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The Bus Stops Here: Trial Court Finds Venue Proper in Philadelphia Based on Busing Company's Defendant's Periodic Contacts in the County

Philadelphia Skyline

In the case of Warren v. Heagy, No. 240100294 (C.P. Phila. Co. May 2025 Anders, J.), the court issued a Rule 1925 Opinion requesting the Superior Court to affirm the trial court’s Order overruling the Defendant’s Preliminary Objections that Philadelphia County was an improper venue for the case.

According to the Opinion, this matter involved a motor vehicle accident during which a bus owned by the Defendant bus company collided with the Plaintiff’s vehicle.

The Defendants asserted in Preliminary Objections that the Defendant bus company had no physical presence in Philadelphia County, did not derive any revenue from customers located in Philadelphia County, and does not perform acts or maintain contacts in Philadelphia County sufficient to satisfy the quality-quantity tests for venue.

The court overruled the Preliminary Objections after noting that the record revealed that the Defendant bus company is in the business of transporting students to and from school and activities, including transporting students into Philadelphia County for purposes of activity such as field trips. It was noted that over the years, the business company had transported students into Philadelphia County about 10 times during one school year and 10 times during another school year, and 23-30 times on another recent school year.

After reviewing the law regarding the quality-quantity tests for proper venue, the court ruled that the evidence before it demonstrated that the Defendant regularly conducted business in Philadelphia County.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Source: “The Legal Intelligencer Common Pleas Case Alert,” www.Law.com (July 2, 2025).

PA Supreme Court Issues Interim Policy On Use of Generative Artificial Intelligence By Judicial Officers And Court Personnel (Effective Dec. 8, 2025)

Here is a LINK to the interim policy that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has issued for judges and court personnel who want to use AI.

The policy allow for judges and court personnel to utilizes AI for summarizing documents, conducting preliminary legal research, and drafting initial versions of documents.

These rules which are identified as the “Interim Policy On The Use Of Generative Artificial Intelligence By Judicial Officers And Court Personnel" goes into effect on December 8, 2025.

It is anticipated that, in the near future, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court may also come out with rules to guide attorneys on the proper of AI in the practice of law relative to any filings with the courts.

Source: Article – “Pa. High Court Allow Judges, Personnel To Use AI For Document Summary, Preliminary Legal Research” By Max Mitchell of the Legal Intelligencer (Sept. 9, 2025).

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Trial Court Denies Various Motions For Summary Judgment in a Medical Malpractice Case

In the case of Leber v. Frattali, No. 2023-CV-1442 (C.P. Lacka. Co. 2025 Powell, J.), the court addressed fifteen (15) pre-trial motions presented by the defense, which included fourteen (14) Motions for Partial Summary Judgment and one (1) Motion for Summary Judgment in a wrongful death and survival action arising out of a medical malpractice claim.

Overall, the court found that genuine issues of material fact prevented the court from entering any judgments.

In particular, the court rejected the defense claims that the Plaintiff’s expert reports were insufficient to establish negligence. The court stressed that issues of the credibility of the experts and the differing interpretations of risk models were for the jury to resolve, not the court on summary judgment.

The court additionally noted that alleged systemic negligence, including lack of training, inadequate policies, and supervisory failures, could all serve to support claims of corporate negligence and constructive notice.

In the end, the court reiterated that there were issues of fact that prevented the entry of summary judgment on the claims presented. Accordingly, all defense Motions for Summary Judgment and Partial Summary Judgment were denied.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Plaintiff Wins Denial of Summary Judgment Motion Without Even Filing a Response

 

In the case of Dunkel v. Dallago, No. S-1335-CV-2022 (C.P. Schuly. Co. Sept. 5, 2025 Burke, J.), the court denied a Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment in a motor vehicle accident case in which the Defendant asserted that it should be granted summary judgment in light of the Plaintiff’s failure to produce any expert medical testimony on the issues of causation.  

The Plaintiff, who was represented by counsel, failed to file any response whatsoever to the Motion for Summary Judgment. The court still denied the Motion for Summary Judgment after finding that it had the discretion to excuse this failure and otherwise rule upon the Motion.

According to the Opinion, this matter arose out of a motor vehicle accident as a result of which the Plaintiff alleged personal injuries.

Relative to the defense argument that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law given the Plaintiff’s failure to produce expert medical testimony to support the Plaintiff’s burden of proof on causation, the court referenced the exception to the law generally requiring such expert testimony. The court noted that, under that exception, where there is an obvious causal relationship between an accident and an injury, the requirement of expert testimony may be excused. The court noted that an obvious causal relationship can be found to exist where the injuries are either an “immediate and direct” or the “natural and probable” of the alleged negligent act.

The court found that there remained factual issues in this regard supported the court's denial of the request for the entry of summary judgment.

Although the Plaintiff never filed a Response to the Motion, the court also went on to note that there were other genuine issues of material fact presented in the case.  The court noted that the Plaintiff claimed that the Defendant was negligent and the Defendant not only denied negligence in its pleadings but also asserted contributory negligence against the Plaintiff. The court also noted sua sponte that there were other issues likely to be raised at the time of trial, including the speed of the Defendant’s vehicle, whether the Defendant was distracted at the time of the accident, and whether the Defendant pled guilty to any criminal charges in connection with the accident.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of the Court’s Opinion granting summary judgment in favor of a Plaintiff who did not file any Response to the Motion may click this LINK.

Source of image:  www.urbandictionary.com.

Court Rules that Punitive Damages May Not Be Claimed for Post-Incident Conduct

In the case of Pavlik v. Smith, No. 2024-CV-09109 (C.P. Luz. Co. Aug. 1, 2025 Gelb, J.) the court denied a Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend the Complaint in a dog bite case.

Of note, the court denied the Plaintiff’s efforts to file an Amended Complaint that would contain a claim for punitive damages for post-incident conduct by the Defendants relative to the dog bite incident.

The court noted that punitive damages are not available for post-incident conduct of a tortfeasor. In so ruling, the court cited, with “see” signals, the cases of Bert Co. v. Turk, 298 A.3d 44, 61 (Pa. 2023) (Explaining that the fact-finder may impose punitive damages for torts, as opposed to any post-incident conduct) and Feld v. Merriam, 485 A.2d 742, 748 (Pa. 1984) (Stating that “one must look to the act itself together with all circumstances when imposing punitive damages).

Anyone wishing to review this detailed Order without Opinion may click this LINK.

