleas ruled that the Plaintiff's remedy was limited to those remedies provided for under the provisions of the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (MVFRL) pertaining to first party benefits.
For more info on the O'Connor decision, click on this link to the Tort Talk post on that case:
http://www.torttalk.com/2010/03/bad-faith-claim-dismissed-from-first.html.
The above recitation of cases is not meant to be exhaustive on this issue but only serves to point out those cases that have been brought to my attention. Based on the above cases, there appears to be a split of authority on the issue among the trial courts and no appellate case on point to provide guidance.
I send thanks to Erie's defense attorney Robert Panowicz, Esquire for bringing the Skiro case to my attention.
Anyone desiring a copy of Skiro v. Erie Ins. Exchange court filings or court Order or the decision in O'Connor v. Erie Insurance Exchange may contact me at dancummins@comcast.net.
As stated, I do not have the Veltri v. Traveler's decision but if you click on the link above to the other Tort Talk post on Veltri you will find info on how to order a copy of that case from the Instant Case Service run by the Pennsylvania Law Weekly. [UPDATE (6/13/10): I now have a copy of the Veltri opinion should anyone one need it].
In Skiro, Erie had paid first party medical benefits over the first five years following a motor vehicle accident to its insured. The insured exhausted his $100,000 in PIP medical benefits and then began to receive additional benefits under his extra ordinary medical benefits where he had a $1 million dollar policy limit available.
Erie referred its insured for an independent medical examination [IME] pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S. Section 1796 (as opposed to engaging in a peer review under 75 Pa.C.S. Section 1797). The IME doctor found that the insured had reached maximum medical improvement and that the ongoing treatment was not medically reasonable or necessary for the alleged injuries from the subject motor vehicle accident.
Accordingly, Erie stopped the medical benefits payments. The insured responded by suing Erie for breach of contract and bad faith. Erie responded to the Complaint by filing preliminary objections to the Complaint asserting that the bad faith claims brought under the bad faith statute (Section 8371) must be dismissed because the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law [MVFRL] provided, under 75 Pa.C.S. Section 1798, for the sole remedies available for the denial of benefits pursuant to the mental and physical evaluation process.
Under Section 1798, if it is determined that the carrier acted unreasonably in refusing to pay benefits, the carrier would be compelled to pay the medical expenses, any interest, and a reasonable attorneys fee to the injured party for having to fight the issue [but punitive damages are not provided for]. The Plaintiff apparently pursued a bad faith claim under Section 8371 in part because that statute provides for the additional remedies of additional interest, costs, and punitive damages.
While Erie attempted to analogize the issues presented in this matter involving an IME in the first party context to those peer review cases where it has been held that MVFRL provides the exclusive remedies for first party disputes, the insured countered with the argument that the issue presented under the first party benefits IME scenario had not been definitively decided by the appellate courts.
Judge Thomson issued a one line Order, without an Opinion, on May 19, 2010 overruling Erie's preliminary objections and allowing the bad faith claim to proceed in this context.
I note that Judge Thomson's decision is consistent with a prior decision issued by Judge Carmen Minora also out of Lackawanna County in the case of Veltri v. Travelers Commercial Insurance Company, 08-CIVIL-8534 (Lacka. Co. September 2, 2009 Minora, J.) [I do not have a copy of this decision--UPDATE (6/13/10) I have now secured a copy of this opinion should anyone need a copy--contact me at dancummins@comcast.net].
In Veltri, Travelers’ decided to terminate first party benefits after a favorable IME pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S. Section 1796. This led to the filing of a breach of contract and bad faith Complaint by the Plaintiff.
Travelers responded with Preliminary Objections to the bad faith count of the Complaint alleging that the general tenants of the bad faith statute at 42 Pa. C.S.A. §8371 are essentially trumped by the specific remedies of the MVFRL found at 75 Pa. C.S.A. §1716 and §1798.
Judge Minora denied Travelers’ Preliminary Objections and rejected the carrier's contention that the rules of statutory construction mandate that the provisions for the nonpayment of first party benefits found under the MVFRL negate or trump the general bad faith statute.
The court in Veltri essentially ruled that where the Complaint specifically alleges culpable misconduct both within and beyond the coverage of the specific statutes of the MVFRL, then the remedies under the general bad faith statute at §8371 (i.e., punitive damages, costs and interest) may additionally apply as well.
For more info on Judge Minora's decision in the Veltri case, click on this link to the Tort Talk post on that case:
http://www.torttalk.com/2009/11/lackawanna-county-judge-carmen-minora.html
Also of note on this issue is the fact that Judge Zulick of the Monroe County Court of Common Pleas reached the opposite decision in the case of O'Connor v. Erie Ins. Exchange, No. 8654 CV 2009 (Monroe Co. Feb. 9, 2010 Zulick, J.).
