Trial Court Dismisses Case for Lack of Timely and Proper Service of Process

In the case of Coleman v. Ducon, Jan. Term 2024, No., 2722 (C.P. Phila. Co. Dec. 19, 2025 Roberts, J.), the trial court issued a Rule 1925 Opinion requesting the Superior Court to affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the action as a result of the Plaintiff’s failure to make a good faith effort to complete service upon the Defendants.

According to the Opinion, this matter arose out of a motor vehicle accident.

The court noted that the Plaintiff failed to serve either of the Defendants within thirty (30) days of filing the Complaint. Thereafter, the Plaintiff reinstated the Complaint on three (3) occasions over the next year.

Thereafter, the court sustained Preliminary Objections that raised the failure to properly complete service of process. The Plaintiff’s Complaint was dismissed on the basis that the claims were barred by the statute of limitations due to the fact that the Plaintiff had failed to make a good faith effort to complete service.

More specifically, with respect to one Defendant, the Plaintiff had failed to take any action to attempt to serve the Complaint over an eleven (11) month period.

As to the other Defendant, while the Plaintiff had attempted, through a Delaware County Sheriff, to serve that Defendant, that effort at service was unsuccessful in March of 2024. However, the Plaintiff did not file the Delaware County Sheriff’s Affidavit of Non-Service until December of 2024.

The Plaintiff’s next attempt to serve that particular Defendant, according to the docket, was not until seven (7) months later in July of 2025, at which point the Plaintiff improperly served that Defendant in a manner in which the Delaware County Sheriff was not involved.

Overall he court found that the unexcused delay in completing proper service justified the dismissal of the claims.

In this Rule 1925 Opinion, the trial court requested the Superior Court to affirm its decision.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer Common Pleas Case Alert, www.Law.com (Feb. 26, 2026).

Superior Court Affirms Philadelphia Trial Court's Decision to Slash $25 Million Punitive Damages Award in Trucking Accident Case

In its non-precedential decision in the case of Clemmons v. Lehr, No. 1426 EDA 2024 (Pa. Super. Feb. 27, 2026 Olson, J., Dubow, J., and Beck, J.)(Mem. Op. by Olson, J.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court upheld a Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas decision to slash a $25 million dollar punitive damages award down to just $1 million dollars based on the “interests of justice and constitutional considerations.”

In its decision, the appellate court also found that questions remained regarding how much the Plaintiff should be awarded in this regard. The appellate court provided instructions to the trial court to re-evaluate its decision after finding that the trial court failed to consider all compensatory damages awarded, including for loss of consortium, when reviewing the validity of the punitive damages claim.

On appeal, the court noted that the current status of Pennsylvania law requires that, if a compensatory damages award includes a recovery for a claim of loss of consortium, the trial court must consider the entire compensatory award when assessing the ratio between the compensatory award and the punitive damages award entered by a jury.

In this case, a Philadelphia County jury returned an award of $26.2 million dollars, which included $25 million dollars in punitive damages, in a rear-end trucking accident case in which the Plaintiff claimed that he sustained injuries to his head, neck and back as a result.

On appeal, the Superior Court determined that the entry of punitive damages was warranted by the evidence presented but agreed with the trial court that the ratio between the punitive damages award and the compensatory damages award was unduly excessive. 

Pointing to the United States Supreme Court’s 2003 holding in the case of State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance v. Campbell, in which the U.S. Supreme Court held that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits “the imposition of grossly excessive or arbitrary punishment on a tortfeasor,” and that “few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive damages and compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due process.” 

Here, the Pennsylvania Superior Court determined that the decision to reduce the punitive damages award to $1 million dollars based upon a 2:1 multiplier was incorrect because the trial court had only considered the $500,000.00 in compensatory damages awarded to the injured party Plaintiff and improperly excluded the $700,000.00 loss of consortium damages that was awarded to the wife from the calculations. The court noted that, in committing this error, the trial court erroneously inflated the ratio of the punitive damages award awarded.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this non-precedential decision may click this LINK.


Source: Article – “In Case With Slashed $25M Verdict, Pa. Appeals Court Wades Into Constitutionality Of ‘Excessive” Punitive Awards,” By Riley Brennan The Legal Intelligencer (March 2, 2026).

Factual Issues on Question Presented Compel Superior Court To Quash Appeal Under the Collateral Order Doctrine

In the case of Hailu v. Giorgio Fresh Company, No. 2988 EDA 2024 (Pa. Super Feb. 25, 2026 Lazarus, P.J., Panella, P.J.E., and Sullivan, J.) (Op. by Panella, P.J.E.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court quashed an appeal under the collateral order doctrine in a third party claim arising out of a work injury.

More specifically, the Superior Court quashed an appeal from a trial court’s denial of summary judgment under which a Defendant had asserted worker’s compensation immunity under the borrowed employee doctrine.

The Defendant employer was arguing that, with respect to the Plaintiff’s work place accident, the Plaintiff, who had been hired as a temporary employee from a staffing company should be considered to be a “borrowed employee” and that, therefore, the Defendant employer was immune from suit under the provisions of the Worker’s Compensation Act, which provided for the exclusive remedies to injured parties for work place injuries.

After the trial court denied the Defendant’s Motion without an Opinion, the Defendant filed an appeal and asserted that the Order was a collateral order capable of being appealed under Pa. R.A.P. 313. The Defendant asserted that the issue of whether the Plaintiff was a borrowed employee was separable from the main cause of action and was too important to be denied immediate review given that the issues involved immunities afforded under the Worker’s Compensation Act.

The Superior Court disagreed. The Superior Court found that the Defendant’s appeal did not present a purely legal question, but rather a factual one regarding whether the Defendant employer had sufficient control over the Plaintiff employee’s work, which was central to the determination of whether the borrowed employee doctrine applied.

The Superior Court noted that the trial court had ruled that the evidence was insufficient to establish the borrowed employee doctrine such that there was an indication that further factual development was necessary at the lower court level.

The Superior Court ultimately concluded that the issue of whether the Plaintiff was a borrowed employee required a fact-based inquiry, which was not a suitable topic for collateral review of a matter on appeal. Accordingly, the Superior Court ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to review the interlocutory order of the trial court.

