Court Grants Summary Judgment and Rejects Plaintiff's Reliance Upon Local Ordinance Requiring Ice and Snow Removal

In the case of Foxx v. City of New Castle, No. 11038 of 2023, C.A. (C.P. Lawr. Co. Hodge, J.), the court granted summary judgment in a premises liability case.

According to the Opinion, this matter involved a Plaintiff who left her residence and proceeded two (2) blocks to a Rite Aid pharmacy in a motorized wheelchair. As the Plaintiff approached the corner of one intersection, she attempted to proceed through a crosswalk but noted that snow was not cleared from the sidewalk. As a result, the Plaintiff was forced to cross the street in a different area and enter the Rite Aid parking lot utilizing a vehicle ramp. The Plaintiff was able to safely traverse that area and enter the store.

After leaving the store, the Plaintiff went to the end of the parking lot and stopped on the sidewalk as she noticed that it was full of snow and ice. Accordingly, she went back over to the same vehicle ramp that she had previously used to enter the parking lot. 

As she proceeded down to the bottom of the ramp, her wheels got caught in a hole which resulted in her falling from the motorized wheelchair and onto the street. The Plaintiff stated that she could not see the hole as it was slushy, dark brown water was coming down the street. 

Plaintiff later filed suit for her personal injuries.

The Defendant making the motion for summary judgment in this matter was the out-of-possession owner of the Rite Aid premises. The Defendant landowner asserted that its tenant was in possession of the premises and had the responsibility to repair and maintain the premises. The Defendant owner asserted that the tenant’s responsibility extended to the exterior facility such as the sidewalks and parking areas.

The Defendant asserted in its Motion for Summary Judgment that the Plaintiff had not presented any evidence that the Defendant, as a landlord out-of-possession, had breached any duty of care owed to the Plaintiff. 

The Defendant also asserted that the condition that allegedly caused the Plaintiff’s injuries was an open and obvious condition.

After reviewing the record before it, the court provided a detailed recitation of the current status of the premises liability law in this regard relative to a landlord out of possession. The court ruled that the record before it confirmed that the landlord out-of-possession had leased the premises to a tenant who exercises exclusive possession of the premises at the time. The lease agreement also required that the tenant was responsible for maintaining and repairing the premises including the sidewalk areas and the place where the Plaintiff was injured.

The trial court rejected the Plaintiff’s reliance upon a local ordinance regarding ice and snow removal in an effort to attach liability to the out-of-possession landlord.  The court found that the local ordinance did not appear to be applicable as the Plaintiff’s injuries were not sustained as an accumulation of snow and ice but due to the motorized wheelchair encountering a hole near the end of the vehicle ramp. The ordinance at issue appeared to only apply to ice and snow that rendered sidewalks dangerous to pedestrian travel.

It appears that, given the court’s decision on the landlord out of possession issue, it did not reach the open and obvious argument presented by the defense.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney Gerald Connor of the Scranton office of the Margolis Edelstein law firm for bringing this case to my attention.

Source of image:  Photo by Damian McCoig on www.unsplash.com.

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Superior Court Rules That 3 Hour Delay Between End of Snowstorm and Beginning of Cleanup Was Not Unreasonable (Non-Precedential)

It appears that it is reasonable in Pennsylvania to have a cup of coffee or tea and enjoy the sight of a freshly fallen snow before having to go out and shovel.

In its non-precedential decision in the case of Melvin v. Sellani, No. 1234 MDA 2024 (Pa. Super. Dec. 31, 2025 Bowes, J., Stabile, J., and Stevens, P.J.E.) (Mem. Op. by Stabile, J.), the court affirmed the entry of summary judgment in favor of the Defendant landowners and property manager in a slip and fall matter involving ice and/or snow.

The trial court decision entering summary judgment in favor of the Defendants had been entered by Judge Richard M. Hughes, III of the Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas.

Relative to the hills and ridges argument, the court noted that the Plaintiff failed to present evidence to establish when photographs of the scene of the incident were taken. There were conflicting statements as to whether the photos were taken the day of the incident or shortly thereafter. As such, the court noted that the photographs relied upon by the Plaintiff were not sufficient to create any material issues of fact as to whether the Defendants were under a duty to remedy any alleged hills and/or ridges of snow at the time of the incident.

The Superior Court otherwise observed that the Plaintiff failed to establish that an unreasonable of time had passed between the snowstorm and the alleged dangerous accumulation of snow or ice.

By the Plaintiff’s own testimony, it was snowing when she arrived at work at 6:30 in the morning on the day of the fall. The Plaintiff also confirmed that the snow had stopped by 3:00 p.m. when she left work. Three (3) to five (5) inches of snow had accumulated.

