Court Sees Former Prisoner Plaintiff's Civil Rights Claims as Plausible and Allows Them to Proceed Forward

In the case of Walton v. Lackawanna County, No. 3:25-CV-02461-MEM (M.D. Pa. July 7, 2026 Mannion, J.), the court denied a municipality’s Motion to Dismiss a former prisoner Plaintiff’s civil rights claims.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff was pursuing §1983 civil rights claims, along with other disability claims, relative to allegations that, during a period of incarceration at the Lackawanna County Prison, the Plaintiff was prevented from securing the small plunger-like devices he allegedly required to remove his scleral contact lenses each day for his condition of keratoconus.  The Plaintiff alleged that, due to the fact that he was allegedly prevented from securing the plunger devices, he could not remove his scleral contact lenses, and suffered injuries to his eyes as a result.

After the filing of the Complaint, the municipality filed a Motion to Dismiss the Plaintiff’s various claims, including claims of municipal liability, deliberate indifference claims, and claims of liability under various disability laws.

After reviewing the record before him and applying the allegations against the standard of review, Federal Court Judge Malachy E. Mannion found that the Plaintiff had stated plausible causes of action in all respects. As such, the Defendant’s Motion was denied and the case was allowed to proceed.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Trial Court Rules Appeal Not Permissible From a Denial of a Motion to Recuse

In the case V.M., a minor v. Sattar, No. 2025-CV-01838 (C.P. Montg. Co. April 14, 2026 Saltz, J.), the trial court issued a Rule 1925 Opinion requesting the Superior Court to find that an interlocutory appeal from an Order denying a Motion for Recusal was not permissible given that the Order at issue was neither final nor otherwise immediately appealable.

In this matter, the Defendant’s Motion for Recusal was, according to the Court, based upon the judge’s prior rulings that were adverse to the party filing the motion for recusal. The Defendant was asserting that the judge had allegedly demonstrated bias against the Defendant in that regard.

In denying the Motion for Recusal, the court further ruled that a hearing on the recusal motion was not necessary because the motion did not present any facts that, if proven, would raise questions regarding the judge’s impartiality. Rather, in this matter, the Defendant’s Motion for Recusal was primarily based on the judge’s prior adverse rulings.

In this Rule 1925 Opinion, the trial court requested the Superior Court to quash the Defendant’s appeal as improper.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer Common Pleas Case Alert, www.Law.com (July 2, 2026).

Source of image:  Photo by Katrin Bolovtsova on www.pexels.com.

  

Consolidation Order Vacated on Appeal

In the case of DLP Conemaugh Mem. Medical Center v. Doe, 2026 Pa. Super. 107 (Pa. Super. May 26, 2026 Stabile, J., King, J., Sullivan, J.) (Op. by Stabile, J.), the Superior Court vacated a trial court Order consolidating various actions involving alleged sexual abuse by a Defendant physician, which case involved different Defendants and different alleged assaults over a 16 year period.

The Superior Court vacated a trial court Order of consolidation after finding that there is a danger of prejudice to Defendants and a danger of confusion among the jury. The appellate court noted that, although common questions of law existed in this case, there were no common questions of fact. As such, consolidation was found not to be warranted.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Source: “Court Summaries” by Timothy L. Clawges in the Pennsylvania Bar News (July 6, 2026).

Source of image: Photo by www.kaboompics.com on www.pexels.com.

A Dead End: Paved Pathway in Park is Not a Street Under the Streets Exception to Governmental Immunity

In the case of Gabra v. Borough of Prospect Park, No. 1343 C.D. 2024 (Pa. Cmwlth. June 18, 2026 Covey, J., Tsia, J., and Leavitt, S.J.) (Op. by Covey, J.), the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court addressed the issue of whether a pathway in a park fell within the Streets Exception to governmental immunity under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiffs filed a negligence Complaint after the Plaintiff’s decedent was struck and killed by a vehicle driven on a pathway in a park. According to the Opinion, the driver of the vehicle purposely drove his truck off of a roadway and into a park.  The road in question ended at a small, paved parking area and then narrowed significantly into a paved asphalt pathway leading to a pavilion and baseball fields.

It was additionally noted that the roadway had “No Outlet” and “No Parking This Side of the Street” signs in the area.

The accident occurred just after the end of the pathway and past the pavilion.

The Plaintiff’s Complaint invoked the Real Property, Utility Service, Streets, and Sidewalks Exceptions to governmental immunity afforded under the Act. Earlier in the litigation, the Real Property and Utility Service Exceptions theories of liability were stricken but the Streets and the Sidewalk theories were allowed to proceed.

On appeal, the appellate court addressed the issue of whether the paved pathway within the park could meet the definition of a street under the Streets Exception. 

In part, the court noted that the pathway was significantly narrower than the roadway that led to it. No evidence was presented by the Plaintiff that the pathway was wider than an alley or lane. 

There was additionally no evidence that the pathway afforded an exit at each end of the pathway   It was noted that the pathway ended just beyond the pavilion in the park. 

Nor was any evidence presented that the pathway was used for travel as a street or that the pathway connected one street to another.  Also, no evidence was presented by the Plaintiff to show that the pathway had been legally laid out or opened as a street.