Consequently, the appeal was quashed with the Superior Court emphasizing that the collateral order doctrine must be narrowly applied in order to prevent the erosion of the final order rule regarding appeals.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer State Appellate Case Alert, www.Law.com (March 17, 2026).

Source of image: Photo by Jim Wilson on www.unsplash.com.

Plaintiffs Secure Split Decision on Statute of Limitations Issues in a Professional Negligence Case

In the case of Boyanowski v. Carl J. Babushko, CPA, P.C., No. 2021-CV-1975 (C.P. Lacka. Co. Feb. 12, 2026 Nealon, J.), the court addressed a statute of limitation issue in a professional negligence claim filed by taxpayers against their former accountant and his employer for allegedly failing to timely prepare and file their individual and business tax returns.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiffs asserted causes of action for “professional negligence,” “negligence,” and “breach of contract.”

The court noted that, even when viewing the case in a light most favorable to the Plaintiffs as required by the standard of review, the record shows that, for more than two (2) years prior to the commencement of the action, the Plaintiffs had actual or constructive knowledge that the accountant had failed to timely file their tax returns due to alleged accountant malpractice. Accordingly, the court dismissed the claims in professional negligence and negligence.

However, relative to the breach of contract claims, the court found that there were triable issues of fact as to whether the parties’ words and course of conduct created an enforceable contract under which the accountant and his employer allegedly agreed to timely file the Plaintiffs’ federal and state tax returns. As such, the Motion for Summary Judgment with respect to the breach of contract claim was denied.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Source of image:  Photo by Recha Oktaviani on www.unsplash.com.

U.S. Supreme Court Weighs In On a Pennsylvania Civil Litigation Matter

In the case of Galette v. NJ Transit, Nos. 24-1021, 24-1113 (U.S. March 4, 2026) (Op. by Sotomayor, J.), the United States Supreme Court ruled that New Jersey Transit is not entitled to interstate sovereign immunity. With this decision, the United States Supreme Court overruled the decision entered in the case by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.

The United States Supreme Court held that the New Jersey Transit Corp. was not an arm of the state. In so ruling, the United States Supreme Court recognized a state’s choice to create a legally separate entity from itself via a corporate form.

Given the finding that New Jersey Transit was not an arm of the state, the court ruled that interstate sovereign immunity did not apply.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: Article – “US Supreme Court Rules NJ Transit Is Not Entitled To Interstate Sovereign Immunity,” By Tristin Hoffman of The Legal Intelligencer (March 4, 2026).

Article: The Rise and Fall of The Gist of The Action Doctrine

Here is a LINK to the latest edition of the Pennsylvania Bar Association Quarterly which contains an article written by my son, Daniel E. Cummins, Jr. and myself entitled "The Rise and Fall of the Gist of the Action Doctrine." The article can be found on p. 118 of this edition.

My son, Daniel, is currently finishing up his second year at Virginia Law School where he is currently serving as one of the Articles Editors for the Virginia Law Review. He is set to work as a Summer Associate this summer with Cozen & O'Connor in their Philadelphia office. He is also looking forward to his clerkship with Federal Middle District Court Judge Joseph F. Saporito, Jr. after he graduates from law school next year.

As noted in the article, the gist of the action doctrine prevents plaintiffs from bringing both a breach of contract claim and a negligence claim based on an alleged breach of the same duty.

The article reviews the centuries of jurisprudence behind the gist of the action doctrine as compared to the recent Pennsylvania Superior Court decisions that call into question the continuing validity of the doctrine. The article also predicts further anticipated developments in the law going forward.

Daniel and I send thanks to Professor Emeritus Robert E. Rains of the Dickinson School of Law, who is the Editor of the Pennsylvania Bar Association Quarterly, for selecting this article for publication and for editing it into a better article.  We also thank Tina R. Schreiber for her editorial assistance on the article.



I also proudly note that I am referenced the first article listed in this edition. That article, written by Joel Fishman, Ph.D., M.L.S. and entitled "The Pennsylvania Bar Association Quarterly: A 10-Year History Volumes 87-96 (2016-2025)," references two past PBA Quarterly articles of mine on pages 80-81 as part of the history of this periodical. I thank Professor Rains for selecting those articles for publication as well.

Register Early For Lackawanna Pro Bono Golf Tournament To Save Money

 

Court Rules Plaintiff Cannot Insert Into Written Settlement Agreement a Term That Was Not Contemplated in Previous Oral Settlement Agreement

In the case of Liberty Prop. Ltd. P’ship v. Kendall Heaton Assocs., Inc., No. 2947 EDA 2024 (Pa. Super. Feb. 27, 2026 Olson, J., Dubow, J. and Beck, J.) (Op. by Olson, J.), the Superior Court upheld and affirmed a trial court’s enforcement of a oral settlement agreement reached by the parties in a civil litigation matter.  

In this case, the Plaintiff sought to insert an additional term in an effort to restrict the scope of the written release after the oral settlement contemplated releasing all known and unknown claims.

According to the Opinion, this matter arose out of construction litigation.

The Plaintiff was a developer that had contracted with several parties, including the Defendant, for construction services.  During construction, the Plaintiff discovered design defects that lead to additional costs. After attempts to resolve these issues through a Mediation failed, the Plaintiff filed a lawsuit for breach of contract and professional negligence.

During the course of the litigation, the parties reached a settlement during negotiations participated in by the Plaintiff’s in-house representatives, including an attorney, as well as outside counsel for the Plaintiff. Once that oral agreement to settlement was reached, the Defendant’s attorney confirmed the terms of that settlement via an email.  Plaintiff’s counsel acknowledged the email as representing the Plaintiff's understanding of the agreement as well.

However, the Plaintiff later sought to exclude latent defects from the final written settlement agreement, which was a term that was not part of the original oral settlement agreement.

Thereafter, when the parties could not resolve their dispute over the terms of the settlement agreement, the Defendant filed a Motion to Enforce the original settlement agreement. The Plaintiff filed a cross-Motion requesting the court’s enforcement of the different version of the settlement that the Plaintiff desired. 

The trial court granted the Defendant’s Motion relative to the original oral settlement agreement and denied the Plaintiff’s Motion to seeking to change that agreement under a written settlement agreement.