It was additionally indicated that the Defendant property manager indicated that he had begun to remove snow at 9:30 a.m. at the Plaintiff’s residence. The Plaintiff confirmed that the property manager was still working at snow removal when the Plaintiff arrived at home.

The court noted that, even if the snow had stopped immediately when the Plaintiff arrived at work earlier that morning, the Plaintiff provided no case law to support an argument “that a 3-hour delay between the cessation of the snow and the beginning of the clean up effort constitute[d] an unreasonable delay.” See Op. at 7.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Source of image:  Photo by Jill Wellington on www.pexels.com.

Civil Trial Stayed Pending Resolution of Companion Criminal Case

In the case of Estate of Dugan v. Hotton, No. 2023-CV-4957 (C.P. Lacka. Co. Jan. 6, 2026 Nealon, J.), the court granted a Defendant’s Motion to Stay a civil jury trial in a wrongful death action arising out of a motor vehicle accident pending the resolution of the Defendant’s companion criminal court proceedings under charges of driving under the influence.

In so ruling, the court reviewed the applicable six-factor balancing test adopted by the Pennsylvania Superior Court in the case of Kessee v. Dougherty, 230 A.3d 1128 (Pa. Super. 2020). After reviewing those 6-factors, the court deemed it appropriate to enter the stay.

Judge Terrence R. Nealon of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas, who decided this issue, handed down a very detailed Opinion outlining the current status of the law in this regard.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Defense counsel in this case is Daniel E. Cummins, Esq.

Source of image: Photo by Cottonbro Studios on www.pexels.com.

Court Allows Claim To Proceed Against UIM Carrier Where UIM Claims Rep Allegedly Interfered With Settlement Negotiations In Third Party Case

In the case of Winner v. Progressive Advanced Ins., No. 2230 EDA 2024 (Pa. Super. Sept. 24, 2025 Panella, P.J.E., Nichols, J., and Ford Elliott, P.J.E.) (Op. by Panella, P.J.E.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court overruled the dismissal of an Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law (UTPCPL) claims that was based on alleged actions of an insurance adjuster who allegedly intentionally interfered with the policyholder’s settlement negotiations in a lawsuit with a third party Defendant.

According to the Opinion, this matter arose out of a car accident.  During the course of the matter, after completing productive settlement negotiations in the third party matter, Plaintiff's counsel contacted the UIM carrier to request that a UIM claim be opened.

Thereafter, the UIM claims representative, without the consent of the carrier's insured or the insured's attorney, contacted the third party defense attorney and informed that defense attorney of a subsequent accident that the Plaintiff had been involved in.  As is turned out, the subsequent accident only involved property damages and no injuries to the insured.

Plaintiff's counsel in this matter alleged that the UIM carrier had allegedly contacted the third party defense attorney in order to persuade that attorney to reduce his settlement offer in the third party case in an attempt to shield the UIM carrier from the UIM claim.  In other words, the Plaintiff asserted that the UIM carrier purposely interfered in the third party matter in an effort to prevent the Plaintiff from recieving UIM benefits.

Based on these facts, the Superior Court overruled the trial court's dismissal of the Plaintiff's UTPCPL claims.

The Superior Court additionally held that the forum selection clause in the policy that applies to any action brought against the insurance company requiring that such action must be brought in a county in which a person seeking benefits resides also applies to bad faith and unfair trade practices claims based on the conduct alleged in this matter.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: “Court Summaries” By Timothy L. Clawges, Pennsylvania Bar News (Oct. 20, 2025).

Source of image:  Photo by Sean Musil on www.unsplash.com.

Not So Fast: Superior Court Quashes Appeal After Finding That Trial Court Order Was Not a Final Order

In the case of Henry v. Colangelo, 2025 Pa. Super. 265 (Pa. Super. Nov. 26, 2025 Kunselman, J., McLaughlin, J., and Lane, J.) (Op. by Kunselman, J.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court quashed an appeal after finding that the Order that the appellant had appealed from was not a final Order.

More specifically, although the trial court had certified an Order granting summary judgment against some but not all of the Defendants in a negligence and wrongful death suit as a final Order and immediately appealable, the Superior Court quashed the appeal after finding that the Order was not final and that an appeal would not facilitate resolution of the entire case.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: “Court Summaries” By Timothy L. Clawges, Pennsylvania Bar News (Dec. 22, 2025).

