PA Federal Court Predicts PA Supreme Court Will Adopt Efficient Proximate Cause Doctrine in Property Insurance Coverage Cases

In the case of Stella Prop. Dev. and Event Prod., LLC v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., No. 3:24-CV-00060-SLH (W.D. Pa. Jan. 28, 2026 Smith, J.), the court ruled in favor of an insurance carrier on Cross-Motions for Partial Summary Judgment in an insurance coverage, breach of contract, and bad faith claims.

According to the Opinion, this matter involved a commercial property policy that offered protection to the Plaintiff’s property. The Plaintiff’s property allegedly sustained damages from a windstorm.

The Plaintiff had an inspection completed and submitted a claim to the insurance company for first-party property coverage. The Plaintiff provided the carrier with the inspection report.

The carrier had their own inspection completed and that report indicated that the damage to the Plaintiff’s roof involved shingles that appeared to be over twenty-five (25) years of age and in very poor condition. That expert also concluded that no sudden loss created the damages to the roof. 

The carrier also secured an engineering expert who completed an additional inspection and also concluded that the roof and the shingles on the roof were not damaged by the wind event. Based at least in part on these reports, the carrier denied the claim.

In issuing the denial, the carrier relied upon certain exclusions including a wear-and-tear exclusion and a maintenance exclusion.

Thereafter, the Plaintiff filed suit alleging a breach of contract and bad faith claims. The matter came before this court on Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment on the issues presented.

The court denied the Plaintiff’s Motions and granted the insurance company’s Motions.

In reviewing the Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment on its breach of contract claim, the court noted that, based upon the exclusions claimed by the carrier, the carrier was asserting that summary judgment in favor of the Plaintiff was inappropriate because there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the damages to the roof pre-existed the storm or were caused by the storm.

In this regard, the court reviewed the efficient proximate cause doctrine and compared it to the concurrent causation doctrine in coverage dispute matters.

In the end, this court predicated that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would adopt and apply the efficient proximate cause doctrine if faced with the issue.

Applying that doctrine to the case presented, the court noted that the Plaintiff’s claims of a breach of contract is not defeated merely because wear-and-tear and/or inadequate maintenance may have contributed to the roof damage. Rather, the Plaintiff must still be provided with an opportunity to prove that the windstorm was the “dominant and efficient” cause of the roof destruction as opposed to being merely a “remote” or “incidental” cause. 

Given that there were issues of material fact in this regard, the court ruled that this question should be decided by a jury.

Relative to the carrier’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the Plaintiff’s statutory bad faith claim, the court ruled that the Plaintiff had not produced sufficient evidence from which a jury could reasonably conclude, by clear and convincing evidence, that the carrier lacked a reasonable basis to deny the claim. 

The court noted that the record before it confirmed that the carrier relied upon detailed investigative materials and expert assessments that attributed the roof damage to decay and wear-and-tear. 

The court found that these expert assessments supplied an objectively reasonable basis for the carrier to conclude that wear-n-tear and/or inadequate maintenance, as opposed to a covered windstorm, was the dominant and efficient cause of the loss, and that the exclusions therefore applied.

The court noted that the mere possibility that the insured may prevail at proving the Plaintiff’s case in this regard “hardly equates to bad faith.” Rather, the court noted that the question under the bad faith statute, 42 Pa. C.S.A. §8371 is whether the denial lacked a reasonable basis. The court cited to other case law confirming that a reasonable basis for the denial of a claim is all that is required in order to defeat a claim of insurance bad faith.

Based on this law, the court ruled in favor of the carrier’s Motion for Summary Judgment on the bad faith issues and dismissed that claim of the Plaintiff with prejudice.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney Robert S. Stickley of Stickley Law LLC in Newtown Square, PA for bringing this case to my attention.

Source of image:  Photo by Andreas Ebner on www.pexels.com.

Philadelphia County Matter Coordinated to Matter in Jefferson County Arising Out of Same Incident

Jefferson County Courthouse

In the case of Bucci Express, LLC v. SG Freight, Inc., No. 263-CV-2025 C.D. (C.P. Jeff. Co. Dec. 29, 2025 Foradora, P.J.), the court granted a Plaintiff’s Motion for Coordination of Actions in different counties relative to separate claims arising out of the same trucking accident, one of which was filed in Jefferson County and one of which was filed in Philadelphia County. The court ruled that the Philadelphia County lawsuit would be coordinated with the case that was filed in Jefferson County. The court made this ruling pursuant to Pa. R.C.P. 213.1.

According to this Opinion, this matter arose out of a fatal multi-vehicle crash involving commercial trucks. Following the crash, two (2) trucking companies files suit in Jefferson County against multiple Defendants, including Pennsylvania Department of Transportation. The Plaintiffs alleged that the Jefferson County lawsuit was improperly filed to block proceedings in Philadelphia County.

In issuing his ruling, the court noted that PennDOT’s presence in the case weighed heavily in the decision, noting that state law limits where that agency can be sued. The court noted that keeping the case out of Jefferson County would effectively block the Plaintiffs from pursuing certain claims against PennDOT under the applicable law.

Although the court acknowledged that Philadelphia County may have been more convenient for some of the parties in that case, the court found that key witnesses, including first responders, were based in Jefferson County and should not be required to travel long distances.

Judge Foradora also noted that many pre-trial proceedings could be handled remotely, thereby reducing travel burdens on lawyers and witnesses.

The court additionally noted that, by coordinating the lawsuits, duplicative and inconsistent rulings, Orders, or judgments would be avoided a judicial economy furthered.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Source: Article “Venue Fight Ends As Court Moves Fatal Trucking Cases Outside Of Phila. Courts” By Tristin Hoffman of The Legal Intelligencer (Dec. 30, 2025).

Pennsylvania Lawyer Magazine Recognized on a National Level

An article of mine was featured in The Pennsylvania Lawyer magazine over the past year, which magazine was awarded a 2025 Luminary Award from the National Association for Bar Professionals!

My article entitled "Use of Exhibits in Opening Statements is Allowed" appeared in the May/June 2025 edition of the magazine. Here is a LINK to the Tort Talk post on that article, which post contains a link to the article.

I send thanks to Patricia Graybill, the editor of The Pennsylvania Lawyer magazine for agreeing to publish the article. I also extend my congratulations to her for receiving this recognition for the excellent work she has done for years with the magazine for the Pennsylvania Bar Association.

If you are interested in authoring an article, contact the Pennsylvania Bar Association via email at: editor@pabar.org.

