ARTICLE: Appellate Courts Disagree on Whether the Discovery Rule Applies in Breach of Contract Actions

 The below article written by myself and my son, Daniel E. Cummins, Jr., who is a second year student at Virginia Law School and a member of the Virginia Law Review, was recently published in the September 25, 2025 edition of the Pennsylvania Law Weekly.

    Daniel E. Cummins, Jr.                                        Daniel E. Cummins, Esq.

Expert Opinion // Discovery

Appellate Courts Disagree on Whether the Discovery Rule Applies in Breach of Contract Actions

September 25, 2025

By

Daniel E. Cummins, Esq.

and

Daniel E. Cummins Jr.

It seems that, with respect to breach of contract actions, there is no meeting of the minds as to whether the discovery rule applies to toll the running of the statute of limitations.

In recent years, Pennsylvania law has remained unsettled over whether the discovery rule is applicable to actions based on an express written contract. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not issued any decisions extending the discovery rule to such cases. However, the Commonwealth Court and the Superior Court have taken opposite positions on this issue. The Commonwealth Court has refused to apply the discovery rule to breach of written contract cases, while the Pennsylvania Superior Court has held that the discovery rule applies in all cases.

The Importance of Statutes of Limitations

Pennsylvania courts have repeatedly emphasized the important purposes that statutes of limitations serve. The courts have noted that “statutes of limitations ‘are designed to effectuate three purposes: preservation of evidence; the right of potential defendants to repose; and administrative efficiency and convenience.’” See Lesoon v. Metropolitan Life Insurance, 898 A.2d 620, 626–27 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006) (quoting Kingston Coal v. Felton Mining, 690 A.2d 284, 288 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997)). Statutes of limitations also serve to give defendants prompt notice that claims are being made against them, prevent stale claims that may prejudice defendants, and promote finality and stability with respect to civil disputes. See Estate of Gasbarini v. Medical Center of Beaver County, 409 A.2d 343, 346 (Pa. 1979).

As such, a statute of limitations defense is not a mere technicality, but rather a "substantial and meritorious” defense that is “vital to the welfare of society and ... favored in the law." See Schmucker v. Naugle, 231 A.2d 121, 123 (Pa. 1967).

Statute of Limitations in Contract Actions

Under Pennsylvania law, a four-year statute of limitations applies to contract actions. See 42 Pa.C.S. Section 5525.

In Erie Insurance Exchange v. Bristol, 174 A.3d 578, 585–86 (Pa. 2017), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that this statute of limitations begins to run when the defendant is alleged to have breached the contract. The court noted that its holding was “in accord with the law across the country.” This decision is consistent with 42 Pa.C.S. Section 5502(a), which provides that “[t]he time within which a matter must be commenced ... shall be computed ... from the time the cause of action accrued.”

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has also generally held that “the lack of knowledge, mistake or misunderstanding do not toll the running of the statute of limitations.” See Rice v. Diocese of Altoona-Johnstown, 255 A.3d 237, 246 (Pa. 2021). However, this article discusses the discovery rule, an equitable exception to this general rule.

The Discovery Rule

The discovery rule is a doctrine that suspends or tolls the running of a statute of limitations until an injured party knows or reasonably should know of their injury, and its cause. See Fine v. Checcio, 870 A.2d 850, 858 (Pa. 2005). This doctrine ensures that, in certain limited circumstances, a plaintiff is not barred from bringing suit simply because they could not discover their injury and its cause in time.

For the discovery rule to apply, a plaintiff must have been unaware of their injury and unable to discover its cause despite the "exercise of reasonable diligence.” See Fine, 870 A.2d at 858. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has defined “reasonable diligence” in this context as “what is expected from a party who has been given reason to inform himself of the facts upon which his right to recovery is premised.”

Under this standard, “there must be some reason to awaken inquiry and direct diligence in the channel in which it would be successful.” Stated otherwise, “a party fails to exercise reasonable diligence when they fail to make an inquiry when ... information regarding their injury becomes available.” See Mariner Chestnut Partners v. Lenfest, 152 A.3d 265, 279 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2016).

The party seeking to invoke the discovery rule bears the burden of establishing their inability to discover their injury despite the exercise of reasonable diligence. See Dalrymple v. Brown, 701 A.2d 164, 167 (Pa. 1997). In this regard, the courts have noted that “the polestar of the Pennsylvania discovery rule is not a plaintiff's actual acquisition of knowledge but whether the information, through the exercise of due diligence, was knowable to the plaintiff. The failure to make inquiry when information is available is failure to exercise reasonable diligence as a matter of law.” See DiDomizio v. Jefferson Pulmonary Associates, 280 A.3d 1039, 1046 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2022).

Whether an injured party exercised reasonable diligence is typically a question for the jury. See Wilson v. El-Daief, 964 A.2d 354, 362 (Pa. 2009). Nonetheless, because of the objective nature of the test, a court may determine the applicability of the discovery rule as a matter of law where "the facts are so clear that reasonable minds cannot differ." See Schmidt v. Skolas, 770 F.3d 241, 251 (3d Cir. 2014).

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has applied the discovery rule to a wide variety of tort actions. However, to date the Supreme Court has not yet applied the rule by name to a case involving allegations of a breach of a written contract.

Does the Discovery Rule Apply in Breach of Contract Actions?

In 2019, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court noted that, based on its research as of that time, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had never applied the discovery rule to a breach of contract claim. See Carulli v. North Versailles Township Sanitary Authority, 216 A.3d 564, 580 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2019) (en banc).

The Commonwealth Court is correct that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has never applied the discovery rule by name to a breach of contract case. However, in the case of Romeo & Sons v. P.C. Yezback & Son, 652 A.2d 830, 832 (Pa. 1995), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the statute of limitations on a construction contract “will not start to run until the injured party becomes aware, or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should become aware, of the defect.” In this case, the Supreme Court did not adopt a broad rule for breach of contract actions. Given that this decision was limited to “the case of a latent defect in construction,” whether the discovery rule applies to breach of contract actions in general remains an open question.

