Attorney Faulted For Submitting Brief with AI Hallucinations

Examples of attorneys getting trouble for utilizing AI tools for legal research and then not checking the accuracy of the information gathered has occurred in Pennsylvania.  Inaccurate information secured from AI sources are known as hallucinations.

In the Pennsylvania federal court case of Jakes v. Youngblood, No. 2:24-cv-1608 (W.D. Pa. June 26, 2025 Stickman, J.), the court faulted an attorney for submitting briefs with wholly fabricated quotations from case law, including fabricated quotations from this court’s own prior Opinion. 

The court faulted that attorney for not only failing to offer any explanation for the deficiencies and fabrications in his own brief, but for also attacking the content of the opposing party’s brief, which the court noted did not contain any fabricated quotations or misrepresented case law. 

The court also noted that, “[e]ven more outrageously,” a review of the AI-happy attorney’s reply brief demonstrated that that brief also contained fabricated quotes and misrepresented case law.

The court noted that it found it to be “very troubling” that, when accused of serious ethical violations, the attorney at fault “chose to double down” and not admit to wrongdoing. 

In the end, the court noted that it viewed the attorney’s “conduct as a clear ethical violation of the highest order.” 

In its Opinion, the court noted that the attorney at fault had filed a Withdrawal of Appearance in response to the issues presented.

This Pennsylvania federal court cited to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 as confirming that attorneys have legal and ethical duties owed to the court in terms of filings presented to the Court. The court also cited to Pennsylvania Rule of Professional Conduct 3.3 regarding candor toward a tribunal.

In its Opinion, the court presumed that the at fault attorney’s briefs were constructed by generative artificial intelligence utilized by the attorney, rather than an effort by the attorney to personally construct false and misleading information. Regardless, the court noted that the attorney still had an ethical obligation under Rule 11 and the state’s professional canons to review every document submitted to the court under their name and signature in order to ensure the accuracy of the document.

The court also noted that, an attorney who signs and files a brief authored by a non-lawyer, such as a paralegal or an intern or a clerk, is personally responsible for all that the filing contains. The court noted that the same rule applies to the use of artificial intelligence.

In the end, the Jakes court dismissed the filings presented by the at fault attorney and ordered that attorney to show cause as to why his filings should not be viewed as having violated Rule 11 and Pa. RPC 3.3.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK

Source of image:  Photo by Igor Omilaev on www.unsplash.com.

Another Pennsylvania Attorney Sanctioned by Court for Submitting Inaccurate Citations Apparently Secured From AI Resarch

In another Pennsylvania case involving an attorney utilizing AI hallucinations in a court filing, the court issued sanctions.

In Bevins v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., No. 25-576 (E.D. Pa. April 10, 2025 Baylson, J.), the attorney provided the court with case citations in court filings that were inaccurate and did not lead the reader to any identifiable court Opinion. The court noted that, based upon its search, it could not locate a case relative to the two citations at issue and/or could not detect a possible typographical error relative to the citation provided.

When the court ordered the attorney to provide an explanation, the attorney asserted that the inclusion of the incorrect citations was unintended given that he planned to replace the wrong cite with a proper one but failed to do so in his final draft. The court noted its concern as to why the attorney was silent as to his act of providing the court with case citations to decisions that did not exist and, as such, the court noted that it was “unconvinced by counsel’s explanations.”

The court referred to Rule 11 and sanctioned the attorney. The court also referred the matter to the State Bar.

Moreover, the court struck the attorney’s appearance in the case.  The attorney was ordered to advise the client of the sanctions and the fact that, should the Plaintiff chose to refile her case, she must find new counsel.

Anyone wishing to review the court's decision in Bevins may click this LINK.  The Court's companion Order can be viewed HERE.

Third Circuit Addresses AI Hallucinations in Court Filing

In the case of McCarthy v. U.S. DEA, No. 24-2704 (3d Cir. July 21, 2025) (Op. by Chung, J.) (not precedential), the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, in a case involving issues arising from the Drug Enforcement Administration revoking a Certificate of Registration to the Plaintiff who was a P.A. the court chastised the Plaintiff’s attorney for relying upon “summaries” of eight (8) previous DEA adjudications that the attorney secured through research on an artificial intelligence tool. 

The court confirmed that the Plaintiff’s counsel acknowledged that seven (7) of the summaries were inaccurate and the eighth did not exist. The attorney further acknowledged to the court that he “never took care to confirm the accuracy of the summaries or even that the decisions existed.”

The court confirmed that it would not consider this faulty portion of the Plaintiff’s attorney’s Brief.

In this decision, the court also noted that it was separately ordering Plaintiff’s counsel to show cause why he should not be sanctioned for his conduct “particularly for his lack of candor to the court.” See Op. at 7 n. 5.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Superior Court Upholds Application of Regular Use Exclusion

In the case of Erie Insurance Exchange v. Russo, No. 1138 MDA 2024 (Pa. Super. July 22, 2025 Murray, J., King, J., and Stevens, P.J.E.) (Op. by Stevens, P.J.E.), the court affirmed the trial court’s decision in a declaratory judgment action brought by the UIM carrier denying UIM coverage through the application of the regular use exclusion present in the Plaintiff’s automobile insurance policy.

This matter arose out of a motor vehicle accident that occurred during the course and scope of the Plaintiff’s employment. At the time of the accident, the Plaintiff was operating a vehicle that had been supplied by his employer.

