What Constitues Recklessness in Terms of Operators of Emergency Vehicles?

In the case of Piotrowski v. Department of Health, No. 1232 C.D. 2023 (Pa. Cmwlth. Oct 24, 2024 Ceisler, J., Dumas, J., and Leavitt, S.J.) (Op. by Leavitt, S.J.), the court reviewed any Petition for an Adjudication of the Department of Health that suspended the Petitioner’s license as an emergency medical services provider for operating an ambulance in a reckless manner.

Relative to the suspension, the health department rejected the proposed adjudication of its hearing officer that the Petitioner’s operation of an ambulance en route to an emergency in excess of the posted speed limit did not, ipso facto, constitute reckless conduct.

At issue on appeal was the interpretation and application of the term “reckless” as set forth in §8121(a)(6) of the Emergency Medical Services System Act (EMS Act), 35 Pa. C.S.A. §8121(a)(6).

After a review of the matter, the Commonwealth Court reversed the health department’s adjudication.

In its Opinion, the Commonwealth Court began with a review of the Vehicle Code, which, under 75 Pa. C.S.A. §3105, grants special privileges to drivers of emergency vehicles responding to an emergency call.

The court also referred to the other provisions of the Vehicle Code that relate to vehicle speed and safety. The court noted that 75 Pa. C.S.A. §3736 prohibits reckless driving.

The court then turned to the EMS Act and noted that the Act sets forth numerous grounds for the suspension or revocation of an EMS provider’s certification. Under 35 Pa. C.S.A. §8121(a)(6), the Department of Health is authorized to discipline an EMS provider relative to the “operation of an emergency vehicle in a reckless manner….”

In this case, the Petitioner was charged with operating his ambulance in a reckless manner.

The issue before the court centered over a proper definition for the word “reckless” in this context.

The court turned to the rules of statutory construction. The court noted that the word “reckless” is not defined in the EMS Act. This allowed the court to consider dictionary sources. The court also referred to the Restatement (Second) of Torts for guidance.

In the end, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court held that “for a person’s conduct to be reckless,” there must be “conscious” or “deliberate” indifference to the risk of causing harm to others. In this regard, the court cited to Black’s Law Dictionary.

In this case, the court noted that the hearing officer improperly construed reckless as careless, which only implicated absent-mindedness or negligence and overlooked the conscious or deliberate intent required in order to prove recklessness as a matter of law.

Turning the facts of the case, the Petitioner was arguing that the deputy secretary erred in concluding that he violated the EMS Act.

The court noted that the evidence showed that the Petitioner drove the ambulance in excess of the posted speed limit. However, the Petitioner also noted that he was on his way to an emergency with his lights and sirens activated. There is also evidence that the ambulance crew was responding to a call of a drug overdose, making time of the essence.

The Commonwealth Court noted that there was no evidence presented that the Petitioner’s excessive speed made the accident highly probable. Rather, relative to the underlying accident at issue, the court noted that it was the decedent’s failure to stop at a posted stop sign that caused the accident.

In the end, the court noted that exceeding the speed limit alone cannot be said to be reckless conduct in this context. Finding that the Petitioner’s actions in this case did not rise to the level of recklessness, but rather showed care for the safety of others, including a victim of a drug overdose, the court found that the health department did not establish that the Petitioner had violated the EMS Act.

It is noted, however, that, although the court found that the ambulance driver did not exhibit recklessness in driving over the speed limit in the context of this case, in footnote 12 of the Opinion on page 21 of the Opinion, the court noted that there may be cases where the rate of speed of an ambulance could constitute recklessness. 

The court noted that an example of an ambulance crew driving an ambulance over the speed limit with the lights and sirens activated in order to get to a party, as opposed to a dispatch emergency, could constitute a violation of the EMS Act. 

In that footnote, the court also noted that an accident, or lack thereof, is not required to prove or disprove recklessness.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney Joseph T. Healey of the Kingston, PA office of Burns White for bringing this case to my attention.

Source of image:  Photo by Camilo Jiminez on www.unsplash.com.