What Constitues Recklessness in Terms of Operators of Emergency Vehicles?

In the case of Piotrowski v. Department of Health, No. 1232 C.D. 2023 (Pa. Cmwlth. Oct 24, 2024 Ceisler, J., Dumas, J., and Leavitt, S.J.) (Op. by Leavitt, S.J.), the court reviewed any Petition for an Adjudication of the Department of Health that suspended the Petitioner’s license as an emergency medical services provider for operating an ambulance in a reckless manner.

Relative to the suspension, the health department rejected the proposed adjudication of its hearing officer that the Petitioner’s operation of an ambulance en route to an emergency in excess of the posted speed limit did not, ipso facto, constitute reckless conduct.

At issue on appeal was the interpretation and application of the term “reckless” as set forth in §8121(a)(6) of the Emergency Medical Services System Act (EMS Act), 35 Pa. C.S.A. §8121(a)(6).

After a review of the matter, the Commonwealth Court reversed the health department’s adjudication.

In its Opinion, the Commonwealth Court began with a review of the Vehicle Code, which, under 75 Pa. C.S.A. §3105, grants special privileges to drivers of emergency vehicles responding to an emergency call.

The court also referred to the other provisions of the Vehicle Code that relate to vehicle speed and safety. The court noted that 75 Pa. C.S.A. §3736 prohibits reckless driving.

The court then turned to the EMS Act and noted that the Act sets forth numerous grounds for the suspension or revocation of an EMS provider’s certification. Under 35 Pa. C.S.A. §8121(a)(6), the Department of Health is authorized to discipline an EMS provider relative to the “operation of an emergency vehicle in a reckless manner….”

In this case, the Petitioner was charged with operating his ambulance in a reckless manner.

The issue before the court centered over a proper definition for the word “reckless” in this context.

The court turned to the rules of statutory construction. The court noted that the word “reckless” is not defined in the EMS Act. This allowed the court to consider dictionary sources. The court also referred to the Restatement (Second) of Torts for guidance.

In the end, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court held that “for a person’s conduct to be reckless,” there must be “conscious” or “deliberate” indifference to the risk of causing harm to others. In this regard, the court cited to Black’s Law Dictionary.

In this case, the court noted that the hearing officer improperly construed reckless as careless, which only implicated absent-mindedness or negligence and overlooked the conscious or deliberate intent required in order to prove recklessness as a matter of law.

Turning the facts of the case, the Petitioner was arguing that the deputy secretary erred in concluding that he violated the EMS Act.

The court noted that the evidence showed that the Petitioner drove the ambulance in excess of the posted speed limit. However, the Petitioner also noted that he was on his way to an emergency with his lights and sirens activated. There is also evidence that the ambulance crew was responding to a call of a drug overdose, making time of the essence.

The Commonwealth Court noted that there was no evidence presented that the Petitioner’s excessive speed made the accident highly probable. Rather, relative to the underlying accident at issue, the court noted that it was the decedent’s failure to stop at a posted stop sign that caused the accident.

In the end, the court noted that exceeding the speed limit alone cannot be said to be reckless conduct in this context. Finding that the Petitioner’s actions in this case did not rise to the level of recklessness, but rather showed care for the safety of others, including a victim of a drug overdose, the court found that the health department did not establish that the Petitioner had violated the EMS Act.

It is noted, however, that, although the court found that the ambulance driver did not exhibit recklessness in driving over the speed limit in the context of this case, in footnote 12 of the Opinion on page 21 of the Opinion, the court noted that there may be cases where the rate of speed of an ambulance could constitute recklessness. 

The court noted that an example of an ambulance crew driving an ambulance over the speed limit with the lights and sirens activated in order to get to a party, as opposed to a dispatch emergency, could constitute a violation of the EMS Act. 

In that footnote, the court also noted that an accident, or lack thereof, is not required to prove or disprove recklessness.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney Joseph T. Healey of the Kingston, PA office of Burns White for bringing this case to my attention.

Source of image:  Photo by Camilo Jiminez on www.unsplash.com.

Superior Court Addresses Law of Liability for Ambulance Crew Members

In the case of Lamarr-Murphy v. Del. Co. Mem. Hosp., No. 1846 EDA 2021 (Pa. Super. Dec. 20, 2023 McCaffery, J., Lazarus, J., and Murray, J.) (Op. by McCaffery, J.), the court affirmed the trial court’s denial of post-trial motions in a case involving emergency medical services rendered to the Plaintiff's decedent.

The decedent, who was only 39 at the time of his death, had a history of gout, blood clots, and deep vein thrombosis.  On the day in question, he passed out at home and an ambulance was summoned.  The Plaintiffs alleged negligence with respect to how the ambulance crew handled their interaction with the decedent at his home and during the transport to the hospital.  In addition to having issues with the medical treatment provided to the decedent by the EMS crew, the Plaintiffs also asserted that the ambulance crew was negligent for taking a different route to the hospital that the family would have taken and for stopping at red lights and stop signs.

Along the way to the hospital, the Plaintiff's decedent went into cardiac arrest and the ambulance was stopped so that the crew could administer CPR and provide other treatment measures.