The court otherwise noted that borough ordinances prohibited vehicular traffic in parks without permission. 

Other testimony showed that the pathway’s primary purpose was for use by employees of the borough and for short-term vehicle loading and unloading by youth clubs. As such, the court noted that the pathway was more akin to a driveway.

After a review of the facts against the applicable law, the Commonwealth Court held that, because the Plaintiffs had failed to establish that the pathway was a street, the court further held that the concrete base around the pavilion could not be deemed to be a sidewalk “within the rights-of-way of streets owned by the local agency” under 42 Pa. C.S.A. §8542(b)(7). 

Accordingly, the appellate court reversed the portions of the trial court Order denying summary judgment relative to the applicability of the Streets and Sidewalk Exceptions to governmental immunity.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer State Appellate Case Alert, www.Law.com (Jul 7, 2026).

Source of image:  Photo by Azgan Mjeshtri on www.unsplash.com.

PA. Supreme Court Rules That Liability Carriers Are Not Automatically Protected From Having To Provide Coverage in Sex Trafficking Cases

In the case of Samsung Fire and Marina v. R.I. Settlement Trust, No. 61 EAP 2024 (Pa. July 21, 2026) (Op. by Donohue, J.)(Wecht, J., Concurring), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court issued an opinion responding to questions presented by a way of a Petition for Certification filed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit relative to the ability of insurance carriers to block its insured hotels from receiving from insurance coverage if they are sued over allegations that they allegedly turned a blind eye to sex trafficking activities on hotel premises.

In a unanimous decision, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected efforts by insurance carriers to deny coverage in this regard. The Court held that the fact that Pennsylvania criminalizes sex trafficking activities through its criminal laws does not mean that hotels that profited from the conduct should automatically be barred from seeking insurance coverage for lawsuits that arise out of that conduct.

In so ruling, the Supreme Court reviewed the interplay between the public policy of interpreting insurance contracts broadly to favor coverage, and the policy against requiring carriers to provide coverage when the conduct at issue is so repugnant to society that the provision of insurance coverage for such acts would violate other overriding public policy.

The Court noted that, where Pennsylvania's Human Trafficking Law does not address the issues presented regarding the availability of insurance coverage, the parties should instead look to the insurance contract to resolve any cover disputes.

Accordingly, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that “neither an insurer’s duty to defend nor its duty to identify is abrogated on the basis of public policy when the insured is alleged to have enabled or profited from sex trafficking.”

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.  The Concurring Opinion by Justice Wecht can be viewed HERE.

Source: “Pa. Supreme Court Removes Insurance Hurdle For Sex Trafficking Survivors Seeking Coverage Stemming From Abuse," by Max Mitchell of The Legal Intelligencer (July 21, 2026).

Carrier Prevails on Declaratory Judgment Action Regarding Validity of Rejection of UIM Coverage By Insured

In the case of Huggins v. Progressive Adv. Ins. Co., No. 965 MDA 2025 (Pa. Super. June 18, 2026 Bowes, J., Dubow, J., and Neuman, J.) (Op. by Bowes, J.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed a trial court’s dismissal of a Plaintiff’s declaratory judgment action against Progressive in which the Plaintiff had sought UIM benefits.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff had a single policy with Progressive Insurance which was a motorcycle insurance policy. The Plaintiff had electronically executed the policy and signed a letter rejecting UIM protection.

After the Plaintiff was involved in a motor vehicle accident while operating his motorcycle, he settled the third party claim against the tortfeasor. He then pursued a UIM claim under his motorcycle policy with Progressive. That claim was denied by Progressive based upon the fact that the Plaintiff had previously signed a letter rejecting UIM coverage.

The Plaintiff filed a declaratory judgment action, asserting an entitlement to UIM coverage. According to the Plaintiff, the rejection was invalid because the form he executed did not include the associated policy number.  The Plaintiff made this argument even though he only had one policy with Progressive.

As noted above, the trial court had ruled in favor of the insurance company. The trial court determined that there was no question that the UIM rejection form pertained to the only policy that the Plaintiff had with Progressive. The trial court found that the Plaintiff had declined UIM coverage in accordance with the provisions set forth in 75 Pa. C.S.A. §1731 of the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law. The trial court therefore granted summary judgment in favor of Progressive and dismissed the Plaintiff’s Complaint with prejudice.

As noted, on appeal, the Superior Court affirmed.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney David Friedman of the King of Prussia office of Forry Ullman for bringing this case to my attention.

Source of image:  Photo by Valentin Sarte on www.pexels.com.

Trial Court Finds No Bad Faith in Carrier's Handling of Regular Use Exclusion Dispute in UIM Case

In the case of Erie Insurance Exchange v. Hallam, No. 2021-CV-7526 (C.P. Wash. Co. June 24, 2026 Lucas, J.), the court granted the carrier’s Motion for Summary Judgment on the Plaintiff’s bad faith claim relative to the regular use exclusion.