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Trial Court Allows Claims of Recklessness and Punitive Damages to Proceed Where Defendant Driver Took Eyes Off Road Where Something Fell to the Floor of Vehicle

In the case of Lin v. Gutowski, No. 2024-CV-5659 (C.P. Lacka. Co. Aug. 11, 2025 Powell, J.), Judge Mark Powell of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas overruled a Defendant’s Preliminary Objections seeking to strike claims for recklessness, punitive damages, and negligent entrustment in an alleged distracted driver motor vehicle accident case.

Judge Mark Powell
Lackawanna County

Relative to the allegations of recklessness, Judge Powell followed the current trend of allowing allegations of recklessness to be pled generally in cases where negligence has been alleged. With regards to the claims for punitive damages, the court noted that the Plaintiff alleged that the Defendant was distracted by an item that fell to the floor which caused him to remove his eyes from the road while approaching the intersection at a speed that was allegedly too fast for the conditions and while failing to yield to traffic where the Plaintiff was attempting to make a left hand turn.

The court found that the allegations presented by the Plaintiff rendered it unclear as to whether or not a jury could find that such conduct was reckless such that the claim for punitive damages could be supported. In so ruling, Judge Powell cited to a Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision in which it was stated that a more appropriate course of action under the circumstances would be to pull to the side of the road to retrieve the item.

The court otherwise noted that the allegations that the Defendant driver diverted his eyes from the road, in combination with the allegations that the Defendant was traveling too fast for conditions and that he failed to yield to other traffic on the roadway, all served to support the Plaintiff’s potential claim for punitive damages. The court noted that it was otherwise not clear and free from doubt as to the Defendant’s subjective understanding of the risk his conduct posted to the safety of others and whether or the Defendant carelessly disregarded those risks. Accordingly, the court allowed the claim for punitive damages to proceed.

In his decision, Judge Powell also outlined the current status of the law regarding negligent entrustment claims. After applying that law to the case presented, the court noted that the Plaintiff’s claims that the Defendant owner knew or should have known that the Defendant driver had a prior history of motor vehicle violations and that the Defendant driver would allegedly fail to operate the vehicle safely, that the Defendant driver had a propensity for speeding and driving while distracted and for ignoring the law, not only stated claims for negligence, but also supported claims of recklessness for which a jury may decide to award punitive damages. As such, the court also overruled the Defendant’s Preliminary Objections to the Plaintiff’s claims of negligent entrustment.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney Stephen T. Kopko of the Anzalone and Doyle law firm in Wilkes-Barre, PA for bringing this case to my attention.

Trial Court Gives Lessons on Medical Malpractice Complaint Drafting

In the case of Dawes v. The Williamsport Home, No. 2025-CV-00381 (C.P. Lyc. Co. June 6, 2025 Carlucci, J.), the court granted in part and denied in part Preliminary Objections filed against a Plaintiff’s claim in a medical malpractice case arising out of alleged negligent care regarding the Plaintiff’s thoracic surgical wound.

According to the Opinion, the court denied the Defendant’s demurrer to the Plaintiffs’ claim for punitive damages but still directed the Plaintiff to file an Amended Complaint which either deletes any claim for punitive damages or sets forth sufficient material allegations in support of the same.

Relative to any claims against any agents or employees of the medical Defendants the court directed that the Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint should limit allegations regarding the acts or omissions by a Defendant or its agent or employees to that conduct that the Plaintiff contends was a substantial factor in causing the Plaintiff’s injuries. In this regard, the court directed the Plaintiff to not include any extraneous allegations not pertinent to the causation issues. 

The court also required the Plaintiff to provide additional factual support and allegations on the claims for corporate liability.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: “The Legal Intelligencer Common Pleas Case Alert,” www.Law.com (Aug. 7, 2025).

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Summary Judgment Granted in Water Park Ride Under "No-Duty" Rule

In the case of Mantilla v. CMBK Resort Holdings, LLC, No. 5780-Civil-2023 (C.P. Monroe Co. April 25, 2025 Williamson, J.), the court granted a Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment in a case in which the Plaintiff alleged injuries from a water park ride during which the raft either flipped or the Plaintiff fell from it, resulting in injuries to the Plaintiff.

After reviewing the applicable law, which included the fact that, generally speaking, purveyors of theaters, amusement parks, or sports facilities have a “no-duty” rule to protect a party from injuries so long as the injuries suffered arose from a risk that was “common, frequent, and expected” of the situation.

The court ruled that, based upon the record before it, the Plaintiff has failed to allege or establish any conduct on the part of the Defendants that was not an inherent risk of utilizing a water slide.

In this matter, the Plaintiff admitted at her deposition that her raft flipped due to a sudden change in the water pressure, causing her to strike her shoulder on the side of the slide itself. The court noted that this is an inherent risk of water slides, where unexpected changes in water flow and the possibility of body parts colliding with the hard surface of the tube.

Given that the Plaintiff failed to show any other evidence of negligence and given that the Defendant had no duty to protect the Plaintiff from the “common, frequent, and expected” dangers of water slides, the court granted summary judgment.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: “The Legal Intelligencer Common Pleas Case Alert,” www.Law.com (July 10, 2025).

Who Bears the Burden of Proving a Plaintiff is Covered by the Limited Tort Option?

In the case of Rogers v. Blair, No. 2:24-CV-01534-ETH (E.D. Pa. July 28, 2025 Hey, M.J.), a federal magistrate judge addressed the issue of how to resolve a dispute over whether or not a motor vehicle accident Plaintiff was covered under the limited tort option.

In this matter, on the issue of whether the Plaintiff was covered under the limited tort option or the full tort option, the record revealed that the only evidence in the case was that the Plaintiff testified at his deposition that he was unsure as to which coverage he selected.

The court ruled that, because the issue of the limited tort defense is considered an affirmative defense, Defendants bear the burden of proving a limited tort election. In this regard, the court cited to the case of Sanderson v. Cruz, U.S., 88 F. Supp. 2d 388, 392 (E.D. Pa. 2000). The court also noted that a Plaintiff’s uncertainty as to which coverage he or she may have selected is not determinative on the issue. In this regard, the court cited with a “see” signal Vaughan v. Williams, 725 EDA 2023, 2024 WL 1231352, at *3-5 (Pa. Super. 2024) (affirming trial court’s decision finding that Plaintiff elected limited tort as a matter of law, focusing its analysis on the signed tort election form and associated policy documents, as opposed to phone call transcripts and oral statements).

