Showing posts with label Judge Julia K. Munley. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Judge Julia K. Munley. Show all posts

Tuesday, September 2, 2025

Court Dismisses Negligent Entrustment Claim Against Parents Relative to Use of Cell Phone by Child


In the case of JH v. Dunmore School District, No. 3:24-CV-1154 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 8, 2025 Munley, J.), Judge Julia K. Munley of the Federal Middle District Court of Pennsylvania addressed various Motions to Dismiss filed by different Defendants relative to a case involving allegations that certain middle school student allegedly recorded a minor Plaintiff who was on the autism spectrum, inside a bathroom stall at the school and then allegedly disseminating that video to other students who also allegedly shared the video with others.

Among the claims presented by the Plaintiffs were allegations of negligence entrustment and intentional infliction of emotional distress against the minor Defendants at issue and their parents. The negligent entrustment claim was that the parents had negligently entrusted a cell phone owned by the parents to their children.

The court granted in part and denied in part the request for a dismissal of the negligent entrustment claims asserted against the parents given that the Plaintiffs did not allege facts to support their conclusion that the parent Defendants knew or should have known that their children would use their cell phones in ways that would hurt people.

The court also noted that, based upon the facts alleged by the Plaintiff, which included references to school policy and state law, the Plaintiffs’ allegations actually support the proposition that the parent Defendants yielded control of the cell phones, or the use of the cell phones to the teachers and administrators when their children were at school. 

In this regard, the court pointed to the school district’s rules requiring students to refrain from utilizing their cell phone on the school ground during school hours. 

The court emphasized that the alleged negligent conduct of the students took place during the course of the school day and that there were no allegations that any of the minor Defendants in this action shared the video of the minor Plaintiff outside of the school day. 

The court in this matter did allow the Plaintiffs’ claims or intentional infliction of emotional distress to proceed against the parent Defendants.

The court otherwise dismissed a number of claims asserted against the school district and school officials but allow the Plaintiffs to file another Amended Complaint relative to the possible civil rights allegations under 42 U.S.C. §1983.

The court allowed the claims of punitive damages to remain in the case relative to the claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.  The Court's companion Order can be viewed HERE.

Source of image:  Photo by Tracy Le Blanc on www.unsplash.com.

Friday, December 6, 2024

Slip and Fall Case at Waterpark Allowed to Slide Past a Motion to Dismiss


In the case of Ahmed v. Kalahari Resorts & Conventions-Poconos, No. 3:24-CV-00851-JKM (M.D. Pa. Nov. 7, 2024 Munley, J.), the court denied a Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, or in the alternative, Motion for a More Definite Statement, in a slip and fall case involving an indoor water park.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff alleged that he slipped and fell in the waterpark area allegedly due to the fact that the steps were not properly treated and were covered with mold or algae.

In reviewing the Plaintiff’s Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss, the court found that the Plaintiff had pled sufficient facts regarding his status as a business invitee and the alleged breach of a duty of reasonable care on the part of the Defendant. The court found that, if the Plaintiff’s alleged facts were accepted as true, as they must be at this stage of the proceedings, the Plaintiff had sufficiently provided a short and plain statement of the claims presented demonstrating that he is entitled to relief in accordance with F.R.C.P. 8.

Accordingly, the court denied the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss.

Relative to the Defendant’s Motion for a More Definite Statement of the Plaintiff’s claim pursuant to F.R.C.P. 12(e), the court agreed with the defense argument that the Plaintiff’s Complaint was too vague or ambiguous in that it did not state with specificity the location of the stairs upon which the Plaintiff allegedly fell.

In response to this motion, the Plaintiff indicated that he would provide photographs of the exact location of his fall during the course of discovery.

Judge Munley ruled that, given that the Plaintiff had admitted that he evidently knew which steps he fell upon, and given that the location of the steps at issue could affect how the different Defendants named in this lawsuit might respond to the Complaint, the court granted the Motion for More Definite Statement and directed the Plaintiff to file an Amended Complaint to more specifically assert where the Plaintiff allegedly fell on the premises.

Judge Munley otherwise raised an issue of jurisdiction sua sponte. The court noted that it could not determine from the Complaint whether the court had jurisdiction.

In this matter, the Plaintiff had alleged that jurisdiction was based on the diversity jurisdiction statute. However, the Complaint did not list the citizenship of the parties, but only the residency of the parties.