In O'Connor, Judge Zulick struck a bad faith claim against the carrier in a matter pertaining to a denial of PIP medical benefits after an IME. The Monroe County Court of Common Pleas ruled that the Plaintiff's remedy was limited to those remedies provided for under the provisions of the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (MVFRL) pertaining to first party benefits.
For more info on the O'Connor decision, click on this link to the Tort Talk post on that case:
http://www.torttalk.com/2010/03/bad-faith-claim-dismissed-from-first.html.
The above recitation of cases is not meant to be exhaustive on this issue but only serves to point out those cases that have been brought to my attention. Based on the above cases, there appears to be a split of authority on the issue among the trial courts and no appellate case on point to provide guidance.
I send thanks to Erie's defense attorney Robert Panowicz, Esquire for bringing the Skiro case to my attention.
Anyone desiring a copy of Skiro v. Erie Ins. Exchange court filings or court Order or the decision in O'Connor v. Erie Insurance Exchange may contact me at dancummins@comcast.net.
As stated, I do not have the Veltri v. Traveler's decision but if you click on the link above to the other Tort Talk post on Veltri you will find info on how to order a copy of that case from the Instant Case Service run by the Pennsylvania Law Weekly. [UPDATE (6/13/10): I now have a copy of the Veltri opinion should anyone one need it].
Labels:
Automobile Insurance,
Bad Faith,
Independent Medical Examinations,
Judge Harold A. Thomson,
Judge Minora
SAVE THE DATE: Thursday, July 15, 2010 - Pennsylvania Defense Institute CLE Seminar in Pittsburgh
THE PENNSYLVANIA DEFENSE INSTITUTE
Proudly Presents Our Fourth Annual
“Key Insurance Law Developments 2010”
Proudly Presents Our Fourth Annual
“Key Insurance Law Developments 2010”
The Pennsylvania Defense Institute's annual up-to-the-minute program on issues important to insurance claim representatives and defense counsel. Experienced local counsel will present updates on:
Compliance with Medicare and DPW liens
Auto UIM/UM law
Insurance bad faith law
Federal and state ADR
3 Substantive CLE Credits
Thursday, July 15, 2010
1:30 P.M. – 4:45 P.M. Registration begins at 1:00 P.M.
Sheraton Station Square Hotel
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
Costs for the event:
· Program for claim representatives $25.00
· CLE program for lawyers $125.00
For reservations, please complete the form below and return to PDI or e-mail us at coled01@padefense.org
· CLE program for lawyers $125.00
For reservations, please complete the form below and return to PDI or e-mail us at coled01@padefense.org
Name(s)__________________________________________________
Firm/Company_____________________________________________
Make checks payable to:
PENNSYLVANIA DEFENSE INSTITUTE
P.O. Box 697, Camp Hill, PA 17001-0697
For more information, contact PDI at 800-734-0737
Wednesday, June 9, 2010
Atlantic Second Citation for Tannenbaum Decision
Here is the citation given to the Tannenbaum v. Nationwide case in case you need it sometime:
Tannenbaum v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 992 A.2d 859 (Pa. 2010)(Recovery of UM/UIM benefits can be offset by amount of insureds group plan and personal disability benefits).
Tannenbaum v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 992 A.2d 859 (Pa. 2010)(Recovery of UM/UIM benefits can be offset by amount of insureds group plan and personal disability benefits).
Superior Court Holds Oral Argument on Expert Discovery Issue
On June 9, 2010 I traveled to Harrisburg to participate in oral argument before the Pennsylvania Superior Court during which I presented the Pennsylvania Defense Institute's amicus curiae position in the case of Barrick v. Holy Spirit Hospital, No. 1856 MDA 2009 (Pa.Super. 2009).
As you may recall from recent posts on Tort Talk, the issue presented, as set forth in my amicus brief and filed of public record, is "[w]hether the trial court [Cumberland County Court of Common Pleas--Judge Hess] properly ruled, within its broad discretion, that repeated communications from plaintiff's attorney to the plaintiff's expert medical witness for trial were discoverable by the defense where the letters and e-mails to the expert purposefully addressed how the expert should frame his opinion testimony and where the trial court found, after an in camera inspection of the documents, that such written documents may have materially impacted the expert's formulation of his opinion."
Plaintiff's counsel argued, in part, that his letters and e-mails were protected from disclosure by the attorney work product doctrine. He also asserted that recent changes to the companion Federal Rules of Discovery in this regard allegedly showed a trend in favor of protecting such communications from disclosure.