In this Opinion, the court noted that the Plaintiff’s decision to raise this limited tort election issue through a Motion In Limine rather than through an earlier a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, combined with the absence of the relevant insurance documents, rendered the resolution of this matter ill-time given that it was presented on the eve of trial. 

As such, the judge denied the Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine to have the Plaintiff deemed to be full tort as a matter of law.  Presumably, the defense was going to be permitted to present evidence a trial through an insurance representative as to the Plaintiff’s election of a limited tort choice.

In another decision of note in this Opinion, the court barred a Defendant in a rear-end motor vehicle accident from arguing at trial that the Plaintiff was not injured in the accident given that both parties had acknowledged, through expert testimony, that the Plaintiff had indeed sustained some form of injury.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.  The court's companion Order can be viewed HERE.


Source: “Article – “Defendant Can’t Argue Rear-End Crash Didn’t Result In Injuries, Pa. Fed. Court Rules Citing Defense Expert Report” By Riley Brennan The Legal Intelligencer (July 30, 2025).

Source of image:  Photo by Niki Nikitaxnikin on www.pexels.com.

Court Dismisses Negligent Entrustment Claim Against Parents Relative to Use of Cell Phone by Child

In the case of JH v. Dunmore School District, No. 3:24-CV-1154 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 8, 2025 Munley, J.), Judge Julia K. Munley of the Federal Middle District Court of Pennsylvania addressed various Motions to Dismiss filed by different Defendants relative to a case involving allegations that certain middle school student allegedly recorded a minor Plaintiff who was on the autism spectrum, inside a bathroom stall at the school and then allegedly disseminating that video to other students who also allegedly shared the video with others.

Among the claims presented by the Plaintiffs were allegations of negligence entrustment and intentional infliction of emotional distress against the minor Defendants at issue and their parents. The negligent entrustment claim was that the parents had negligently entrusted a cell phone owned by the parents to their children.

The court granted in part and denied in part the request for a dismissal of the negligent entrustment claims asserted against the parents given that the Plaintiffs did not allege facts to support their conclusion that the parent Defendants knew or should have known that their children would use their cell phones in ways that would hurt people.

The court also noted that, based upon the facts alleged by the Plaintiff, which included references to school policy and state law, the Plaintiffs’ allegations actually support the proposition that the parent Defendants yielded control of the cell phones, or the use of the cell phones to the teachers and administrators when their children were at school. 

In this regard, the court pointed to the school district’s rules requiring students to refrain from utilizing their cell phone on the school ground during school hours. 

The court emphasized that the alleged negligent conduct of the students took place during the course of the school day and that there were no allegations that any of the minor Defendants in this action shared the video of the minor Plaintiff outside of the school day. 

The court in this matter did allow the Plaintiffs’ claims or intentional infliction of emotional distress to proceed against the parent Defendants.

The court otherwise dismissed a number of claims asserted against the school district and school officials but allow the Plaintiffs to file another Amended Complaint relative to the possible civil rights allegations under 42 U.S.C. §1983.

The court allowed the claims of punitive damages to remain in the case relative to the claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.  The Court's companion Order can be viewed HERE.

Source of image:  Photo by Tracy Le Blanc on www.unsplash.com.

Attorney Faulted For Submitting Brief with AI Hallucinations

Examples of attorneys getting trouble for utilizing AI tools for legal research and then not checking the accuracy of the information gathered has occurred in Pennsylvania.  Inaccurate information secured from AI sources are known as hallucinations.

In the Pennsylvania federal court case of Jakes v. Youngblood, No. 2:24-cv-1608 (W.D. Pa. June 26, 2025 Stickman, J.), the court faulted an attorney for submitting briefs with wholly fabricated quotations from case law, including fabricated quotations from this court’s own prior Opinion. 

The court faulted that attorney for not only failing to offer any explanation for the deficiencies and fabrications in his own brief, but for also attacking the content of the opposing party’s brief, which the court noted did not contain any fabricated quotations or misrepresented case law. 

The court also noted that, “[e]ven more outrageously,” a review of the AI-happy attorney’s reply brief demonstrated that that brief also contained fabricated quotes and misrepresented case law.

The court noted that it found it to be “very troubling” that, when accused of serious ethical violations, the attorney at fault “chose to double down” and not admit to wrongdoing. 

In the end, the court noted that it viewed the attorney’s “conduct as a clear ethical violation of the highest order.” 

In its Opinion, the court noted that the attorney at fault had filed a Withdrawal of Appearance in response to the issues presented.

This Pennsylvania federal court cited to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 as confirming that attorneys have legal and ethical duties owed to the court in terms of filings presented to the Court. The court also cited to Pennsylvania Rule of Professional Conduct 3.3 regarding candor toward a tribunal.

In its Opinion, the court presumed that the at fault attorney’s briefs were constructed by generative artificial intelligence utilized by the attorney, rather than an effort by the attorney to personally construct false and misleading information. Regardless, the court noted that the attorney still had an ethical obligation under Rule 11 and the state’s professional canons to review every document submitted to the court under their name and signature in order to ensure the accuracy of the document.

The court also noted that, an attorney who signs and files a brief authored by a non-lawyer, such as a paralegal or an intern or a clerk, is personally responsible for all that the filing contains. The court noted that the same rule applies to the use of artificial intelligence.

In the end, the Jakes court dismissed the filings presented by the at fault attorney and ordered that attorney to show cause as to why his filings should not be viewed as having violated Rule 11 and Pa. RPC 3.3.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK

Source of image:  Photo by Igor Omilaev on www.unsplash.com.

Another Pennsylvania Attorney Sanctioned by Court for Submitting Inaccurate Citations Apparently Secured From AI Resarch

In another Pennsylvania case involving an attorney utilizing AI hallucinations in a court filing, the court issued sanctions.

In Bevins v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., No. 25-576 (E.D. Pa. April 10, 2025 Baylson, J.), the attorney provided the court with case citations in court filings that were inaccurate and did not lead the reader to any identifiable court Opinion. The court noted that, based upon its search, it could not locate a case relative to the two citations at issue and/or could not detect a possible typographical error relative to the citation provided.

When the court ordered the attorney to provide an explanation, the attorney asserted that the inclusion of the incorrect citations was unintended given that he planned to replace the wrong cite with a proper one but failed to do so in his final draft. The court noted its concern as to why the attorney was silent as to his act of providing the court with case citations to decisions that did not exist and, as such, the court noted that it was “unconvinced by counsel’s explanations.”