Court Refers To Required Liberal Construction of Rules in Relieving Pro Se Plaintiff From a Judgment Non Pros

In its non-precedential decision in the case of Morrison v. Pennsylvania State Police, No. 182 C.D. 2024 (Pa. Cmwlth. Dec. 9, 2025 Covey, J., Fizzano Cannon, J., and Wallis, J.) (Op. by Covey, J.) (Op. not reported), the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court ruled that a trial court’s failure to send a Notice of Judgment Non Pros to Plaintiff’s correct address warranted a liberal application of the Rules of Procedure to allow the Plaintiff to amend his Motion to Strike the Judgment of Non Pros in order to allow the Plaintiff to comply with the rules’ requirements.

Based upon this ruling, the appellate court vacated the trial court’s Order and remanded the case for further proceedings.

This matter involved a pro se prisoner Plaintiff.

In so ruling, the appellate court also referred to the liberal construction of the Rules of Civil Procedure that is required by Pa.R.C.P. 126.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this non-precedential decision may click this LINK.


Source: “The Legal Intelligencer State Appellate Case Alert,” www.Law.com (Dec. 23, 2025).

Judge Munley of Federal Middle District Court Addresses Scope of State Created Danger Claims

In the case of T.M. v. East Stroudsburg Area School District, No. 3:24-CV-1465 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 11, 2025 Munley, J.), the court granted in part and denied in part a Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss a personal injury action arising out of allegations that the minor Plaintiff, who was a 6 year old boy with special education needs, allegedly sustained permanent injuries after being allegedly violently beaten by another student on a school bus.

According to the Opinion, the case involved, at a minimum, constitutional claims against the school district and certain school officials, as well as state law claims under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (PSTCA). Included in the claims were state created danger federal claims.

As part of her decision, Judge Julia K. Munley rejected the defense argument that the Plaintiffs were required to allege “affirmative acts” on the part of the state actors to meet the legal standards required to proceed on a claim of a state created danger.

Judge Julia K. Munley
M.D. Pa.

Rather, Judge Munley agreed with the Plaintiff’s argument that an awareness of a risk, coupled with acts of omission or failures to act, could render the Plaintiff more vulnerable to harm. The court therefore held that such circumstances could constitute “affirmative misuse of state authority” sufficient to establish a state created danger claim, assuming the other elements of that cause of action are also met. In so ruling, the court rejected the Defendants’ argument that affirmative action is required to support a claim of a state created danger.

The court also addressed the vehicle exception to governmental immunity under the PSTCA. The court rejected the Defendants’ argument that the Plaintiff’s injury must stem from the actual operation of a vehicle in motion. To the contrary, the court ruled that the exception applies even where a state actor is in actual physical control of the vehicle when the harm occurs, such as even when a parked vehicle is involved. Accordingly, the court ruled that the exception could apply regardless of whether the vehicle was in motion.

Judge Munley additionally rejected the defense argument that pain and suffering damages were not available to the 6 year old minor Plaintiff under the PSTCA. The Defendants argued that the minor’s injuries did not amount to a permanent loss of bodily function or disfigurement. In this case, the Plaintiff sustained a concussion, facial contusions and lacerations, and severe PTSD.

Judge Munley found that such injuries did in fact support a request for pain and suffering damages under the PSTCA.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.  The Court's companion Order can be viewed HERE


I send thanks to Attorney Robert T. Moran of the Moran Law Group, LLC in Scranton, PA for bringing this case to my attention.

Another Appellate Brief Containing AI Hallucinations Found in Pennsylvania

In the case of Assoc. Builders and Contractors, Inc. v. Bucks County Community College, No. 1172 C.D. 2025 (Pa. Cmwlth. Nov. 24, 2025 Cohn Jubelirer, P.J.) (Opinion not reported), the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court refused to allow an attorney to file an Amended Appellate Brief after it was determined that the original Brief filed by that attorney was created using generative artificial intelligence (AI) and was riddled with numerous factual and legal errors.

This matter arose out of an emergency application for a stay in the nature of a preliminary injunction pending appeal. There was an expedited consideration of the appeal by the court. There was also a condensed briefing scheduled issued.

The attorney for the appellee filed an initial Brief. The appellant filed a Reply Brief in which it contended that AI may have been used by the appellee to prepare the initial Brief given that the appellee’s Brief was apparently filled with fake citations, quotes to cases that do not exist and to information in the record that did not exist, and material misrepresentations with respect the record, all of which were described as AI-created hallucinations.

A week later and just two (2) days before the appeal was scheduled to be argued before the court, another attorney for the appellee filed a Motion for Leave to File an Amended Brief. The proposed Amended Brief was noted to be significantly different from the initial Brief of the appellee in both form and substance.

The appellant filed an opposition to the request for permission by the appellee to file an Amended Brief.

