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Superior Court Addresses How To Address Settled Defendants at Trial

In its non-precedential decision in the case of Swank v. Rabkin Dermatopathology Laboratory, P.C., No. 342 WDA 2025 (Pa. Super. Dec. 15, 2025 Panella, P.J.E., McLaughlin, J., and Bender, P.J.E.) (Op. by Panella, P.J.E.), the court reversed the entry of judgment in favor of certain Defendants in a medical malpractice case and remanded the case back down for further proceedings.

According to the Opinion, this matter involved a delayed cancer diagnosis case.

Prior to trial, the Plaintiff reached a settlement with all parties except one and proceeded to trial against that last remaining party.

The Plaintiff, along with the settling Defendants, requested the trial court to dismiss the settling Defendants prior to trial because the remaining Defendant did not have any expert to provide an expert opinion against the settling Defendants. Moreover, the remaining Defendant did not file any crossclaim against the settled Defendants. Also, the Plaintiff did not have any expert testimony that was critical of the settling Defendants that would be presented at trial.  At the trial level, it was the Plaintiff’s position that it was legally impossible for there to be a prima facie case established against the settling Defendants and that, as such, those Defendants should be dismissed. 

The trial court disagreed and kept those settling Defendants in the case, relying upon the Fair Share Act in doing so.

As the case proceeded, the trial court did end up dismissing one of the settling Defendants after the Plaintiff’s case-in-chief was completed. The remaining other settled Defendants were dismissed just before closing arguments.

At trial, the Plaintiffs claimed that there was prejudice to the Plaintiff because the jury was left wondering why these Defendants were dismissed after they participated in the trial.

The jury ended up entering a defense verdict.  

The Plaintiff appealed and, in this Superior Court decision, the appellate court reversed the trial court’s decision and remanded the matter for further proceedings after finding that the trial court’s reliance upon Fair Share Act was misplaced.

Judge Panella, who wrote this Opinion, as well as the Fair Share Act case of Spencer v. Johnson, 249 A.3d 529 (Pa. Super. 2021), noted that the Superior Court has concluded that, for the “Fair Share Act to apply, the Plaintiff’s negligence must be an issue in the case.” See Op. at 13 citing Spencer, 249 A.3d at 559.

The court noted that, in this case, the Plaintiff’s negligence was not at issue in the case. As such, the court ruled that the trial court erred in relying upon the Fair Share Act to keep Defendants in the case.

The court otherwise noted that there is no absolute right to have settled Co-Defendants on a Verdict Sheet. Rather, the appellate court noted that a trial court must determine whether any evidence of the settled Co-Defendant’s liability exists in the case presented before deciding whether that party should be put on the Verdict Slip.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this non-precedential decision may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney Carmen J. Nocera of the Pittsburgh law firm of Harry S. Cohen & Associates, P.C. for bringing this case to my attention.

Source of image: Photo by Tima Miroshnichenko on www.pexels.com.

Superior Court Upholds The "Miscellaneous Vehicle" Exclusion Contained in UIM Policy

In the case of Erie Ins. Exch. v. Estate of Kennedy, 210 WDA 2025, 2025 Pa. Super 276 (Pa. Super. Dec. 11, 2025 Bowes, J., Stabile, J., Bender P.J.E.) (Op. by Stabile, J.), the Superior Court upheld a "miscellaneous vehicle" exclusion contained in the UIM carrier’s policy. 

The court more specifically ruled that the denial of coverage was proper when the deceased injured party had a policy providing stacking of uninsured and underinsured benefits that included an exclusion stating that the policy would not cover damages sustained by an insured while occupying a miscellaneous vehicle owned by a relative and that was not covered under the subject insurance policy. 

The Superior Court ruled that the "miscellaneous vehicle" exclusion was valid in this case because the insured was seeking to stack policies but had not first received uninsured and underinsured coverage under the policy applicable to the vehicle he occupied at the time the injuries occurred.  

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Source:  “Court Summaries” by Timothy L. Clawges in the Pennsylvania Bar News (Jan. 19, 2026). 