In one other case, a justice of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court touched upon the issue in a dissenting and concurring opinion. See Crouse v. Cyclops Industries, 745 A.2d 606, 613 n.1 (Pa. 2000) (Saylor, J., dissenting and concurring). In Crouse, then-Justice Thomas Saylor wrote that "although the discovery rule, which evolved in the tort context, has been applied by Pennsylvania courts in some discrete categories of cases involving contractual or quasi-contractual claims ... , its use has not been adopted on a wholesale basis in this area” with regard to breach of contract claims.

In the absence of a concrete ruling from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, the Commonwealth Court and the Superior Court have taken opposite positions on whether the discovery rule applies to breach of contract actions generally.

The Commonwealth Court’s View

In Carulli, 216 A.3d 564, the en banc Commonwealth Court held that the discovery rule does not apply to breach of contract actions.

The Commonwealth Court in Carulli employed three different rationales to come to this conclusion. First, the Commonwealth Court noted that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court “has neither expressed a blanket prohibition nor has it applied the discovery rule ... to a breach of contract action where a party is seeking to enforce an express written contract that the party negotiated.” See Carulli, 216 A.3d at 583.

Second, the Commonwealth Court asserted that equitable considerations do not require applying the discovery rule to breach of contract claims. In support of this rationale, the Commonwealth Court noted that “parties to a contract are not without recourse.” Rather, parties to a contract have the chance to draft provisions to protect their interests, including provisions requiring inspections along with terms outlining the rights of parties in the event of a breach. Under the Commonwealth Court’s rationale in Carulli, there should be no situation in which contract parties are unable to discover a breach in time to bring suit.

Third, the Commonwealth Court reviewed the substantive differences between tort claims and contract claims. The Commonwealth Court reiterated that parties to a contract can protect themselves from undiscovered injuries or damages in ways that tort plaintiffs cannot. The court also noted that “in a breach of contract action, the injury is ... the breach,” whereas “a tort action cannot be brought until the plaintiff suffers appreciable injury.” The court thus implied that because contract parties presumably have the ability to discover breaches and may bring suit immediately upon a breach, it makes little sense to apply the discovery rule in this context.

The court in Carulli also cited the general rationale behind statutes of limitations, noting that it is unjust to compel a party to defend a lawsuit long after the alleged injury has occurred, when memories have faded, witnesses have died and/or evidence has been lost.

The Superior Court’s View

In sharp contrast, in Morgan v. Petroleum Products Equipment, 92 A.3d 823, 828 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2014), the Pennsylvania Superior Court held that “the discovery rule in Pennsylvania applies to all causes of action, including breach of contract.” In support of this contention, the Superior Court cited its previous decision in Sadtler v. Jackson-Cross, 587 A.2d 727, 731 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) in which the court also applied the discovery rule to a breach of contract claim. However, neither case contained any detailed discussion of the rationale for applying the discovery rule to contract actions; rather, the courts simply held that the discovery rule did apply.

In two recent cases over the past year and a half, the Superior Court has again held that the discovery rule applies to breach of contract actions. See Spiritrust Lutheran v. Wagman Construction, 314 A.3d 894, 907 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2024); Wasielewski v. Goebel Insurance Agency, 334 A.3d 372, 372 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2025) (unpublished table decision). No Superior Court decision has strayed from that court’s repeated application of the discovery rule to contract cases.

A number of Pennsylvania federal court judges from each of the districts have also followed the Superior Court’s decision in Morgan, holding that the discovery rule applies to all actions, including breach of contract actions. See Handy v. Delaware River Surgical Suites, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 174030, at *12 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 29, 2024); Walden v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65250, at *49 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 10, 2024); see also Canfield v. Statoil USA Onshore Properties, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40870, at *40 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 22, 2017) [other citations omitted].

Grounds for Varying Arguments

The review of the above jurisprudence confirms that there remains a split of authority on whether the discovery rule applies to toll the statute of limitations in breach of written contract actions. Given the unsettled nature of the law, there remains grounds for the defense to oppose the application of the rule as well as grounds for plaintiffs to press for the application of the doctrine.

Until this matter proceeds back up the appellate ladder to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, it appears that, for the time being, both the bench and the bar will have to continue to grapple with the issue of whether the discovery rule applies to breach of written contract actions.



Daniel E. Cummins is the managing partner at Cummins Law in Clarks Summit, Pennsylvania. Contact him at dancummins@cumminslaw.net. Daniel E. Cummins Jr. is a second-year law student at the University of Virginia School of Law, where he is a member of the Virginia Law Review. He is also the director of operations for the Virginia Law Moot Court Team and a member of the Virginia Law Mock Trial Team.

Reprinted with permission from the September 25, 2025 edition of the Pennsylvania Law Weekly © 2025 ALM Global Properties, LLC. All rights reserved. Further duplication without permission is prohibited, contact 877-256-2472 or asset-and-logo-licensing@alm.com.

Trial Court Addresses Validity of Claims Against a Drugstore

In the case of Burke v. Hoffman Health Partners, P.C., No. 2024-CV-8753 (C.P. Lacka. Co. Aug. 4, 2025 Powell, J.), the court addressed various Preliminary Objections filed in a medical malpractice case.

In this matter, the Plaintiff alleged that she sustained severe injuries after being prescribed and dispensed a medication inappropriately. 

The Plaintiff sued the medical providers relative to the prescription of the medication. She also sued CVS, who allegedly filled the prescription without providing the required counseling, verifying the safety of the prescription, or reconciling what the Plaintiff alleged were inadequacies on the face of the prescription with the prescribing physician.

With regards to the claims against CVS, the court found that the Plaintiff had sufficiently alleged both vicarious and direct liability claims.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff’s Complaint alleged that the CVS agents failed to counsel the Plaintiff, ignored dosage red flags, and did not consult with the prescribing physician. The Plaintiff additionally alleged ischemic failures in the training, policy enforcement, and prescription review within CVS.