Mock Trial Jurors Needed For Semi-Final Round of Lackawanna County Competition Set For February 24th

 

Pennsylvania Federal Court Rules that Insurance Information Is Not Admissible at Post-Koken Trial on UIM Claims

In the case of Saeli v. Geico Adv. Ins. Co., No. 1:24-CV-00025-RAL (W.D. Pa. Jan. 28, 2026 Lanzillo, Chief Mag. J.), the Chief Magistrate Judge for the Western District Federal Court of Pennsylvania addressed a Motion In Limine filed a UIM carrier in a post-Koken case seeking to preclude the Plaintiff from introducing any evidence or testimony regarding the amount of the tortfeasor’s liability limits, the UIM limits, or any premiums paid.

The court ruled that, since the probative value of such evidence, if any, is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice and confusion on the issues presented, the UIM carrier’s Motion was granted.

The court additionally found that the evidence at issue is irrelevant to the issues presented in the trial. The court noted that the central issue in the case was the extent of the damages sustained by the Plaintiff. As such, the court found that the amount of the tortfeasor’s liability limits, the UIM limits, and the premiums paid were irrelevant to such issues.

The court noted that, while the tortfeasor’s liability coverage will have to be credited to the UIM carrier, the court noted that this is a simple mathematical calculation that the court could accomplish by molding the verdict after the verdict is handed down the jury and without the need to involve the jury.

The court felt that requesting a jury to apply the liability limit against the UIM benefits coverage would unnecessarily complicate the issues before the jury and could risk prejudice to Geico.

Magistrate Judge Lanzillo included in his Opinion a review of other Pennsylvania federal court decisions on the issue and noted that all but one had held the evidence of coverage limits and premiums paid provided no benefit to the jury in determining the issue of damages in post-Koken cases and that, even if such evidence was minimally relevant, its probative value was substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice to the Defendant. See Op. at 4.

It is noted that the court additionally indicated that the Plaintiff did not file a Response to Geico’s Motion In Limine by the time of the deadline set by the court.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

I send thanks to Attorney Joseph Hudock of the Pittsburgh office of the Summers, McDonnell, Hudock, Guthrie & Rauch, P.C. law firm for bringing this case decision to my attention.


Please note that the Post-Koken scorecard on the Tort Talk blog will be updated with this decision.

The post-Koken scorecard on the Tort Talk blog is always freely available for research. You can access the scorecard by going to www.TortTalk.coom and scrolling a bit down the hand column to the label for Post-Koken Scorecard and clicking on the date under that.

Source of image:  Photo by Scott Greer on www. unsplash.com.

Motion For Summary Judgment Denied in Zipline Accident Case

In the case of Witkowski v. Hellerick’s Family Farm, Inc., No. 230900999 (C.P. Phila. Co. Sept. 18, 2025), the trial court issued a Rule 1925 Opinion requesting the Superior Court to affirm its decision denying a Motion for Summary Judgment in a premises liability case.

According to the Opinion, this matter arises out of a fatal accident that occurred when the Plaintiff died after experiencing difficulties on a zipline course at the Defendant’s farm.

Prior to the incident, the Plaintiff has signed liability waivers acknowledging the risks involved in the activity.

After the accident, the Plaintiff filed a negligence suit in which recklessness was alleged as well.

The Defendant farm moved for summary judgment arguing that the signed waivers and the Agritourism Activity Protection Act shielded the Defendants from liability.

According to the Opinion, the Agritourism Activity Protection Act limits liability for agritourism providers unless gross negligence or recklessness is proven.

The court found that issues of fact with regards to whether the Defendant’s conduct constituted gross negligence or recklessness, which would negate the protections of the waivers and the act existed in the case presented. As such, the court noted that the issues should be permitted to proceed to a jury.

The trial court otherwise noted that the appeal should be dismissed on procedural grounds as its order did not meet the criteria for an appealable Order under Pennsylvania law given that the Order at issue was not a final Order.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer Common Pleas Case Alert, www.Law.com (Jan. 8, 2026).

Trial Court Addresses Whether a Certificate of Merit is Required

In the case of Muniz-Colon v. Friends Hospital, Sept. Term, 2025, No. 0068500065 (C.P. Phila. Co. Jan. 12, 2026 Hill, J.), the court addressed the issue of when a Certificate of Merit may be required for a professional negligence case.

According to information gathered on this case, the Plaintiff in this matter was allegedly brought to the hospital where he was allegedly assaulted and apparently knocked unconscious by the staff as he was allegedly being admitted to the facility on a 302 admission.

In response to the lawsuit filed, the Defendants all filed Motions for Non Pros due to the failure of the Plaintiff to present a Certificate of Merit under the MCARE statute.

Plaintiff’s counsel filed a Motion under Pa. R.C.P. 1042.6(c) for a determination as to whether a Certificate of Merit was required or not.

In its decision, the court ruled that the alleged assault may have indeed occurred in the course of a professional relationship given that it occurred during the admissions process. However, the court ruled the allegations in the Complaint as involving alleged negligence that did not involve medical judgment. 

Accordingly, the court ruled that no Certificate of Merit was required for the case presented.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney Robin Feeney of the Philadelphia law firm of Matkoff, Shengold, Berman, Goodnow & Associates, P.C. for bringing this case to my attention.

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Link to Copy of Hagedorn Decision Reviewed in Yesterday's Tort Talk Post.

Yesterday's Tort Talk blog post reviewed the case of Hagedorn v. Rick’s Backhoe Service, Inc., No. 2018-CV-3723 (C.P. Lacka. Co. Jan. 9, 2026 Nealon, J.), which involved a decision on a Motion for Bifurcation.  The Link to the post was not complete.

Here is the LINK to the above decision.  Sorry for any inconvenience.

Thank you for reading Tort Talk.

Motion To Bifurcate Motor Vehicle Accident Lawsuit Involving Bad Injuries Denied

In the case of Hagedorn v. Rick’s Backhoe Service, Inc., No. 2018-CV-3723 (C.P. Lacka. Co. Jan. 9, 2026 Nealon, J.), the court denied a Defendant’s Motion to Bifurcate the liability and damages issues presented in a motor vehicle accident case.

According to the Opinion, this matter arose out of a motor vehicle accident during which the Plaintiff was operating a motorcycle.  The Plaintiff and the Defendant driver allegedly engaged in road rage in a construction zone and that, during the interaction, the Defendant driver negligently and recklessly struck the Plaintiff’s motorcycle, resulting in the accident.