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PA Federal Court Predicts PA Supreme Court Will Adopt Efficient Proximate Cause Doctrine in Property Insurance Coverage Cases

In the case of Stella Prop. Dev. and Event Prod., LLC v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., No. 3:24-CV-00060-SLH (W.D. Pa. Jan. 28, 2026 Smith, J.), the court ruled in favor of an insurance carrier on Cross-Motions for Partial Summary Judgment in an insurance coverage, breach of contract, and bad faith claims.

According to the Opinion, this matter involved a commercial property policy that offered protection to the Plaintiff’s property. The Plaintiff’s property allegedly sustained damages from a windstorm.

The Plaintiff had an inspection completed and submitted a claim to the insurance company for first-party property coverage. The Plaintiff provided the carrier with the inspection report.

The carrier had their own inspection completed and that report indicated that the damage to the Plaintiff’s roof involved shingles that appeared to be over twenty-five (25) years of age and in very poor condition. That expert also concluded that no sudden loss created the damages to the roof. 

The carrier also secured an engineering expert who completed an additional inspection and also concluded that the roof and the shingles on the roof were not damaged by the wind event. Based at least in part on these reports, the carrier denied the claim.

In issuing the denial, the carrier relied upon certain exclusions including a wear-and-tear exclusion and a maintenance exclusion.

Thereafter, the Plaintiff filed suit alleging a breach of contract and bad faith claims. The matter came before this court on Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment on the issues presented.

The court denied the Plaintiff’s Motions and granted the insurance company’s Motions.

In reviewing the Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment on its breach of contract claim, the court noted that, based upon the exclusions claimed by the carrier, the carrier was asserting that summary judgment in favor of the Plaintiff was inappropriate because there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the damages to the roof pre-existed the storm or were caused by the storm.

In this regard, the court reviewed the efficient proximate cause doctrine and compared it to the concurrent causation doctrine in coverage dispute matters.

In the end, this court predicated that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would adopt and apply the efficient proximate cause doctrine if faced with the issue.

Applying that doctrine to the case presented, the court noted that the Plaintiff’s claims of a breach of contract is not defeated merely because wear-and-tear and/or inadequate maintenance may have contributed to the roof damage. Rather, the Plaintiff must still be provided with an opportunity to prove that the windstorm was the “dominant and efficient” cause of the roof destruction as opposed to being merely a “remote” or “incidental” cause. 

Given that there were issues of material fact in this regard, the court ruled that this question should be decided by a jury.

Relative to the carrier’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the Plaintiff’s statutory bad faith claim, the court ruled that the Plaintiff had not produced sufficient evidence from which a jury could reasonably conclude, by clear and convincing evidence, that the carrier lacked a reasonable basis to deny the claim. 

The court noted that the record before it confirmed that the carrier relied upon detailed investigative materials and expert assessments that attributed the roof damage to decay and wear-and-tear. 

The court found that these expert assessments supplied an objectively reasonable basis for the carrier to conclude that wear-n-tear and/or inadequate maintenance, as opposed to a covered windstorm, was the dominant and efficient cause of the loss, and that the exclusions therefore applied.

The court noted that the mere possibility that the insured may prevail at proving the Plaintiff’s case in this regard “hardly equates to bad faith.” Rather, the court noted that the question under the bad faith statute, 42 Pa. C.S.A. §8371 is whether the denial lacked a reasonable basis. The court cited to other case law confirming that a reasonable basis for the denial of a claim is all that is required in order to defeat a claim of insurance bad faith.

Based on this law, the court ruled in favor of the carrier’s Motion for Summary Judgment on the bad faith issues and dismissed that claim of the Plaintiff with prejudice.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney Robert S. Stickley of Stickley Law LLC in Newtown Square, PA for bringing this case to my attention.

Source of image:  Photo by Andreas Ebner on www.pexels.com.

Philadelphia County Matter Coordinated to Matter in Jefferson County Arising Out of Same Incident

Jefferson County Courthouse

In the case of Bucci Express, LLC v. SG Freight, Inc., No. 263-CV-2025 C.D. (C.P. Jeff. Co. Dec. 29, 2025 Foradora, P.J.), the court granted a Plaintiff’s Motion for Coordination of Actions in different counties relative to separate claims arising out of the same trucking accident, one of which was filed in Jefferson County and one of which was filed in Philadelphia County. The court ruled that the Philadelphia County lawsuit would be coordinated with the case that was filed in Jefferson County. The court made this ruling pursuant to Pa. R.C.P. 213.1.