At the time of the accident, the Plaintiff was injured while in an accident while driving a salt truck for his employer.  In addition to other recoveries, the Plaintiff sought to recover UIM benefits under an Erie Insurance policy that covered one of his personal vehicles at home.

According to the Opinion, the insurance company commenced this action seeking to enforce the “regular use” exclusion found in its personal automobile insurance policy issued to the Defendant. Erie asserted that the Plaintiff had regular access to a work vehicle,i.e. a vehicle that was not covered under the Erie policy.  The Plaintiff was allegedly injured while driving that work vehicle. As such, Erie was seeking a ruling that it did not have to pay UIM benefits to the insured.

The insured argued that, at the time he made a claim for his personal UIM benefits, Erie knew that its interpretation of its “regular use” exclusion had been rejected by the Pennsylvania Superior Court. More specifically, the Plaintiff argued that, as of that time, the Superior Court had determined in the case of Rush v. Erie Insurance Exchange that Erie’s “regular use” exclusion was invalid and therefore, unenforceable.

The insured otherwise argued that, in any event, he was not regularly using the work vehicle that he was injured in. Rather, he asserted that the use of the work vehicle was incidental. 

As such, the insured asserted a breach of contract a statutory bad faith claim against the carrier in a counterclaim. In response, Erie filed a summary judgment motion.

Erie argued that, further up the appellate ladder, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had more recently ruled in Rush v. Erie Insurance Exchange that the regular use exclusion was still valid in at least certain circumstances, which circumstances applied in this case.

Erie argued that there can be no bad faith where the carrier correctly applies a policy exclusion.  Erie asserted that, despite conflicting decisions in recent years on the validity of the regular use exclusion, Erie argued that it had reasonably relied upon existing legal precedent on the regular use exclusion to deny UIM benefits to the insured.

The Plaintiff countered by arguing that, at the time Erie denied coverage, the law was that the exclusion was “invalid.” The Plaintiff asserts that Erie had no good faith basis to disregard the Superior Court’s ruling and to deny coverage when it did so in this matter.

In this decision, the trial court noted that, in order to show bad faith on the part of an insurance company, an insured must show that the carrier breached its duty of good faith through some motive of self-interest or ill-will. The court also noted that bad faith must be shown by clear and convincing evidence. The insured must additionally show that the carrier did not have a reasonable basis for denying benefits under the policy, and that the carrier knew or recklessly disregarded its lack of a reasonable basis in denying the claim.

The trial court in this case noted that the carrier had remained in regular communication with the insured regarding the status of the claim. It was also noted that the carrier had informed the insured’s attorney that Erie was requesting a reconsideration of the Rush decision. In light of this, Erie requested that no further action be taken until a decision was made on that request by the appellate courts.

The court also noted that the insured in this case did not go so far as to argue that Erie lacked a bona fide belief that it had a good chance of ultimately succeeding in having the Pennsylvania Supreme Court declare that the “regular use” exclusion was valid under Pennsylvania law.

The court emphasized that, in this case, the insured did not offer any evidence to demonstrate that Erie’s manner in handling the claim was anything other than an attempt to enforce a written exclusion in the contract. 

The court went on to find that, where an insurer has no duty to provide coverage, there can be no bad faith. 

Here, the insured argued that Erie failed to take enough steps to limit the enforceability of the Superior Court decision in Rush while the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania considered whether or not to accept the case for review and then decide the case.  In essence, the insured argued that Erie should have paid him UIM benefits even though Erie had otherwise appealed the Superior Court decision in Rush to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.

The trial court in this matter found that this fact, alone, did not amount to potentially clear and convincing evidence of a dishonest purpose, a lack of a reasonable basis to deny benefits, or a knowing or reckless disregard of a reasonable basis to deny coverage on the part of the carrier.

The trial court also noted that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision in Rush made clear that the Superior Court decision in Rush deviated from well-established precedent that had continually upheld the validity of the regular use exclusion.

Accordingly, the trial court in this case found that the insured did not produce evidence to establish any bad faith on the part of the carrier. As such, Erie’s Motion for Summary Judgment was granted and the Plaintiff’s bad faith clam was dismissed.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney Joseph Hudock of the Pittsburgh office of the law firm of Summers, McDonnell, Hudock, Guthrie & Rauch, P.C. for bringing this interesting case to my attention.

Source of image:  Photo by Jay Brand at www.pexels.com.

Trial Court Requests Affirmance of its Order Transferring Venue of a Nursing Home Negligence Case Out of Philadelphia and to Delaware County

In the case of Bennett v. Providence Operator, LLC, No. June Term, 2024, No. 240603252 (C.P. Phila. Co. March 4, 2026 Cohen, J.), the trial court judge issued a Rule 1925 Opinion requesting the Superior Court to affirm the trial court’s finding that venue was improper in this nursing home malpractice case filed in Philadelphia County. The trial court had transferred the case to Delaware County after finding that all relevant conduct occurred at the Defendant’s facility that was located in Delaware County. The court noted that the Defendant only had incidental marketing contacts with Philadelphia County.

As such, the trial court had granted the Defendant’s Preliminary Objections as to improper venue.

The court otherwise emphasized that advertising and solicitation do not constitute conducting business. 