The court ruled that, under the facts alleged, such claims could rise to the level of reckless indifference and could warrant a claim for punitive damages. Accordingly, CVS’ Preliminary Objections were overruled.

The court otherwise overruled the preliminary objections asserted against by the medical Defendants against the punitive damages claims as well. The court held that the Plaintiff’s claims of misdiagnosis, discharged despite warning signs, and inadequate supervision of the Plaintiff as a patient, all supported direct claims and warranted the consideration of punitive damages.

The court did, however, sustain the Preliminary Objection filed by Geisinger Clinic to a claim for vicarious liability for punitive damages because the court found that the Complaint failed to allege that the clinic had actual knowledge of its agents’ conduct as required under §505(c) of the MCARE Act.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: Lackawanna Jurist Case Summary (Aug. 15, 2025).

Source of image:  Photo by Marques Thomas on www.unsplash.com.

Court Rejects Medical Malpractice Defendants' Efforts To Have Lawsuit Transferred to Arbitration

In the case of O’Shea v. Loyalsock Rehab Center, LLC, No. 2023-CV-01142 (C.P. Lyc. Co. 2025 Carlucci, J.), the court addressed Preliminary Objections asserted by a Defendant in a nursing home case in which the Defendants, in part, sought to have the matter remanded to arbitration based upon an arbitration clause.

The court overruled the Defendant’s Preliminary Objections in this regard after finding that the arbitration clause was not obvious or conspicuous in the documents.

The court also rejected the request to transfer the case to arbitration givent that the parties had engaged in discovery in two (2) years of litigation before the Defendants ever raised this issue.  The issue was raised when the Defendant's filed Preliminary Objections to a Second Amended Complaint. 

The court noted that it would prejudice the Plaintiff to have to start the entire litigation over in an arbitration proceeding.

The court otherwise noted that the record lacked any evidence to show that the Plaintiff had the authority or any intention to enter into an arbitration agreement.

The court otherwise struck the Plaintiff’s count alleging res ipsa loquitur given that that doctrine was a rule of circumstantial evidence, not a cause of action.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney Thomas J. Foley, III of The Foley Law Firm in Scranton, PA for bringing this case to my attention.

Court Refuses to Open Non Pros Judgment Where Plaintiff Repeatedly Failed To Abide By Court's Orders

In the case of Harrison v. Pinnacle Exteriors, No. 6493-CV-2023 (C.P. Monroe Co. July 21, 2025 Zulick, J.), the court denied a Plaintiff’s Motion to Open a Judgment of Non Pros.

The court denied the Plaintiff’s Petition, holding that the Plaintiff was not entitled to relief where the Plaintiff failed to comply with certain Court Orders.

More specifically, the Plaintiff failed to comply with the Court Order to file a Fourth Amended Complaint. The Plaintiff also failed to comply with another Order requiring the Plaintiff to show cause why the action should not be dismissed due to failure to prosecute the claim.

The court noted that the resulting three (3) months of delay in the proceedings caused by the Plaintiff’s failure to act supported the denial of the Petition to Open the Non Pros Judgment.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer Common Pleas Case Alert, www.Law.com (Sept. 5, 2025).

 

Court Rules that Plaintiff's Claim Barred By Prior Settlement Agreement

In the case of West v. Abington Memorial Hospital, No. 1723 EDA 2023 (Pa. Super. Aug. 28, 2025 Bowes, J., Olson, J., and McLaughlin, J.) (Op. by Bowes, J.) (dissenting Opinion by McLaughlin, J.), the Superior Court affirmed a trial court’s granting of a medical malpractice Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings based on a conclusion that the Plaintiff’s lawsuit was barred by a Release executed in the parties’ previous settlement.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiffs had previously filed a medical malpractice action against certain Defendants alleging that the Defendants were negligent during the Plaintiff’s labor and delivery that resulted in injuries to the Plaintiff’s child.

In the midst of the malpractice trial in the previous matter, the parties reached a settlement for the full insurance policy limits.

The Plaintiffs executed a Settlement and a Release that was approved by the trial court.

Several years later, the Plaintiffs filed the present lawsuit, alleging that they were fraudulently induced to enter into the settlement due to the hospital’s failure to produce a memo from one of the Defendant doctors that was responsive to the Plaintiff’s discovery requests in the previous case and which addressed one of the primary issues in the malpractice trial.

The Plaintiffs have discovered the memo when the hospital produced it in an unrelated case involving the Plaintiff’s attorney.

The Plaintiffs claimed in the new lawsuit that, had the memo been produced in their previous malpractice action, they would have obtained a settlement or jury verdict above the settlement that they actually negotiated.

In this new case, the Defendants filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings based upon the Release previously entered into between the parties.

The Superior Court affirmed the trial court’s granting of the judgment on the pleadings. The appellate court agreed that the Release covered all claims arising from or connected to the Plaintiff’s malpractice action. The court found that the new lawsuit fell within the scope of the Release given that the new lawsuit sought to recover the difference between the parties’ settlement in the amount of compensation the Plaintiffs claimed that they could have obtained had the Defendants produced the memo at issue.

The appellate court ruled that the Plaintiffs were unable to avoid the effect of the integration clause in the Release, which precluded the Plaintiffs from introducing parol evidence to prove fraud in the inducement.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of the Majority Opinion for this decision may click this LINK.  The Dissenting Opinion may be reviewed HERE.

Source of image:  Photo by Solange Brenis on www.unsplash.com.

Superior Court Addresses Discoverability of Hospital Patient Safety Review Records

In the case of Boyle v. Main Line Health, Inc., No. 2454 EDA 2023 (Pa. Super. Aug. 10, 2025 King, J., Lazarus, J., and Lane, J.) (Op. by King, J.) (Lane, J. concurring and dissenting), the appellate court affirmed in part and reversed in part a trial court discovery Order relative to the discoverability of hospital patient safety review records in a medical malpractice action.

The court noted that discovery Orders involving claims of privilege are immediately appealable a collateral Orders.

The Superior Court noted that hospital patient safety review records that are actually used to make MCARE mandatory reports are protected from disclosure in litigation by the Act.