In seeking to bifurcate the liability and damages issues presented, the Defendants asserted that they were proceeding on a strong liability defense. 

The Defendants also asserted that, given the severity of the injuries sustained by the Plaintiff, there was a strong likelihood that the jury’s decision on liability would be tainted by sympathy for the Plaintiff if the jury was to hear the damages evidence and the severity of the damages alleged. 

The defense further argued that the bifurcation would expedite the action by allowing for a clear presentation of the negligence issues to the jury without confusing the issues relative to the injuries and damages claims presented.

In opposition, the Plaintiff asserted, in part, that the testimony of the treating physicians would explain, in part, the mechanics of the Plaintiff’s injuries which could also provide relevant context on how the collision actually occurred and what the forces involved were. The Plaintiff additionally asserted that a bifurcation of the trial would not serve the interests of judicial economy as it would cause a lengthier trial and additional expenses.

Judge Terrence R. Nealon of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas reviewed the Motion to Bifurcate under the standard of review set forth in Pa. R.C.P. 213(b). 

In reviewing the law, Judge Nealon noted that appellate decisions indicated that cases should only be bifurcated where the separation of the issues would facilitate the orderly presentation of evidence and would support judicial economy. Bifurcation is typically only granted where the issues of liability and damages are “totally independent.” See Op. at 4 [citation omitted].

Here, the court found that bifurcation of the trial would not promote convenience or judicial economy. The court additionally found that the issues of liability and damages were not totally independent from one another based upon the information in the record before the court.

Judge Terrence R. Nealon
Lackawanna Co.

In this regard, Judge Nealon noted that the Plaintiff indicated that his treating physicians would testify regarding the mechanics of his injuries, which could provide context regarding the dynamics of the impact, which could bear on the issue of how the accident occurred. Judge Nealon also noted that proof of that nature indicates that certain evidence on liability and damages is intermingled. 

The court also noted that the defense had not established that bifurcation was necessary to actually avoid prejudice. In terms of any concern that the jury might be sympathetic towards the Plaintiff due to the nature of the Plaintiff’s injuries, the court noted that the jury would be furnished with instructions from the court admonishing the jury that they should not allow sympathy or emotion to influence their deliberations or verdict.

Judge Nealon additionally cited to Pennsylvania Supreme Court precedent confirming that the courts may assume that juries will follow judicial instructions faithfully.

Based upon its review of the matter, the court found that bifurcation of the liability and damages issues into separate trials pursuant to Pa. R.C.P. 213(b) was not proper in this matter. Accordingly, the Motion was denied.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

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Third Circuit Addresses Strict Liability Claims in Alleged Food Poisoning Case

In its unpublished decision in the case of Kovalev v. Lidl US, LLC, No. 24-3224 (3rd Cir. Nov. 12, 2025 Hardiman, J., Matey, J., Chung, J.) (per curiam) (unpublished), the appellate court affirmed the entry of summary judgment and other motions after finding that the thirty (30) day removal to federal court deadline begins when the Defendant learns that the case is indeed removable.

According to the record before this court, the Plaintiff had made a demand in excess of the diversity jurisdictional amount.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff claimed food poisoning from eating bread from a loaf of bread he had purchased.   

The court otherwise noted that the Plaintiff failed to establish that the alleged defective condition existed at the time of the sale, thereby precluding any strict liability claims. The court also found that the Plaintiff did not have any evidence to support the allegation that the alleged defect caused his claimed injuries.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney James Beck of the Philadelphia office of the Reed Smith law firm for bringing this case to my attention.

More Attorneys In Trouble for AI Hallucinations in Citations in Brief

In the case of Lifetime Well LLC v. Ibspot.com, Inc., No. 2:25-CV-05135-MAK (E.D. Pa. Jan. 26, 2026 Kearney, J.), a federal court judge sanctioned two (2) Pennsylvania and New York based attorneys after the court identified numerous artificial intelligence hallucinations in briefs. The court issued both non-monetary and monetary sanctions.

In its Opinion, the court noted that the two (2) attorneys failed to thoroughly review a Brief that they both signed and filed. According to the Opinion, a law clerk in the law office had allegedly drafted the Brief utilizing AI. The court found that the conduct of the attorneys was in violation of Federal Rule 11.

The court felt that sanctions were necessary in order to deter other attorneys from repeating such conduct.

Given that both attorneys had taken steps to remedy their mistakes, the court declined to refer the attorneys to the disciplinary board.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Source: Fed. Judge Sanctions Two Attorneys Over AI Hallucinations, Declines Disciplinary Referral By Riley Brennan of The Legal Intelligencer (Jan. 26, 2026).

Source of image:  Photo by Numan Ali on www.unsplash.com.

Accidental Shooting From One Vehicle To Another Found To Involve "Use" of a Motor Vehicle

In the case of Allmerica Financial Benefit Ins. Co. v. Hunt, No. 2:24-CV-02767 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 15, 2025 Weilheimer, J.), the court denied Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings filed by two (2) UIM carriers in a case in which the two (2) automobile insurance companies were attempting to avoid having to pay underinsured motorists (UIM) coverage after an accidental shooting while the vehicle was at a red light.

This matter arose out of an accidental shooting that occurred between two drivers at a red light. One driver was attempting to unload a gun he had taken out of his glove compartment. The gun accidentally went off and struck an individual in the adjacent car, resulting in fatal injuries to that person.

The family of the decedent recovered the liability limits from the tortfeasor’s coverage and then turned to seek UIM coverage.

The UIM carrier filed suit, arguing that the shooting did not result from the “use” of a vehicle as required under the terms of that policy.

The court held that the policy language contained in the UIM policies conflicted with Pennsylvania’s Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (MVFRL) because it attempted to impose a stricter, proximate cause standard for UIM coverage instead of Pennsylvania’s broader standard of review.

The court wrote that, in close or doubtful insurance coverage cases, the law requires judges to err on the side of the insured.

The court additionally noted that, while insurers should not be considered to always be on the hook in terms of coverage because of their perceived ability to bear the cost of paying on the policy, public policy dictates that when there is a “tie” on the positions put forth by the UIM carrier and the insured on a coverage dispute, the court should err in favor of finding coverage.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.  The Court's companion Order can be viewed HERE.


Source: Article – “Pa Federal Judge Rules Auto Insurers Can’t Dodge UIM Coverage In Fatal Stoplight Shooting Case,” By Tristin Hoffman of the Legal Intelligencer (Jan. 2,2 026).