After recovering UIM benefits under his employer’s policy, the Plaintiff sought UIM benefits under his personal automobile insurance policy. 

The personal automobile insurance carrier filed this declaratory judgment action and asserted that the regular use exclusion supported a denial of the requested coverage.

The trial court had otherwise ruled that there was no “stacked” underinsured motorist coverage available on the Plaintiff’s personal automobile insurance policy atop of the UIM benefits recovered under the Plaintiff’s employer’s vehicle policy.

The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s finding that the Plaintiff was not an “insured” under the employer’s policy for purposes of the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law. As such, the Plaintiff could not “stack” benefits under his personal automobile insurance policy in any event.

The Superior Court emphasized that merely receiving UIM coverage for injuries sustained as an occupant in a first priority vehicle does not make one “an insured” under that vehicle’s policy such that the person would then be entitled to stack one’s personal automobile policy UIM coverage.

Accordingly, the appellate court ruled that, because the Plaintiff was not entitled to stack his personal policy UIM coverage with the UIM coverage he received from his employer’s policy, the Plaintiff could not establish any error in the trial court’s declaration that there existed no UIM coverage available to the Plaintiff under his personal automobile insurance policy.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: “The Legal Intelligencer State Appellate Case Alert,” www.Law.com (Aug. 13, 2025).

Trial Court Confirms That a Corporation Cannot Assert the Fifth Amendment, But a Corporate Representative Can

In the case of L.V. v. Water Gap Capital Partners, LLC, No. 1189-CV-2025 (C.P. Monroe. Co. June 3, 2025 Zulick, P.J.), the court denied a Defendant’s Motion to Stay a civil litigation matter in order to protect the Fifth Amendment rights of their employees and corporate representatives.

The court reviewed the law regarding the assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The court noted that it is well-settled that a corporate Defendant may not assert the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 

However, a corporate representative is permitted to assert the privilege if answers in litigation may tend to incriminate the representative personally. However, if the representative whom the corporate appoints to act on its behalf asserts the Fifth Amendment privilege, the corporation must appoint someone else to respond on its behalf unless the corporation can show that there is no corporate representative who could furnish the discovery without the possibility of self-incrimination.

Here, the court noted that certain Defendants were corporate Defendants. Those corporate Defendants did not have the Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination available to them.

The court did otherwise note that, as noted above, the corporate Defendants did have a right to appoint a representative to speak on their behalf under the parameters of the law.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Source: “The Legal Intelligencer Common Pleas Case Alert,” www.Law.com (July 10, 2025).

Judge Terrence R. Nealon of Lackawanna County Addresses Law Regarding Parties Intervening Into a Lawsuit

In the case of Helring v. Scranton Police Pension Board, No. 2024-CV-7781(C.P. Lacka. Co. July 9, 2025 Nealon, J.), the court addressed the ability to the City of Scranton to intervene into an action regarding a dispute over police pension benefits.

While the case was pending, the City of Scranton filed a Petition to Intervene as a party, which intervention request was opposed by the former police officer, but not the Scranton Police Pension Board.

In his decision, Judge Terrence R. Nealon of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas provided a thorough overview of the Rules of Civil Procedure and Pennsylvania law regarding intervention in an action under Pa. R.C.P. 2327(4).

The court found that, after reviewing the facts of the case before it, as applied to the applicable law, the City’s interest in preventing the violation of its ordinances provided the City with grounds to intervene in the action.

The court also noted that none of the three (3) discretionary bases for refusing intervention as set forth under Pa. R.C.P. 2329 existed in the matter.

Accordingly, the court granted the City’s Petition to Intervene.


Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Court Refuses to Strike a Discontinuance Entered in a Medical Malpractice Case

In the case of Eubank v. Ing, Nov. Term, 2023, No. 0926 (C.P. Phila. Co. Feb. 7, 2025 Bright, J.), the trial court issued a Rule 1925 Opinion requesting the Superior Court to affirm the trial court’s denial of a Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike a Discontinuance that was filed in a medical malpractice action.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff alleged that his former attorney acted without the Plaintiff’s understanding or consent when the attorney filed the Discontinuance.

However, evidence was produced from the former attorney that specifically confirmed that the Plaintiff gave authorization to the former attorney to discontinue the matter.

Accordingly, the trial court concluded that the Discontinuance was not filed without the Plaintiff’s consent. The court also found that there were no grounds to support any finding of any confusion or misunderstanding by the Plaintiff about what was taken place relative to the filing of the Discontinuance.

The court ruled that, where a party fails to show that the entry of a Discontinuance with the result of fraud, imposition, or mistake, it is not an abuse of discretion by the trial court to deny a Petition to Strike a Discontinuance.

Moreover, the trial court noted that the Plaintiff commenced the lawsuit within the two (2) year statute of limitations but then discontinued the matter. It was noted that the Plaintiff’s Petition to Strike the Discontinuance was not filed until after the expiration of statute of limitations. The court found this to be an additional reason for the Superior Court to find that there was no abuse of discretion by the trial court to deny the Plaintiff’s request to reopen the matter.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: “The Legal Intelligencer Common Pleas Case Alert,” www.Law.com (June 11, 2025).

Source of image:  Photo by Wesley Tingey on www.unsplash.com.