The court noted that residency and citizenship do not have the same meaning for purposes of the diversity statute. As such, the Plaintiff was directed to pile a more specific Complaint in order to properly allege the citizenship of all of the parties named in the Complaint so that the court could assure itself that jurisdiction was proper.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Source: Article – “Slip-And-Fall Suit Cleared to Proceed Against Kalahari Indoor Waterpark.” By Riley Brennan Pennsylvania Law Weekly (Nov. 8, 2024).

Tuesday, September 24, 2024

Federal Court Vacates Default Judgment Where Record Confirms Defendant Was Not Served


In the case of McLaughlin v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 3:23-cv-839 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 27, 2024 Munley, J.), the court granted a Defendant’s Motion to Vacate a Default Judgment in a case involving a playpen that was sold on Amazon.com that allegedly caused the death of the Plaintiff’s child.

According to the Opinion, the defense argued that the Defendant was not properly served within ninety (90) days of the Complaint being filed. Rather, Amazon claimed that the Plaintiff sent to the Defendant a request for a waiver of service to which Amazon did not reply. The Plaintiff relied upon an argument of service based upon a return receipt indicating that the Plaintiff had been sent to Amazon’s legal department and that it had been received by an agent identified only by initials. The Plaintiff’s claims that these receipts were proof of service of the Complaint on the Defendant.

Judge Munley noted that the distinction between sending a waiver of service to the Defendants and serving the Complaint on the Defendants was critical to the Plaintiff’s request for the entry of a default judgment.

Judge Julia K. Munley
M.D. Pa.

After reviewing the Plaintiff’s exhibits again, the Court confirmed that Amazon was correct in that it had not been served with the Summons or the Complaint.

The Court agreed with the Defendants that the default judgment should not have been entered in the first place given that service had not been completed.  The court found that the default judgment was, therefore, void.

With regards to the Defendant’s related Motion to Dismiss the Complaint, the Court granted the Plaintiffs a thirty (30) day extension to serve the Defendant with the Summons and the Complaint. The Court found that the Defendants would most likely not be prejudiced by that extension of time.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.  The Court's companion Order can be viewed HERE


Source: Article – “Judge Voids Default Judgment Against Amazon Due to Procedural Error, Grants Extra Time for Proper Service” by Riley Brennan of the Legal Intelligencer (Aug. 29 2024).

Thursday, March 21, 2024

Federal Court Case Remanded to State Court Based on Untimeliness of the Removal



In the case of Calpin v. The ADT Security Services, Inc., No. 3:2023-CV-1418-JKM (M.D.Pa. Feb. 20, 2024, Munley, J.), the Court remanded the case back to the state court after finding that the defendant’s notice of removal was procedurally defective in that it was untimely.

According to the opinion, this matter arose out of the alleged termination of the plaintiff’s employment while he pursued worker’s compensation benefits.

The plaintiff originally filed suit in the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas. Nearly ten months after the filing of the plaintiff’s Complaint, the defendant removed the matter to federal court.

In the matter before the Court on the motion to remand, the defendant asserted that the removal was timely based upon when information was obtained during discovery regarding the amount in controversy. As noted, the plaintiff argued that the defendant removed the matter in an untimely manner.

Judge Julia K. Munley
M.D. Pa.


Judge Julia K. Munley of the Federal Middle District Court of Pennsylvania generally noted that a notice of removal must be filed within thirty days after service of the initial pleading setting forth the claim for relief upon which the action is based. Here, there was no dispute that the defendant filed its notice of removal beyond the thirty day period.

While the Court noted that, under certain circumstances, a defendant may file a notice of removal more than thirty days after the receipt of the initial pleading, here, the Court rejected the defendant’s contention that they did not know that the amount in controversy exceeded $75,000 until information was secured from the plaintiff’s responses to Interrogatories.

The plaintiff asserted that the state court Complaint placed the defendant on notice that the amount in controversy exceeded $75,000. The Court agreed. The Court noted that the plaintiff’s Complaint detailed the underlying economic damages claims and also asserted a punitive damages claim. The Court found that the amounts regarding the plaintiff’s alleged ongoing wage loss claim could be readily calculated and evaluated by the defendant based upon the information provided.

The Court additionally noted that, on the basis of the plaintiff’s alleged punitive damages claims alone as set forth in the state court Complaint, the defendant had the ability to remove the case to federal court when the complaint. was served.

Overall, the Court found that, where the defendant did not remove the case within the thirty day period allowed, the plaintiff’s motion to remand the case to state court was granted.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney Michael Foley of the Foley Law Firm in Scranton for bringing this case to my attention.