In this case, the Defendant hospital had an MCARE patient safety plan and a patient safety officer. The MCARE safety patient plan established a patient safety committee pursuant to MCARE and also set forth requirements for both internal and external reporting.

The Superior Court noted that MCARE confidentiality extends to all documents, materials, or information solely prepared or created for the purpose of reporting compliance.

However, the court noted that, without evidence that the event at issue was actually submitted to a patient safety committee or governing board, the MCARE privilege cannot be established. 

The court noted that a general assertion of a particular privilege as to all documents is sufficient to preserve the privilege as to any portion of the documents.

The court also noted that, under the federal Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act privilege, “patient safety work product” is not subject to state-law discovery. The court noted that documents produced solely in accordance with the Patient Safety Evaluation System and reported to the patient safety organization are protected under the PSQIA.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.  The Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by Judge Lane can be reviewed HERE.


I send thanks to Attorney James M. Beck of the Philadelphia office of the Reed Smith law firm for bringing this case to my attention.

Court Punts On Summary Judgment in Football Stadium Trip and Fall Case

In the case of DeLuca v. Scranton School District, No. 2021-CV-3506 (C.P. Lacka. Co. Aug. 19, 2025 Powell, J.), the court denied Motions for Summary Judgment filed by the Scranton School District and Scranton Preparatory School relative to a trip and fall action brought by the Plaintiff after the Plaintiff tripped on an alleged uneven slab of sidewalk at the Scranton Memorial Stadium during a football game.

According to the Opinion, the stadium is owned by the Scranton School District and was leased to the Scranton Preparatory School under an oral agreement.

The Plaintiff alleged negligence against both Defendants.

The Scranton School District argued that it was immune from liability under the Pennsylvania Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act given that it allegedly lacked notice of the defect and given that the Plaintiff had not suffered a “permanent injury” as required by law to proceed with such a claim in this context.

The court found that the Plaintiff had produced liability and medical expert evidence on the claim presented such that issues of fact precluded the entry of summary judgment.

More specifically, on the liability issues, the Plaintiff produced an expert who asserted that the walkway’s 1.5 inch uneven slab not only constituted a trip hazard, but had also existed for years and allegedly remained unaddressed despite safety inspections.

Regarding the Plaintiff’s injuries, the Plaintiff’s medical experts reported ongoing hand dysfunction and other chronic conditions. The court noted that genuine issues of fact existed for a jury to decide on the alleged permanence of the Plaintiff’s injuries.

The Co-Defendant, Scranton Prep, asserted that it did not bear any responsibility for maintaining the stadium given that it was a lessee without possession or control premises. The court found issues of fact regarding control and responsibility over the premises. As such, summary judgment was denied in this regard as well.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: Lackawanna Jurist (Aug. 29, 2025).

Summary Judgment Granted in Store Bathroom Slip and Fall Case

In the case of Staley v. Price Chopper, No. 3908-CIVIL-2024 (C.P. Monroe Co. Aug. 11, 2025 Williamson, J.), the court granted summary judgment in a slip and fall matter that occurred at a grocery store.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff visited a grocery store and went to use the lady’s restroom. While in the restroom, the Plaintiff allegedly slipped on some unknown substance and fell.

After the completion of discovery, the defense filed a Motion for Summary Judgment asserting that the Plaintiff had failed to offer any evidence to show how or when the alleged substance came to be on the floor and/or that the store employees had any actual or constructive notice of the condition.

The court agreed with the defense position. The court noted that the Plaintiff failed to offer any evidence as to what substance allegedly caused her to fall. The Plaintiff admitted that she did not notice any wet spots on the floor before she fell. 

All the Plaintiff could state at her deposition was that she knew there was a liquid on the floot because her clothes were wet after the incident.  However, the record revealed not only that it may have been raining on the day of the accident but also that, when the Plaintiff fell in the bathroom stall area, her arm and hand had gone into the toilet.

The court also noted that, even considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, the only conclusion is that the Plaintiff allegedly may have slipped on something wet. The court noted that it is not unusual for wet spots to be found in public restrooms, particularly around the toilet area. The court held that, without some indication of what the substance actually was, for example, from a leaking toilet or a spilled hand soap, it was difficult to determine from the record whether the condition that caused the Plaintiff was a long-standing condition as opposed to a transitory one.

In this regard, the court also noted that the Plaintiff failed to provide any evidence as to the length of time that the condition existed or if the Defendant store employees knew or should have known of the alleged condition.

The court also rejected the Plaintiff’s contention that the Defendant should have regularly checked the bathroom during the course of the day. The court noted that the Plaintiff did not produce any evidence in this regarding, including any chart under which employees would check off whether or not they had inspected the bathroom at certain times during day.

The Plaintiff also pointed to surveillance video of the store that shows that no employee entered the restroom for thirty (30) minutes prior to the Plaintiff’s fall. 

The court noted that while the video may show that no one attended to the restroom for thirty (30) minutes before the Plaintiff’s fall, that evidence does not translate to a finding that the Defendant was negligent in not cleaning the restroom that entire day. 

Rather, the court noted that the surveillance video simply showed that the restroom was not checked for thirty (30) minutes before the Plaintiff’s fall. The court held that this did not mean that the Defendant was aware of, or should have been aware of, an alleged dangerous condition that went unattended.

For these reasons, and others noted in the Opinion, the court granted summary judgment to the Defendant store.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

It is noted that Daniel E. Cummins of Cummins Law was defense counsel in this matter.

Source of image: Photo by Juno Jo on www.unsplash.com.

Appellate Court Agrees That No Spoliation Occurred Where Camera Would Not Have Captured Area of the Incident

In a decision marked Non-Precedential in the the case of Conklin v. Wawa, Inc., No. 3006 EDA 2024 (Pa. Super. Aug. 6, 2025 Beck, J., Panella, P.J.E, Stabile, J.) (Op. by Beck, J.), the appellate court affirmed a trial court’s denial of post-trial motions in a slip and fall case.