The court additionally noted that any revenue generated from Philadelphia residents at the Defendant’s facility was incidental to the care provided in Delaware County.

The trial court additionally rejected the argument that venue was proper in Philadelphia County given that the pre-admission assessment was conducted while the Plaintiff’s decedent was hospitalized in Philadelphia. The court rejected the argument that this constituted a transaction giving rise to the cause of action. 

Rather, the court found that the claims instead of arose from the care provided at the Defendant’s facility and not from the admission decision itself. In this case, the claims of injury were with respect to a fall down event that the Plaintiff decedent allegedly had at the facility in Delaware County.

As such, the trial court found that all relevant transactions and occurrences took place in Delaware County, where the alleged negligence occurred. 

Accordingly, the trial court urged the Superior Court to affirm the trial court’s finding that venue in Philadelphia County was improper and that the Order transferring the case to Delaware County should be affirmed.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer Common Pleas Case Alert, www.Law.com (July 2, 2026).

Trial Court Addresses Protections Afforded by Mental Health Procedures Act Relative to Mental Health Records in Discovery

In the case of Morreck v. Karns, No. 2025-CV-1140 (C.P. Lacka. Co. June 12, 2026 Minora, S.J.), the court addressed discovery issues in a motor vehicle accident case.

According to the court’s decision, the Plaintiff alleged physical injuries as a result of a motor vehicle accident but confirmed that she was not alleging any independent psychological injury as a result of the accident.

At issue in this matter was the Plaintiff’s objection to the Defendant’s subpoenas for medical records.   In the subpoenas, the Defendant specifically excluded from production any records concerning mental health or psychiatric treatment from either before or after the subject accident.

The Plaintiff objected to the subpoenas, raising concerns of a possible unintended release of information protected by privileges afforded by the Mental Health Protections Act, 50 Pa. C.S.A. §7111.

Senior Judge Carmen Minora
Lackawanna County

In his decision, Senior Judge Carmen D. Minora of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas confirmed that mental health records were indeed privilege under the MHPA. 

However, the court noted that a patient can waive the confidentiality protections under the MHPA where, as judged by an objective standard, the Plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known that the Plaintiff’s mental health would be placed directly at issue by the filing of a lawsuit.

However, here, where the Plaintiff had not placed her mental health at issue, the court found that the Plaintiff had not waived any confidentiality protections under the MHPA. 

As such, the court precluded discovery on any mental health treatment records and allowed discovery only of materials that were not protected under the privileges afforded under the MHPA.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney Joshua J. Perry of the O’Donnell Law Offices in Kingston, PA for bringing this case to my attention.

The Beginning of the End? Pennsylvania Supreme Court Agrees to Address Whether the Gist of the Action Doctrine Remains Valid Law

According to a July 14, 2026 article by Riley Brennan in The Legal Intelligencer entitled "Pa. High Court to Revisit 'Gist of the Action' Doctrine for Legal Malpractice Cases, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has agreed to address the ongoing validity of the doctrine in the case of Poteat v. Asteak.

Pennsylvania Supreme Court

As Tort Talkers may recall, my son, Daniel, Jr. (now about to enter his third year at Virginia Law where he is an Articles Editor on the Virginia Law Review) and I recently published a timely article in the April, 2026 edition of the Pennsylvania Bar Association Quarterly entitled "The Rise and Fall of the Gist of the Action Doctrine," in which the history of the doctrine was analyzed and and predictions were made regarding possible further developments in the law with respect to the doctrine.

We again thank Professor Emeritus Robert E. Rains of the Dickinson School of Law and Editor of the Quarterly for selecting this article for publication and for his excellent editorial assistance.

Here is the prediction from the end of the article with regards to the future of the gist of the action doctrine:

Thus, Swatt and Poteat appear to herald the beginning of the end of the gist of the action doctrine as a defense in Pennsylvania civil litigation matters. If and when the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has another opportunity to consider the validity of the gist of the action doctrine, it can be reasonably anticipated that the Supreme Court will finally swat the remaining mist of this doctrine into oblivion as contrary to the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure. Moreover, most of the current Justices on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court will also likely see the purpose of the gist of the action doctrine in maintaining the conceptual differences between tort and contract actions as less important than allowing injured parties to explore all potential theories of recovery available under the law.

With the anticipated downfall of the gist of the action doctrine, negligence and breach of contract will no longer be viewed as causes of action encompassing different types of wrongs that have to be kept apart. Rather, these types of claims will be viewed as parts of a menu of numerous options from which plaintiffs may select when deciding how to proceed with a lawsuit, including the option of proceeding with both types of claims in a single lawsuit. The anticipated total eradication of the defense of the gist of the action doctrine will therefore serve to expand the avenues of recovery for injured parties in Pennsylvania. However, until such time that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court again addresses the viability of the gist of the action doctrine and provides clarity and guidance, the courts and members of the bar will be left to grapple with implications of the Superior Court’s recent decisions on the doctrine.

To view the entire article, please click this LINK to the Tort Talk post on the article and then click the Link within that post to view the article.