Monday, July 24, 2023

CORRECTED LINK: Trial Court Upholds Right of Plaintiff To Amend Complaint At Trial To Add Claims of Recklessness and Punitive Damages

 

Here is the corrected LINK for the case of Vanston v. Green Ridge Health Care Group, LLC, No. 2019-CV-6227 (C.P. Lacka. Co. July 7, 2023 Munley, Julia, J.), which was highlighted here on Tort Talk yesterday.  The case involved the Court's allowance of an amendment to a Complaint at trial to add claims of recklessness and punitive damages.

Sorry for any confusion that may have been caused.


Trial Court Upholds Right of Plaintiff To Amend Complaint At Trial To Add Claims of Recklessness and Punitive Damages


In the case of Vanston v. Green Ridge Health Care Group, LLC, No. 2019-CV-6227 (C.P. Lacka. Co. July 7, 2023 Munley, Julia, J.), the court denied a Defendant’s Motion for an Amendment of an Order for the purpose of seeking an interlocutory appeal.  This request was made relative to the trial court’s underlying Order that had allowed an amendment to the Plaintiff’s Complaint at a trial of a negligence case involving a nursing home to add a claim of recklessness and a claim for punitive damages after the completion of the testimony of certain Defendants and even though the statute of limitations had previously expired.

In this regard, Judge Munley found that there were sufficient facts pled in the original Complaint such that the court rejected the Defendant’s argument that the claims of recklessness and punitive damages were barred by the statute of limitations.

In her decision, Judge Munley cited to previous decisions by her colleague on the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas, Judge Terrence R. Nealon, who had previously ruled that amendments to a Complaint are permitted after the running of the statute of limitations so long as no new causes of action are pled.

Judge Julia Munley
Lackawanna County


In this regard, Judge Munley noted that recklessness is considered an aggravated form of negligence and not a new cause of action. She also noted that, under Pennsylvania law, a request for punitive damages does not constitute a cause of action in and of itself. Rather, a request for punitive damages is merely incidental to an underlying cause of action.

Accordingly, Judge Munley ruled that an amendment to a Complaint to add a claim for punitive damages after the statute of limitations has run is permissible where the main operative facts to support such a claim have been previously alleged in the original Complaint.

Judge Munley noted that a decision was further supported by the fact that the Plaintiffs alleged facts indicative of reckless conduct in the original Complaint.  The Court pointed to those cases in which it has been held that recklessness can be pled in any case whatsoever, regardless of the facts pled.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney Jamie Anzalone and Attorney Kelly Ciravolo of Anzalone Law Offices in Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania for bringing this case to my attention.

Wednesday, June 30, 2021

Judge Munley of Lackawanna County Addresses Standard for Scandalous and Impertinent Matter in a Complaint

 In the case of Janiszewski v. Millville Mut. Ins. Co., No. 2021-CV-839 (June 2, 2021 Munley, J.), the court addressed Preliminary Objections filed by a Defendant in an insurance bad faith action in which the Defendants sought to strike internet reviews of the Defendant insurance company from the Complaint as scandalous and impertinent matter.   

After reviewing the record before the court in this property damage homeowner’s insurance claim, and applying the law relative to efforts to strike allegedly scandalous and impertinent information, the court denied the Defendant’s Preliminary Objections.   


In so ruling, the court cited to precedent confirming that, “[t]o be scandalous and impertinent, the allegations must be immaterial and inappropriate to the proof of the cause of action.”  See Op. at p. 4.


The court noted that, whereas here, the allegations in the Plaintiff’s Complaint are material, relevant, and supportive of the Plaintiff’s causes of action and where a Defendant cannot affirmatively show prejudice by the inclusion of the allegations, the allegations should not be stricken as scandalous or impertinent. 


As stated, the Preliminary Objections were denied here where the negative internet reviews that were referenced in the Complaint were related to denial of claims by the carrier, which the court felt would be material and pertinent to the Plaintiff’s bad faith causes of action contained in the Complaint at issue in this case.   


Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.



Source of Image: Photo by Andrew Neel on Unsplash.com.








Friday, May 21, 2021

Judge Julia K. Munley of Lackawanna County Addresses Service of Process Issues


In the case of Kadtka v. 81 Keystone, LLC, No. 2019-CV-7109 (C.P. Lacka. Co. May 6, 2021 Munley, J.), Judge Julia K. Munley of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas addressed Preliminary Objections that raised the primary issue of whether or not the Plaintiff had made a good faith effort to notify the Defendant of the commencement of the litigation with the service of the Complaint.