The court referred to Rule 11 and sanctioned the attorney. The court also referred the matter to the State Bar.

Moreover, the court struck the attorney’s appearance in the case.  The attorney was ordered to advise the client of the sanctions and the fact that, should the Plaintiff chose to refile her case, she must find new counsel.

Anyone wishing to review the court's decision in Bevins may click this LINK.  The Court's companion Order can be viewed HERE.

Third Circuit Addresses AI Hallucinations in Court Filing

In the case of McCarthy v. U.S. DEA, No. 24-2704 (3d Cir. July 21, 2025) (Op. by Chung, J.) (not precedential), the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, in a case involving issues arising from the Drug Enforcement Administration revoking a Certificate of Registration to the Plaintiff who was a P.A. the court chastised the Plaintiff’s attorney for relying upon “summaries” of eight (8) previous DEA adjudications that the attorney secured through research on an artificial intelligence tool. 

The court confirmed that the Plaintiff’s counsel acknowledged that seven (7) of the summaries were inaccurate and the eighth did not exist. The attorney further acknowledged to the court that he “never took care to confirm the accuracy of the summaries or even that the decisions existed.”

The court confirmed that it would not consider this faulty portion of the Plaintiff’s attorney’s Brief.

In this decision, the court also noted that it was separately ordering Plaintiff’s counsel to show cause why he should not be sanctioned for his conduct “particularly for his lack of candor to the court.” See Op. at 7 n. 5.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Superior Court Upholds Application of Regular Use Exclusion

In the case of Erie Insurance Exchange v. Russo, No. 1138 MDA 2024 (Pa. Super. July 22, 2025 Murray, J., King, J., and Stevens, P.J.E.) (Op. by Stevens, P.J.E.), the court affirmed the trial court’s decision in a declaratory judgment action brought by the UIM carrier denying UIM coverage through the application of the regular use exclusion present in the Plaintiff’s automobile insurance policy.

This matter arose out of a motor vehicle accident that occurred during the course and scope of the Plaintiff’s employment. At the time of the accident, the Plaintiff was operating a vehicle that had been supplied by his employer.

After recovering UIM benefits under his employer’s policy, the Plaintiff sought UIM benefits under his personal automobile insurance policy. 

The personal automobile insurance carrier filed this declaratory judgment action and asserted that the regular use exclusion supported a denial of the requested coverage.

The trial court had otherwise ruled that there was no “stacked” underinsured motorist coverage available on the Plaintiff’s personal automobile insurance policy atop of the UIM benefits recovered under the Plaintiff’s employer’s vehicle policy.

The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s finding that the Plaintiff was not an “insured” under the employer’s policy for purposes of the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law. As such, the Plaintiff could not “stack” benefits under his personal automobile insurance policy in any event.

The Superior Court emphasized that merely receiving UIM coverage for injuries sustained as an occupant in a first priority vehicle does not make one “an insured” under that vehicle’s policy such that the person would then be entitled to stack one’s personal automobile policy UIM coverage.

Accordingly, the appellate court ruled that, because the Plaintiff was not entitled to stack his personal policy UIM coverage with the UIM coverage he received from his employer’s policy, the Plaintiff could not establish any error in the trial court’s declaration that there existed no UIM coverage available to the Plaintiff under his personal automobile insurance policy.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: “The Legal Intelligencer State Appellate Case Alert,” www.Law.com (Aug. 13, 2025).

Trial Court Confirms That a Corporation Cannot Assert the Fifth Amendment, But a Corporate Representative Can

In the case of L.V. v. Water Gap Capital Partners, LLC, No. 1189-CV-2025 (C.P. Monroe. Co. June 3, 2025 Zulick, P.J.), the court denied a Defendant’s Motion to Stay a civil litigation matter in order to protect the Fifth Amendment rights of their employees and corporate representatives.

The court reviewed the law regarding the assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The court noted that it is well-settled that a corporate Defendant may not assert the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 

However, a corporate representative is permitted to assert the privilege if answers in litigation may tend to incriminate the representative personally. However, if the representative whom the corporate appoints to act on its behalf asserts the Fifth Amendment privilege, the corporation must appoint someone else to respond on its behalf unless the corporation can show that there is no corporate representative who could furnish the discovery without the possibility of self-incrimination.

Here, the court noted that certain Defendants were corporate Defendants. Those corporate Defendants did not have the Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination available to them.

The court did otherwise note that, as noted above, the corporate Defendants did have a right to appoint a representative to speak on their behalf under the parameters of the law.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Source: “The Legal Intelligencer Common Pleas Case Alert,” www.Law.com (July 10, 2025).

Judge Terrence R. Nealon of Lackawanna County Addresses Law Regarding Parties Intervening Into a Lawsuit

In the case of Helring v. Scranton Police Pension Board, No. 2024-CV-7781(C.P. Lacka. Co. July 9, 2025 Nealon, J.), the court addressed the ability to the City of Scranton to intervene into an action regarding a dispute over police pension benefits.

While the case was pending, the City of Scranton filed a Petition to Intervene as a party, which intervention request was opposed by the former police officer, but not the Scranton Police Pension Board.

In his decision, Judge Terrence R. Nealon of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas provided a thorough overview of the Rules of Civil Procedure and Pennsylvania law regarding intervention in an action under Pa. R.C.P. 2327(4).

The court found that, after reviewing the facts of the case before it, as applied to the applicable law, the City’s interest in preventing the violation of its ordinances provided the City with grounds to intervene in the action.

The court also noted that none of the three (3) discretionary bases for refusing intervention as set forth under Pa. R.C.P. 2329 existed in the matter.

Accordingly, the court granted the City’s Petition to Intervene.


Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Court Refuses to Strike a Discontinuance Entered in a Medical Malpractice Case

In the case of Eubank v. Ing, Nov. Term, 2023, No. 0926 (C.P. Phila. Co. Feb. 7, 2025 Bright, J.), the trial court issued a Rule 1925 Opinion requesting the Superior Court to affirm the trial court’s denial of a Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike a Discontinuance that was filed in a medical malpractice action.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff alleged that his former attorney acted without the Plaintiff’s understanding or consent when the attorney filed the Discontinuance.

However, evidence was produced from the former attorney that specifically confirmed that the Plaintiff gave authorization to the former attorney to discontinue the matter.