Of note, the appellate court agreed that the Plaintiff was not entitled to an adverse inference jury charge based on the Defendant’s alleged spoliation of surveillance tapes.

In this matter, the record revealed that the video cameras could not have recorded the fall down event. Accordingly, the appellate court ruled that there was no basis for the claim that the fact that the tapes were routinely overwritten amounted to an intentional destruction of evidence.

The appellate court also found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion finding a lack of any fault to the Defendant with respect to the alleged loss of the evidence. The court additionally noted that, since the claimed fall would not have been on camera, there is no showing of any relevance or prejudice with respect to this evidence.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this non-precedential decision may click this LINK.

I send thanks to Attorney James M. Beck of the Philadelphia office of the Reed Smith law firm for bringing this case to my attention.

Trial Court Denies Summary Judgment on Products Liability Claims Regarding Motorcycle

In the case of Windhorst v. Colvin, No. 11230 of 2019, C.A. (C.P. Lawr. Co. June 27, 2025 Hodge, J.), the court denied a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant, Harley Davidson Motor Company, after finding issues of fact in this products liability case arising out of a motorcycle accident.

In this matter, the Plaintiff alleged a designed defect in the lighting system of the motorcycle. 

One defense presented by the Defendants was that the Plaintiff had substantially altered the lighting system on the motorcycle prior to the accident. More specifically, there was evidence in the record that the Plaintiff had installed an after market LED headlamp on the motorcycle in an effort to improve the headlamp’s brightness. 

The record before the court confirmed that the Plaintiff took this step without following the specifications or alignment instructions in the owner’s manual for the motorcycle that was provided by the Defendants. It was also noted that the owner’s manual expressly warned against the use of non-specified parts and also outlined the appropriate wattage for headlamps.

The Defendants additionally contended that the Plaintiff’s claims for a negligent design and for strict product liability were legally insufficient as the subject motorcycle complied with all federal and state conspicuity regulations in terms pf head lamps. 

The Defendant additionally argued that, in any event, the Plaintiff was aware of the alleged design defect and assumed the risk by continuing to operate the motorcycle.

The court denied the Motion after finding genuine issues of material fact existed regarding whether there was an alleged design defect in the motorcycle’s lighting system. The court also found genuine issues of material fact on the issue of whether the Plaintiff had assumed the risk of injury.

The court noted that both parties had produced conflicting evidence on the issue presented through expert reports on the issues of whether or not a design defect existed.

The court additionally noted that, while compliance with government standards is relevant to a claim for negligent design, such evidence is not determinative in cases of strict product liability regarding allegations of defects.

Accordingly, the judge denied the Motion for Summary Judgment.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer Common Pleas Case Alert, www.Law.com (Sept. 18, 2025).

SAVE THE DATE FOR THE LACKAWANNA PRO BONO ANNUAL GALA

 

Plaintiff Knocked Into By Dogs in Dog Park Gets Knocked Out of Court

In the case of Bushner v. Nimeh, No. 2024-C-0616 (C.P. Leh. Co. 2025 Reichley, J.), the court granted the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment in a case in which the Plaintiff was run into by two dogs in a dog park and allegedly sustained injuries. One of the dogs was a Great Dane and the other dog was a Labrador Retriever.

According to the Opinion, both dogs were wearing pronged collars and were on leashes at the park. At the Plaintiffs’ suggestion, after asking the Defendant dog owners if their two dogs were “good dogs,” all of the parties’ dogs were let off of their leashes and allowed to run and play with each other in the dog park.

The court noted that, at her deposition, the Plaintiff admitted that the dog at issue did not attack her. Also, when asked if there was anything she believed that the Defendants should have done differently before the dogs ran into her, the Plaintiff responded in the negative.

After discovery was completed, the Defendants filed their Motion for Summary Judgment at issue.

In addition to alleging negligence, the Plaintiffs asserted that, even though she invited the Defendants’ dogs to go unleashed, the Defendants still had a duty to warn the Plaintiff on whether the Defendants’ dogs would be controllable while unleashed and/or whether the dogs posed a serious threat to the safety of others in their vicinity.

The Plaintiffs further alleged that the Defendants knew that the dogs allegedly had dangerous propensities and that the dogs should not be allowed to be off-leash.  The Plaintiff based this allegation  on the fact that the Defendants knew that their dogs pulled on their leashes before and given that the Defendants used pronged collars on their dogs to help mitigate the pulling.

The court found that neither of these acts, in isolation or together, showed any tendency on the part of the Defendants’ dogs to do an act that might endanger the safety of the person and property of others. The court otherwise noted that the Plaintiff failed to produce any evidence to support allegations that the dogs in question had dangerous propensities of which the Defendants were aware.

The court also rejected the Plaintiff’s attempt to prove negligence under the Dog Law. The court noted that where proof of negligence rests upon a violation of the Dog Law, liability does not attach unless causation is also established. The court noted that the record was devoid of evidence to support a finding of negligence under the Dog Law.

Accordingly, the court rendered summary judgment in favor of the Defendants dog owners.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: “The Legal Intelligencer Common Pleas Case Alert,” www.Law.com (Aug. 7, 2025).

Source of image:  Photo by Rui Alves on www.unsplash.com.

Commonwealth Court Rules That Trial Court Erred in Giving Comparative Negligence Jury Instruction in Dog Bite Case

In its decision, which was listed as “Opinion not Reported,” (Why write and Opinion if your not going to report it?) in the case of Coffin v. Carbon County Animal Shelter, No. 1516 C.D. 2023 (Pa. Cmwlth. July 22, 2025 McCullough, J., Cannon, J., and Hannah Leavitt, S.J.) (Mem. Op. by Leavitt, S.J.), the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania overruled a trial court Order denying a Plaintiff’s Motion for a New Trial in a dog bite case.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff arrived at an animal shelter. While there, the Plaintiff was attacked by a dog. She was bitten on her leg and was also caused to fall. In addition to the suffering the dog bites, the Plaintiff broke both of her ankles in the fall and required surgery on one of her ankles.