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Superior Court Addresses the Parameters of the 'Common Interest Privilege' Under the Related Attorney-Client Privilege

In the case of Solid Waste Services, Inc. v. Ember Partners, LP, No. 1674 EDA 2025 (Pa. Super. June 9, 2026 Lazarus, P.J., Panella, P.J.E., and Stevens, P.J.E.) (Op. by Panella, P.J.E.), the Superior Court addressed discovery issues in a civil litigation dispute.

A primary issue addressed was whether a trial court Order granting a Motion to Compel production of documents withheld by a Defendant should be affirmed.

On appeal, the Defendant that was subject to the Motion to Compel was relying upon the somewhat novel “common interest” privilege to contend that they were legally entitled to withhold certain requested documents under a related attorney-client privilege argument

On appeal, the Superior Court noted that it agreed with the trial court’s findings that, while there may have been a common interest between the applicable parties earlier in the negotiations and dealings between the parties, the record revealed that there was no evidence of a common interest at the times relevant to the subject lawsuit. 

The Superior Court also found that the Defendant that was subject to the Motion to Compel Order did not meet their burden of proving the existence of an agreement to share the common interests privilege at any time. 

Accordingly, the Superior Court affirmed the trial court finding that the common interest doctrine did not protect attorney-client communications shared with a third-party because the Defendant at issue failed to prove an agreement to pursue a shared legal strategy and also failed to show any continuing common legal interest at the relevant times in the lawsuit.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer State Appellate Case Alert, www.Law.com (June 30, 2026).

Source of image:  Photo by Sasun Bughdaryan on www.unsplash.com.

Superior Court Rules That Plaintiff's Effort To Revive a Previously Discontinued Med Mal Case Was Time Barred

The following decision is a cautionary tale for those cases where a Plaintiff discontinues a personal injury case, for one reason or another, before the matter is fully litigated and a recovery is secured.

In the case of Dixon v. Heritage Valley Sewickley, No. 307 WDA 2025 (Pa. Super. May 28, 2026 Olson, J., Stabile, J., and King, J.) (Op. by Stabile, J.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court vacated a trial court Order and held that a Plaintiff could not revive a voluntarily discontinued medical malpractice action by way of a Praecipe to Reinstate after the statute of limitations expired. 

 The appellate court ruled that attorney mistake and/or equitable considerations alone did not serve to toll the limitations period. 

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff filed a medical malpractice action alleging negligent treatment of arm wounds after the Plaintiff suffered an injury. The Plaintiff alleged that he did not learn that the Defendant medical provider had failed to remove a piece of glass from his arm until that piece of glass was later removed during a subsequent emergency medical procedure.

After the Defendant had filed a Notice of Intention to Enter a Judgment of Non Pros, the Plaintiff voluntarily filed a Praecipe to Discontinue the action without prejudice.

Then, more than two (2) years after the Plaintiff alleged that he had discovered that the glass was still in his arm, the Plaintiff filed a Praecipe to Reinstate the Complaint.

The Defendant medical provider pled the statute of limitations defense in an Answer and New Matter. 

The Defendant later moved for judgment on the pleadings which was denied. The trial court reasoned that the Defendant had waived the statute of limitations defense by untimely raising it and, in the alternative, that equitable considerations allowed the claim to proceed because the Plaintiff’s attorney’s discontinuance of the case was inadvertent and was not shown to have been filed for a procedural advantage.

On appeal, the Superior Court noted that it had the ability to address the issues on appeal despite a challenge to the appealability of the same.

On the merits, the Superior Court held that the trial court had erred in treating the statute of limitations defense as waived. 

The appellate court noted that, under the coordinate jurisdiction rule, one judge at the trial court level had accepted the Defendant’s Answer and New Matter as timely and, therefore, the later judge was barred from disregarding that previous Order. The Superior Court also noted that the trial court had relied upon case law that was no longer good law due to recent Supreme Court precedent.

The court otherwise noted that the attempt by the Plaintiff to use a reinstatement praecipe to revive a previously discontinued action was improper under the circumstances of this case.  The Court noted that a reinstatement praecipe could not substitute for filing a Complaint within the statute of limitations period.

The Superior Court noted that, once a Discontinuance had been filed, this action could only proceed again by way of the filing of a new Complaint within the two year statute of limitations period.  Because that did not occur, the appellate court found that the Plaintiff's claims were time barred.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.  The Dissenting Opinion by Judge Olson, noting that Judge's opinion that the appeal should have been quashed, can be viewed HERE


Source: The Legal Intelligencer State Appellate Case Alert, www.Law.com (June 16, 2026).

Case Removed to Federal Court Sent Back to State Court

In the case of Mason v. Sams Club, No. 2:25-CV-05038-JHS (E.D. Pa. April 27, 2026 Slomsky, J.), the federal court remanded a slip and fall case back to state court after finding that the Defendant had prematurely removed the case to federal court.

The court noted that, under federal law, a Defendant may only remove a case when the Defendant receives a document that puts the Defendant on notice that the case is removal because the $75,000.00 jurisdiction threshold is met. Moreover, under the Rules, once the Defendant receives a document that puts the Defendant on notice that the case is removable, a case must be removed within thirty (30) days of receiving that document.