According to the Opinion, the Defendant was asserting that the Plaintiff unduly delayed in completing service and engaged in non-compliance with the Rules of Civil Procedure. The Plaintiff countered that a good faith effort was made and that the Defendant allegedly evaded service.

After reviewing the current status of Pennsylvania law relative to the Lamp v. Heyman standard of review for the completion of service of process, including the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s most recent pronouncement on the issues in the Gussom case, Judge Munley found that the Plaintiff had indeed made a good faith effort to complete service. [Click HERE to see the Tort Talk post on the Gussom case along with a link to that Pennsylvania Supreme Court Opinion].

In this Kadtka case, Judge Munley took into account that some of the delays with respect to the completion of service may have been attributable to the COVID-19 pandemic which the court acknowledged had had a significant impact upon lawyers, litigants, and the court system.

The court additionally encouraged the utilization of evidentiary hearings with regards to service of process issues as the court believed that the credibility of the claims and defenses with regard to service could be more fully addressed at an evidentiary hearing as opposed to the reliance upon submitted paperwork in the form of pleadings, affidavits or deposition testimony.

The court was also influenced to deny the Preliminary Objections on the basis of its findings that a technical non-compliance with the rules of service was excusable, particularly where the record confirmed that the Defendant received actual notice of the lawsuit and was not prejudiced by the delay in service.

The decision by Judge Munley is also notable in that the court rejected a Defendant’s Preliminary Objections in which it was asserted that, in this trip and fall case, the allegations by the Plaintiff that the exterior steps upon which the Plaintiff allegedly fell were “dangerous” and “unreasonably unsafe” were not sufficiently specific to allow the claims to go forward.  The court instead found that the Complaint as a whole put the defense on notice of the claims presented.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Friday, December 28, 2018

THE 2018 TORT TALK TOP 10








Here is the 2018 Tort Talk Top Ten--an annual listing of notable cases and important trends in Pennsylvania civil litigation law over the past year as highlighted in Tort Talk blog posts:


10.  FEDERAL COURT JURISDICTION ISSUES

Trending over the past year were a number of notable Pennsylvania federal court decisions handed down reviewing the issue of jurisdiction over foreign or out of state Defendants.

A common thread in a number of the decisions was an agreement that, if a foreign business had registered to do business in Pennsylvania, that minimal contact in and of itself was sufficient to allow for jurisdiction over that defendant.  See Mendoza v. Electrolux Home Products, Inc., No. 4:17-CV-02028 (M.D.Pa. 2018 Brann, J.).

In a number of other decisions, the federal courts addressed whether jurisdiction could be had under a stream of commerce theory.  For example in Wylam v. Trader Joe's Co., No. 3:16-CV- 2112 (M.D.Pa. 2018 Mariani, J.), the court noted that neither a single sale directed at the forum state nor the fact that the Defendant's products were carried by national retailers was sufficient to establish jurisdiction.


9.  PROPERLY PLEADING BAD FAITH COMPLAINTS

In 2018, federal court bad faith Complaints were getting bounced left and right for being rife with conclusory allegations lacking sufficient factual support. 

Decisions in the Western District, Eastern District and the Middle District tasked plaintiffs with the need to offer facts to support claims of poor claims handling, delays in payment, and lack of investigations by carriers.  Lucky for the plaintiffs, in most cases leave to amend was granted.

A number of those cases can be accessed at this LINK.


8.  UM/UIM STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

Judge James M. Munley of the Federal Middle District Court of Pennsylvania denied the carrier’s Motion for Summary Judgment on a UIM statute of limitations defense in the case of Legos v. Travelers Cas. Ins. Co., No. 3:16-CV-1917 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 11, 2018 Munley, J.), by holding that the statute of limitations for a UIM is four (4) years from the date of a breach of the automobile insurance contract and not the date of the third party settlement.  The breach of contract was noted to be the carrier's denial of the request, or settlement demand, for payment of UIM benefits.

In so ruling, the court referenced the Pennsylvania Supreme Court case of Erie Ins. Exch. v. Bristol, 174 A.3d 578 (Pa. 2017), in which it was held that the statute of limitations in an uninsured (UM) motorist case does not begin to run until there is an alleged breach of the insurance contract, i.e., the denial of a claim or a refusal to arbitrate.

 The Legos decision can be viewed HERE.