After a trial, a jury entered a verdict in favor of the Plaintiff and awarded $40,000.00 but also assessed 50% of comparative negligence against the Plaintiff.

The Plaintiffs filed a post-trial motion asserting that the Defendant did not prove that the Plaintiff was negligent in any way.  The Plaintiff argued that, as such, the jury should not have been provided with jury instructions on comparative negligence. The trial court denied the Plaintiff’s Motion for a New Trial and the case was appealed to the Commonwealth Court.

The Commonwealth Court reversed and remanded and held that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on comparative negligence where there was no evidence that the Plaintiff had acted negligently.  The appellate court noted that the Plaintiff did not act negligently in allegedly failing to distance herself from a leashed dog that merely jumped towards the Plaintiff as it approached, only to then attack the Plaintiff unexpectedly from behind thereafter.

The court rejected the defense argument that the Plaintiff was negligent in allowing the dog to get close to her, which allowed the dog to attack. 

The appellate court noted that, while the Plaintiff may have understood the risks posed by the dog as involving the possibility that the dog would jump at her again, there was no indication for the Plaintiff that a vicious attack would possibly occur. The court noted that the Plaintiff’s previous brief encounter with the dog was not sufficient to put the Plaintiff on notice of the dog’s vicious propensities. The court noted that the previous jump was not, according to the evidence, accompanied by a growl, a snap, or any attempt by the dog to harm the Plaintiff.

Accordingly, the court found that there was no evidence of any negligence on the part of the Plaintiff relative to the dog getting close to the Plaintiff a second time. Therefore, there was no support for the trial court to have given the jury the Comparative Negligence jury instruction.

The case was remanded back for the entry of an Order awarding the Plaintiff the total damages awarded by the jury at trial.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this non-precedential decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer State Appellate Case Alert, www.Law.com (Aug. 19, 2025).

Source of image:  Photo by Pixabay on www.pexels.com.

NEED CLE CREDITS? UPCOMING ZOOM CLE TO CONSIDER

 

Trial Court Sheds Light On Why It Granted Summary Judgment in Allegedly Defective Street Light Case

In the case of Medina v. Zorrilla, June Term, 2023, No. 1233 (C.P. Phila. Co. June 9, 2025 Bright, J.), the court issued a Rule 1925 Opinion in a case of a pedestrian hit by a vehicle at an intersection with allegedly deficient street lighting.

The trial court assserted in its Opinion that its Order granting summary judgment in favor of the City Defendants should be affirmed where the Plaintiff did not offer up any evidence that the City had notice of an allegedly defective streetlight.  The trial court also noted that there was no evidence that the City had negligently maintained the streetlight.

The Plaintiff asserted that he had provided adequate evidence to support a claim under the Trees, Traffic Controls and Street Lighting exception to the municipal immunity afforded under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act, 42 Pa. C.S.A. §8542(b).

The trial court disagreed. The court noted that the Plaintiff never provided that any evidence that the City had notice, actual or constructive, regarding the alleged defect or malfunctioning of the streetlight where the accident happened. 

There was also no evidence in the record to suggest that, even if the City had notice, there would have been sufficient time to repair the allegedly defective streetlight before the accident happened.

The court did confirm that, once the City installed a streetlight in the area in question, it did have a duty to maintain it. However, the court found that there was no evidence in the record to show that the City failed to properly to maintain the streetlight in question.

Relative to any liability expert evidence offered by the Plaintiff, the court noted that the test completed on the streetlight by the Plaintiff’s expert were completed 1-2 years after the accident. Accordingly, the court stated that the test results did not shed any light onto the condition of the streetlight as of the day of the incident.

As such, the trial court requested the appellate court to affirm the trial court's entry of summary judgment in favor of the defendants.  

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer Weekly Case Alert, www.Law.com (Aug. 28, 2025).

Privilege Against Producing Patient-Safety Investigation Report in a Med Mal Case Can Be Waived

In its non-precedential decision in the case of Fielding v. Robleski, No. 1340 EDA 2023 (Pa. Super. Sept. 4, 2025 Bowes, J., Nichols, J., and Sullivan, J.) (Op. by Sullivan, J.), the court reviewed a hospital’s appeal from a trial court’s Order denying the hospital’s Motion for a Protective Order concerning a patient-safety investigation report in a medical malpractice case. 

The trial court had ordered the disclosure over the report. The trial court also found that the hospital had waived any federal privilege by failing to raise it in its initial Motion to Compel.

On appeal, the Superior Court affirmed the trial court’s conclusion that the hospital had failed to timely preserve its claims of a federal law privilege. 

As such, the Pennsylvania Superior Court has ruled that a discovery protection allowed under federal law is indeed waivable in medical malpractice suits in which the Federal Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act of 2005 is raised.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney Michael J. Foley of the Foley Law Firm in Scranton, PA for bringing this case to my attention.

Federal Court Bounces Premises Liability Case Back to State Court After Finding That Store Manager Was Fraudulently Joined in the Matter

In the case of Kincaid v. Dollar Tree, Inc., No. 2:25-CV-00787 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 2, 2025 Stickman, J.), the court denied a Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand a matter to the state court and also granted the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the store manager as a Defendant.

This case arose out of an incident that occurred at a Dollar Tree store where the Plaintiff allegedly reached up to a top shelf to grab a coffee mug and the mug tipped over, spilling its contents onto her face, body and clothing. The Plaintiff alleged that the cup contained urine and other hazardous fluids.

The Plaintiff originally filed suit in state court. The Defendant removed the matter to federal court.

In removing the case to federal court, the Defendants asserted that the Plaintiff’s joinder of the store manager into the lawsuit was a purposeful effort to have residents from Pennsylvania on both the Plaintiffs side and the defense side of this matter so as to preclude removal on the basis that there was no diversity of citizenship.

The Plaintiff filed a Motion to Remand the case to state court.