The Superior Court found that the trial court had properly ruled that the parties had reached an enforceable oral settlement agreement, which was not contingent upon the confirmation of the terms in a written document. The court additionally found that the agreement included a mutual release of all known and unknown claims related to the construction project in exchange for the monetary settlement payment.

The appellate court otherwise determined that the Plaintiff’s attempt to alter the agreement in the written settlement agreement to exclude latent defects was an additional term that was not part of the original settlement agreement.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of the Majority decision may click this LINK.  The dissenting Opinion by Judge Dubow can be viewed HERE.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer State Appellate Case Alert, www.Law.com (March 17, 2026).

Source of image:  Photo by Radisson US on www.unsplash.com.

Appellate Court Addresses Jerk and Jolt Doctrine With Respect to Bus Passengers

In the case of Musser v. SEPTA, No. 60 C.D. 2025 (Pa. Cmwlth. Feb. 27, 2026 Cohn Jubelirer, P.J., Fizzano Cannon, J., and Tsai, J.) (Op. by Fizzano Cannon, J.), the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court affirmed a trial court’s denial of a Plaintiff’s post-trial motions in a matter involving a Plaintiff who was injured when a SEPTA bus began to move before the Plaintiff had sat down, as a result of which, the Plaintiff allegedly fell and was injured.

The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s provision of instructions to the jury that, under Pennsylvania law, a bus operator has no obligation to wait until boarding passengers are seated before proceeding from a stop.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff alleged that, as she was seating herself, the bus restarted with an “aggressive” motion, causing her to fall. SEPTA presented contrary evidence, including a video of the incident. A defense verdict was entered by the jury and the Plaintiff appealed.

The court noted that the Plaintiff’s claims were based upon the jerk and jolt doctrine, which holds that a common carrier may be liable if a Plaintiff is injured due to a sudden, unusual or extraordinary jerk or jolt of the vehicle. However, the court noted that, under the doctrine, merely restarting a bus before a passenger is seated is not considered negligence unless the passenger requests the driver to wait. Here, there was no such request noted in the evidence. Rather, the Plaintiff only asserted that the restart was a sudden jolt.

On appeal, the appellate court found no abuse of discretion by the trial court in its evidentiary rulings. The appellate court also found that the trial court was appropriate in clarifying to the jury that merely restarting the bus before a passenger is seated did not, in and of itself, constitute negligence under the jerk and jolt doctrine.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer State Appellate Case Alert, www.Law.com (March 17, 2026).

Court Applies Program of Protection Standard Relative to Negligence By Security Services at Casino

In its non-precedential decision in the case of Jackson v. Live! Casino and Hotel, No. 2792 EDA 2024 (Pa. Super. Feb. 24, 2026 Bowes, J., King, J., and Ford Elliott, P.J.E.) (Mem. Op. by Bowes, J.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court addressed the “program of protection” standard in Pennsylvania in a premises liability case.

According to the Opinion, this case arose out of the Plaintiff being attacked by other patrons while at the casino. It was noted that the assailant was allegedly intoxicated.

With regards to the “program of protection" issue, the Superior Court noted that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has recognized that the voluntary gratuitous adoption of a program of protection, such as by employing security personnel, gives rise to the expectation that the security personnel will perform their duties with reasonable care. As such, where the security provided is not executed reasonably, and that negligence is the proximate cause of the harm, liability can attach.

The Superior Court found that the evidence presented in this case was sufficient to support the Plaintiff’s claims of negligence asserted against the casino. 

More specifically, the court found that the evidence presented at trial established that the Plaintiff was injured as a result of the Defendant’s failure to reasonably execute its security program. 

Accordingly, the Superior Court held that the trial court properly concluded that the Defendant was not entitled to a judgment notwithstanding the verdict in this case in which the jury entered a multi-million dollar verdict in favor of the Plaintiff.

The court otherwise rejected the Defendant’s claims that it was entitled to a new trial.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this non-precedential decision may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney Anthony J. Gabriel of the Hummelstown, PA office of the McQuaide Balsko law firm for bringing this case to my attention.

Source of image:  Photo by Kvnga on www.pexels.com.

Appellate Court Upholds Ruling That Contracts Regarding Gambling Debts Are Void

In its non-precedential decision in the case of Dhaduk v. Patel, No. 576 MDA 2025 (Pa. Super. March 16, 2026 Kunselman, J., McLaughlin, J., and Lane, J.) (Mem. Op. by McLaughlin, J.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court sustained a trial court decision by Judge Terrence R. Nealon of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas granting demurrers against a Plaintiff’s claims in a case arising out of a neurologist and his wife who sued an internist seeking to recover $700,000.00 for gambling losses that allegedly occurred at a Florida casino. 

The Plaintiffs alleged that the neurologist agreed to play blackjack on behalf of the internist with the express understanding that the internist would be responsible for any resultant gambling losses suffered by the neurologist in the process.

The Plaintiffs claim that the internist had not reimbursed the neurologist for $200,000.00 for chips that the neurologist purchased and lost and for an additional $500,000.00 that the neurologist obtained from his casino line of credit and ultimately lost playing black jack.

The Defendant internist filed demurrers against the Plaintiff’s claim of breach of contract, promissory estoppel, fraud, and unjust enrichment.

The Superior Court agreed with the trial court’s decision that a Pennsylvania statute held that gambling debts between private individuals were uncollectable and that any related contracts regarding gambling are void. The Superior Court upheld Judge Nealon’s ruling and agreed that Pennsylvania law precluded the recovery of the debt.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this non-precedential decision may click this LINK.


Source: Article – “Court: Pair Can’t Recoup $700K Loan Friend Used For Gambling,” By Jim Lockwood of The Scranton Times (March 20, 2026).

Source of image:  Photo by Dusan Kipic on www.unsplash.com.  

Pennsylvania District Court Finds Jurisdiction Over Out-of-State Manufacturer Under Consent-by-Registration Statute

 In the case of Blade v. Sig Sauer, Inc., No. 2:25-CV-06645-MAK (E.D. Pa. March 5, 2026 Kearney, J.), the Eastern District Federal Court ruled that a lawsuit against Sig Sauer, a gun manufacturer, would remain in Pennsylvania in light of the U.S. Supreme Court's 2023 decision in the case of Mallory v. Norfolk Southern Railway which provided the court with jurisdiction over this out-of-state company.