According to this Opinion, this matter arose out of a fatal multi-vehicle crash involving commercial trucks. Following the crash, two (2) trucking companies files suit in Jefferson County against multiple Defendants, including Pennsylvania Department of Transportation. The Plaintiffs alleged that the Jefferson County lawsuit was improperly filed to block proceedings in Philadelphia County.

In issuing his ruling, the court noted that PennDOT’s presence in the case weighed heavily in the decision, noting that state law limits where that agency can be sued. The court noted that keeping the case out of Jefferson County would effectively block the Plaintiffs from pursuing certain claims against PennDOT under the applicable law.

Although the court acknowledged that Philadelphia County may have been more convenient for some of the parties in that case, the court found that key witnesses, including first responders, were based in Jefferson County and should not be required to travel long distances.

Judge Foradora also noted that many pre-trial proceedings could be handled remotely, thereby reducing travel burdens on lawyers and witnesses.

The court additionally noted that, by coordinating the lawsuits, duplicative and inconsistent rulings, Orders, or judgments would be avoided a judicial economy furthered.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Source: Article “Venue Fight Ends As Court Moves Fatal Trucking Cases Outside Of Phila. Courts” By Tristin Hoffman of The Legal Intelligencer (Dec. 30, 2025).

Pennsylvania Lawyer Magazine Recognized on a National Level

An article of mine was featured in The Pennsylvania Lawyer magazine over the past year, which magazine was awarded a 2025 Luminary Award from the National Association for Bar Professionals!

My article entitled "Use of Exhibits in Opening Statements is Allowed" appeared in the May/June 2025 edition of the magazine. Here is a LINK to the Tort Talk post on that article, which post contains a link to the article.

I send thanks to Patricia Graybill, the editor of The Pennsylvania Lawyer magazine for agreeing to publish the article. I also extend my congratulations to her for receiving this recognition for the excellent work she has done for years with the magazine for the Pennsylvania Bar Association.

If you are interested in authoring an article, contact the Pennsylvania Bar Association via email at: editor@pabar.org.

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Pennsylvania Federal Court Rules that Insurance Information Is Not Admissible at Post-Koken Trial on UIM Claims

In the case of Saeli v. Geico Adv. Ins. Co., No. 1:24-CV-00025-RAL (W.D. Pa. Jan. 28, 2026 Lanzillo, Chief Mag. J.), the Chief Magistrate Judge for the Western District Federal Court of Pennsylvania addressed a Motion In Limine filed a UIM carrier in a post-Koken case seeking to preclude the Plaintiff from introducing any evidence or testimony regarding the amount of the tortfeasor’s liability limits, the UIM limits, or any premiums paid.

The court ruled that, since the probative value of such evidence, if any, is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice and confusion on the issues presented, the UIM carrier’s Motion was granted.

The court additionally found that the evidence at issue is irrelevant to the issues presented in the trial. The court noted that the central issue in the case was the extent of the damages sustained by the Plaintiff. As such, the court found that the amount of the tortfeasor’s liability limits, the UIM limits, and the premiums paid were irrelevant to such issues.

The court noted that, while the tortfeasor’s liability coverage will have to be credited to the UIM carrier, the court noted that this is a simple mathematical calculation that the court could accomplish by molding the verdict after the verdict is handed down the jury and without the need to involve the jury.

The court felt that requesting a jury to apply the liability limit against the UIM benefits coverage would unnecessarily complicate the issues before the jury and could risk prejudice to Geico.

Magistrate Judge Lanzillo included in his Opinion a review of other Pennsylvania federal court decisions on the issue and noted that all but one had held the evidence of coverage limits and premiums paid provided no benefit to the jury in determining the issue of damages in post-Koken cases and that, even if such evidence was minimally relevant, its probative value was substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice to the Defendant. See Op. at 4.

It is noted that the court additionally indicated that the Plaintiff did not file a Response to Geico’s Motion In Limine by the time of the deadline set by the court.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

I send thanks to Attorney Joseph Hudock of the Pittsburgh office of the Summers, McDonnell, Hudock, Guthrie & Rauch, P.C. law firm for bringing this case decision to my attention.