Some argue that these cases serve to eradicate the statute of limitations in UM/UIM cases by basing the start of the statute of limitations upon the alleged breach of the auto insurance contract by the carrier.  When filing such Complaints, Plaintiffs typically allege that auto insurance carriers breach the contract by not paying the Plaintiff's request for UM or UIM benefits.  

As the argument goes, every time a carrier declines to pay a Plaintiff's settlement demand, another breach occurs which causes the running of the statute of limitations to start again (and again and again and again, every time a demand is rejected). Look for the defense bar to challenge this issue in the future.


7.  AIN'T NO LIABILITY IF IT'S STILL SNOWING

A number of decisions handed down over the past year confirmed that there is no liability under the Hills and Ridges Doctrine if a person slips and falls during the course of a snowstorm.

In the case of Collins v. Phila. Sub. Devel., No. 2018 Pa. Super. 17 (Pa. Super. Jan. 31, 2018 Panella, J., Olson, J., Stevens, P.J.E.)(Op. by Stevens, P.J.E.), the court affirmed the entry of summary judgment in favor of a premises liability Defendant under the Hills and Ridges Doctrine where the evidence before the trial court confirmed that the winter storm, described in the record as a blizzard, was still active at the time of the Plaintiff's alleged slip and fall on ice and/or snow.

The Collins decision is also notable for the court's ruling that the Defendant's alleged failure to pretreat a walking surface was not a basis upon which to impose liability under Pennsylvania law.

Another case from the past year along these lines was the case of Bless v. Pocono Mountain Recovery Center, LLC., No. 8167 - CV - 2016 (C.P. Monroe Co. May 17, 2018 Zulick, J.).  

In Bless, which is noted to be the most viewed case of 2018 on the Pennsylvania Law Weekly's Instant Case Service, Judge Arthur L. Zulick, of the Monroe County Court of Common Pleas granted the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment based upon the hills and ridges doctrine in a case where the record contained evidence that the Plaintiff's fall occurred right after a recent snowfall which caused slippery conditions. 

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


6.  EXPERT TESTIMONY IN MED MAL CASES

In the case of Gintoff v. Thomas, No. 2016-CV-2155 (C.P. Lacka. Co. May 4, 2018 Nealon, J.), Judge Terrence R. Nealon of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas granted a Defendant hospital’s Motion for Summary Judgment in a medical malpractice case given the Plaintiff’s failure to support the claims against that Defendant with expert opinion testimony on those particular claims.  

This decision was the fourth most viewed case on the The Pennsylvania Law Weekly's Instant Case Service  in 2018.

In Gintoff, the court found that the Plaintiff's medical expert report, which only addressed the care provided by the defendant doctor, lacked sufficient expert opinion to establish a prima facie case for vicarious liability or corporate negligence on the part of the defendant hospital.

As such summary granted was entered in favor of the hospital.  Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision by Judge Nealon may click this LINK.


5.  SOCIAL MEDIA DECISIONS

Notable social media discovery and evidentiary decisions continued to trend over the past year.

Earlier this year, in the case of Commonwealth v. Mangel, 181 A.3d 1154 (Pa. Super. 2018), the Pennsylvania Superior Court ruled that social media posts are inadmissible in criminal cases unless prosecutors can present evidence of who actually authored the commentary, that is, unless the evidence is authenticated under Pa.R.E. 901.

Both the trial court and the appellate court in Mangel found that merely presenting evidence that the posts and messages came from a social media account bearing the defendant’s name was not enough to allow the evidence in. The court noted that Facebook posts and messages must instead be authenticated under Pa.R.E. 901 in a manner similar to how text messages and email messages are authenticated.

The Superior Court in Mangel relied on its own 2011 decision in Commonwealth v. Koch, 39 A.3d 996, 1005 (Pa. Super. 2011), affirmed by an equally divided court, 106 A.3d 705 (Pa. 2014), which dealt with the admissibility and authentication of cell phone text messages.
It can be expected that a similar ruling will also be handed down in the context of a civil litigation matter should that issue come before the trial or appellate courts.

In terms of social media discovery decisions, in Kelter v. Flanagan, PICS Case No. 18-0266, No. 286-Civil-2017 (C.P. Monroe Co. Feb. 19, 2018 Williamson, J.), Judge David J. Williamson granted a defendant’s motion to compel a plaintiff to provide the defense counsel with the plaintiff’s Instagram account log-in information.

The court ruled in this fashion given that the defense had made a predicate showing that the
public pages on the plaintiff’s profile showed that more information may be found on the private pages of the same profile.