According to the Opinion, the gun manufacturer had moved to dismiss the case based on an argument that the court lacked personal jurisdiction because Pennsylvania’s “consent-by-registration” statute allegedly violated the dormant commerce clause and was unconstitutional under the due process clause.

The Eastern District federal court rejected these arguments and ruled that, in light of the Mallory decision, the court had general personal jurisdiction over the lawsuit because the gun manufacturer had consented to such jurisdiction by registering to do business in Pennsylvania.

The court additionally ruled that Pennsylvania’s registration clause did not violate the due process or the dormant commerce clauses as applied to the Defendant.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: Article – “Gun Malfunction Litigation Will Remain in Pa., Thanks to Controversial US Supreme Court Jurisdiction Decision” By Riley Brennan of The Legal Intelligencer (March 11, 2026).

Source of image:  Photo by Addy Mae on www.pexels.com.

Judge Nealon of Lackawanna County Rules in Favor of Consolidation of Post-Koken UIM and Third Party Claims

Lackawanna County Courthouse

On the heels of Lackawanna County Judge Mark Powell's decision in favor of the consolidation of claims in Post-Koken automobile accident cases that was summarized in yeasterday's Tort Talk Blog post comes the decision of Judge Terrence R. Nealon of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas in the case of Bello v. Smith and Progressive Ins. Co., No. 2024-CV-6105 (C.P. Lacka. Co. March 6, 2026 Nealon, J.).

In Bello, Judge Nealon addressed Preliminary Objections filed by a UIM carrier in a post-Koken matter involving combined third party claims against a tortfeasor and UIM claims against the Plaintiff’s own insurance carrier. This case also involved the additional fact that the tortfeasor Defendant was allegedly operating his vehicle under the influence at the time of the accident.

The UIM carrier filed Preliminary Objections under Pa. R.C.P. 1028(a)(5) asserting the “misjoinder of a cause of action,” and arguing that the tort and UIM claims should be severed for pre-trial and trial purposes.

Here, Judge Terrence R. Nealon, of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas reviewed the current status of Pennsylvania law on issue of the joinder of third party tortfeasor claims and UIM claims under a single caption, much of which prior case law was developed through his own judicial Opinions, to come to conclusion that the Preliminary Objections should be denied and the cases allowed to proceed, at least through the pleadings and discovery phases, in a consolidated basis.

Of note, the Court also referenced, on multiple occasions, the Pennsylvania Bar Quarterly article written by Daniel E. Cummins entitled "Hurricane Koken Rages On:  Uncertainty Continues in Motor Vehicle Accident Litigation In The Stormy Post-Koken Era," 90 Pa. B.A.Q., 108, 111 & n. 15-19 (July 2019). 

Judge Terrence R. Nealon
Lackawanna County 

In support of this decision, Judge Nealon noted that the damages that might be recoverable both the tortfeasor and the UIM carrier present common questions of law and fact and involve the same evidence and issues.

One additional issue involved in this matter was the fact that there were claims for punitive damages asserted against the tortfeasor Defendant due to the DUI allegations and other allegations.  The court acknowledged would be irrelevant to the compensatory damages determination given that the UIM coverage barred the recovery of any punitive damages under that policy.

Relative to the allegations that the tortfeasor Defendant was operating his vehicle while under the influence of alcohol and controlled substances, the court noted that such evidence “could unfairly prejudice the UIM insurer by inflaming the jurors’ emotions and influence the compensatory damages award.”

Judge Nealon noted that, while, in such instances, bifurcation of the compensatory damages and punitive damages claims for trial may be warranted, that decision should be left to be made later by the assigned trial judge after discovery has been completed and the case has been certified for trial.

However, after review copious case law in support of the same, the court ruled that, in the meantime, no legitimate basis existed for severing the tort and UIM claims for purposes of discovery and pre-trial matters.

Accordingly, the court overruled the UIM carrier’s Preliminary Objection asserting a misjoinder of a cause of action under Rule 1028(a)(5).  With this decision, the court denied the request to sever the tort claim from the UIM claims.

Judge Nealon did note that his decision was without prejudice to the right of any Defendant to later seek a bifurcation of the claims for compensatory damages and punitive damages for trial.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Judge Powell of Lackawanna County Rules in Favor of Consolidation of Post-Koken UIM and Third Party Claims

In his decision in the post-Koken case of Roth v. Gonzalez, No. 2025-CV-06170 (C.P. Lacka. Co. Feb. 19, 2026 Powell, J.), Judge Mark Powell of the Lackawanna County Cour of Common Pleas overruled the UIM carrier’s Preliminary Objections seeking to sever the Plaintiffs’ claims against the tortfeasors for negligence from the Plaintiffs’ claims against the UIM carrier for UIM benefits.

The court also overruled the tortfeasor’s Preliminary Objections seeking to strike the Plaintiff’s claims for punitive damages under an argument that there were no facts to support the claims for reckless, willful, or wanton misconduct that was asserted against a tortfeasor Defendant.

Relative to the Motion to Sever the negligence claims from the UIM claims, the court noted that the consolidation of such claims for discovery and pre-trial preparation will promote convenience and avoid duplicate depositions and other forms of discovery.

Judge Mark Powell
Lackawanna County 

Relative to the third party Defendant’s Preliminary Objections on the allegations of recklessness and the claims for punitive damages, the court found that sufficient facts were pled under which the jury could conceivably conclude that the Defendant allegedly demonstrated a careless disregard for the safety of the traveling public.

Judge Powell also noted that, with regards to the concern of the UIM carrier about the possible references to “insurance” during the course of the trial, and the prejudice that may result therefrom, the court noted that the mere mentioning of insurance, in and of itself, does not preclude the joinder of the claims as the trial court judge still has the ability to address evidentiary issues and may deal with any references to insurance at trial in a manner that the trial judge deems appropriate.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Mock Trial Jurors Needed for State Championship Competition

 

THE 2026 PENNSYLVANIA HIGH SCHOOL MOCK TRIAL STATE CHAMPIONSHIP COMPETITION PUT ON BY THE YOUNG LAWYERS DIVISION OF THE PENNSYLVANIA BAR ASSOCIATION IS SET TO TAKE PLACE THIS UPCOMING FRIDAY AND SATURDAY, MARCH 27-28, 2026 IN THE DAUPHIN COUNTY COURTHOUSE IN HARRISBURG, PA.

