In the case of Gainer v. Bordertown Transp., Inc., No. 2:24-CV-01296-KNS (E.D. Pa. Dec. 2, 2024 Scott, J.), the Federal Eastern District Court granted a Plaintiff’s Motion for a Remand of a personal injury litigation to state court where the federal court found that the Plaintiff’s litigation conduct while the case was at the state court trial level, which case handling ended up with the removal request being facially untimely, did not evidence bad faith on the part of the Plaintiff.
According to the Opinion, the case involved a Plaintiff who was injured while she was standing behind the wheel of a truck that was hit by the Defendant’s vehicle. The Plaintiffs sued the Defendant tortfeasor and also sued PennDOT.
However, after over a year of discovery and pre-trial litigation that resulted in the dismissal of PennDOT from the action, the remaining Defendants then removed the case to federal court.
The Plaintiff then filed the present Motion for Remand. The Defendants opposed the motion on the grounds that the Plaintiff had acted in bad faith to prevent the removal in the first place.
According to the Opinion, there is a dearth of case law in the Third Circuit regarding the definition of bad faith in this context.
The court noted that bad faith under the removal statute, 28 U.S.C. §1446(c)(1) means “intentional conduct on behalf of the Plaintiff which denies the Defendant the opportunity to remove the case to federal court.” The court noted that bad faith can be demonstrated through circumstantial evidence.
The court also noted that, when completing the analysis of allegations of bad faith in this case, a court must look at all available evidence to determine whether the Plaintiff engaged in intentional conduct to deny the Defendant the chance for removal.
In this case, the Defendants were alleging that, although PennDOT was in the case in the state court matter, the Plaintiff did not move forward in terms of any efforts to enter a default judgment against PennDOT, move to strike PennDOT’s untimely Answer to the Complaint, or otherwise move to compel PennDOT to comply with discovery requests. The defense also noted that the Plaintiff dismissed PennDOT from the suit a little over two months after the expiration of the one year removal deadline. The defense additionally indicated that the Plaintiff made no effort to settle with PennDOT before dismissing PennDOT from the case and did not otherwise have the Plaintiff’s expert witness attempt to establish liability against PennDOT in any expert report.
The Plaintiff responded by indicating that many of the decisions relative to the Plaintiff’s litigation conduct were based on practice customs in the Philadelphia County Court, were based upon strategy, and were not based on any motivation to thwart the Defendants’ removal rights. The Plaintiff contended that motions for a default judgment, or to strike an untimely answer to a Complaint or to compel discovery would not have functionally improved the Plaintiff’s position in the litigation because Plaintiff’s counsel had allegedly never seen any of these types of motions successfully granted in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas.
The Plaintiffs also noted that they chose not to dismiss PennDOT from the suit previously, jointly with the Defendants, because the Plaintiffs felt that the individual tortfeasor Defendants bore the vast majority of the liability. Moreover, the Plaintiffs had a strategy of attempting to gut the Defendants’ likely joint tortfeasor arguments at trial.
The Plaintiffs also noted that they waited until the date they did to dismiss PennDOT from the suit because they were waiting to fully assess the Defendants’ expert report, which report was dated three days after the one year removal deadline expired. The Plaintiff noted that it was determined within the Plaintiff’s strategy that it would be best to remove PennDOT from the case to instead focus the liability arguments against the individual Defendants, particularly where the Defendants remaining in the case had already admitted liability but PennDOT did not. As such, Plaintiff’s counsel noted that it would be an easier, cleaner, and cheaper trial without PennDOT because the Plaintiff would not have to establish PennDOT’s liability at any trial if PennDOT was dismissed from the case.
With regard to the argument that the Plaintiff did not try to seek out settlement with PennDOT prior to dismissing PennDOT, Plaintiff’s counsel explained to the court that there were settlement conversations with PennDOT but that they were not successful.
Based upon the above, as well as additional factors noted in the Opinion, the court held that the individual Defendants in this case had not met their heavy burden of demonstrating bad faith on the part of the Plaintiff. Rather, the Plaintiff was found to have offered plausible strategic arguments in explanations of the Plaintiff’s strategic decisions. Accordingly, the court did not find that the Plaintiff engaged in any intentional conduct to deny the Defendants the opportunity to move the case to federal court.
While the court noted, in this case, that the issue of whether Plaintiff’s counsel’s strategic decisions were the best course of action was irrelevant to the court’s consideration, the court did also note that, in other cases, the court is permitted to call into question the sincerity of the Plaintiff’s “strategic decisions” and to make a finding of bad faith. However, such was not the case in this matter.
In the end, the court granted Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand the case to the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas.
Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK. The Court's Order in this case can be viewed HERE.
Source: “The Legal Intelligencer Federal Case Alert,” www.Law.com (Jan. 2, 2025).
The Plaintiff responded by indicating that many of the decisions relative to the Plaintiff’s litigation conduct were based on practice customs in the Philadelphia County Court, were based upon strategy, and were not based on any motivation to thwart the Defendants’ removal rights. The Plaintiff contended that motions for a default judgment, or to strike an untimely answer to a Complaint or to compel discovery would not have functionally improved the Plaintiff’s position in the litigation because Plaintiff’s counsel had allegedly never seen any of these types of motions successfully granted in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas.
The Plaintiffs also noted that they chose not to dismiss PennDOT from the suit previously, jointly with the Defendants, because the Plaintiffs felt that the individual tortfeasor Defendants bore the vast majority of the liability. Moreover, the Plaintiffs had a strategy of attempting to gut the Defendants’ likely joint tortfeasor arguments at trial.
The Plaintiffs also noted that they waited until the date they did to dismiss PennDOT from the suit because they were waiting to fully assess the Defendants’ expert report, which report was dated three days after the one year removal deadline expired. The Plaintiff noted that it was determined within the Plaintiff’s strategy that it would be best to remove PennDOT from the case to instead focus the liability arguments against the individual Defendants, particularly where the Defendants remaining in the case had already admitted liability but PennDOT did not. As such, Plaintiff’s counsel noted that it would be an easier, cleaner, and cheaper trial without PennDOT because the Plaintiff would not have to establish PennDOT’s liability at any trial if PennDOT was dismissed from the case.
With regard to the argument that the Plaintiff did not try to seek out settlement with PennDOT prior to dismissing PennDOT, Plaintiff’s counsel explained to the court that there were settlement conversations with PennDOT but that they were not successful.
Based upon the above, as well as additional factors noted in the Opinion, the court held that the individual Defendants in this case had not met their heavy burden of demonstrating bad faith on the part of the Plaintiff. Rather, the Plaintiff was found to have offered plausible strategic arguments in explanations of the Plaintiff’s strategic decisions. Accordingly, the court did not find that the Plaintiff engaged in any intentional conduct to deny the Defendants the opportunity to move the case to federal court.
While the court noted, in this case, that the issue of whether Plaintiff’s counsel’s strategic decisions were the best course of action was irrelevant to the court’s consideration, the court did also note that, in other cases, the court is permitted to call into question the sincerity of the Plaintiff’s “strategic decisions” and to make a finding of bad faith. However, such was not the case in this matter.
In the end, the court granted Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand the case to the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas.
Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK. The Court's Order in this case can be viewed HERE.
Source: “The Legal Intelligencer Federal Case Alert,” www.Law.com (Jan. 2, 2025).
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