Vehicle Exception to Commonwealth Immunity Reviewed by Commonwealth Court

In the case of Brown-Boyd v. SEPTA, No. 1167 C.D. 2022 (Pa. Cmwlth. July 15, 2024 Wojcik, J., Wallace, J., Leavitt, S.J.) (Op. by Wallace, J.), the Commonwealth Court affirmed the trial court’s decision denying SEPTA's Motion for Summary Judgment which was based on an argument that SEPTA was immune from suit under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act.  

In this case, the Plaintiff prevailed in convincing both the trial court, and the Commonwealth Court on appeal, that the facts implicated the vehicle exception to the immunity provided by the Act.

The vehicle exception to the general rule of immunity for municipal defendants provides that a Commonwealth entity may be found liable for acts resulting in damages caused by the "operation of any motor vehicle in the possession of a Commonwealth party."  See 42 Pa.C.S.A. Section 8522(b)(1).

The appellate court here affirmed the trial court's finding that the defendant bus driver was “operating” a bus for purposes of the motor vehicle exception of the sovereign immunity statute when the bus driver stopped to allow the Plaintiff to exit and allegedly refused to lower the bus’s handicap ramp which allegedly resulted in the Plaintiff falling and being injured. 

The appellate court noted that, under established case law, the “operation” of a motor vehicle covers more than simply moving the vehicle. Instead, this term also covers a variety of activities as well as the decision-making processes related to moving a vehicle.

The court primarily relied upon the plain language of the statute and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s discussion of the statute in the case of Balentine v. Chester Water Auth., 191 A.3d 799 (Pa. 2018). 

The court noted that, under this legal authority, the “operation” of a vehicle under this exception would include both acts and failures to act, including the Defendant bus driver’s allegedly failure in this case to lower the handicap ramp for the benefit of the Plaintiff.  In the end, the court found that the Defendant bus driver was “operating” the bus when the bus driver stopped to allow the Plaintiff to exit and allegedly refused to lower the handicap ramp.

As such, the appellate court concluded that the trial court did not err in denying the Defendants’ summary judgment motion pursuant to the vehicle exception to the sovereign immunity law.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: “The Legal Intelligencer State Appellate Case Alert,” ww.Law.com (July 31, 2024).