IF YOU ARE WILLING AND ABLE TO VOLUNTEER TO SERVE AS A JUROR TO JUDGE THE COMPETITION, PLEASE EMAIL MARIA ENGLES OF THE PENNSYLVANIA BAR ASSOCIATION AT maria.engles@pabar.org.

Judge Williamson of Monroe County Addresses a Novel Issue of Proper Pleading

Which way to plead?

In the case of Windsor-Mount Joy Mut. Ins. Co. as subrogee to the Rights of The Revillas v. Cory Willis Trucking, LLC, No. 006821-CV-2024 (C.P. Monroe Co. Jan. 6, 2026 Williamson, J.), the court addressed a Defendant’s Petition for Leave of Court to File a Third Party Complaint to Join Additional Defendants.

According to the Opinion, this matter involved a bridge collapse allegedly caused by the Defendants while crossing a bridge with a load of stone. The bridge was owned by the Plaintiff insurance company’s insureds and provided access across a creek to the land of the insureds.  The Plaintiff insurance company, as subrogee to the rights of their insureds, brought suit against the Defendants seeking to recoup the damages they paid out for the repair of the bridge.

One issue faced by the court in this regard was the argument by the Plaintiff that the proper method to bring in the insureds as allegedly responsible parties for the damages that were incurred was by way of a counterclaim in the Defendants’ Answer to the Complaint as opposed to the Defendants proceeding by way of a Joinder Complaint to name the insureds as Additional Defendants.

The Plaintiffs in the case were asserting that the insureds, being listed in the caption as being related to the subrogation insurance company Plaintiff, and as otherwise already being involved in the case, could only be subject to a counterclaim and not a Joinder Complaint.

After reviewing the issues, Judge David J. Williamson of the Monroe County Court of Common Pleas found that the insureds were not parties to the suit for purposes of requiring a counterclaim as opposed to a joinder as a third party Defendant. The court noted that the Plaintiff in this matter was the insurance company, which had filed the action as subrogee for the insureds. The court noted that the insurance company’s appearance in the lawsuit did not bring personal jurisdiction of the court over the insureds as parties.

Judge David J. Williamson
Monroe County

Judge Wiliamson noted that subrogation rights confer the right to proceed against someone else, but it does not mean that the subrogee stands in the shoes of the insured for purposes of claims made against the insured. The court noted that it “makes sense” that the insured must be officially joined as an actual party.

The court additionally noted that the parties in this matter had not cited any case law that would support an argument that, as subrogee, the insureds were automatically a party to the action. The court noted that all counsel seemed to be in agreement that this was novel issue.

Judge Williamson otherwise noted that, in the pleadings, the insureds were not named as the actual party Plaintiff and were repeatedly referred to as the Plaintiff’s insureds.  The court also noted that, throughout the Complaint, the Plaintiff insurance company was listed as being a separate and distinct party from its insureds.

The court also noted that the insureds did not sign any verification to the Complaint.

For these reasons, Judge Williamson ruled that the proper procedure was for the insureds to be brought into the case by way of a Third Party Complaint.

In addressing the timeliness of the Third Party Complaint, the court noted that such Joinder Complaints are permitted as course within sixty (60) days of the filing of the original Complaint. Once the sixty (60) day period expired, the court is required to undertake a balancing test.

After reviewing the record in this matter, the court ruled in favor of allowing for the filing of a Joinder Complaint, particularly where there would be no prejudice to the parties by allowing the same.

In terms of any argument with regards to the statute of limitations, Judge Williamson noted that that issue could be raised in the pleadings that would be filed after the filing of the Joinder Complaint.

As such, the court granted the Petition for Leave of Court of File a Joinder Complaint.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer Common Pleas Case Alert, www.Law.com (March 12, 2026).

Source of image:  Photo by Tormius on www.unsplash.com.

Interesting Legal Issue: ChatGPT Sued in Federal Court in Illinois Under Allegation of Practicing Law Without a License

According to an article written by Laura Lorek which was published in a March 9, 2026 online edition of The Legal Intelligencer, an interesting lawsuit was filed in the US District Court of the Northern District of Illinois recently, naming OpenAI Foundation and OpenAI Group PBC as Defendants. The lawsuit accuses ChatGPT, a chatbot developed by OpenAI, of practicing law without a license.

Nippon Life Insurance Company of America filed suit against the Defendants noted after a former pro se litigant used ChatGPT to contest a previously settled and dismissed lawsuit, which the pro se Plaintiff later acknowledged was a final and enforceable settlement.

The Complaint that was filed in the lawsuit alleges that ChatGPT provided unauthorized legal assistance to the former pro se litigant who had settled claims against the insurance company. The Complaint alleges that the unauthorized legal assistance provided by ChatGPT resulted in forty-four (44) frivolous Motions being filed and allegedly caused the Plaintiff $300,000 in legal expenses.

The insurance company was seeking in its lawsuit $300,000 in compensatory damages, court costs, attorneys’ fees, a permanent injunction barring OpenAI from providing legal assistance in Illinois, and $10 million dollars in punitive damages.

As noted in the article written by Laura Loreck for The Legal Intelligencer, the case raises unresolved legal questions, including whether AI tools can be held liable as third-party offenders, whether providing legal assistance constitutes “the practice of law” under state statutes, and the extent to which AI companies are responsible for foreseeable misuse of their products.

Source: Article – “Practicing Law Without a License: ChatGPT Sued For Legal Fees,” By Laura Lorek of The Legal Intelligencer (March 9, 2026).

Source of image:  Photo by Matheus Bertelli on www. pexels.com.

Pa. Supreme Court Finds Issues of Fact Regarding Immunity Defense in Third Party Liability Case Arising Out of a Work Injury

In the case of Brown v. Gaydos, No. 22 WAP 2024 (Pa. Feb. 18, 2026) (Op. by Mundy, J.)(Brobson, J., concurring and dissenting)(Wecht, J. dissenting), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the trial court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of a Defendant employer in a third party litigation based upon §205 of the Workers’ Compensation Act, 77 P.S. §72, which provides for co-employee immunity, was appropriate.