Senior Judge Minora Addresses Permissible Scope of Pre-Complaint Discovery Addressed to an Insurance Company in a Bad Faith Claim

In the case of Minooka Pastry Inc. v. Erie Insurance, No. 2024-CV-4077 (C.P. Lacka. Co. Jan. 15, 2026), Judge Carmen D. Minora of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas addressed pre-Complaint discovery issues in a bad faith and breach of contract action brought against an insurance carrier.

According to the Opinion, this matter arose out of a claim presented by the Minooka Bakery to Erie Insurance for water damage sustained the interior of the property during a windstorm. After Erie denied the claim, the Minooka Bakery was seeking to commence a multi-count lawsuit against Erie, including causes of action for bad faith, breach of contract, and violation of Pennsylvania’s Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law.

To assist it in the preparation of a Complaint, the Minooka Bakery served upon Erie Insurance written discovery requests. In response, Erie objected to the same but otherwise independently provided some materials along with a privilege log.

This matter came before the court on the Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Pre-Complaint Discovery under Pa. R.C.P. 4003.8. The Plaintiff asserted that it was still in need of additional information and documentation despite the materials produced by Erie Insurance. The carrier asserted that the materials it turned over were sufficient.

In the end, the court granted in part and denied in part the Motion to Compel.

In so ruling, the court noted that, because the Plaintiff intends to assert a bad faith claim against its carrier, an expansion of the scope of pre-Complaint discovery was warranted given that that particular cause of action requires the Plaintiff to present clear and convincing evidence that the carrier did not have a reasonable basis for denying benefits under the policy and that the carrier knew, or recklessly disregarded, its alleged lack of a reasonable basis in denying the claim.

Senior Judge Carmen D. Minora
Lackawanna County 

Judge Minora noted that the second prong of this test requires a demonstration of a heightened level of intent on the part of the carrier, thereby making inquiry into certain areas, “such as past practices and reserve information,” more likely accessible for purposes of pre-Complaint discovery.

Keeping in mind that the burden upon the Plaintiff to assert a bad faith claim sufficient to defeat any Preliminary Objections for lack of specificity, and also considering the discovery sought “will not cause unreasonable annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, burden or 

expense” under Pa. R.C.P. 4003.8(a), the court overruled the carrier’s objections, except those objections asserted with respect to privilege material. In this regard, the court reviewed the carrier’s privilege log and agreed with the carrier’s position with respect to those objections.

The court more specifically noted that, in making this ruling, it was specifically determined that “guidebooks, training manuals, non-privilege communications, reserve information, comparative claim data and regulatory filings” were within the permissible scope of pre-Complaint discovery in this matter. The court did impose a time limitation of not to exceed three (3) years prior to the date of loss relative to the scope of the information required to be produced.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney Paul Walker of Walker Law in Clarks Summit, Pennsylvania for bringing this case to my attention.

U.S. Supreme Court Decision Ruling that Delaware Rule Requiring Certificate of Merit for Professional Liability Claims Has Implications In Pennsylvania Matters

In the United State Supreme Court case of Berk v. Choy, No. 24-440 (U.S. Jan. 20, 2026) (Op. by Barrett, J.), the United States Supreme Court held that a Delaware law requiring a Plaintiff suing for medical malpractice to provide an affidavit from a medical professional attesting to the merit of the claims presented in the law suit conflicts with valid Federal Rule of Civil Procedure and, as such, does not apply in federal court proceedings.

According to commentators, this United States Supreme Court decision can be read as establishing that Pennsylvania's requirements for a Certificate of Merit in professional negligence in state court matters would not apply in the federal courts of Pennsylvania.

As such, these commentators have suggested that, in those cases where a plaintiff can establish diversity jurisdiction in order to get into federal court, those plaintiffs may opt to proceed in federal court where they need not secure and produce a Certificate or Merit before proceeding with a professional negligence claim, such as a medical malpractice claim or a legal malpractice claim.   

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

I send thanks to Attorney Thomas J. Foley, III of the Foley Law Firm in Scranton, PA for bringing this decision to my attention.

Source of image:  Photo by Fine Photographics on www.pexels.com.

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Reviews, in Part, Ability of a Party To Proceed on A Cause of Action Based on Spoliation of Evidence

In the case of Erie Insurance Exchange v. United Services Auto, No. 19 WAP 2024 (Pa. Jan. 21, 2026) (Op. by Donohue, J.), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether one carrier had a claim against another carrier under and allegation of promissory estoppel due to the failure to preserve evidence pertinent to the damages claims presented in a property damage subrogation claim.

According to the Opinion, this matter involved a fire that occurred at an auto repair shop, resulting in damages to the property and several vehicles. 

The insurance company for the property paid out damages and then sought reimbursement from those parties allegedly responsible. The insurer who brought the lawsuit suspected that a specific vehicle, insured by another insurance company, was the source of the fire.  As such, the Plaintiff insurance company requested that the vehicle in question be preserved for further investigation. 

Despite assurances that the vehicle would be preserved, the vehicle was instead sold at a salvage auction, thereby eliminating the possibility of further examination of the vehicle and hindering the Plaintiff’s potential claims against the other parties.  The Plaintiff insurance company filed suit based, in part, on the other insurance company's failure to preserve evidence as requested.

The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Defendant, concluding that the promissory estoppel claim was, in substance, a claim for negligence spoliation of evidence, which was a cause of action not recognized in Pennsylvania.

The trial court also noted that subrogation principles did not allow recovery because the Defendant had not caused the original property loss.

On appeal, the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed and found that the facts might support a promissory estoppel claim. The Superior Court also felt that the trial court erred in dismissing the Complaint on grounds of speculative damages and unrecognized causes of action.

Further up the appellate ladder, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that, as subrogee, the Plaintiff insurance company’s rights were limited to recovery from the party responsible for the original loss and, because that Defendant did not cause the fire, no right of recovery existed. As such, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court vacated the Superior Court’s erroneous decision, and reinstated the trial court’s Order in favor of the Defendant.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of the Majority's decision may click this LINK.

Justice Brobson's Concurring and Dissenting Opinion can be viewed HERE.

Justice Dougherty's Dissenting Opinion can be viewed HERE.


Source: Justia Daily Opinion Summaries, www.justia.com (Jan. 22, 2026).