Please note that the Post-Koken scorecard on the Tort Talk blog will be updated with this decision.

The post-Koken scorecard on the Tort Talk blog is always freely available for research. You can access the scorecard by going to www.TortTalk.coom and scrolling a bit down the hand column to the label for Post-Koken Scorecard and clicking on the date under that.

Source of image:  Photo by Scott Greer on www. unsplash.com.

Motion For Summary Judgment Denied in Zipline Accident Case

In the case of Witkowski v. Hellerick’s Family Farm, Inc., No. 230900999 (C.P. Phila. Co. Sept. 18, 2025), the trial court issued a Rule 1925 Opinion requesting the Superior Court to affirm its decision denying a Motion for Summary Judgment in a premises liability case.

According to the Opinion, this matter arises out of a fatal accident that occurred when the Plaintiff died after experiencing difficulties on a zipline course at the Defendant’s farm.

Prior to the incident, the Plaintiff has signed liability waivers acknowledging the risks involved in the activity.

After the accident, the Plaintiff filed a negligence suit in which recklessness was alleged as well.

The Defendant farm moved for summary judgment arguing that the signed waivers and the Agritourism Activity Protection Act shielded the Defendants from liability.

According to the Opinion, the Agritourism Activity Protection Act limits liability for agritourism providers unless gross negligence or recklessness is proven.

The court found that issues of fact with regards to whether the Defendant’s conduct constituted gross negligence or recklessness, which would negate the protections of the waivers and the act existed in the case presented. As such, the court noted that the issues should be permitted to proceed to a jury.

The trial court otherwise noted that the appeal should be dismissed on procedural grounds as its order did not meet the criteria for an appealable Order under Pennsylvania law given that the Order at issue was not a final Order.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer Common Pleas Case Alert, www.Law.com (Jan. 8, 2026).

Trial Court Addresses Whether a Certificate of Merit is Required

In the case of Muniz-Colon v. Friends Hospital, Sept. Term, 2025, No. 0068500065 (C.P. Phila. Co. Jan. 12, 2026 Hill, J.), the court addressed the issue of when a Certificate of Merit may be required for a professional negligence case.

According to information gathered on this case, the Plaintiff in this matter was allegedly brought to the hospital where he was allegedly assaulted and apparently knocked unconscious by the staff as he was allegedly being admitted to the facility on a 302 admission.

In response to the lawsuit filed, the Defendants all filed Motions for Non Pros due to the failure of the Plaintiff to present a Certificate of Merit under the MCARE statute.

Plaintiff’s counsel filed a Motion under Pa. R.C.P. 1042.6(c) for a determination as to whether a Certificate of Merit was required or not.

In its decision, the court ruled that the alleged assault may have indeed occurred in the course of a professional relationship given that it occurred during the admissions process. However, the court ruled the allegations in the Complaint as involving alleged negligence that did not involve medical judgment. 

Accordingly, the court ruled that no Certificate of Merit was required for the case presented.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney Robin Feeney of the Philadelphia law firm of Matkoff, Shengold, Berman, Goodnow & Associates, P.C. for bringing this case to my attention.

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Link to Copy of Hagedorn Decision Reviewed in Yesterday's Tort Talk Post.

Yesterday's Tort Talk blog post reviewed the case of Hagedorn v. Rick’s Backhoe Service, Inc., No. 2018-CV-3723 (C.P. Lacka. Co. Jan. 9, 2026 Nealon, J.), which involved a decision on a Motion for Bifurcation.  The Link to the post was not complete.

Here is the LINK to the above decision.  Sorry for any inconvenience.

Thank you for reading Tort Talk.

Motion To Bifurcate Motor Vehicle Accident Lawsuit Involving Bad Injuries Denied

In the case of Hagedorn v. Rick’s Backhoe Service, Inc., No. 2018-CV-3723 (C.P. Lacka. Co. Jan. 9, 2026 Nealon, J.), the court denied a Defendant’s Motion to Bifurcate the liability and damages issues presented in a motor vehicle accident case.