A contrary result was handed down in the Northampton County Court of Common Pleas ruling in Allen v. Sands Bethworks Gaming, No. C-0048-CV-2017-2279 (C.P. North. Co. Aug. 6, 2018 Dally, J.).

This case arose out of the plaintiff’s alleged slip-and-fall in a bathroom at the Sands Casino in Bethlehem, Pennsylvania.

After reviewing the record before the court, the court in Allen ruled that the defense had failed to establish the factual predicate of showing sufficient information on the plaintiff’s public pages to allow for discovery of information on the plaintiff’s private pages.

In a footnote, the court also emphasized that such a factual predicate must be established with respect to each separate social media site the defendant wishes to access further.

For a comprehensive compilation of social media discovery decisions, one can freely access the FACEBOOK DISCOVERY SCORECARD on the Tort Talk blog. Many of the decisions handed down to date can be viewed and even downloaded from that page.


4.  CELL PHONE USE - PUNITIVE DAMAGES

With the continuing absence of any appellate authority on the issue to date, the trial courts of Pennsylvania have developed a common law on the issue of whether punitive damages are a viable part of an auto accident claim involving cell phone use by a defendant driver.

In the Cumberland County case of Manning v. Barber, No. 17-7915 Civil (C.P. Cumb. Co. 2018), preliminary objections were granted and a plaintiff’s punitive damages claim was dismissed in a case in which the plaintiff alleged that the defendant driver was texting while driving.

According to the opinion, the plaintiff’s vehicle was stopped at a red light with another vehicle stopped behind it. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant failed to stop for the traffic light and rear-ended the second vehicle, causing it to strike to the rear of the plaintiff’s vehicle. The plaintiff additionally alleged that, at the time of the accident, the defendant was not looking at the roadway because she was distracted while looking at and texting on her cell phone.

After reviewing the general law pertaining to punitive damages, the court confirmed that there remains “a lack of Pennsylvania appellate case law in the context of distracted driving cases where the tortfeasor is distracted by the use of a cellular phone at the time of the accident.”

The Manning court concluded that the mere use of a cell phone absent additional indicia of recklessness was not enough to sustain a claim for punitive damages.  This decision can be viewed at this LINK.


3.  NON-PRECEDENTIAL OPINIONS

Over the past year, the Pennsylvania Superior Court has continued to hand down important decisions that are marked as "Non-Precedential" by that Court, rendering the decisions to be of minimal or no persuasive value going forward.

One rationale voiced at CLE seminars for marking the decisions as "Non-precedential" is that the Superior Court writes hundreds and hundreds of opinions every year.  Huh?

With all the room in the  online world for continuing publications of everything in this Digital Age, including numerous court decisions, the hope is that the Pennsylvania Superior Court begins to publish all of its decisions so as to render them precedential and, therefore, useful.

The Superior Court internal rules or customs pertaining to marking Opinions as "Non-precedential" are as necessary as its old, repealed rules that use to make litigators waste time needlessly looking up and citing to both the "A.2d" citation and the "Pa.Super." citation to cases back in the day.  Here's to hoping that a change is coming in 2019.  


3. (Tie)  THE DAWN OF UBER LITIGATION

In what may be the first reported Pennsylvania decision in an Uber personal injury litigation matter, the court in Fusco v. Uber Technologies, PICS No. 18-0944  (E.D. Pa. July 27, 2018 Goldberg, J.)(Mem. Op.), conditionally granted Uber’s motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s negligent hiring, retention and supervision claims in a case of an Uber driver who allegedly attacked the plaintiff-customer.

In this matter, when the Uber driver arrived to pick up the plaintiff, the driver refused to take the plaintiff to his requested destination as it was too far. The plaintiff, apparently knowing the rules that Uber imposes on its drivers to honor the customer's request to be taken to a certain destination, remained seated in the car and repeated his request to be brought home. At that point, the driver dragged the plaintiff out of the car, kicked and beat him, leaving the plaintiff unconscious and bleeding.

The plaintiff later filed this suit against Uber asserting a negligent hiring claim, fraud and misrepresentation claims and vicarious liability claims.

According to the opinion, the court had originally granted Uber’s motion to dismiss on the negligent hiring and related claims given that there was no record of any alleged instances of past misconduct by the offending driver.

The court noted, however, that, after the plaintiff filed his complaint, news outlets in the area reported that the driver involved in the incident had a prior criminal conviction. In light of this development, the court granted the plaintiff leave to amend his complaint as to these claims. 