Here are links to the other Tort Talk posts on this case:
http://www.torttalk.com/2010/02/amicus-brief-on-expert-discovery-issue.html
http://www.torttalk.com/2009/12/plaintiffs-also-required-to-produce.html
http://www.torttalk.com/2010/02/new-westlaw-citation-for-trial-court.html
The Superior Court took the matter under advisement. I will post a summary of the Court's decision here on Tort Talk once it is handed down.
As you may recall from recent posts on Tort Talk, the issue presented, as set forth in my amicus brief and filed of public record, is "[w]hether the trial court [Cumberland County Court of Common Pleas--Judge Hess] properly ruled, within its broad discretion, that repeated communications from plaintiff's attorney to the plaintiff's expert medical witness for trial were discoverable by the defense where the letters and e-mails to the expert purposefully addressed how the expert should frame his opinion testimony and where the trial court found, after an in camera inspection of the documents, that such written documents may have materially impacted the expert's formulation of his opinion."
Plaintiff's counsel argued, in part, that his letters and e-mails were protected from disclosure by the attorney work product doctrine. He also asserted that recent changes to the companion Federal Rules of Discovery in this regard allegedly showed a trend in favor of protecting such communications from disclosure.
Here are links to the other Tort Talk posts on this case:
http://www.torttalk.com/2010/02/amicus-brief-on-expert-discovery-issue.html
http://www.torttalk.com/2009/12/plaintiffs-also-required-to-produce.html
http://www.torttalk.com/2010/02/new-westlaw-citation-for-trial-court.html
The Superior Court took the matter under advisement. I will post a summary of the Court's decision here on Tort Talk once it is handed down.
Monday, June 7, 2010
Assumption of Risk Defense Upheld in Centre County Case
The assumption of risk defense was recently upheld in the Centre County trial court decision of Vail v. Leonard S. Fiore, Inc., PICS Case No. 10-1789 (C.P. Centre April 28, 2010 Lunsford, J.).
The Vail case involved a plaintiff who was employed at an elementary school that was undergoing renovations. On the day of the trip and fall incident, the plaintiff was on her way to monitor dismissal of students.
As she was going through the doorway to the main building of the school, plaintiff stepped around a tightly rolled carpet that was about six to eight inches high. There was a one-foot wide space where the carpet was not blocking the doorway.
Plaintiff stepped through this one-foot wide space to walk around the carpet. She caught her pant leg on the roll of carpet and fell, allegedly sustaining personal injuries.
Plaintiff filed this negligence action against various defendants. All of the defendants moved for summary judgment on the basis of the plaintiff's alleged assumption of the risk presented.
The evidence in the case established that about two or three minutes prior to the accident, plaintiff had walked out of the school's main building, using the same doorway where her accident later occurred.
At that time, the plaintiff admittedly saw the carpet that was partially across the bottom of the doorway. On her way out of the building before her incident, she also walked through the same one-foot wide opening in the doorway rather than stepping over the carpet. The plaintiff later came back and walked through the same doorway when her trip and fall occurred.
The court determined that because plaintiff voluntarily and intelligently chose to try to step around the rolled up carpet, with the previous awareness of the presence of the carpet and the risk of potentially falling, she was barred from recovery under the assumption of risk doctrine.
Accordingly, the court granted defendants' summary judgment on the basis of assumption of risk.
The Vail case involved a plaintiff who was employed at an elementary school that was undergoing renovations. On the day of the trip and fall incident, the plaintiff was on her way to monitor dismissal of students.
As she was going through the doorway to the main building of the school, plaintiff stepped around a tightly rolled carpet that was about six to eight inches high. There was a one-foot wide space where the carpet was not blocking the doorway.
Plaintiff stepped through this one-foot wide space to walk around the carpet. She caught her pant leg on the roll of carpet and fell, allegedly sustaining personal injuries.
Plaintiff filed this negligence action against various defendants. All of the defendants moved for summary judgment on the basis of the plaintiff's alleged assumption of the risk presented.
The evidence in the case established that about two or three minutes prior to the accident, plaintiff had walked out of the school's main building, using the same doorway where her accident later occurred.
At that time, the plaintiff admittedly saw the carpet that was partially across the bottom of the doorway. On her way out of the building before her incident, she also walked through the same one-foot wide opening in the doorway rather than stepping over the carpet. The plaintiff later came back and walked through the same doorway when her trip and fall occurred.
The court determined that because plaintiff voluntarily and intelligently chose to try to step around the rolled up carpet, with the previous awareness of the presence of the carpet and the risk of potentially falling, she was barred from recovery under the assumption of risk doctrine.
Accordingly, the court granted defendants' summary judgment on the basis of assumption of risk.
Source: Case Digests of June 8, 2010 Pennsylvania Law Weekly
Anyone desiring a copy of this case may secure one for a small fee by calling the Instant Case Service of the Pennsylvania Law Weekly at 1-800-276-PICS (7427) and giving the above PICS Number.
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