According to the Opinion, this matter arose out of a motor vehicle accident during which the Plaintiff was operating a motorcycle.  The Plaintiff and the Defendant driver allegedly engaged in road rage in a construction zone and that, during the interaction, the Defendant driver negligently and recklessly struck the Plaintiff’s motorcycle, resulting in the accident.

In seeking to bifurcate the liability and damages issues presented, the Defendants asserted that they were proceeding on a strong liability defense. 

The Defendants also asserted that, given the severity of the injuries sustained by the Plaintiff, there was a strong likelihood that the jury’s decision on liability would be tainted by sympathy for the Plaintiff if the jury was to hear the damages evidence and the severity of the damages alleged. 

The defense further argued that the bifurcation would expedite the action by allowing for a clear presentation of the negligence issues to the jury without confusing the issues relative to the injuries and damages claims presented.

In opposition, the Plaintiff asserted, in part, that the testimony of the treating physicians would explain, in part, the mechanics of the Plaintiff’s injuries which could also provide relevant context on how the collision actually occurred and what the forces involved were. The Plaintiff additionally asserted that a bifurcation of the trial would not serve the interests of judicial economy as it would cause a lengthier trial and additional expenses.

Judge Terrence R. Nealon of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas reviewed the Motion to Bifurcate under the standard of review set forth in Pa. R.C.P. 213(b). 

In reviewing the law, Judge Nealon noted that appellate decisions indicated that cases should only be bifurcated where the separation of the issues would facilitate the orderly presentation of evidence and would support judicial economy. Bifurcation is typically only granted where the issues of liability and damages are “totally independent.” See Op. at 4 [citation omitted].

Here, the court found that bifurcation of the trial would not promote convenience or judicial economy. The court additionally found that the issues of liability and damages were not totally independent from one another based upon the information in the record before the court.

Judge Terrence R. Nealon
Lackawanna Co.

In this regard, Judge Nealon noted that the Plaintiff indicated that his treating physicians would testify regarding the mechanics of his injuries, which could provide context regarding the dynamics of the impact, which could bear on the issue of how the accident occurred. Judge Nealon also noted that proof of that nature indicates that certain evidence on liability and damages is intermingled. 

The court also noted that the defense had not established that bifurcation was necessary to actually avoid prejudice. In terms of any concern that the jury might be sympathetic towards the Plaintiff due to the nature of the Plaintiff’s injuries, the court noted that the jury would be furnished with instructions from the court admonishing the jury that they should not allow sympathy or emotion to influence their deliberations or verdict.

Judge Nealon additionally cited to Pennsylvania Supreme Court precedent confirming that the courts may assume that juries will follow judicial instructions faithfully.

Based upon its review of the matter, the court found that bifurcation of the liability and damages issues into separate trials pursuant to Pa. R.C.P. 213(b) was not proper in this matter. Accordingly, the Motion was denied.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

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Third Circuit Addresses Strict Liability Claims in Alleged Food Poisoning Case

In its unpublished decision in the case of Kovalev v. Lidl US, LLC, No. 24-3224 (3rd Cir. Nov. 12, 2025 Hardiman, J., Matey, J., Chung, J.) (per curiam) (unpublished), the appellate court affirmed the entry of summary judgment and other motions after finding that the thirty (30) day removal to federal court deadline begins when the Defendant learns that the case is indeed removable.

According to the record before this court, the Plaintiff had made a demand in excess of the diversity jurisdictional amount.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff claimed food poisoning from eating bread from a loaf of bread he had purchased.   

The court otherwise noted that the Plaintiff failed to establish that the alleged defective condition existed at the time of the sale, thereby precluding any strict liability claims. The court also found that the Plaintiff did not have any evidence to support the allegation that the alleged defect caused his claimed injuries.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney James Beck of the Philadelphia office of the Reed Smith law firm for bringing this case to my attention.

More Attorneys In Trouble for AI Hallucinations in Citations in Brief

In the case of Lifetime Well LLC v. Ibspot.com, Inc., No. 2:25-CV-05135-MAK (E.D. Pa. Jan. 26, 2026 Kearney, J.), a federal court judge sanctioned two (2) Pennsylvania and New York based attorneys after the court identified numerous artificial intelligence hallucinations in briefs. The court issued both non-monetary and monetary sanctions.