Here, the Defendant removed the case after receiving emails from the Plaintiff’s counsel that the Plaintiff was going to undergo wrist surgery as a result of the injuries.

The Plaintiff argued that the case should be remanded back to state court, claiming that the Notice of Removal was filed prematurely because the Defendant did not have notice that the amount in controversy exceeded $75,000.00.

The court agreed, finding that the Defendant did not provide sufficiently specific information to confirm to the court that the amount in controversy exceeded $75,000.00. Here, there was a lack of any information regarding costs, total damages, or a settlement demand, any of which could have put the Defendant on notice that the jurisdictional threshold have been met.

The court noted that, with the Defendants bearing the burden of proving that the removal was proper, the Defendant’s failure to explain how a wrist surgery alone would necessarily surpass the jurisdictional threshold left to much ambiguity.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.  The Court's companion Order can be viewed HERE


Source: Article – “Sams Club Slip-In-Fall Slides Back To State Court Due To Premature Removal Notice,” By Riley Brennnan of The Legal Intelligencer (May 4, 2026).

Source of image:  Photo by Jim Wilson on www.unsplash.com.

Federal Court Rejects Plaintiff's Request to Remand UIM Breach of Contract/Bad Faith Claim Back to State Court

In the case of Victoria-Melo v. Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. Of America, No. 5:25-CV-07282-JMG (E.D. Pa. May 14, 2026 Gallagher, J.), the court denied a Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand a UIM/Bad Faith suit back to state court.

The insurance company had removed the case to federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction and alleging that the amount in controversy exceeded $75,000.00.

The Plaintiff responded by asserting that the Defendants had failed to establish the amount in controversy. The Plaintiffs also argued that the action presented unsettled issues of Pennsylvania insurance law that would be better resolved by the state courts.

After reviewing the matter before it, the court concluded that diversity jurisdiction existed and that abstention was not warranted.

In so ruling on the issue of whether the exercise jurisdiction under the Declaratory Judgment Act, the federal court considered the factors set forth by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in the Reifer case. 

As part of this analysis, the court found that this case did not present the type of unsettled or novel issues of state law that would weigh in favor of abstention. 

One issue in this regard in this case is that the Plaintiff contended that the applicability of Pennsylvania’s Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law to an insurance policy issued outside of Pennsylvania presented as an unresolved legal question. 

The court disagreed and pointed to Pennsylvania cases that had addressed the issue previously. As such, this case was found to involve the routine application of established statutory language and insurance principles to the case at hand.

As such, the Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand was denied.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.  The Court's companion Order can be viewed HERE.


I send thanks to Attorney Candace M. Edgar of the Camp Hill, PA office of Marshall Dennehey for bringing this case to my attention.

Post-Trial Rulings By Trial Court in MVA Case Affirmed on Appeal

In their non-precedential decision in the case of Major v. Five Star Equipment, Inc., No. 735 MDA 2025 (Pa. Super. June 30, 2026 Panella, P.J.E., King, J., and Lane, J.) (Mem. Op. by King, J.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the post-trial rulings issued by Judge Terrence R. Nealon of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas related to a motor vehicle versus pedestrian accident case.

According to the Opinion, at a bifurcated trial, the jury attributed 75% of the responsibility for the happening of the accident to the Plaintiff and 25% to the Defendant.

On appeal, the Plaintiff challenged portions of the verdict slip and related jury instructions. The Plaintiff also asserted that the trial court had erred prior to trial in granting partial summary judgment on behalf of the Defendant and dismissing the Plaintiff’s claim for recklessness and in excluding post-accident evidence regarding the Defendant driver’s competence. The Plaintiff also argued that the trial court abused its discretion in bifurcating the trial.

Here, the court had bifurcated the trial based upon the fact that, after the parties were given a trial date with a certain number of trial days based on what the parties had advised the Court as to how much trial time was needed, the parties listed additional witnesses which led the court to conclude that it was highly unlikely that the parties would finish the trial within the allocated time period requested. As such, the court bifurcated the trial to avoid unnecessary cost and to facilitate the interests of judicial economy. The trial was bifurcated into liability and damages phases.

The appellate court rejected the Plaintiff’s argument that they were entitled to a new trial on the basis that the trial court had incorrectly bifurcated the case. The appellate court emphasized that the decision whether or not to bifurcate a case is entrusted to the broad discretion of the trial court, which is considered to be in the best position to evaluate the necessity for bifurcation.

Here, after consultation with the parties, the trial court had scheduled five (5) days for trial based upon the parties estimation as to the amount of time they believed the trial would take. Later, at a pre-trial conference, the parties then indicated that they intended to call eleven (11) lay witnesses and nine (9) expert witnesses to testify. The parties further estimated that one of the four days scheduled for trial would be taken up by the jury selection process, the court’s introductory instructions, and counsel’s opening statements.

The trial court had determined that it was highly unlikely that the remaining four (4) days of trial would be sufficient time for all of their testimony, closing arguments, jury instructions and deliberations. The trial court had expressed a concern that it would be forced to declare a mistrial if the trial is not completed within the allotted time. The appellate court agreed with the trial court’s conclusion that the interest of judicial economy and conveniens supported the bifurcation of the case. The appellate court was not swayed by the Plaintiff’s argument that the trial actually ended up only taking three (3) days to complete.