WATCH OUT FOR THIS PITFALL WITH DEADLINES

On December 24, 2025, the U.S. Postal Service implemented new procedures for dating mail.  As of that date and going forward, the Post Office will postmark letters and packages with the date they are processed at the postal facility rather than the date that they are dropped off in the mailbox as was the case in the past. 

This shift in procedure could affect whether time-sensitive mail is considered to be on time.

Commentators have recommended that, if your mail is time-sensitive in this regard, you should walk the mail into the post office and request a manual postmark to ensure that the postmark date matches the day you mailed the item.  You can also request a certificate of mailing.

Source of image:  Photo by Anthony Acosta on www.pexels.com.

Please Consider Signing Up As a Mock Trial Juror for Lackawanna County Competition

 

Summary Judgment Denied in Federal Court Snow and Ice Slip and Fall Case

In the case of Spa Resort, L.P., No. 3:24-CV-0796 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 9, 2026 Saporito, J.), the court denied the Defendant resort’s Motion for Summary Judgment in a slip and fall case.

The Defendant landowner argued that the hills and ridges doctrine applied because the Plaintiff allegedly slipped and fell due to icy conditions that resulted from snowfall on the day of the incident.

In opposition, the Plaintiffs argued that the Plaintiff did not slip and fall due to icy conditions caused by the snowstorm, but rather, because the Defendants’ driveway was improperly maintained and repaired such that the hills and ridges doctrine did not apply.

The court ultimately concluded that questions of fact remained as to whether the hills and ridges doctrine applied to shield the property owner from liability regarding the allegedly slippery conditions on the premises.

Judge Joseph F. Saporito, Jr.
M.D. Pa.

In his decision, Judge Saporito provided a detailed review of the current status of the law in Pennsylvania regarding the hills and ridges doctrine.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: Article – “Jury To Decide If Spa Resort Can Be Liable Under ‘Hills and Ridges’ Doctrine In Slip-And-Fall Case,” By Riley Brennan of The Legal Intelligencer (Jan. 12, 2026).

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Finds It Cannot Reach Question of Validity of Uber's Arbitration Clause

In the case of Chilutti v. Uber, No. 58 EAP 2024 (Pa. Jan. 21, 2026) (Op by Brobson, J.), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court addressed a request by Uber to refer a personal injury civil litigation matter to arbitration.

According to the Opinion, a woman who uses a wheelchair sued Uber Technologies, Inc. and others after an incident in which an Uber driver failed to provide her with a seat belt while transporting her in a wheelchair-accessible vehicle, causing her to fall and sustain injuries.

The Plaintiff filed a negligence cause of action in court. Uber responded by filing a Petition to Compel Arbitration, arguing that the Plaintiffs had agreed to arbitrate their claims when they enrolled in Uber’s service.

At the trial court level, the trial court granted Uber’s Petition and ordered the parties to proceed to Arbitration.

At the Superior Court level, the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed and held that there was valid agreement to arbitrate and remanded for further proceedings.

In this decision, the Pennsylvania Supreme court first reviewed whether an Order compelling Arbitration and staying trial proceedings is an immediately appealable collateral Order. The Supreme Court held that such an Order does not meet the requirements for a collateral Order because the issue can be reviewed after the entry of a final judgment and, as such, did not result in irreparable loss if the judicial review is postponed. 

Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the Superior Court’s decision and remanded the case back to the trial court with instructions on how to proceed.

In light of this decision, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not address the issue of the validity of the Uber Arbitration Agreement or the merits of whether Arbitration could be compelled in cases involving Uber.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: Justia Daily Opinion Summaries, www.justia.com (Jan. 22, 2026).4

Source of image:  Photo by Tingey on www.unsplash.com.

Plaintiff Lost In More Ways Than One: Summary Judgment Granted Where Plaintiff Ventured Onto the Property By Mistake and Fell

In its unpublished decision in the case of DeWitt v. Bedford County Airport Auth., No. 1345 C.D. 2024 (Pa. Cmwlth. Nov. 10, 2025 Wolf, J., Jubelirer, J., and Wojcik, J.) (Op. by Wolf, J.) (unpublished), the Commonwealth Court affirmed the entry of summary judgment in favor of the Defendant after finding that the record confirmed that the Plaintiff, at the time of his premises liability accident, was a trespasser and not a business invitee.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff was traveling to a house to take a look at a trailer he was thinking of buying from the owner.  The Plaintiff followed GPS directions via the Google Maps app but ended up unkowningly going to the wrong address. The record confirmed that the Plaintiff was only on the property by mistake at the time he slipped and fell on an icy condition.

After discovery, the Defendant homeowners filed a Motion for Summary Judgment asserting that the Plaintiff was a trespasser and that, therefore, the homeowners legally did not owe the Plaintiff any duty with respect to the icy condition.

The trial court entered summary judgment and the Commonwealth Court affirmed.

In its Opinion, the Commonwealth Court noted that, even if the Plaintiff had license to ask for direction while on the property, the Plaintiff was injured after he went to a second location deeper into the land owned by the landowner, further trespassing on the property.

The court stated a rule of law that a mistake by an entrant onto another’s land as to their status or permission enter the land does not relieve such entrant of a trespasser status.  See Op. at 5 citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 329 [other citations omitted].

The appellate court noted that the implied license doctrine does not extend to premises liability actions.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision, which the Commonwealth Court marked as an "Opinion Not Reported," may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney James Beck of the Philadelphia office of the Reed Smith law firm for bringing this case to my attention.

Source of image:  Photo by Tamas Tuzes-Katai on www.unsplash.com.

Judge Linhardt of Lycoming County Rules that Allegations of Recklessness Must Be Supported By Facts Pled in the Complaint

In the case of Charles v. Martin, No. CV25-00, 974 (C.P. Lyc. Co. Dec. 12, 2025 Linhardt, J.), Judge Eric R. Linhardt of the Lycoming County Court of Common Pleas overruled a Defendant-driver’s Preliminary Objections against allegations of recklessness in a motor vehicle accident case in a matter in which intoxication on the part of the Defendant-driver was alleged.

Notably, in his decision, Judge Linhardt held that, while allegations of recklessness could be pled generally, a plaintiff still also has to plead facts in the Complaint to support such a claim.   

According to the Opinion, this matter arose out of a fatal motor vehicle accident during which it was alleged that the Defendant-driver crossed the center line and was involved in a head-on collision with the decedent’s vehicle.  As noted, included in the Complaint were allegations that the Defendant-driver was intoxicated and under the influence of a controlled substance at the time of the incident.