In its Opinion, the court noted that the two (2) attorneys failed to thoroughly review a Brief that they both signed and filed. According to the Opinion, a law clerk in the law office had allegedly drafted the Brief utilizing AI. The court found that the conduct of the attorneys was in violation of Federal Rule 11.

The court felt that sanctions were necessary in order to deter other attorneys from repeating such conduct.

Given that both attorneys had taken steps to remedy their mistakes, the court declined to refer the attorneys to the disciplinary board.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Source: Fed. Judge Sanctions Two Attorneys Over AI Hallucinations, Declines Disciplinary Referral By Riley Brennan of The Legal Intelligencer (Jan. 26, 2026).

Source of image:  Photo by Numan Ali on www.unsplash.com.

Accidental Shooting From One Vehicle To Another Found To Involve "Use" of a Motor Vehicle

In the case of Allmerica Financial Benefit Ins. Co. v. Hunt, No. 2:24-CV-02767 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 15, 2025 Weilheimer, J.), the court denied Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings filed by two (2) UIM carriers in a case in which the two (2) automobile insurance companies were attempting to avoid having to pay underinsured motorists (UIM) coverage after an accidental shooting while the vehicle was at a red light.

This matter arose out of an accidental shooting that occurred between two drivers at a red light. One driver was attempting to unload a gun he had taken out of his glove compartment. The gun accidentally went off and struck an individual in the adjacent car, resulting in fatal injuries to that person.

The family of the decedent recovered the liability limits from the tortfeasor’s coverage and then turned to seek UIM coverage.

The UIM carrier filed suit, arguing that the shooting did not result from the “use” of a vehicle as required under the terms of that policy.

The court held that the policy language contained in the UIM policies conflicted with Pennsylvania’s Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (MVFRL) because it attempted to impose a stricter, proximate cause standard for UIM coverage instead of Pennsylvania’s broader standard of review.

The court wrote that, in close or doubtful insurance coverage cases, the law requires judges to err on the side of the insured.

The court additionally noted that, while insurers should not be considered to always be on the hook in terms of coverage because of their perceived ability to bear the cost of paying on the policy, public policy dictates that when there is a “tie” on the positions put forth by the UIM carrier and the insured on a coverage dispute, the court should err in favor of finding coverage.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.  The Court's companion Order can be viewed HERE.


Source: Article – “Pa Federal Judge Rules Auto Insurers Can’t Dodge UIM Coverage In Fatal Stoplight Shooting Case,” By Tristin Hoffman of the Legal Intelligencer (Jan. 2,2 026).

Senior Judge Minora Addresses Permissible Scope of Pre-Complaint Discovery Addressed to an Insurance Company in a Bad Faith Claim

In the case of Minooka Pastry Inc. v. Erie Insurance, No. 2024-CV-4077 (C.P. Lacka. Co. Jan. 15, 2026), Judge Carmen D. Minora of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas addressed pre-Complaint discovery issues in a bad faith and breach of contract action brought against an insurance carrier.

According to the Opinion, this matter arose out of a claim presented by the Minooka Bakery to Erie Insurance for water damage sustained the interior of the property during a windstorm. After Erie denied the claim, the Minooka Bakery was seeking to commence a multi-count lawsuit against Erie, including causes of action for bad faith, breach of contract, and violation of Pennsylvania’s Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law.

To assist it in the preparation of a Complaint, the Minooka Bakery served upon Erie Insurance written discovery requests. In response, Erie objected to the same but otherwise independently provided some materials along with a privilege log.

This matter came before the court on the Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Pre-Complaint Discovery under Pa. R.C.P. 4003.8. The Plaintiff asserted that it was still in need of additional information and documentation despite the materials produced by Erie Insurance. The carrier asserted that the materials it turned over were sufficient.

In the end, the court granted in part and denied in part the Motion to Compel.

In so ruling, the court noted that, because the Plaintiff intends to assert a bad faith claim against its carrier, an expansion of the scope of pre-Complaint discovery was warranted given that that particular cause of action requires the Plaintiff to present clear and convincing evidence that the carrier did not have a reasonable basis for denying benefits under the policy and that the carrier knew, or recklessly disregarded, its alleged lack of a reasonable basis in denying the claim.