On appeal, the appellate court otherwise agreed with the trial court that the Plaintiff had waived her claim of error with regards to the Verdict slip.  The appellate court otherwise agreed with the trial court that separate questions as to each theory of negligence asserted against the Defendant company were unnecessary given that the trial court’s jury instructions specified and explained all of the theories of negligence involved in the case. The appellate court found that the trial court had repeatedly instructed the jury that, if they found negligence on any of the grounds described during the jury instructions, the jury must find that the Defendant company was negligent.

With regards to the trial court having issued a partial summary judgment against the Plaintiff’s claims of recklessness, the appellate court reviewed the law of punitive damages and, after a review of the trial record, found that the Plaintiff failed to produce any evidence to support the claims of recklessness. As such, the appellate court stated that the trial court did not err in dismissing the Plaintiff’s punitive damages claims whether in terms of the direct actions of the Defendant company or on the basis of vicarious liability.

Based upon the above reasons, the appellate court affirmed all of the trial court’s post-trial rulings.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

To view the Tort Talk post on Judge Nealon's trial court Opinion and for access to a Link to that Opinion, please click HERE.

Party's Destruction of Evidence Paves The Way For a Spoliation Sanction

In the case of United Paving, LLC v. Plaza Drive, LP, No. 1259-CV-2024 (C.P. West. Co. June 8, 2026 Smail, J.), the court granted a Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions for spoliation of evidence in a breach of contract case involving paving work.

A dispute arose between the parties regarding whether the paving work was allegedly correctly completed. The Defendants in this matter allegedly did not pay the Plaintiff for the paving work completed on the basis that the work done was allegedly incorrectly completed.

After the suit was filed, a representative of the contracting party wrote to the Plaintiff’s attorney asserting that the work completed was defective and that, as such, plans were in place to mill and repave the roadway within a few days.

Plaintiff’s counsel advised defense counsel that he would like to have the Plaintiff’s own expert view the job completed within the following two weeks and that if the repaving was done within the next few days as threatened, a spoliation of evidence argument would be raised.

Counsel for the Defendants replied and indicated that the repaving work was going to go ahead as soon as possible.

The Plaintiff’s attorney was able to have an asphalt professional view and photograph the site before it was repaved. However, the Plaintiff was not able to retain an expert in time to complete a site inspection on such short notice. The repaving was then completed.

The Plaintiff then filed a Motion for Sanctions on the basis of spoliation of evidence.   

The court reviewed the current law of spoliation and noted that, under that law, where there is a non-preservation or a significant alteration of evidence by a party for a pending or future litigation, the court has the discretion to impose a range of sanctions against the spoliator.

In this matter, the Defendants argued that the they did not engage in spoliation because the road involved was allegedly in such poor condition that they had no choice but to repave it quickly. The Defendants further argued that to require roads to stay in states of alleged disrepair during litigation would be unreasonable and would violate public policy.

The court noted that, while it understood the defense position, there was no argument being made that the road would have to be preserved until the end of litigation. Rather, the court stated that the “reasonable course of action” would have been for the parties and their attorneys to cooperate to allow both sides to have adequate access to the road for expert analysis. According to the court, this could have been accomplished in a matters of days or weeks after which the road could have been repaved and the Plaintiffs would not have been prejudiced by the failure to have an equal opportunity for expert analysis.

The court found that spoliation indeed occurred under the facts presented. The entire focus of the case was the quality of the paving work completed by the Plaintiffs. The Defendant then destroyed the paving work completed by the Plaintiff shortly after the filing of their Complaint, but prior to the Defendants filing their own Answer to the Complaint. The court also noted that the Defendants were able to obtain two of their own expert reports, while essentially preventing the Plaintiff from doing the same.

As such, the court applied the standard of review under Pennsylvania law to determine what appropriate sanction was required. In this regard, the court noted that, in determining an appropriate sanctions for spoliation, the court must weigh three factors: (1) the degree of fault of the party who altered or destroyed the evidence; (2) the degree of prejudice suffered by the opposing party; and (3) whether there is a lesser sanction that will avoid substantial unfairness to the opposing party and, where the offending party is seriously at fault, a determination as to what type of sanction would serve to deter such conduct by others in the future.

In this matter, the court ruled that the Defendants would be precluded from offering into evidence any and all expert reports and any photographs of the conditions of the asphalt. Moreover, the court stated that, at the time of trial, the court would issue and adverse inference instruction regarding the spoliation of evidence.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


It is noted that the Plaintiff’s attorney in this case was Daniel C. Hudock of the Law Office of Daniel C. Hudock in Latrobe, Pennsylvania. I send thanks to Attorney Joseph Hudock of the Pittsburgh office of the Summers, McDonnell, Hudock, Guthrie & Rauch, P.C. law firm for bringing this case to my attention.

Source of image:  Photo by Ray Donnelly on www.unsplash.com.