Accordingly, the claim against Uber was allowed to proceed.

Anyone wishing to review this memorandum decision may click this LINK.  The companion Order can be viewed HERE.

And so, with the dawn of the age of Uber and Lyft litigation arising, it may be wise to read up on any case law you see in this regard.  Please email me a copy of any decisions you see to be posted here on Tort Talk so that all can benefit from this knowledge.

For an article by myself and Steve Kopko, Esquire on the law pertaining to required insurance in Uber and Lyft cases, click HERE.


2.  12 YEARS OF PRECEDENT OVERTURNED

Twelve (12) years of precedent was overturned by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in the case of Cagey v. PennDOT, 179 A.3d 458 (Pa. Feb. 21, 2018) (Maj. Op. by Donohue, J.)(Saylor, C.J., Concurring) (Wecht, J., Concurring), thereby exposing PennDOT to more litigation relative to accidents involving guiderails along Pennsylvania state roadways.

In Cagey, the court expressly overruled the long-followed 12-year-old Commonwealth Court decision in Fagan v. PennDOT, 946 A.2d 1123 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006), along with its progeny, which had previously held that PennDOT is immune from liability in guiderail cases.  With the Cagey decision from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court handed down earlier this year, PennDOT is now only immune when it fails to install a guide rail.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court otherwise held in the Cagey case that when PennDOT has previously installed a guide rail, sovereign immunity is waived if the agency’s negligent installation and design created a dangerous condition that causes or contributes to an accident.

 Although there are two concurring opinions in the Cagey decision, it appears that all of the justices agreed on the ultimate holding of the case.

With this reversal of many years of legal authority that protected PennDOT from liability pertaining to guide rail claims, it is expected that there will be a dramatic increase in litigation for the government in defending accidents that involve alleged issues with a guiderail.

Anyone wishing to review the Majority Opinion written by Justice Christine Donohue may click this LINK.

The Concurring Opinion written by Chief Justice Thomas G. Saylor can be viewed HERE.

The Concurring Opinion written by Justice David Wecht can be viewd HERE.


1.  30 YEARS OF PRECEDENT OVERTURNED

In a monumental reversal in the case of Balentine v. Chester Water Authority, 191 A.3d 799 (Pa. Aug. 21, 2018 Mundy, J.) (Justices Todd, Dougherty, and Wecht joined in the majority Opinion) (Baer, J., concurring) (Saylor, dissenting, J.), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court overturned 30 years of precedent by holding that the involuntary movement of a vehicle can constitute the operation of a motor vehicle for purposes of the vehicle liability exception to governmental immunity under 42 Pa. C.S.A. Section 8542(b)(1).

The plaintiff’s decedent in Balentine was a contractor working at a site just off the side of a roadway.  The Plaintiff was fatally injured when one car struck a parked car that was running and propelled that parked car into the pedestrian plaintiff. 

The parked car was government inspector's car which gave rise to claims being pursued against governmental agencies that are generally protected with immunity under the Tort Claims Act.  One exception to the immunity provisions is the motor vehicle exception, for accidents involving government motor vehicles in operation.

In this case, the appellate ladder, the majority of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reviewed the law behind the Tort Claims Act and decided to overturn 30 years of precedent by holding that movement of a vehicle, whether voluntary or involuntary, is not required by the statutory language of the vehicle liability exception in order for that exception to apply.

The Majority Opinion of the Court in Balentine can be viewed HERE.

Justice Baer's Concurring Opinion can be viewed HERE.

Chief Justice Saylor's Dissenting Opinion can be viewed HERE.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in Balentine was recently followed by Judge Julia K. Munley in the Lackawanna County case of Sands v. Hamilton, No. 2013-CV-55 (C.P. Lacka. Co. Nov. 5, 2018 Munley, J.).

In Sands, the court addressed a defendant municipal bus company’s Motions In Limine seeking to preclude evidence and testimony related to negligent supervision, negligent training, and negligent retention of the bus driver.  The defense was asserting that such evidence was irrelevant given that such evidence did not relate to the central issue of whether the “operation” of the motor vehicle at issue fell under an exception to the governmental immunity provided under42 Pa. C.S.A. §8542(b)(1). 

Based in part upon the Balentine decision, the court denied the motion in limine and allowed the evidence in at trial. 

Anyone wishing to review this decision online may click this LINK.