After the Plaintiff filed a Complaint alleging, in part, that the Defendant driver was negligent, careless and reckless, the Defendant-driver filed Preliminary Objections for a variety of reasons. In part, the Defendant asserted that the Complaint contained non-specific allegations of recklessness which should be stricken or dismissed. The Defendant also requested that the Plaintiffs’ claim for punitive damages also be stricken or dismissed.

After reviewing the current status of Pennsylvania law regarding the pleading of recklessness allegations and claim for punitive damages, the court noted that, while Pennsylvania is a fact-pleading state which requires a Plaintiff to plead the material facts upon which a cause of action is based, notwithstanding this rule, allegations regarding conditions of a tortfeasor’s mind may be alleged generally.

However, in his decision, even after referring to the Superior Court's decision in the case of Monroe v. CBH2O, LP, 286 A.3d 785, 798-99 (Pa. Super. 2022), Judge Linhardt noted that the exception to the general rules of pleading permitting a party’s state of mind to be pled generally does not dispense with the requirement that material facts constituting the conduct of a Defendant must also still be pled. See Op. at 7 citing Ammlung v. City of Chester, 302 A.2d 491, 497-98 (Pa. Super. 1973).

Judge Eric R. Linhardt
Lycoming Co.

Accordingly, Judge Linhardt held that, although a Plaintiff may generally allege that the Defendant- driver acted recklessly, the Plaintiff still “must allege sufficient material facts to support their general allegation and, if the material facts proposed in their Complaint operate to disprove their allegations of recklessness, those allegations must be dismissed.” See Op. at 7 citing with see, e.g. signal, Orange Stones Co. v. City of Reading, 87 A.3d 1014, 1025-26 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014).

In this case, the court noted that the Plaintiff’s Complaint alleged that the Defendant acted recklessly because he operated a motor vehicle while intoxicated and under the influence of a controlled substance. The Complaint also alleged a number of ways in which the Defendant was reckless by violating several provisions of the Motor Vehicle Code.

Judge Linhardt pointed to case law confirming that the operation of a vehicle while under the influence is sufficient to support allegations that a Defendant driver acted recklessly and may be exposed to an award of punitive damages.

Accordingly, the court found that the Plaintiff had sufficiently pled their allegations of recklessness such that the Preliminary Objections were overruled. 

Judge Linhardt ended his decision by noting that, should facts emerge during discovery calling the Plaintiff’s allegations into question, the Defendant had the right to file an appropriate Motion.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer Common Pleas Case Alert, www.Law.com (Jan. 8, 2026).

Source of image:  Photo by Olia Danilevich on www.pexels.com.

Summary Judgment Granted Due to Lack of Actual or Constructive Notice of a Spill

In the case of Donahue v. Wal-Mart Stores East, LP, No. 2:24-68 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 13, 2025 Dodge, M.J.), the court granted summary judgment in a slip and fall case.

The court ruled that the mere existence of an allegedly harmful condition or the mere happening of an accident is not evidence of negligence nor does it create a presumption of negligence.

In this matter, the court confirmed that the Plaintiff did not have any evidence of any actual notice on the part of the Defendant of the alleged spill.

The court additionally found that evidence of seven (7) incidents over the previous five (5) years in other areas of the store were insufficient to impute knowledge on the part of the Defendant.

The court also noted that the Plaintiff failed to present any evidence as to the amount of time that the alleged spill existed.

Without such evidence, the court noted that a claim of constructive notice cannot be supported. The court also noted that constructive notice cannot be shown by a negative inference.

Any speculation about how long the alleged condition may have existed before the start of the surveillance video available was insufficient.

The court also held that liability cannot be based on the Defendant’s failure to adhere to its own inspection policies or that its inspection policies were generally inadequate. Rather, there may be a duty of care before there can be a breach.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney James Beck of the Philadelphia office of the Reed Smith law firm for bringing this case to my attention.

Source of image:  Photo by Eva Bronzini on www.pexels.com.

Heavy Reading: Summary Judgment Recommended in Case Where Plaintiff Hit By Books He Accidentally Pulled From Shop Shelf

In the case Pidich v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 3:24-CV-1848 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 28, 2025 Bloom, M.J.), the court recommended the entry of summary judgment.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff was reaching up to try to get a book out of a box on a top shelf.  The book was wedged in the box tightly with other books.  The Plaintiff testified that he "pulled really hard" and the Plaintiff was then hit by multiple falling books.

This all occurred in an aisle where there was a sign that directed customers to "[a]sk for assistance with items on the top shelf."  

In this matter, Federal Magistrate Judge Bloom found that the Plaintiff violated an explicit warning to ask for assistance for items on the top shelf. As such, the court found that the evidence established that the Plaintiff caused his own injuries when the item he pulled off the top shelf fell upon him.

The court additionally noted that, assuming that the item was not, in fact, on the top shelf, then the Plaintiff had no evidence to show that the Defendant had notice of an allegedly dangerous condition.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

I send thanks to Attorney James Beck of the Philadelphia office of the Reed Smith law firm for bringing this case to my attention.

Source of image:  Photo by Becca Correia on www.pexels.com.

ARTICLE: Preserving Confidentiality When Using AI Platforms

 The below article of written by myself and my son, Michael appeared in the January 22, 2026 edition of the Pennsylvania Law Weekly and is republished here with permission.

Michael is a Computer Science major focusing on Artificial Intelligence studies at Ursinus College outside of Philadelphia, PA. He provided the insight on the computer science aspects of the article and I focused on the legal points included in the article.

Expert Opinion/Legal Ethics and Attorney Discipline

Preserving Confidentiality When Using AI Platforms

By

Daniel E. Cummins & Michael J. Cummins

As the use of artificial intelligence (AI) rises in the practice of law, so does the concern for preserving confidentiality. Whether it be preserving one’s own client’s confidentiality as required by the Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Responsibility, or preserving the confidentiality of records related to an opposing party under the requirements of HIPAA, counsel must be careful.

This is particularly so with the rising trend of automation through the use of AI platforms for completing tasks such as streamlining review and summarization of documents, including medical records, in the practice of law. In this day in age, lawyers can upload documents to an AI platform and have the platform review the records and create a summary of the same. In fact, some insurance carriers are beginning to mandate that their defense counsel do so. This practice raises ethical and confidentiality concerns.

The Requirement of Confidentiality

Under Pennsylvania Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6, attorneys are required to protect the confidentiality of certain information that they are handling. Under Rule 1.6, titled “Confidentiality of Information,” it is provided, in pertinent part, that “a lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation of a client unless the client gives informed consent, except for disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation … .”