The court noted that, §205 of the Workers' Compensation Act provides that, “[i]f disability or death is compensable under this act, a person shall not be liable to anyone at common law or otherwise on account of such disability or death for any act or omission occurring while such person was in the same employ as the person disabled or killed, except for intentional wrong.

The court found that there were no genuine issues of material fact regarding whether the Defendant employee’s allegedly negligent acts or omissions occurred while he was in the same employ as the Plaintiff that supported the trial court's denial of summary judgment. As such, the court remanded the case back to the trial court for further proceedings.

According to the Opinion, this matter involved a workplace accident that occurred when the Plaintiff decedent was fatally injured by a skid loader which was owned by the Defendant employer. The decedent’s supervisor was not on the premises at the time of the incident.

After securing workers' compensation from his employer, the estate of the decedent pursued a third party claim against his employer and asserted that, among other acts, the employer and its employees were negligent in maintaining the skid loader and in failing to train or supervise the company’s employees in operating the machine.

The employer filed a Motion for Summary Judgment asserted that the Workers’ Compensation Act provided immunity from civil suit as either the decedent’s employer or co-employee.  In this decision, the Supreme Court ruled that issues of fact should have compelled the trial court to deny the Motion.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of the Majority Opinion for this decision may click this LINK.

Justice Brobson's Concurring and Dissenting Opinion can be viewed HERE.

Justice Wecht's Dissenting Opinion can be viewed HERE.


Source: Article – “Pa. Supreme Court Rules Against Broad Application of Co-Employee Immunity Under the Workers’ Comp Act, “ By Riley Brennan of The Legal Intelligencer (Feb. 18, 2026).

Superior Court Upholds Right to Jury Trial and Rejects Arbitration Clause Relative to Contract Plaintiff Entered Into on Defendant's Website

In the case of Duffy v. Tatum, No. 483 EDA 2025 (Pa. Super. March 3, 2026 Lazarus, P.J., Panella, P.J.E., and Sullivan, J.) (Op. by Panella, P.J.E.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed a trial court’s Order overruling a Defendant’s Preliminary Objections under which the Defendant asserted that a Plaintiff had waived the right to a jury trial by way of an agreement entered into via the Defendant's website.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff had proceeded to the Defendant’s website to book services provided by the Defendant moving company.

On that website, the customer was required to check off a box accepting the Defendant’s terms of services. The customer had the ability to click on an underlined phrase that would take the customer to the Defendant’s Terms of Service by way of a hyperlink. 

On that hyperlink, if the customer accessed it, one of the provisions that would be seen in the language on that page would be an ADR clause for the resolution of any disputes that arose between the parties by way of mediation followed by an arbitration, as opposed to by way of an opportunity for a jury trial in a court of law.

In this matter, the trial court found that the Defendant’s website did not provide a reasonably obvious notice of its Terms of Service to the Defendant’s customers prior to the customer’s purchasing the services offered by the company.  As such, the trial court ruled that the customer had never agreed to waive his constitutional right to a jury trial. As noted, on appeal, the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the trial court’s decision in this regard.

The Superior Court framed the central issue before it as involving “an overarching question of whether a person should be deprived of their constitutional right to a jury trial when they ostensibly enter into an arbitration agreement through hyperlinked Terms of Service on a website that the person never clicked on, viewed, or read.” See Op. at p. 6.

In so ruling, the Pennsylvania Superior Court referred to its prior decisions on this issue in which the court had held that the Pennsylvania State Constitution provides its citizens with the greater protections afforded by the right to a jury trial.

The Superior Court otherwise noted that the “copious use of contracts with restrictive arbitration agreements causes concern, particularly in the context of internet contracts like the one at issue here, where the parties are frequently of unequal bargaining power and one party may be unaware of the significant rights they are waiving simply by using a website to make a purchase or retain services.” See Op. at p. 8.

President Judge Emeritus Panella noted in his Opinion that, in recognition of this reality, Pennsylvania courts have taken a small step towards righting the wrongs of arbitration agreements with respect to wrongful death actions involving negligent nursing center facilities. The court otherwise noted that there is still a need for greater scrutiny regarding a person’s waiver of their constitutional right to a jury trial when it comes to these types of arbitration agreements in other scenarios as well. 

Judge Panella stated that “[t]his need is imperative when there is no genuine effort to inform a purchaser of the terms of the contract before they click on a link or box that purports to generate their agreement to a contract, as the case” was in this matter. See Op. at p. 9.

The court went on to note that it found that it is imperative that, in the context of civil litigation matters, that a person be fully informed of their constitutional right to a jury trial and of the effect of waiving that right. Accordingly, the court held that it is essential that any waiver of the right to a jury trial must be clearly described and evidenced such that the person waiving the right fully understands the right that they are giving up by agreeing to enter into the contract.

In light of its holding that the constitutional right to a jury trial in Pennsylvania should be afforded the greatest protection possibly by the courts of Pennsylvania, the court in this Duffy case enunciated a “strict burden of proof [that its] necessary to demonstrate a person’s unambiguous manifestation of assent to arbitration.” See Op. at p. 15.

More specifically, the court noted that this strict burden of proof necessary to demonstrate a person unambiguous assent to arbitration requires (1) an explicit statement on the registration website and application screens that a consumer is waiving their right to a jury trial when then the person agrees to the seller’s Terms of Service and the registration cannot be completed until the person is fully informed of that waiver, and (2) when the agreements are available for viewing after a user has clicked on a hyperlink, the waiver should be not hidden in the middle of the document, but rather, should appear prominently in bold, capitalized text. See Op. at p. 15.

The court additionally noted that the word “arbitration” must also be clearly defined within the arbitration agreement in addition to being prominently displayed in the language of the contract. See Op. at p. 16.

In the end, in this case, where the customer here never clicked on the Terms of Service and, therefore, never saw the Terms of Service, the court ruled the customer did not unambiguously assent or agree to give up his or her rights to a jury trial in favor of arbitration. 

The Superior Court also ruled that, where the website did not provide a reasonably obvious notice of its Terms of Service, there was no meeting of the minds on a contractual basis relative to the issue of arbitration for the resolution of any disputes. 