Claims Regarding Duty to Provide Safe Drinking Water Flow Through Summary Judgment Motion

In the case of McNair v. Pennsylvania-America Water Co., No. 2024-CV-5834 (C.P. Lacka. Co. June 11, 2026 Nealon, J.), Judge Terrence R. Nealon of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas addressed a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by a water company in a class action suit by residents of a Monroe County lake community in which the Plaintiffs had asserted claims of public nuisance under the safe drinking water statute, private nuisance, and breach of implied contract for failing to provide clean, safe, and reliable water surface to their company.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiffs asserted that the drinking water supplied by the utility company was chronically tainted with excessive levels of manganese that adversely affected the color, case, smell, and safety of the water.

The utility company filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on several grounds.

Relative to the request for the dismissal of certain nuisance claims based upon the statute of limitations, the court ruled that there were issues of fact under the discovery rule to the statute of limitations that prevented the entry of summary judgment in that regard.

Judge Terrence R. Nealon
Lackawanna County

Judge Nealon also found that the record before the court confirmed that the Plaintiff’s claims for breach of the utility’s implied duty to provide safe drinking water should be allowed to proceed to the jury.

Relative to the utility’s argument that the Plaintiff’s claims failed due to the Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust their administrative remedies, the court found that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies only applies where the available administrative remedy is adequate and complete with respect to the alleged harm sustained and the specific relief requested. 

Here, the court found that, given that the resident’s public nuisance claims sought to recover compensatory and punitive damages for the diminution of the value of their property, the loss of the use and enjoyment of the land, and the inconvenience, discomfort and annoyance that they have endured, the circumstances did not meet the elements of the doctrine given that the appropriate state administrative agency had no authority to award damages. 

As such, the court found that residents were not required to first exhaust their available administrative procedures before filing suit in a court of law.

In the end, the court denied the utility’s Motion for Summary Judgment.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Source of top image:  Photo by Wallace Chuck on www.pexels.com.

Court Addresses Various Breach of Contract and Bad Faith Allegations in a First Party Medical Benefits Case

In the case of Castellani v. Travelers Ins. Co., No. 2025-CV-3425 (C.P. Lacka. Co. May 18, 2026 Nealon, J.), the court addressed various issues raised in a claim for breach of contract and bad faith in a first party medical benefits case.

The Plaintiff basically asserted that the insurance company had allegedly fraudulently induced her to purchase medical expense benefits coverage that it allegedly never truly intended to provide. 

The Plaintiff also asserted that the carrier unjustifiably initiated numerous peer reviews by allegedly biased medical professionals in order to allegedly manufacturer a sham basis upon which to deny coverage for allegedly reasonable and necessary treatment.

In additional to suing the carrier for breach of contract and bad faith, the Plaintiff also sued the individual claims representative as well.

The carrier filed Preliminary Objections relative to the Plaintiff’s demand for counsel fees under §1716 and §1798 of the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law. 

The carrier also filed Preliminary Objections against the bad faith claim.

The claims representative also filed a demurrer on the claims against that party.

Challenges were also made against the claims under the UTPCPL.

The court granted the demurrer asserted by the claims adjuster after finding that the Plaintiff was not able to demonstrate a duty of care owed to the claims adjuster to the insured so as to expose the adjuster to individual tort liability.

The court otherwise found that the Plaintiff had stated a valid cause of action against the carrier for bad faith. The court also found that the claims were not barred by the gist of the action doctrine. The court additionally found that the economic loss doctrine did not preclude the tort claims asserted by the Plaintiff.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Source of image:  Photo by Marek Studzinski on www.unsplash.com.

Superior Court Finds That Having Lunch At Mom's House Doesn't Make You a Resident of that House When You Have Your Own Apartment

In the case of Lanunziata v. Penn. Nat’l Mut. Cas. Ins., No. 2026 Pa. Super. 97 (Pa. Super. May 13, 2026 Bowes, J., Dubow, J., and Neuman, J.) (Op. by Dubow, J.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the entry of summary judgment in favor of an insurance company in a declaratory judgment action in which the child of the insured was seeking UIM benefits under his parent’s automobile policy following an accident.

According to the Opinion, under the policy in question, an insured included the named insured and any family member.  A family member was defined, in part, as a resident of the insured's household. 

Here, the record before the court confirmed that the child had moved out of his parents’ home several years before the incident and spent a majority of his time in his own apartment.

After reviewing the case law on the issue of "residency" in this context, the Superior Court rejected the claim that the Plaintiff was a resident of his parents’ home.  The Plaintiff asserted that he ate lunch at his parents' house on a regular basis, had his mail delivered there, and had left a few personal items at his parents’ home.

The Court noted that the Plaintiff had graduated from college in 2016 and had leased an apartment in 2019 and had no intention of returning to his parents' home to live. 

The Court found that the evidence confirmed that the quantity of contacts and time that the Plaintiff spent in his own apartment greatly outweighed his contacts with his parents home.

As such, the Superior Court affirmed the entry of summary judgment in favor of the carrier on the coverage question presented.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: “Court Summaries” by Timothy L. Clawges of The Pennsylvania Bar News (June 15, 2026).