The court held that, as pled, there were no grounds upon which the Plaintiff may maintain an action against the store manager under Pennsylvania law.  In this Opinion, the court noted that the “Plaintiff’s argument is an exercising sophistry.”  Accordingly, the court denied the Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand and granted the store manager’s Motion for a Dismissal.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney Sarah E. Cobbs of the Pittsburgh office of the law firm of Thomas, Thomas & Hafer, LLP, for bringing this case to my attention.

LACKAWANNA PRO BONO GALA SET FOR NOVEMBER 6, 2025

 

The Bus Stops Here: Trial Court Finds Venue Proper in Philadelphia Based on Busing Company's Defendant's Periodic Contacts in the County

Philadelphia Skyline

In the case of Warren v. Heagy, No. 240100294 (C.P. Phila. Co. May 2025 Anders, J.), the court issued a Rule 1925 Opinion requesting the Superior Court to affirm the trial court’s Order overruling the Defendant’s Preliminary Objections that Philadelphia County was an improper venue for the case.

According to the Opinion, this matter involved a motor vehicle accident during which a bus owned by the Defendant bus company collided with the Plaintiff’s vehicle.

The Defendants asserted in Preliminary Objections that the Defendant bus company had no physical presence in Philadelphia County, did not derive any revenue from customers located in Philadelphia County, and does not perform acts or maintain contacts in Philadelphia County sufficient to satisfy the quality-quantity tests for venue.

The court overruled the Preliminary Objections after noting that the record revealed that the Defendant bus company is in the business of transporting students to and from school and activities, including transporting students into Philadelphia County for purposes of activity such as field trips. It was noted that over the years, the business company had transported students into Philadelphia County about 10 times during one school year and 10 times during another school year, and 23-30 times on another recent school year.

After reviewing the law regarding the quality-quantity tests for proper venue, the court ruled that the evidence before it demonstrated that the Defendant regularly conducted business in Philadelphia County.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Source: “The Legal Intelligencer Common Pleas Case Alert,” www.Law.com (July 2, 2025).

PA Supreme Court Issues Interim Policy On Use of Generative Artificial Intelligence By Judicial Officers And Court Personnel (Effective Dec. 8, 2025)

Here is a LINK to the interim policy that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has issued for judges and court personnel who want to use AI.

The policy allows for judges and court personnel to utilize AI for summarizing documents, conducting preliminary legal research, and drafting initial versions of documents.

These rules which are identified as the “Interim Policy On The Use Of Generative Artificial Intelligence By Judicial Officers And Court Personnel" goes into effect on December 8, 2025.

It is anticipated that, in the near future, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court may also come out with rules to guide attorneys on the proper of AI in the practice of law relative to any filings with the courts.

Source: Article – “Pa. High Court Allow Judges, Personnel To Use AI For Document Summary, Preliminary Legal Research” By Max Mitchell of the Legal Intelligencer (Sept. 9, 2025).

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Trial Court Denies Various Motions For Summary Judgment in a Medical Malpractice Case

In the case of Leber v. Frattali, No. 2023-CV-1442 (C.P. Lacka. Co. 2025 Powell, J.), the court addressed fifteen (15) pre-trial motions presented by the defense, which included fourteen (14) Motions for Partial Summary Judgment and one (1) Motion for Summary Judgment in a wrongful death and survival action arising out of a medical malpractice claim.

Overall, the court found that genuine issues of material fact prevented the court from entering any judgments.

In particular, the court rejected the defense claims that the Plaintiff’s expert reports were insufficient to establish negligence. The court stressed that issues of the credibility of the experts and the differing interpretations of risk models were for the jury to resolve, not the court on summary judgment.

The court additionally noted that alleged systemic negligence, including lack of training, inadequate policies, and supervisory failures, could all serve to support claims of corporate negligence and constructive notice.

In the end, the court reiterated that there were issues of fact that prevented the entry of summary judgment on the claims presented. Accordingly, all defense Motions for Summary Judgment and Partial Summary Judgment were denied.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Plaintiff Wins Denial of Summary Judgment Motion Without Even Filing a Response

 

In the case of Dunkel v. Dallago, No. S-1335-CV-2022 (C.P. Schuly. Co. Sept. 5, 2025 Burke, J.), the court denied a Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment in a motor vehicle accident case in which the Defendant asserted that it should be granted summary judgment in light of the Plaintiff’s failure to produce any expert medical testimony on the issues of causation.  

The Plaintiff, who was represented by counsel, failed to file any response whatsoever to the Motion for Summary Judgment. The court still denied the Motion for Summary Judgment after finding that it had the discretion to excuse this failure and otherwise rule upon the Motion.

According to the Opinion, this matter arose out of a motor vehicle accident as a result of which the Plaintiff alleged personal injuries.

Relative to the defense argument that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law given the Plaintiff’s failure to produce expert medical testimony to support the Plaintiff’s burden of proof on causation, the court referenced the exception to the law generally requiring such expert testimony. The court noted that, under that exception, where there is an obvious causal relationship between an accident and an injury, the requirement of expert testimony may be excused. The court noted that an obvious causal relationship can be found to exist where the injuries are either an “immediate and direct” or the “natural and probable” of the alleged negligent act.

The court found that there remained factual issues in this regard supported the court's denial of the request for the entry of summary judgment.

Although the Plaintiff never filed a Response to the Motion, the court also went on to note that there were other genuine issues of material fact presented in the case.  The court noted that the Plaintiff claimed that the Defendant was negligent and the Defendant not only denied negligence in its pleadings but also asserted contributory negligence against the Plaintiff. The court also noted sua sponte that there were other issues likely to be raised at the time of trial, including the speed of the Defendant’s vehicle, whether the Defendant was distracted at the time of the accident, and whether the Defendant pled guilty to any criminal charges in connection with the accident.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of the Court’s Opinion granting summary judgment in favor of a Plaintiff who did not file any Response to the Motion may click this LINK.

Source of image:  www.urbandictionary.com.

Court Rules that Punitive Damages May Not Be Claimed for Post-Incident Conduct

In the case of Pavlik v. Smith, No. 2024-CV-09109 (C.P. Luz. Co. Aug. 1, 2025 Gelb, J.) the court denied a Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend the Complaint in a dog bite case.