Overall, 39-40 minutes had passed between the time the ambulance left the decedent's home and the time it arrived at the hospital.  The decedent was pronounced dead on arrival.

During the course of this litigation, the ambulance company defendants asserted that it was immune from liability under the Good Samaritan Act.  The trial court ruled that the Act applied and that, therefore, at trial, the Plaintiffs would have to prove gross negligence to prevail on the claims presented.  A mixed verdict resulted at trial and this appeal followed.   

The Superior Court noted that the exclusion in the emergency responder statute for “hospital emergency facilities” was meant to exclude on-site emergency rooms, not hospital ambulance services, from liability.  The appellate court otherwise noted that an emergency provider is granted immunity under the statute unless that individual’s actions amount to intentional harm or gross negligence with respect to the injured party.

The Superior Court also held that the choice of route or the use of sirens by an ambulance crew does not rise to the level of gross negligence.

The court otherwise noted that an ambulance driver’s compliance with traffic laws also does not amount to a breach of duty to a healthy passenger that could serve to support the passenger’s claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress based upon an injury to a relative located within the ambulance.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney James M. Beck of the Reed Smith law firm in Philadelphia for bringing this case to my attention.

Source of image:  Photo by Erik McLean on www.unsplash.com.

Summary Judgment In Favor of Ambulance Company Upheld [Non-Precedential]

In the non-precedential decision in the case of Fry v. Montrose Minute Men, Inc., No. 50-MDA-2022 (Pa. Super. July 28, 2023 Dubow, J., McLaughlin, J., and Collins, J.) (Op. by Collins, J.) [non-precedential], the Pennsylvania Superior Court sustained the entry of summary judgment entered in favor of a Defendant ambulance company in a case in which a Plaintiff alleged negligence and gross negligence against the ambulance crew members after the Plaintiff decedent passed away. 

The appellate court confirmed the lower court’s decision that the Defendant employees, acting in their capacities as a paramedics and EMTs did not demonstrate gross negligence or willful misconduct. As such, those employees, and by extension, the ambulance crew company, were absolved of any potential liability given the language of the Emergency Medical Services System Act (EMSSA), 35 Pa. C.S.A. §8101, et. seq.

Under the EMSSA it is provided that “[n]o EMS agency, EMS agency medical director or EMS provider who in good faith attempts to render or facilitate emergency medical care authorized by this chapter shall be liable for civil damages as a result of an act or omission, absent a showing of gross negligence or willful misconduct.”

As noted, the appellate court affirmed the entry of summary judgment in favor of the Defendants.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


I send thanks to Attorney Ryan McBride of the Scranton office of Weber Gallagher for bringing this case to my attention.

Court Addresses Liability of EMTs/Ambulance Crew Members

In the case of Balderach v. Pennsylvania Medical Transport, Inc., No. 30007 of 2016, C.A. (C.P. Lawr. Co. Nov. 5, 2022 Cox, J.), the court denied a Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment in a medical malpractice case.

The court noted that, while the Pennsylvania Emergency Medical Services Systems Act provides that emergency medical services providers are immune from suit unless the claimant establishes gross negligence or willful misconduct, the Plaintiff’s evidence in this matter, which included two (2) medical expert reports, served to raise genuine issues of material fact on the question of whether the Defendants acted with gross negligence in treating the decedent during a cardiac event.

The court pointed to the record that the Plaintiff’s experts asserted that the two (2) EMTs involved were allegedly grossly negligent in their attempts to resuscitate the decedent. One of the experts also asserted that the EMTs should have transported the decedent to a closer medical facility.

Anyone wishing to review a copy of this decision may click this LINK.


Source: “Digest of Recent Opinions.” Pennsylvania Law Weekly (Nov. 23, 2022).

Limited Tort Motion for Summary Judgment Denied in Lawrence County

In the Lawrence County case of Mason v. Petrone, No. 11084-CV-2016 (C.P. Lawrence Co. May 17, 2018 Motto, P.J.), President Judge Dominick Motto of the Lawrence County Court of Common Pleas denied a limited tort Motion for Summary Judgment.   In this regard, the court ruled that there were issues of fact that were best left for a jury to determine.  

The court additionally ruled that the Plaintiff was not barred from seeking damages for pain and suffering under the Tort Claims Act on the basis that she allegedly did not have evidence of a permanent injury.  In this regard, the court again noted that issues of fact remain and also emphasized that the expert reports were not yet due in the case.  

This matter arose out of a motor vehicle accident during which the Plaintiff struck by an operator who was responding to an emergency at the time of the accident.  

Among other injuries, the Plaintiff suffered a fractured ankle and bruising along the right side of her back. The Plaintiff primarily treated with an orthopedic surgeon and underwent physical therapy.  

After reviewing the settled law pertaining to the need of a Plaintiff to prove a permanent injury in a case against a government agency, as well as the current status of limited tort law in Pennsylvania, the court denied the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment in these respects.

Anyone wishing to read this case may click this LINK.

I send thanks to Attorney Garth Gartin, Esquire of the Pittsburgh office of Simon and Simon, P.C. for bringing this case to my attention.