As such, the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the lower court's decision and found that the trial court did not err in overruling the Defendant company’s Preliminary Objections on the issues presented.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: Article – “Pa. Superior Court Rules Company’s Terms Didn’t Waive Customer’s Right to Jury Trial” By Tristin Hoffman of The Legal Intelligencer (March 6, 2026).


I also send thanks to Attorney Thomas F. Foley, III of the Foley Law Firm in Scranton, Pennsylvania for making sure that I saw this decision as well.

Source of image:  Photo by Vojtech Okenka on www.pexels.com.

Court Allows Punitive Damages Claims to Proceed in Dog Bite Case

In the case of Clifford v. Dickson, No. S-1799-25 (C.P. Schuylk. Co. Feb. 12, 2026 Burke, J.), the court addressed various issues raised by way of Preliminary Objections filed against a Complaint in a dog bite case.

Of note, the court rejected the Preliminary Objection filed by the Defendant relative to the Plaintiffs’ description of the Defendant’s dog as “vicious.” The court noted that it did not see any prejudice from the use of the term “vicious” at this early stage of the proceedings.  The court did note that the use of the term “vicious” may not prove to be admissible at trial.

With regards to the Preliminary Objections filed with regards to the Plaintiff’s claims of outrageous conduct and evil motive, as well as with respect to the request for punitive damages, the court found that the facts pled in the Complaint supported the claims and allegations in this regard.

Here, the court found that the conduct of the Defendant was allegedly more than mere or ordinary negligence. In the Complaint, there were allegations that the Defendant acted in an intentional, willful, wanton, or reckless manner. More specifically, the court noted that there were allegations that the Defendant not only allowed her two pitbulls and another large dog to be unleashed, unrestrained, and uncontrolled on the day of the accident, it was also alleged that the Defendant dog owner had allowed this to happen on prior occasions as well.

The court also pointed to the allegations that the Defendant had failed to vaccinate the dogs in question.

The court additionally noted that it would premature to dismiss the Plaintiff’s request for punitive damages at the pleadings stage. Rather, based, in part, on the Superior Court's decision in the case of Monroe v. CBH2O, LP, 286 A.3d 785, 799-800 (Pa. Super. 2022), the court felt that it would be more appropriate for the Defendant to seek to attempt to have the punitive damages claims dismissed after the close of discovery by way of a Motion for Summary Judgment.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney Thomas J. Newell, a plaintiff's attorney who exclusively represents dog attack victims, for bringing this decision to my attention.

Source of image:  Photo by Pozva on www.unsplash.com.

Superior Court Affirms Trial Court's Refusal to Give Increased Risk of Harm Jury Instruction in Medical Malpractice Case

In its non-precedential decision in the case of Matthews v. Hosp. of the Univ. of Penn., No. 1163 EDA 2024 (Pa. Super. Feb. 26, 2026 Lazarus, P.J., Kunselman, J., and King, J.) (Op. by King, J.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court denied a medical malpractice Plaintiff’s attempt to overcome a defense verdict in a Philadelphia County case.

In part, the Plaintiff argued that the trial court had erred in denying the Plaintiff’s request for an increased risk of harm jury charge.

Upon review of the record, the court found that the jury instruction was not warranted because the Plaintiff’s witnesses, including expert witnesses, failed to testify as to how the Defendant’s alleged delay in performing a cesarean section caused or increased the risk of harm to the Plaintiff’s child. 

The court noted that the record revealed that the Plaintiff’s expert did not state, within a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that the Defendants’ alleged failure to perform a C-Section earlier could either cause or increase the risk the type of brain injury suffered by the child.  As such, the Superior Court ruled that the Plaintiff was not entitled to the increased risk of harm jury instruction under the evidence that was presented at trial.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this non-precedential decision may click this LINK.


Source: Article – “Insufficient Expert Testimony Sinks Push To Overturn Med. Mal Defense Win, Pa. Appeals Court Rules.” By Riley Brennan The Legal Intelligencer (Feb. 27, 2026).

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Superior Court Refuses to Weigh The Evidence on Appeal

In its non-precedential decision in the case of Kopeissi v. Shipwire, Inc., No. 2789 EDA 2024 (Pa Super. Jan. 23, 2026 Lazarus, P.J., Bowes, J., and Ford Elliot, P.J.E.) (Mem. Op. by Bowes, J.), the court addressed post-trial motions in a matter in which the Plaintiff challenged the trial court’s denial of his request for a new trial on punitive damages.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff was allegedly injured when unloading pallets of Peloton weights from a tractor trailer that had allegedly been improperly stacked on top of each other.

At trial, the Defendant admitted that it had allegedly stacked the pallets did not contest that it acted negligently. Rather, its defense at trial was that it did not act recklessly.

At trial, the jury found that the tractor trailer company was not negligent. However, the jury found that the Defendant that had stacked the pallets and who had admitted negligence but denied recklessness was 80% negligent.  However, the jury found that the actions of that Defendant were not reckless.

After trial, the Plaintiff argued that the jury’s verdict on the issue of reckless was against the weight of the evidence. It was also argued that improper remarks during closing arguments prejudiced the jury and tainted their deliberations on the issue of recklessness.

On appeal, the Superior Court rejected both arguments.

Relative to the claim that the jury’s finding on the issue of recklessness was against the weight of the evidence, the Superior Court noted that the Plaintiff essentially wanted the Superior Court to re-weigh the evidence and come to a different result. The Superior Court noted that it was refusing to do so. The Superior Court otherwise noted that it found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s conclusion that the jury’s verdict did not shock the trial court’s conscience.

As such, the denial of the Plaintiff’s post-trial motions was affirmed.


Anyone wishing to review a copy of this non-precedential decision may click this LINK.

Article: How To Bypass an Impasse At Mediation

Here is a LINK to my article entitled "How To Bypass an Impasse at Mediation" which has just been published in the March/April edition of the Pennsylvania Lawyer magazine.

With this article I gathered lessons from my experience as a certified Federal Middle District Court Mediator and as a private Mediator with Cummins Mediation in order to provide tips on how to get past those difficult times at Mediation where there seems to be no way to move forward with the negotiations.  The hope is that these suggestions will enable you to realize more success at more Mediations.