The commentary to the rule notes that the rule of confidentiality “contributes to the trust that is the hallmark of the client-lawyer relationship.” With confidentiality, a client is encouraged to communicate fully and frankly with the lawyer on the subject matter of the representation. The rule also emphasizes that the lawyer may not disclose confidential information provided to the lawyer by the client except as authorized or required by the Rules of Professional Conduct or some other pertinent law.

As such, utilizing an AI platform that results in the inadvertent disclosure of a client’s private information could land an attorney in hot water with an unforgiving Disciplinary Board.


HIPAA Violations and Enforcement

In addition to attorneys needing to protect the private information of their own clients, lawyers also have to be careful with the confidential information of opposing parties, such as medical records of an opposing party.

HIPAA requires both physical and digital safeguards for patient data. In addition to mandating that medical files should not be left unattended in public areas, the law also requires that private health information must be stored digitally in a secured fashion that prevents unauthorized viewing.

The requirement of keeping an opposing party’s medical records private is mandated by HIPAA. Under the relevant law, failure to comply with HIPAA can result in civil and criminal penalties.

If a HIPAA complaint describes an action that could be a violation of the criminal provisions of HIPAA, the office for civil rights under the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services may refer the complaint to the Department of Justice for an investigation.

Criminal charges typically only arise where an individual “knowingly” obtains and/or discloses individually identifiable confidential health information. The question of whether such criminal penalties could be extended to lawyers handling medical records in a civil litigation matter is subject to dispute. The HIPAA law appears to limit criminal penalties to certain entities within the health care field. Yet, HIPAA also covers third parties that handle private health information on behalf of covered entities, including law firms assisting with medical-related legal matters.

In terms of any noncompliance that may result in the imposition of civil money penalties, the Secretary of the Health and Human Services Department has the discretion in determining the amount of the penalty based upon the nature and extent of the violation and the nature and the extent of the harm resulting from the violation. Civil penalties can range from $100 to $50,000 per violation, with additional penalties for repeat violations.

Based upon the stiff HIPAA penalties that can result from violating client confidentiality or the privacy of third parties, attorneys must be very careful in the use of artificial intelligence when using such platforms to review and summarize medical records and other private information that may arise in a civil litigation matter.


Local AI versus Third-Party AI

When utilizing an AI chatbot, such as Chat-GPT or Google’s Gemini, it may appear that it is entirely personalized and private to yourself. In reality, when utilizing any form of cloud based large-language models (LLM), there is a high risk that the company that provides the model will save, maintain, and even train future models based upon the data the user inputs.

In other words, if you provide a document for Chat-GPT to summarize or prompt a question, you are giving permission for OpenAI, the company that developed and owns Chat-GPT, to save and use that document or question for future training purposes. In addition to utilizing the information or documentation to train the model, this also leaves your documents vulnerable in the case of a data breach of the model provider.

However, this does not mean that this technology is completely useless. If you want to utilize an AI tool without the potential data security risks, you can locally host one within your organization.


How to Create Your Own Safe AI Platform

Using a designated device or server, you can download a model (there are free or pay-to-use options), design an interface for your organization, and run the model locally.

Once the model is running within your network, it will not even require an internet connection, meaning that all data and documents provided to the model will remain safely within your control within your office.

In order to take advantage of such a strategy, a law firm would likely need to hire an AI consultant company or professional to set up, design, and secure the system within one’s own office. There are also options to enter enterprise agreements with companies like OpenAI to establish a business relationship which does not allow them to retain the user input and data for training purposes.


Conclusion

While the use of AI platforms to automate certain tasks in a law office, such as the review and summarization of medical records, provides certain challenges, those challenges are not insurmountable.

Certain vendors who subpoena medical records for law firms have begun to provide AI generated summaries of medical records. Steps should be taken by law firms to ensure that these vendors are utilizing closed AI platforms that protect the confidentiality of the documents.

For those law firms that wish to begin to utilize AI platforms in-house, IT professionals can be retained to assist those firms in creating AI programs that prevent the information being handled from being disclosed outside of the office.

Daniel E. Cummins is the managing attorney at Cummins Law where he focuses his practice on motor vehicle and trucking liability cases, products liability matters, and premises liability cases. He also serves as a mediator for the Federal Middle District Court and for Cummins Mediation. He is additionally the sole creator and writer of the Tort Talk Blog at www.TortTalk.com. 

Michael Cummins, Daniel's son, is a computer science and philosophy major at Ursinus College with a focus on researching artificial intelligence.




Reprinted with permission from the January 22, 2026 edition of the "The Pennsylvania Law Weekly © 2026 ALM Global Properties, LLC. All rights reserved. Further duplication without permission is prohibited, contact 877-256-2472 or asset-and-logo-licensing@alm.com.

Federal Court Addresses Liability of Both Renters of Vehicles and Out-of-Possession Landlords Under Dram Shop Act

In the case of Stopko v. Cobbs, No. 2:25-CV-00074-CB (W.D. Pa. Dec. 31, 2025 Bissoon, J.), the court addressed the issue of the liability of renters of cars and issues surrounding the Dram Shop statute.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff alleged that the Defendant rented a vehicle from a Co-Defendant company. T

The Plaintiff alleged that the Co-Defendant company did not perform any background check on the Defendant driver or review the Defendant driver’s driver’s history before renting him the vehicle. The Plaintiff alleged that, if the rental company had done so, they would have discovered that the Defendant driver should not have been entrusted with the rental vehicle.

The Plaintiff further alleged that, on the date of the accident, the Defendant driver went to a bar where he was allegedly served alcohol, including allegedly being served after he was allegedly visibly intoxicated.

The Plaintiff alleged that the Defendant driver then got into the vehicle that he had rented from the rental company and drove it, while intoxicated, the wrong way on the roadway, colliding in a head-on fashion with the Plaintiff.

In this decision, the court was addressing Motions to Dismiss filed by the Defendants with respect to allegations of negligence against the rental car company and with respect to the Defendant owners of the bar where the Defendant driver was drinking on the night of the accident.

The court granted the rental car company’s Motion to Dismiss after finding that the Plaintiff’s allegations were both factually and legally insufficient to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

The court noted that the Plaintiff’s entire theory of liability rested on the allegation that the rental car company should have performed a background check on the Defendant driver or investigated his driver’s history before renting him the vehicle. The Plaintiff alleged that, due to these failures, the Defendant rental car company was negligent in entrusting the driver with the vehicle.