Senior Judge Carmen D. Minora
Lackawanna County 

Judge Minora noted that the second prong of this test requires a demonstration of a heightened level of intent on the part of the carrier, thereby making inquiry into certain areas, “such as past practices and reserve information,” more likely accessible for purposes of pre-Complaint discovery.

Keeping in mind that the burden upon the Plaintiff to assert a bad faith claim sufficient to defeat any Preliminary Objections for lack of specificity, and also considering the discovery sought “will not cause unreasonable annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, burden or 

expense” under Pa. R.C.P. 4003.8(a), the court overruled the carrier’s objections, except those objections asserted with respect to privilege material. In this regard, the court reviewed the carrier’s privilege log and agreed with the carrier’s position with respect to those objections.

The court more specifically noted that, in making this ruling, it was specifically determined that “guidebooks, training manuals, non-privilege communications, reserve information, comparative claim data and regulatory filings” were within the permissible scope of pre-Complaint discovery in this matter. The court did impose a time limitation of not to exceed three (3) years prior to the date of loss relative to the scope of the information required to be produced.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney Paul Walker of Walker Law in Clarks Summit, Pennsylvania for bringing this case to my attention.

U.S. Supreme Court Decision Ruling that Delaware Rule Requiring Certificate of Merit for Professional Liability Claims Has Implications In Pennsylvania Matters

In the United State Supreme Court case of Berk v. Choy, No. 24-440 (U.S. Jan. 20, 2026) (Op. by Barrett, J.), the United States Supreme Court held that a Delaware law requiring a Plaintiff suing for medical malpractice to provide an affidavit from a medical professional attesting to the merit of the claims presented in the law suit conflicts with valid Federal Rule of Civil Procedure and, as such, does not apply in federal court proceedings.

According to commentators, this United States Supreme Court decision can be read as establishing that Pennsylvania's requirements for a Certificate of Merit in professional negligence in state court matters would not apply in the federal courts of Pennsylvania.

As such, these commentators have suggested that, in those cases where a plaintiff can establish diversity jurisdiction in order to get into federal court, those plaintiffs may opt to proceed in federal court where they need not secure and produce a Certificate or Merit before proceeding with a professional negligence claim, such as a medical malpractice claim or a legal malpractice claim.   

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

I send thanks to Attorney Thomas J. Foley, III of the Foley Law Firm in Scranton, PA for bringing this decision to my attention.

Source of image:  Photo by Fine Photographics on www.pexels.com.

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Reviews, in Part, Ability of a Party To Proceed on A Cause of Action Based on Spoliation of Evidence

In the case of Erie Insurance Exchange v. United Services Auto, No. 19 WAP 2024 (Pa. Jan. 21, 2026) (Op. by Donohue, J.), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether one carrier had a claim against another carrier under and allegation of promissory estoppel due to the failure to preserve evidence pertinent to the damages claims presented in a property damage subrogation claim.

According to the Opinion, this matter involved a fire that occurred at an auto repair shop, resulting in damages to the property and several vehicles. 

The insurance company for the property paid out damages and then sought reimbursement from those parties allegedly responsible. The insurer who brought the lawsuit suspected that a specific vehicle, insured by another insurance company, was the source of the fire.  As such, the Plaintiff insurance company requested that the vehicle in question be preserved for further investigation. 

Despite assurances that the vehicle would be preserved, the vehicle was instead sold at a salvage auction, thereby eliminating the possibility of further examination of the vehicle and hindering the Plaintiff’s potential claims against the other parties.  The Plaintiff insurance company filed suit based, in part, on the other insurance company's failure to preserve evidence as requested.

The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Defendant, concluding that the promissory estoppel claim was, in substance, a claim for negligence spoliation of evidence, which was a cause of action not recognized in Pennsylvania.

The trial court also noted that subrogation principles did not allow recovery because the Defendant had not caused the original property loss.

On appeal, the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed and found that the facts might support a promissory estoppel claim. The Superior Court also felt that the trial court erred in dismissing the Complaint on grounds of speculative damages and unrecognized causes of action.