Proud to note that this is my 200th published article.  Hope you enjoy it and that it helps you with your practice.

Should you ever need assistance with trying to bring a case of yours to a close through a Mediation, please consider Cummins Mediation.

570-319-5899

dancummins@cumminslaw.net

Abington Heights Mock Trial Team Wins Regional Championship! Headed Back to States!

The Abington Heights High School Mock Trial Team from Clarks Summit, Lackawanna County won the 2026 REGIONAL Mock Trial Championship last night and are on their way to the STATE Championship Competition in Harrisburg, PA which is set to take place later this month!

If you have a high school student in your house, or one about to go to high school, please encourage them to consider doing Mock Trial even if they have no intentions or idea of a career in the law.  There is no better activity for increasing a student's self-confidence, public speaking skills, and analytical skills.  Mock Trial students are required to think on their feet and pivot in response to sudden changes in circumstances.  

It is also a great activity for comradery as the students really support one another during the course of the season.

Sending thanks to all the jurors who volunteered their time to serve last night and to those who volunteered through out the season.  The competition cannot succeed without those local lawyers, paralegals, law office staff members, and others who are willing to volunteer.  Thank you.

Also sending thanks to the Lackawanna Bar Association and its Executive Director, Lee Ann Munley, as well as Kaitlin McDonough of that office for all their time and work to make the program a success.

Also sending thanks to Lori Siegle, the Executive Director of the Monroe County Bar Association and her staff for all of their time and work on Mock Trial in their District and for the Regional Competition this year.

Also sending great thanks to the District Coordinator for the Mock Trial Competition, Mackenzie Wilson, a great attorney with Munley Law, for donating all of her time and hard work to make the local competition a success.

Let's go Comets!  Keep soarin' onto the States!  So proud!

Trial Court Overrules Preliminary Objections to Allegations of Recklessness and Claims For Punitive Damages

In the case of Fisher v. Leo, No. 2025-CV-05941 (C.P. Luz. Co. Feb. 4, 2026, Pierantoni, J.), the court overruled a Defendant’s Preliminary Objections to allegations of recklessness and punitive damages. 

In so ruling, the court cited to the Pennsylvania Superior Court case of Monroe v. CBH20, L.P., 286 A.3d 785, 798 (Pa. Super. 2022).

The court also noted that the issue of the validity of claims for recklessness and punitive damages are more appropriate for consideration at the summary judgment stage.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney Peter Biscontini of Biscontini Law for bringing this case to my attention.

Abington Heights High School Mock Trial Team Wins District Championship

2026 Abington Heights Mock Trial Team
From L. to R.: Mark Barbrack, Christopher Cummins, Aaliya Murray, Nolan Moore, Amishi Amit, Leen Abughnia, Chase Roberts, Jasleen Montesino, Henry Mahoney, Hatice Kucak, Sadie Robson, Grace Bennett, Ananya Phadke, Gabe Westgate, Eloise Giroux

Proud to note that the Abington Heights High School Mock Trial Team from Clarks Summit, Lackawanna County won the 2026 District Championship Trial last night and are on their way to the Regional Championship!

The Team is made up of a great bunch of very bright and polite students who work hard and support one another.  Very proud of all of the students on the team, including my son, Christopher.

The coaches and advisors for the team include my wife, Anne Cummins, myself Dan Cummins, Jody Healey, Esq. and Denise Bennett.  We are all so proud of the hard work these students have put in towards the success of the program.

The Mock Trial case this year was an interesting medical malpractice case involving a defendant family doctor's alleged failure to diagnose the plaintiff's medical condition.

The Finals Trial was presided over by The Honorable Judge Terrence R. Nealon who did an excellent job allowing the kids to argue their objections while providing them lessons on the law with his rulings.  Sending thanks to Judge Nealon for donating his time and expertise to the competition.

Also sending thanks to all the jurors who volunteered their time to serve last night and to those who volunteered through out the season.  The competition cannot succeed without those local lawyers, paralegals, law office staff members, and others who are willing to volunteer.  Thank you.

Also sending thanks to the Lackawanna Bar Association and its Executive Director, Lee Ann Munley, as well as Kaitlin McDonough of that office for all their time and work to make the program a success.

Sending great thanks to the District Coordinator for the Mock Trial Competition, Mackenzie Wilson, a great attorney with Munley Law, for donating all of her time and hard work to make the local competition a success.

Let's go Comets!  Keep soarin' onto the Regionals!  So proud!

Mock Trial Jurors Needed for the Northeast PA Regional Final Set For Next Monday

 The Regional Mock Trial Final for northeastern Pennsylvania is set for March 9, 2026 in the Monroe County Court of Common Pleas with a start time of 6:00 p.m.

This Region covers schools in Lackawanna, Wayne, Pike, and Monroe County.

Jurors are needed to fill up the jury box for the students.  If you are willing and able to volunteer as a juror for this Regional Mock Trial Final, here is a LINK to the form being used by the Monroe County Bar Association to sign up.

Litigant Chided For Including AI Hallucinations in Appellate Filings

In the case of Saber v. Navy Federal Credit Union, No. 2449 EDA 2024 (Pa. Super. Jan. 14, 2026 Panella, P.J.E., Dubow, J., and Nichols, J.) (Op. by Nichols, J.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court again addressed an appeal in which a litigant (possibly pro se) utilized AI to draft the appellate submissions which submissions included citations to non-existent case law.

The case involved a dispute over a car loan.

In footnote 4 of its decision, the Pennsylvania Superior Court noted that the litigant provided “non-sensical citations to and characterization of" certain cases. The litigant’s Brief also contained citations to several other cases that did not exist. The court noted that these issues suggested that the litigant utilized generative artificial intelligence to draft his Brief.

The court noted that the party’s reliance upon these hallucinations led to a waiver of his claims on appeal. The Superior Court emphasized the importance of citing pertinent authority and pointed out the potential issues with using generative AI for legal filings without verifying the information secured.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer State Appellate Case Alert, www.Law.com (Feb. 3, 2026).

Source of image:  Photo by Ali Numan on www.unsplash.com.

Mock Trial Jurors Needed For Finals Trial in Lackawanna County Competition Set For Next Tuesday -- Please Consider Volunteering