Accordingly, the trial court concluded that the Discontinuance was not filed without the Plaintiff’s consent. The court also found that there were no grounds to support any finding of any confusion or misunderstanding by the Plaintiff about what was taken place relative to the filing of the Discontinuance.

The court ruled that, where a party fails to show that the entry of a Discontinuance with the result of fraud, imposition, or mistake, it is not an abuse of discretion by the trial court to deny a Petition to Strike a Discontinuance.

Moreover, the trial court noted that the Plaintiff commenced the lawsuit within the two (2) year statute of limitations but then discontinued the matter. It was noted that the Plaintiff’s Petition to Strike the Discontinuance was not filed until after the expiration of statute of limitations. The court found this to be an additional reason for the Superior Court to find that there was no abuse of discretion by the trial court to deny the Plaintiff’s request to reopen the matter.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: “The Legal Intelligencer Common Pleas Case Alert,” www.Law.com (June 11, 2025).

Source of image:  Photo by Wesley Tingey on www.unsplash.com.  

Trial Court Grants Motion to Bifurcate Compensatory and Punitive Damages Phases of Medical Malpractice Trial

In the case of Leber v. Frattali, No. 2023-CV-1442 (C.P. Lacka. Co. 2025 Powell, J.), the court addressed a Plaintiff’s Motion to Bifurcate the trial of a medical malpractice and wrongful death case into separate trials, one for the liability and compensatory damages aspect of the case, and whether the Defendants acted with reckless indifference, and a second trial relative to the amount of any punitive damages that should be awarded.

Judge Mark Powell disagreed with the defense argument that the issues were too interwoven and that bifurcation would cause prejudice.

Relying upon Pa. R.C.P. 213(b), the court exercised its discretion to bifurcate after finding that bifurcation served the issues of convenience, the avoidance of prejudice, and the promotion of the efficiency of the proceedings.

The court found that the bifurcation of the trial as requested by the Plaintiff would promote judicial economy and would avoid the prejudicial introduction of the Defendants’ financial condition during the compensatory phase of the case. The court also therefore found that a bifurcation of the trial would allow for a more orderly presentation of the evidence.

Judge Powell also emphasized that bifurcation under the circumstances presented was reasonable, facilitated potential settlement talks, would realize cost savings, and promoted the issue of fairness. As such, the Motion to Bifurcate was granted.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Trial Court Requests Superior Court to Affirm Dismissal of Case Based on Plaintiff's Failure to Complete Service in a Good Faith and Timely Fashion

In the case of Vargas v. United Modular Enterprises, LLC, No. 2022-CV-05051 (C.P. Bucks Co. April 7, 2025 McMaster, J.), the court issued a Rule 1925 Opinion requesting the appellate court to affirm the trial court’s sustaining of the Defendant’s Preliminary Objections and dismissal of the Plaintiff’s Complaint with prejudice on the basis of the expiration of the statute of limitations and the Plaintiff’s failure to complete service in a timely and good faith fashion.

According to the Opinion, this case involved a tractor trailer that allegedly collided with the Plaintiff’s vehicle. The accident occurred on February 20, 2019.

Although the Plaintiff filed an original Complaint on February 12, 2021, which was eight (8) days before the statute of limitations expired, the court ruled that the Plaintiff ultimately did not make a good faith effort to complete service.

The court noted that the record confirmed that the Plaintiff’s attorney did not give the Complaint to the Bucks County Sheriff and serve the Complaint on the Defendant’s until July 14, 2021, which was five (5) months after the statue of limitations had expired.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer Common Pleas Case Alert, www.Law.com (July 17, 2025).

Superior Court Affirms Award of Delay Damages Where Trial Court Carved Out The Time Period of The Covid-19 Pandemic

In the case of Heffelfinger v. Shen, No. 681 MDA 2024 (Pa. Super. July 21, 2025 Murray, J., King, J., and Stevens, P.J.E.) (Op. by Stevens, P.J.E.), the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s entry of a judgment on a jury verdict in favor of the Plaintiffs in the amount of $11.4 million in a claim by a Plaintiff that the medical Defendants failed to diagnose or treat the Plaintiff’s oral cancer.

Of note, on appeal, the Superior Court held that the trial court did not err in imposing an award of delay damages where the trial court expressly stated that its award in this regard did not include the COVID-19 judicial emergency period in mid-2020. 

In addition to affirming the trial court's award of delay damages, the Superior Court went on to note that, regardless, the COVID-10 pandemic and the ensuing judicial emergency did not serve to diminish the rights of Plaintiff to be made whole or create an unjust windfall in favor of Defendant tortfeasors.

The court otherwise held on appeal that the Plaintiff’s evidence at trial amply supported the jury’s award of over $11.4 million dollars in compensatory and punitive damages.

The Superior Court otherwise affirmed the trial court’s decision in concluding that the jury’s verdict was not against the weight of the evidence.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: “The Legal Intelligencer State Appellate Case Alert,” www.Law.com (Aug. 6, 2025).

Source of image:  Photo by Nick Fewings on www.unsplash.com.

Motion To Compel Arbitration Denied Where Unclear that Plaintiff Was On Notice of the Arbitration Clause

In the case of Bradsher v. Segway, Inc., No. 2:25-CV-02782-JMY (E.D. Pa. July 17, 2025 Young, J.), the court denied Defendant Segway Inc.’s Motion to Compel Arbitration following an accident during which the Plaintiff was injured while utilizing a Segway.

After the Plaintiff filed suit, alleging claims for strict liability, negligence, and breach of warranty, the Defendant Segway filed a Motion to Compel Arbitration, alleging that the Plaintiff was bound by a valid and enforceable Arbitration Agreement.

After reviewing the matter, the court denied the Motion to Compel Arbitration after finding that the Arbitration Agreement was not enforceable as it was unclear as to whether the Plaintiff had been properly informed of and had notice of the agreement.

The court noted that further discovery was required to determine whether or not the Plaintiff received notice of the Arbitration Agreement.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.  The Court's companion Order can be viewed at this LINK.

Source: Article: “Differing Versions of Segway’s Arbitration Agreements Clear Path For Liability Suit,” By Riley Brennan The Legal Intelligencer (July 18, 2025).

Source of image:  Photo by Jan Bochen on www.unsplash.com.