The court found that the Plaintiff had only pled conclusory statements regarding the Defendant driver’s driver’s history in support of these allegations. The court noted that no facts regarding the actual driver’s history appeared anywhere in the Complaint. The court held that, without more, the Plaintiff had failed to plead sufficient facts to support the claim stated.

The court otherwise noted that lessors of vehicles are not liable for a lessee’s negligent driving, unless the lessor was negligent in leasing or renting the vehicle to a person they had reason to know was incompetent to drive the vehicle. 

The court also noted that there was no basis under Pennsylvania law to interpret this standard to impose a duty on rental car companies to investigate a driver’s history before renting a vehicle to them.

The court also noted that other Pennsylvania courts have only considered lessors liable for the harm caused by a lessee’s intoxicated driving when the lessee was intoxicated at the time the vehicle was entrusted to the driver, or where the lessor had reason to know that the driver would later drink and drive. Such was not the case under the facts presented in this matter.

The court noted that, where lessees or drivers unexpectedly become intoxicated later unbeknownst to the lessor or owner of the vehicle, other courts had found that the owners and/or lessors are not liable for the injuries caused by the driver.

Relative to the separate claims against the liquor license holder for the bar and the owner of the bar, the court found that there was no basis in Pennsylvania law to support and argument by the Plaintiff that there is a duty on such Defendants, that is, bars and taverns, to prevent visibly intoxicated patrons from leaving the establishment without safe transportation, to offer alternative transportation, or to contact friends or family of the intoxicated customer. 

This court noted that there was no Pennsylvania or federal appellate court decisions in the Third Circuit that appeared to have directly addressed this issue. However, the court pointed to an unreported Eastern District court decision in which that court found that there was no basis in Pennsylvania law to impose a duty on an alcohol licensee or its agents to prevent an intoxicated patron from operating a motor vehicle.

Relative to the separate argument by the Defendants that all of the Plaintiff’s common law negligence claims should be dismissed because the Pennsylvania Dram Shop Act restricts liability for liquor licensees only to those duties imposed by the Act, the court stated that there was a lack of consensus among the Pennsylvania courts on the exclusivity of the Act. As such, this court attempted to anticipate how the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would rule if faced with this issue.

In the end, this court noted that the Dram Shop Act imposes a statutorily created duty on liquor licensees not to sell alcohol to visibly intoxicated customers and that the breach of such a duty constitutes negligence per say under the Act. This court noted that, once this duty is breached, “it does not stand to reason that [the Dram Shop Act] should shield licensees from all derivative common law liability for their actions in breaching it, including the negligent supervision that led to the breach.” See Op. at 12. Accordingly, the court allowed the Plaintiff’s common law negligence claim to proceed.

This court otherwise ruled that there was support under Pennsylvania law to also allow a claim against a landlord to go forward under an allegation that the landlord may be liable for injuries caused by their tenants’ intoxicated business invitees when the landlord knew, at the time of the lease, that the tenant would sell alcohol on the property, and later, that tenant was doing so improperly. As such, the court in this case allowed the claims against the landlord Defendant to proceed.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney Joseph Hudock of the Pittsburgh office of the law firm of Summers McDonnell Hudock Guthrie & Rauch P.C. for bringing this case to my attention.

Source of image:  Photo by Brett Jordan on www.pexels.com.

Premises Liability Plaintiff Tripped Up By Lack of Medical Expert

In the case of Montanez-Fontanez v. Lehigh Valley Health Network, No. 2023-C-0880 (C.P. Lehigh Co. Oct. 16, 2025 Reichley, J.), the court granted summary judgment due to a Plaintiff’s failure to produce expert evidence on the issue of causation with respect to the Plaintiff’s injuries that resulted from a fall down event.

In this matter, the Plaintiff was attending a physical therapy appointment to undergo therapy for her knee which had undergone a replacement surgery a month before.  As the Plaintiff was leaving the facility, she fell.

During the course of the matter, the defense filed a motion in limine and secured a Court Order holding that the Plaintiff's treating medical providers would be limited to the opinions noted in their office notes and were precluded from offering any opinions on causation.

The defense then followed up with a Motion for Summary Judgment on the grounds that the Plaintiff had not secured and produced an expert opinion on the causation of her alleged injuries.   

The Court noted that, while the Plaintiff’s injuries were immediate and of the type that could be expected to result from the nature of the alleged accident, the Plaintiff’s failure to produce expert causation evidence was still fatal. The Court ruled that, in this matter, unlike other cases that hold that causation may be sufficiently obvious such that no expert testimony is necessary, this Plaintiff was not in good health and had prior medical issues with regards to the same parts of her body before the subject incident.

As such, the Court noted that the facts in this matter that surrounded the Plaintiff’s injuries were not so apparent that a lay person on a jury could diagnose the cause of those injuries as being solely from the Plaintiff’s alleged incident.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

I send thanks to Attorney James Beck of the Philadelphia office of the Reed Smith law firm for bringing this case to my attention.

Source of imaging: Photo by Online Marketing on www.unsplash.com.

Application of Sidewalk Exception to Governmental Immunity Statute Defeats Summary Judgment Motion

Jim Thorpe, PA

In the case of Hontz v. McFarland, No. 22-CV-2524 (C.P. Carbon Co. Dec. 5, 2025 Matika, J.), the trial court denied a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by the Borough of Jim Thorpe after determining that the Borough was not immune from liability under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff tripped and fell over the base of a broken pole that was affixed to a sidewalk. Two days prior to the Plaintiff’s trip and fall, there was a motor vehicle accident during which a vehicle collided with the metal pole and broke it. This left a base of the sign protruding out of the sidewalk surface by 5-6 inches. 

In response to the Motion for Summary Judgment, the Plaintiff asserted that it was permitted to proceed against the Borough under the sidewalk exception to the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act. That exception is found at 42 Pa. C.S.A. §8542(b)(7).

Here, the court found that the Borough was not permitted to raise the defense of governmental immunity where the dangerous condition at issue was “of” the sidewalk where the defect was caused by the Borough’s failure after due notice to properly maintain or to repair the defect in question.

As such, the court denied the Borough’s Motion for Summary Judgment.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Source: “The Legal Intelligencer Common Pleas Case Alert” www.Law.com (Jan. 21, 2026).

Source of image:  Photo by Mariya E. on www.pexels.com.