Of note, the court denied the Plaintiff’s efforts to file an Amended Complaint that would contain a claim for punitive damages for post-incident conduct by the Defendants relative to the dog bite incident.

The court noted that punitive damages are not available for post-incident conduct of a tortfeasor. In so ruling, the court cited, with “see” signals, the cases of Bert Co. v. Turk, 298 A.3d 44, 61 (Pa. 2023) (Explaining that the fact-finder may impose punitive damages for torts, as opposed to any post-incident conduct) and Feld v. Merriam, 485 A.2d 742, 748 (Pa. 1984) (Stating that “one must look to the act itself together with all circumstances when imposing punitive damages).

Anyone wishing to review this detailed Order without Opinion may click this LINK.

SAVE THE DATE -- NOVEMBER 6TH -- LACKAWANNA PRO BONO GALA

 

Trial Court Allows Claims of Recklessness and Punitive Damages to Proceed Where Defendant Driver Took Eyes Off Road Where Something Fell to the Floor of Vehicle

In the case of Lin v. Gutowski, No. 2024-CV-5659 (C.P. Lacka. Co. Aug. 11, 2025 Powell, J.), Judge Mark Powell of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas overruled a Defendant’s Preliminary Objections seeking to strike claims for recklessness, punitive damages, and negligent entrustment in an alleged distracted driver motor vehicle accident case.

Judge Mark Powell
Lackawanna County

Relative to the allegations of recklessness, Judge Powell followed the current trend of allowing allegations of recklessness to be pled generally in cases where negligence has been alleged. With regards to the claims for punitive damages, the court noted that the Plaintiff alleged that the Defendant was distracted by an item that fell to the floor which caused him to remove his eyes from the road while approaching the intersection at a speed that was allegedly too fast for the conditions and while failing to yield to traffic where the Plaintiff was attempting to make a left hand turn.

The court found that the allegations presented by the Plaintiff rendered it unclear as to whether or not a jury could find that such conduct was reckless such that the claim for punitive damages could be supported. In so ruling, Judge Powell cited to a Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision in which it was stated that a more appropriate course of action under the circumstances would be to pull to the side of the road to retrieve the item.

The court otherwise noted that the allegations that the Defendant driver diverted his eyes from the road, in combination with the allegations that the Defendant was traveling too fast for conditions and that he failed to yield to other traffic on the roadway, all served to support the Plaintiff’s potential claim for punitive damages. The court noted that it was otherwise not clear and free from doubt as to the Defendant’s subjective understanding of the risk his conduct posted to the safety of others and whether or the Defendant carelessly disregarded those risks. Accordingly, the court allowed the claim for punitive damages to proceed.

In his decision, Judge Powell also outlined the current status of the law regarding negligent entrustment claims. After applying that law to the case presented, the court noted that the Plaintiff’s claims that the Defendant owner knew or should have known that the Defendant driver had a prior history of motor vehicle violations and that the Defendant driver would allegedly fail to operate the vehicle safely, that the Defendant driver had a propensity for speeding and driving while distracted and for ignoring the law, not only stated claims for negligence, but also supported claims of recklessness for which a jury may decide to award punitive damages. As such, the court also overruled the Defendant’s Preliminary Objections to the Plaintiff’s claims of negligent entrustment.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney Stephen T. Kopko of the Anzalone and Doyle law firm in Wilkes-Barre, PA for bringing this case to my attention.

Trial Court Gives Lessons on Medical Malpractice Complaint Drafting

In the case of Dawes v. The Williamsport Home, No. 2025-CV-00381 (C.P. Lyc. Co. June 6, 2025 Carlucci, J.), the court granted in part and denied in part Preliminary Objections filed against a Plaintiff’s claim in a medical malpractice case arising out of alleged negligent care regarding the Plaintiff’s thoracic surgical wound.

According to the Opinion, the court denied the Defendant’s demurrer to the Plaintiffs’ claim for punitive damages but still directed the Plaintiff to file an Amended Complaint which either deletes any claim for punitive damages or sets forth sufficient material allegations in support of the same.

Relative to any claims against any agents or employees of the medical Defendants the court directed that the Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint should limit allegations regarding the acts or omissions by a Defendant or its agent or employees to that conduct that the Plaintiff contends was a substantial factor in causing the Plaintiff’s injuries. In this regard, the court directed the Plaintiff to not include any extraneous allegations not pertinent to the causation issues. 

The court also required the Plaintiff to provide additional factual support and allegations on the claims for corporate liability.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: “The Legal Intelligencer Common Pleas Case Alert,” www.Law.com (Aug. 7, 2025).

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Summary Judgment Granted in Water Park Ride Under "No-Duty" Rule

In the case of Mantilla v. CMBK Resort Holdings, LLC, No. 5780-Civil-2023 (C.P. Monroe Co. April 25, 2025 Williamson, J.), the court granted a Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment in a case in which the Plaintiff alleged injuries from a water park ride during which the raft either flipped or the Plaintiff fell from it, resulting in injuries to the Plaintiff.

After reviewing the applicable law, which included the fact that, generally speaking, purveyors of theaters, amusement parks, or sports facilities have a “no-duty” rule to protect a party from injuries so long as the injuries suffered arose from a risk that was “common, frequent, and expected” of the situation.

The court ruled that, based upon the record before it, the Plaintiff has failed to allege or establish any conduct on the part of the Defendants that was not an inherent risk of utilizing a water slide.

In this matter, the Plaintiff admitted at her deposition that her raft flipped due to a sudden change in the water pressure, causing her to strike her shoulder on the side of the slide itself. The court noted that this is an inherent risk of water slides, where unexpected changes in water flow and the possibility of body parts colliding with the hard surface of the tube.

Given that the Plaintiff failed to show any other evidence of negligence and given that the Defendant had no duty to protect the Plaintiff from the “common, frequent, and expected” dangers of water slides, the court granted summary judgment.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: “The Legal Intelligencer Common Pleas Case Alert,” www.Law.com (July 10, 2025).