HONORABLE MENTIONS:

POST-KOKEN LITIGATION

Splits of authority continue to abound on many issues in Post-Koken Litigation in the continuing absence of much needed appellate guidance.  Hopefully, the Superior Court will get a chance to decide some of these issues this year and issue published decisions to provide valuable precedent for the courts below.


TINCHER REVISITED

The Pennsylvania Superior Court had another chance to view the issues in Tincher as that case continued its ride up and down the appellate ladder.  In this latest decision, the court again confirm that the Azzarello decision is no longer good products liability law.  Yet, the plaintiff's and the defense bar continue to battle over proper language for jury instructions.

Anyone wishing to review the Pennsylvania Superior Court’s decision in Tincher may click this LINK.


JUDGES SHOULD BE ON THE BENCH FOR VOIR DIRE

In the case of Trigg v. Children’s Hospital of Pittsburgh, No. 2018 Pa. Super. 129 (Pa. Super. May 14, 2018 Kunselmen, Olson, J.J.; Bowes, J., concurring) (Op. by Kunselmen, J.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court noted that, if trial court judges want the benefit of a favorable standard of review on appeal, they better be on the bench during voir dire in order that they may assess a juror's demeanor in person when deciding whether or not to strike a juror for cause.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.  Judge Bowes's Concurring Opinion can be viewed HERE.  


A STEP FORWARD FOR CLE/CJE CREDITS FOR MOCK TRIAL PARTICIPATION


Both the Board of Governors and the House of Delegates of the Pennsylvania Bar Association have adopted a Report and Recommendation with regards to submitting a request to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to issue a new rule allowing attorneys to earn up to 2 CLE credits a year, and judges up to 2 CJE credits a year, for their participation in the annual Mock Trial Competition. 

With this adoption of the Report and Recommendation, it is now the official position of the Pennsylvania Bar Association to submit a request - on behalf of all Pennsylvania lawyers - that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court change the Rules of Continuing Education to allow for two CLE and two CJE credits for mock trial participation.   That request has been submitted.

Here's to hoping the Supreme Court grants the request and thereby provides great assistance to a great program that helps high school and college students all across the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania by increasing the number of attorneys and judges who will be more willing to volunteer their time.


ALSO TRENDING IN 2018 - SHAMELESS PLUGS

In 2018, Cummins Mediation Services was launched and began to provide mediation services to assist in bringing all types of personal injury civil litigation matters to a close with much success.  

Should you wish to mediate a case in the year ahead, please do not hesitate to contact me at dancummins@comcast.net or 570-346-0745 to request a CV or a proposed fee schedule.



Friday, December 7, 2018

Judge Julia K. Munley of Lackawanna County Applies Recent Supreme Court Decision Regarding Governmental Immunity


In her recent decision in the case of Sands v. Hamilton, No. 2013-CV-55 (C.P. Lacka. Co. Nov. 5, 2018 Munley, J.), Judge Julia K. Munley of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas addressed a Defendant municipal bus company’s Motions In Limine seeking to preclude evidence and testimony related to negligent supervision, negligent training, and negligent retention of the bus driver.  The defense was asserting that such evidence was irrelevant given that such evidence did not relate to the central issue of whether the “operation” of the motor vehicle at issue fell under an exception to the governmental immunity provided under42 Pa. C.S.A. §8542(b)(1).  

The defense also sought to preclude evidence of the bus driver’s non-compliance with internal policies and procedures on the same grounds.  

In this matter, the Plaintiff alleged that he was injured when the bus driver took a turn too fast, causing the Plaintiff's motor scooter to tip over while the Plaintiff was sitting on it.

In her decision, Judge Munley pointed to the recent Supreme Court decision in the case of Balentine v. Chester Water Auth., 191 A.3d 799 (Pa. 2018) (Click HERE for the Tort Talk Posts on that case, including a Link to that case) in which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that “operation” in this context refers to a continuum of activity as well as the decision-making processes that are attendant to moving a vehicle.  

Judge Munley also noted that the term “operation” also encompasses negligent acts related to the operation of a vehicle, including even whether a driver should be driving a particular vehicle in the first place.

As such, the court ruled that the Plaintiff was not automatically barred by governmental immunity considerations from presenting evidence at trial of policies and procedures along with other evidence in support of claims of negligent supervision, training, and retention so long as that evidence is relevant and related to the operation of the bus.  

As such, the defense Motion In Limine was denied and the court ordered that the evidence at issue would be permitted at trial. 

Anyone wishing to review this decision online may click this LINK.