The Commonwealth Court confirmed that the appellee’s initial Brief was replete with both factual and legal errors. The court held that granting leave of court for the appellee to file an Amended Brief was “not an option.” The court noted that it would be prejudicial to the appellant to allow the appellee to file what is essentially an entirely new appellate Brief just two (2) days before the argument was scheduled before the en banc appellate court.

The Commonwealth Court also agreed with the argument by the appellant that granting leave under these circumstances would set a poor precedent. As such, the Commonwealth Court denied the application and struck the “AI-ridden” initial Brief. The Commonwealth Court noted that “cannot condone the filing of any legal document that admittedly contained numerous factual legal errors.”

In so ruling, the court noted that the creation of a legal document by way of generative artificial intelligence, in and of itself, is not problematic. However, the court noted that what is problematic is when the document is filed with numerous factual and legal errors and obviously not reviewed and corrected prior to the filing of the document.

In its Opinion, the court referenced a Pennsylvania Federal Court decision addressing similar issues regarding AI hallucinations being found in an filed brief. The court also reviewed the Joint Formal Opinion 2024-200 issued by the Pennsylvania Bar Association Committee on Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility and the Philadelphia Bar Association Professional Guidance Committee which provided guidance on the use of AI for the creation of legal documents.

In its Opinion, the Commonwealth Court noted that it did not “determine or pass judgment on whether any ethical rules were violated” in this case. See Op. at 8. However, with its decision, the court wished “to bring attention to the gravity of the implications of the use of generative AI by attorneys.” See Op. at 8.

In the end, the court denied the application by the appellee to file an Amended Brief.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Court Issues Sanctions When Defense Discloses 600 Pages of Documents on the Eve of Trial

In the case of McCready v. Re/Max Achievers, No. 2:24-CV-02226-JFM (E.D. Pa. Dec. 8, 2025 Murphy, J.), the court addressed a Motion for discovery sanctions against a defense counsel due to the defense counsel’s failure to produce discoverable documentation during the discovery phase of the case. Defense counsel produced 600 pages of the previously undisclosed documentation at issue days before the trial date.

According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff sued the Defendants after he was allegedly placed at an allegedly unlicensed sober home, which allegedly improperly administered his medication, allegedly leading the Plaintiff to suffer a near fatal state of low blood pressure. The Plaintiff also claimed that he was wrongfully evicted from the facility. He sued various Defendants before settling with Re/Max, which was a property manager for the home.

While the Plaintiff asserted that the Defendant at issue should be sanctioned with a default judgment for its late disclosure of relevant evidence, after reviewing the standards applicable to discovery sanctions, the court concluded that an alternative sanction would suffice.

The court awarded attorney’s fees and costs incurred in connection with the discovery issues. The court also prohibited the Defendant from asserting that any negligence found was attributable to parties who had already settled out of the case. The court additionally permitted the Plaintiff to utilize the late-produced documents at trial, but prohibited the culpable Defendant from doing so.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.  The Court's companion Order can be viewed HERE.


Source: Article: “Marshall Dennehey, Re/Max Sanctioned For Delayed Discovery Disclosures Ahead of Trial,” By Riley Brennan of The Legal Intelligencer (Dec. 10, 2025).

Court Rejects Allegations of Fraud Relative to Opposing Counsel Allegedly Meeting Ex Parte With Arbitrator During Lunch Break

In the case of Shannon v. Weis Markets, Inc., No. 1604 MDA 2024 (Pa. Super. Sept. 16, 2025 Panella, P.J.E., Lane, J., and Stevens, P.J.E.) (Op. by Lane, J.), the Superior Court affirmed a trial court’s Order denying a Plaintiff’s Petition to vacate or set aside an Arbitration Award in favor of the Defendant under 42 Pa. C.S. A §7341.

According to the Opinion, this negligence action arose out of a slip and fall in a supermarket. 

After the completion of discovery, the parties agreed to submit the matter to binding Arbitration pursuant to a binding high/low Arbitration pursuant to a written agreement. 

After the Arbitration was completed, the arbitrator determined that the store was not negligent. Consistent with the high/low agreement, the arbitrator entered an award in favor of the Plaintiff in the amount of $75,000.00, which was the low parameter of the high/low agreement. 

Thereafter, the Plaintiff filed a Petition to Vacate or Set Aside the Arbitration Award. The Plaintiff asserted that the arbitrator, Weis’s counsel and a Weis’s corporate representative met privately during a lunch break without the Plaintiff or her counsel present, thereby creating an appearance of “fraud, misconduct, corruption, or other irregularity” resulting in an outcome that was “unjust, inequitable, or unconscionable.”