Nursing Home Arbitration Agreement Ruled Uneforceable

In the case of Gratalo v. Kingston SNF Healthcare, LLC, No. 2024-CV-04585 (C.P. Luz. Zo. April 25, 2025 Saylor, S.J.), the court found an arbitration agreement unenforceable relative to the admissions of an adult individual with down syndrome into a nursing home by his mother.

The court noted that the Defendants did not provide evidence to show that the family was properly advised as to the applicability and the parameters of arbitration agreement. The court also noted that the arbitration agreement was not conspicuously displayed in the documents.

Given the substantiative unconscionability of the arbitration agreement, the court found that the agreement was unenforceable. As such, the court rejected the Defendant’s efforts to have this case taken out of the litigation and put into an arbitration.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this detailed Order without any Opinion may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney Thomas J. Foley, III of the Foley Law Firm in Scranton for bringing this decision to my attention.

Source of image: Photo by Alena Darmel on www.pexels.com.

Article: AI and Its Proper Use in the Practice of Law

The below article written by both myself and my son, Michael, entitled "AI and Its Proper Use in the Practice of Law" appeared in the August 14, 2025 edition of the Pennsylvania Law Weekly and is republished here with permission.   Michael is a computer science and philosophy major at Ursinus College with a focus on AI research.

Expert Opinion  Artificial Intelligence


AI and Its Proper Use in the Practice of Law

August 14, 2025, Pennsylvania Law Weekly

By

Daniel E. Cummins

Michael Cummins

While many articles on AI and the law have shouted “AI is coming! AI is coming!” like Paul Revere galloping through the night, very few of those articles actually provide advice on how to incorporate AI into your law practice.

With this article by a practicing attorney and a budding computer scientist, information is provided not only on the basic terms of art relative to AI and its uses, but advice is also provided on the nuts and bolts of how to begin to properly utilize AI as part of your practice.

Duty to be Competent With Technology

Under Pennsylvania Rule of Professional Conduct 1.1, lawyers are required to continue to work to maintain and improve their competency in the practice of law. Rule 1.1 states, in part, that the provision of competent legal representation to a client “requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.”

This rule has been construed to require attorneys to remain competent with advancements in technology that can improve one’s ability to represent clients. As such, it is not only good for one’s practice to begin the process of becoming proficient in the use of AI in your practice, some may argue that it is required under the rules of ethics.

Common AI Terms to Know

Here are some common terms related to AI that attorneys should know and understand:

Algorithm—A process or set of instructions written by a computer programmer to be followed by a computer.

Artificial intelligence—The development of a series of algorithms that instruct computers to complete tasks which typically require human intelligence, reasoning, and understanding, including visual and audio perception, speech recognition, decision making, etc.

Machine learning/deep learning—Machine learning is a branch of AI which focuses on enabling computers to learn from data and improve their performance without explicit, ongoing programming. Deep learning is a form of machine learning where the computer utilizes multiple layers of processing in order to extract even more information from data.

Large language model (LLM)—A type of AI which utilizes deep learning to process and can generate human language by recognizing patterns and associations. Such AI models are described as "large" due to the massive data sets containing billions of words and parameters. ChatGPT and Gemini are examples of Large Language Models

ChatGPT—An AI tool developed by OpenAI to engage in written conversations with humans to answer questions, complete tasks or follow prompts. You can try it for free at www.chat.com.

Gemini—An AI tool developed by Google very similar to ChatGPT that can generate responses to queries by pulling information from the internet and presenting it in a conversational manner to the reader.

Hallucinations—Hallucinations occur when an AI model produces a response that is factually incorrect and/or nonsensical, but is supported by the existing data that the AI was trained on. This can occur due to datasets that are poorly gathered and maintained or incomplete. Examples of hallucinations would be ChatGPT providing case citations that are inaccurate or even totally fabricated.

AI Is Just Guessing

While it is a common misperception to say that ChatGPT "knew" the answer or that Google AI Overview "understood" what you were searching for, that is actually far from the truth.

Artificial intelligence is essentially a prediction algorithm using an unimaginable number of parameters and associations to give the appearance of knowledge; in other words, AI platforms such as ChatGPT or Google’s Gemini give you their best guess at what you would want to hear based on your prompt and the data it was trained on.

On many occasions, an AI platform may produce a result that is factually correct since it has been trained only on the adequate data for a specific need. However, if it is asked a question or prompted on something that it has not been trained on, there is a good chance it may hallucinate and give a false response. Since AI is predictive in nature, it will only ever give you its "best" response possible within the limitations of the tool. Of course, AI can never give a "truthful" response because truth is foreign to predictive AI.

A good analogy is to think of AI as a contestant on Final Jeopardy. The contestant (AI) is given a query or a prompt. The contestant (AI) then searches through the recesses of his or her mind and knowledge (the data it was trained on) in the hopes of coming up with the correct response. The contestant (AI) provides the response, not knowing if it is a correct response. The only difference between the contestant and AI is that the contestant may give up and admit they do not know the answer; AI will always generate its "best guess" even if it has been trained on none of the relevant information.

Nuts and Bolts of How to Use AI

For instructions on how to try out AI, we will use the most popular AI tool at the moment, ChatGPT.

ChatGPT is free to try out. There are more detailed uses of ChatGPT that you could pay to utilize but, at least for now, anyone can use the basic form of ChatGPT for free.

You can find ChatGPT at www.chat.com. When you go to the site, a box may pop up asking you to log in or sign up, but that is not necessary. You can click “Stay logged out” instead.

You can utilize ChatGPT to conduct a search like you would on Google, but be sure to verify and triple check the responses. You can also give ChatGPT an “assignment” such as following examples:

Research the current status of the law on Limited Tort in Pennsylvania and include case citations;

Draft a Brief outlining the Hills and Ridges Doctrine in Pennsylvania and include case Citations

Draft Interrogatories applicable to a fire loss subrogation case

Provide deposition questions applicable to a dog bite case

ChatGPT will search within its pretrained database for information and will respond with detailed information in response to the queries.

It is crucial to keep in mind that the most important practice to follow when using AI is to verify everything it generates. Whether you are asking it to give you a starting point for research, assist with discovery efforts, or draft documents, you should double check every aspect of its output for hallucinations, that is, for inaccurate, inapplicable or even false information.

How you prompt AI, or submit your queries, is also very important as it can assist in generating more accurate and beneficial responses. When writing prompts, giving the AI context as to your goals and relevant background information is very important. Clarity is also important, and, therefore, breaking down a singular prompt into multiple parts with clear instructions can also yield better results.