Further up the appellate ladder, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that, as subrogee, the Plaintiff insurance company’s rights were limited to recovery from the party responsible for the original loss and, because that Defendant did not cause the fire, no right of recovery existed. As such, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court vacated the Superior Court’s erroneous decision, and reinstated the trial court’s Order in favor of the Defendant.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of the Majority's decision may click this LINK.

Justice Brobson's Concurring and Dissenting Opinion can be viewed HERE.

Justice Dougherty's Dissenting Opinion can be viewed HERE.


Source: Justia Daily Opinion Summaries, www.justia.com (Jan. 22, 2026).

WATCH OUT FOR THIS PITFALL WITH DEADLINES

On December 24, 2025, the U.S. Postal Service implemented new procedures for dating mail.  As of that date and going forward, the Post Office will postmark letters and packages with the date they are processed at the postal facility rather than the date that they are dropped off in the mailbox as was the case in the past. 

This shift in procedure could affect whether time-sensitive mail is considered to be on time.

Commentators have recommended that, if your mail is time-sensitive in this regard, you should walk the mail into the post office and request a manual postmark to ensure that the postmark date matches the day you mailed the item.  You can also request a certificate of mailing.

Source of image:  Photo by Anthony Acosta on www.pexels.com.

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Summary Judgment Denied in Federal Court Snow and Ice Slip and Fall Case

In the case of Spa Resort, L.P., No. 3:24-CV-0796 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 9, 2026 Saporito, J.), the court denied the Defendant resort’s Motion for Summary Judgment in a slip and fall case.

The Defendant landowner argued that the hills and ridges doctrine applied because the Plaintiff allegedly slipped and fell due to icy conditions that resulted from snowfall on the day of the incident.

In opposition, the Plaintiffs argued that the Plaintiff did not slip and fall due to icy conditions caused by the snowstorm, but rather, because the Defendants’ driveway was improperly maintained and repaired such that the hills and ridges doctrine did not apply.

The court ultimately concluded that questions of fact remained as to whether the hills and ridges doctrine applied to shield the property owner from liability regarding the allegedly slippery conditions on the premises.

Judge Joseph F. Saporito, Jr.
M.D. Pa.

In his decision, Judge Saporito provided a detailed review of the current status of the law in Pennsylvania regarding the hills and ridges doctrine.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: Article – “Jury To Decide If Spa Resort Can Be Liable Under ‘Hills and Ridges’ Doctrine In Slip-And-Fall Case,” By Riley Brennan of The Legal Intelligencer (Jan. 12, 2026).

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Finds It Cannot Reach Question of Validity of Uber's Arbitration Clause

In the case of Chilutti v. Uber, No. 58 EAP 2024 (Pa. Jan. 21, 2026) (Op by Brobson, J.), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court addressed a request by Uber to refer a personal injury civil litigation matter to arbitration.

According to the Opinion, a woman who uses a wheelchair sued Uber Technologies, Inc. and others after an incident in which an Uber driver failed to provide her with a seat belt while transporting her in a wheelchair-accessible vehicle, causing her to fall and sustain injuries.

The Plaintiff filed a negligence cause of action in court. Uber responded by filing a Petition to Compel Arbitration, arguing that the Plaintiffs had agreed to arbitrate their claims when they enrolled in Uber’s service.

At the trial court level, the trial court granted Uber’s Petition and ordered the parties to proceed to Arbitration.

At the Superior Court level, the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed and held that there was valid agreement to arbitrate and remanded for further proceedings.

In this decision, the Pennsylvania Supreme court first reviewed whether an Order compelling Arbitration and staying trial proceedings is an immediately appealable collateral Order. The Supreme Court held that such an Order does not meet the requirements for a collateral Order because the issue can be reviewed after the entry of a final judgment and, as such, did not result in irreparable loss if the judicial review is postponed. 

Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the Superior Court’s decision and remanded the case back to the trial court with instructions on how to proceed.

In light of this decision, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not address the issue of the validity of the Uber Arbitration Agreement or the merits of whether Arbitration could be compelled in cases involving Uber.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: Justia Daily Opinion Summaries, www.justia.com (Jan. 22, 2026).4

Source of image:  Photo by Tingey on www.unsplash.com.