The trial court denied the Petition and, with this decision, the Superior Court affirmed the denial.

In its Opinion, the Superior Court reaffirmed high burden set by the scope of review relative to an arbitration award.   

In addition to confirming that the Plaintiff never made an inquiry about the alleged meeting and never produced facts to suggest that the arbitrator’s award was influenced by the alleged meeting, the Superior Court held that the mere appearance of impropriety arising from an alleged ex parte contact between an arbitrator and one party’s counsel’s representative, without clear, precise, and indubitable evidence of misconduct or resulting prejudice, is insufficient to support the vacation of a common law Arbitration Award under §7341.

The court additionally noted that the award itself was not inequitable since the Plaintiff received $75,000.00 under the high/low agreement even though the arbitrator found that the store was not negligent.

The Superior Court otherwise found that the Plaintiff had waived the argument that the trial court had abused its discretion by not developing a factual record before entering its decision denying the Petition to Vacate. The appellate court noted that the trial court’s local rules allowed the trial court the discretion to determine whether to issue a Rule to Show Cause based upon the sufficiency of the allegations. The appellate court noted that, since the Plaintiff’s allegations were insufficient, the record did not need further development for a proper decision.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: The Legal Intelligencer State Appellate Case Alert, www.Law.com (Sept. 30, 2025).

Source of image:  Photo by Rebrand Cities on www.pexels.com.

Effort To Dismiss Case Due To Service of Process Issues Fails Procedurally and Substantively

In the case of Howey v. O’Leary, No. 2024-CV-5227 (C.P. Lacka. Co. Dec. 15, 2025 Nealon, J.), Judge Terrence R. Nealon of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas denied a Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings based upon service of process issues. According to the Opinion, this matter arose out of a motor vehicle accident.

In the Complaint, the Plaintiff alleged that the Defendant resided at a certain address. The Sheriff’s Department served the Complaint on the Defendant’s father at the address pled in the Plaintiff’s Complaint.

Thereafter, the Defendant did not file any Preliminary Objections asserting improper service of a Complaint. Nor did the Defendant file a responsive pleading raising the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense under Pa. R.C.P. 1030(a).

Rather, before the pleadings were closed, the Defendant filed a Motion for Judgment on the pleadings in which she asserted that she did not reside at the address pled in the Complaint when the Complaint was served.

In response, the Plaintiff asserted that the Defendant’s address was identified on the Defendant’s driver’s license, vehicle registration, and insurance paperwork as being the correct address. 

Judge Terrence R. Nealon
Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas

In addresssing the matter before him, Judge Nealon initially noted that Pennsylvania law requires that any alleged defects in service of process must be raised by way of Preliminary Objections. The court additionally noted that a party who fails to object to service of process by way of Preliminary Objections waives the issue. As such, the court found that the Defendant waived the issues regarding service of process by proceeding with a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.

Judge Nealon went on to note that, even if the Defendant’s claim of a failure to complete proper service of process was considered, the defense's request for relief would be denied in any event.

First of all, the court noted that the pleadings were not closed and, as such, the filing of a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings was improper. 

The court additionally noted that the Defendant failed to satisfy the standard of review of showing that there were no disputed issues of fact and that the Defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Here, there was as dispute between the parties as to where the Defendant resided.

For all of these reasons, the court denied the Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and directed that the Defendant file a responsive pleading to the Complaint.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.

Superior Court Affirms Trial Court's Dismissal of Lawsuit on Service of Process Grounds

In its non-precedential decision in the case of Vargas v. United Modular Enterprises, No. 396 EDA 2025 (Pa. Super. Nov. 13, 2025 McLauglin, J., Murray, J., and Ford Elliot, P.J.E.,) (Op. by McLauglin, J.) (unpublished), the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the trial court’s sustaining of Preliminary Objections after finding that the trial court properly dismissed Complaint as time barred under Lamp v. Heyman service of process grounds.

According to the record before the court, the Plaintiff did not make any attempts at service until about five (5) months after the statute of limitations had run. The court reaffirmed the rule of law that a Defendant’s notice of the action does not matter in the absence of any attempt at service of process. In other words, the court reaffirmed that notice of the lawsuit on the part of the Defendant does not excuse the failure to complete proper service of process.

The court additionally noted that the Plaintiff’s successful motion for alternative service did not conflict with the subsequent granting of the trial court of the Lamp v. Heyman Preliminary Objections for purposes of the coordinate jurisdiction rule given that the Motions at issue differed in kind.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney James Beck of the Philadelphia office of the Reed Smith law firm for bringing this case to my attention.

Source of image:  Photo by Nihar Manzalli on www.pexels.com.