Ultimately, AI should be used as more of a tool to assist in menial tasks, rather than a one-stop-shop to replace human ingenuity. To paraphrase what one judge wrote in an Opinion involving an AI issue, the use of artificial intelligence also requires the use of human intelligence.

As noted in greater detail below, the reliance upon artificial intelligence to complete legal research without also verifying the veracity of the citations through other trusted resources is not only dumb, but can also land you in hot water.

Hallucinations All Around the World

Attorneys and judges from all around the world have begun to utilize AI to assist with their legal research and brief writing. As such, a few of those attorneys and judges have been getting in trouble for failing to check the validity and accuracy of the legal citations secured through the use of AI platforms prior to filing documents of record.

An attorney/computer data scientist located in Paris, France by the name of Damien Charlotin has created a worldwide scorecard of sorts documenting cases from around the world where attorneys have been sanctioned for filing briefs and other documents with a court that contain AI hallucinations, or case citations that are improper, invalid, or just fabricated.

As noted on the compilation created by Charlotin, not only lawyers, but judges have also been tripped up by the use of AI. In Georgia, it took an appeals court to reveal that, not only did an attorney in the lower court, but also the lower court itself, had relied upon and cited to bogus case citations secured via AI research. In that case of Shahid v. Esaam, 2025 Ga. App. LEXIS 299, at *3 (Ga. Ct. App. June 30, 2025), the Georgia court of appeals struck the lower court order, remanded the case and sanctioned the attorney involved.

More recently, a New Jersey district court judge withdrew his decision in the biopharma securities case of In Re CorMedix Securities Litigation, 2:21-CV-14020 (D. N.J. July 22, 2025 Neals, J.), after the lawyers involved in the case complained that his opinion contained numerous errors, including made up quotes, misstated case outcomes and incorrect case citations, all presumably secured from research on an AI platform. The court withdrew its published decision and noted that another opinion and order would be issued.

With regards to attorneys running afoul from the use of AI research in their filings, according to the above scorecard, as of July 25, 2025, there were at least 230 cases from around the world where a court had determined that a filing contained AI produced hallucinated content, typically fake citations. Of the 230 instances from around the world, 130 of those cases were found in the United States. Of those numerous cases found in the United States, at least four cases arose in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

Attorneys From Pennsylvania Who Hallucinated

As noted, the filing of court documents containing hallucinations in the form of faulty or fake legal citations has led to sanctions in at least four Pennsylvania cases. The Pennsylvania federal courts who have addressed these issues have found that the submission of court filings with faulty citations amounts to violations of Fed.R.C.P. 11 (by signing a filing, an attorney certifies the accuracy of the legal arguments contained therein), and violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct 1.1 (Competency) and 3.3 (Candor Towards a Tribunal).

In the nonprecedential decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in the case of McCarthy v. U.S. DEA, No. 24-2704 (3d Cir. July 21, 2025 Chung, J.)(Not Precedential), the court addressed the DEA’s revocation of a physician’s assistant’s certificate of registration. The petitioner’s attorney was caught having submitted a filing that relied, in part, on “summaries” of eight previous DEA adjudications in support of arguments on behalf of the petitioner.

After it was determined that seven of the summaries were inaccurate and that the eighth decision did not even exist, the petitioner’s attorney acknowledged the same and admitted that the summaries had been secured through research on an AI tool. The court confirmed in its decision that the petitioner’s attorney confirmed that “he never took care to confirm the accuracy of the summaries or even that the decisions existed.” See McCarthy at p. 7. The court ruled that it would not consider the portion of the brief that contained the hallucinated information and issued a separate Order requiring the at fault attorney “to show cause why he should not be sanctioned for his conduct, particularly for his lack of candor to the court.”

In the separate case of Bunce v. Visual Technology Innovations, No. 2:23-CV-01740 (E.D. Pa. 2025 Kai, J.), a defense attorney admittedly utilized ChatGPT to draft his filings at issue relative to a discovery issue. The filings submitted by the defense counsel contained fake citations that could not be located on trusted resources.

The court in Bunce found violations of Fed.R.C.P. 11 and sanctioned counsel. While the court emphasized that nothing in Rule 11 prohibits use of AI in the practice of law, Rule 11 makes clear that an attorney who signs a filing is responsible for verifying the accuracy of the legal and factual claims contained within the filing.

In the case of Jakes v. Youngblood, No. 2:24-cv-1608 (W.D. Pa. June 26, 2025 Stickman, J.), the court faulted an attorney for submitting briefs with wholly fabricated quotations from case law, including fabricated quotations from this court’s own prior opinion. The court also noted that, “even more outrageously,” a review of the attorney’s reply brief filed in the same case revealed that that brief also contained fabricated quotes and misrepresented case law.

The court noted that it found it to be “very troubling” that, when accused of serious ethical violations, the attorney at fault “chose to double down.” In the end, the court noted that it viewed the attorney’s “conduct as a clear ethical violation of the highest order.” In its opinion, the court noted that the attorney at fault had filed a withdrawal of appearance.

This Pennsylvania federal court cited Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 and Pennsylvania Rule of Professional Conduct 3.3 (Candor Toward Tribunal) as confirming that attorneys have legal and ethical duties owed to the court. The court noted that, an attorney who signs and files a brief authored by a nonlawyer, such as a paralegal or an intern or a clerk, is personally responsible for all that the filing contains. In the end, the Jakes court dismissed the filings presented by the at fault attorney and ordered that attorney to show cause as to why his filings should not be viewed as having violated Rule 11 and Pa. R.P.C. 3.3.

In another Pennsylvania case involving an attorney utilizing AI hallucinations in a court filing, the court issued sanctions. In Bevins v. Colgate-Palmolive, No. 25-576 (E.D. Pa. April 10, 2025 Baylson, J.), the attorney in trouble had provided the court with case citations that were inaccurate and did not lead to any identifiable court opinions. The court noted that, based upon its research, it could not locate a case relative to the two (2) citations at issue and could not detect a possible typographical error in the citations provided.

When the court ordered the attorney to provide an explanation, the attorney asserted that the inclusion of the incorrect citations was unintended given that he planned to replace the wrong citation with a proper one but failed to do so in his final draft. The court noted its concern as to why the attorney was silent as to his act of providing the court with case citations to decisions that did not even exist and, as such, the court noted that it was “unconvinced by counsel’s explanations.”

This court also referred to Rule 11 and sanctioned the attorney. The court additionally referred the matter to the state bar, struck the attorney’s appearance in the case, thereby actually removing the attorney from the case. The court further ordered the attorney to advise the client of the sanctions and the fact that, should the Plaintiff choose to refile her case, she must find new counsel.

The above court decisions confirm that the use of unverified AI legal research in court filings could lead to serious sanctions if hallucinated citations or quotes or summaries are utilized. As one court noted, confirming the validity of one’s legal research and case citations is one of the most basic requirements that has always been present in the practice of law. The decisions on this issue confirm that the courts will rightfully take a hard stance against attorneys who submit hallucinated content to the court. Such a hard stance is required to protect the integrity of the record and the court system as a whole.

Anticipated Rules of Court on the Use of AI

With the rise of the use of AI in the practice of law, the federal and state courts have begun to take steps to promulgate rules and parameters to monitor the same.

In innovative fashion, U.S. District Court Judge Karoline Mehalchick of the Middle District of Pennsylvania crafted a civil practice order on the use of generative artificial intelligence, which appears to be the first of its kind at least in Pennsylvania.

Under that order, issued in all of Mehalchick’s civil cases, attorneys who utilize AI in the drafting of any of their court filings are required to file a certification with the court that identifies what AI platform was utilized, delineates what portion of the filing contains AI generated content, and certifies to the court that the filing attorney checked the accuracy of the AI generated content, including all references to case citations and legal authority.

In her order, Mehalchick also directs that the parties review the joint formal opinion of the Pennsylvania Bar Association and the Philadelphia Bar Association on the “Ethical Issues Regarding the Use of Artificial Intelligence.”

On the state court level, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court created the advisory committee on artificial intelligence in the Pennsylvania courts in order to monitor the use of AI in the court system. One possible recommendation that may come out of the advisory committee might be for the promulgation of a statewide rule of civil procedure on the use of AI in the practice of law, particularly with regards to court filings.

As the future continues to arrive, it is anticipated that the attorneys and judges in Pennsylvania will continue to adapt and the practice of law, hopefully, will improve as a whole.

Daniel E. Cummins is the managing attorney at Cummins Law where he focuses his practice on motor vehicle and trucking liability cases, products liability matters, and premises liability cases. He also serves as a mediator for the Federal Middle District Court and for Cummins Mediation. He is additionally the sole creator and writer of the Tort Talk Blog at www.TortTalkcom. Michael Cummins, Daniel's son, is a computer science and philosophy major at Ursinus College with a focus on researching artificial intelligence.

Reprinted with permission from the July 24, 2025 edition of the "The Pennsylvania Law Weekly © 2025 ALM Global Properties, LLC. All rights reserved. Further duplication without permission is prohibited, contact 877-256-2472 or asset-and-logo-licensing@alm.com.

Trial Court Requests Superior Court To Grant New Trial in Medical Malpractice Case Due, in Part, To Juror Accessing Plaintiff's Attorney's LinkedIn Profile

In the case of Hernandez v. Temple University Hospital, Oct. Term, 2021, No. 01422 (C.P. Phila. Co. March 21, 2025 Hill, J.), the trial court issued a Rule 1925 Opinion requesting the Superior Court to affirm the trial court’s ordering of a new trial at the request of the hospital Defendants in a medical malpractice action for various reasons.

According to the Opinion, this matter involved a Plaintiff who was shot in the neck at a party and then received treatment at various medical facilities. At some point, after extensive treatment, the injured party was discharged.

The Plaintiff then had mashed potatoes with a meal at home and developed difficulty breathing. He was brought to an emergency room in cardiac arrest.

There was a clinical presentation of the patient as being consisted with airway occlusion caused by eating thick foods.

The Plaintiff alleged various physical and traumatic brain injury as a result.

Of note, the court in this Opinion urged the Superior Court to dismiss the cross motions of the parties after the trial court had granted the hospital’s Motion for a New Trial, in part, because the court and counsel had discovered, after the jury trial had concluded, that one of the jurors had accessed the LinkedIn profile of the Plaintiff’s attorney during trial, which action violated the court’s instructions to the jurors.

The court noted that jurors may not consider information secured outside that information that was presented during trial and that is beyond a juror’s common knowledge. The court also noted that jurors are not permitted to contact counsel during the course of the trial.

The trial court found that a new trial was warranted when there was a reasonably likelihood of prejudice and when the harmlessness of such contact is not shown.

Given that this information about the juror accessing the Plaintiff’s attorney’s social media was not known to the court or counsel until after the verdict was rendered, it was not possible for the court to inquire what, if any, information that juror had learned from the LinkedIn page or what, if any, effect this information may have had over the jury deliberations.

The court found that this basis, alone, was sufficient to support the granting of the hospital’s request for a new trial.

The court addressed other issues in its Opinion as well.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Source: The Legal Intelligencer Common Pleas Case Alert, www.Law.com (July 23, 2025).

Superior Court Addresses Issues Raised With Respect to Verdict Slip in Med Mal Case

In the case of Hagans v. Hospital of the University of Pennsylvania, No. 536 EDA 2024 (Pa. Super. July 10, 2025 Stabile, J., McLaughlin, J., and Lane, J.) (Op. by McLaughlin, J.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the trial court’s rulings relative to a medical malpractice action. The appellate court upheld the trial court’s denial of the medical Defendant’s Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, relative to certain evidentiary rulings, and also upheld the trial court’s rulings related to the Verdict Slip.

This action arose out of alleged medical malpractice related to the birth of the Plaintiff’s child.

Of note, the Superior Court upheld the verdict in favor of the Plaintiffs in this action where the jury’s Verdict Slip demonstrated that it found at least one individual medical provider liable and where the Defendants consistently acknowledged that all providers worked together as a single care team relative to the treatment provided.

The hospital Defendant argued that the Verdict Slip should have been required to ask the jury to evaluate the negligence of each individual Defendant. The defense argued that the Plaintiff bore the burden of proof as to whether each Defendant’s conduct fell below the standard of care. The trial court rejected the hospital’s arguments and affirmed the judgment during post-trial proceeds.

On appeal, the appellate court noted that the review of the Verdict Slip confirmed that the jury found at least one individual Defendant liable for the harm such that there was sufficient evidence to establish the hospital Defendant’s vicarious liability.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer State Appellate Case Alert, www.Law.com (July 31, 2025).